The State Of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs Ajodhya Prasad

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 270 of 1959

Decision Date: 25 November, 1960

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.R. Mudholkar

In this matter the Court recorded that the case was titled The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others versus Ajodhya Prasad and that the judgment was delivered on 25 November 1960 by a Bench consisting of Justices P B Gajendragadkar, A K Sarkar, K N Wanchoo, J R Mudholkar and Subbarao. The citation of the decision appeared as 1961 AIR 751 and 1961 SCR (2) 679 along with numerous references to subsequent reports. The petitioner was the State of Uttar Pradesh together with other respondents, while the respondent was Ajodhya Prasad, a police officer. The factual background disclosed that the respondent had been posted as the officer in charge of a police station when the District Magistrate received complaints alleging that the respondent was receiving bribes. Following those complaints the District Magistrate ordered an enquiry to be conducted by the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate. The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate prepared a report, which the District Magistrate endorsed and forwarded to the Superintendent of Police.

The Court noted that after the enquiry the respondent was placed on two‑month leave and was reverted to his substantive rank of Head Constable. Subsequently he was promoted to the rank of officiating Sub‑Inspector and transferred to another police station. Later, additional complaints were lodged, prompting a further investigation that concluded the respondent was a habitual taker of bribes. On the basis of that investigation the respondent was charged with nine offences of bribery under section 7 of the Police Act, 1861. A departmental trial was then held, and the Superintendent of Police dismissed the respondent from service.

Aggrieved by the dismissal, the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the order on the ground that the offences charged were cognizable and therefore the Superintendent of Police lacked jurisdiction to conduct a departmental trial without first complying with paragraph 486(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations. The High Court accepted this contention and set aside the dismissal order.

The Supreme Court, after consideration, held—by the judgment of Justices Sarkar, Subbarao and Mudholkar—that the subject matter of the magisterial enquiry and the subsequent departmental trial was substantially the same, rendering the departmental trial valid. The Court further observed that the interval between the magisterial enquiry and the departmental trial did not affect the validity of the trial. It was decided that paragraph 486 did not apply where a magisterial enquiry had been ordered, and a police officer could still be tried departmentally under section 7 of the Police Act after such an enquiry. The Court also concluded, on the views of Justices Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, that paragraph 486 was merely directory; therefore, non‑compliance with it did not invalidate the order of dismissal.

The Court observed that the lapse of time between the magisterial enquiry and the departmental trial did not alter the issues before it. It held that paragraph 486 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations was inapplicable where a magisterial enquiry had been ordered and the officer could subsequently be tried under section 7 of the Police Act after that enquiry. The Court further noted, relying on the opinions of Justices Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, that the provisions of paragraph 486 were merely directory in nature and that even a failure to comply with them did not render the dismissal order invalid. The judgment was issued in civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 270 of 1959, filed by special leave against the order dated 23 December 1957 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, in Civil Miscellaneous Application (O.J.) No. 86 of 1954. Counsel for the appellants comprised C. B. Aggarwala, G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, while counsel for the respondent included Achhru Ram, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra. The judgment was delivered on 25 November 1960; the opinion of Justices Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudholkar was read by Justice Subba Rao, and the opinion of Justices Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo was read by Justice Wanchoo. Justice Subba Rao explained that the appeal sought special leave to challenge the High Court’s decision to allow the respondent’s petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution, and set out the factual background in brief.

The factual matrix began with the appointment of the respondent as a constable in the Uttar Pradesh Police Force in 1933. He was promoted to head constable on 1 December 1945 and, in May 1952, was assigned as officer‑in‑charge of the police station at Intiathok in Gonda district. Subsequent to his posting, the District Magistrate of Gonda received complaints alleging that the respondent was accepting bribes while performing his duties. Acting on those complaints, the District Magistrate on 16 September 1952 directed the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate to conduct an enquiry. The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate completed the enquiry and, on 3 November 1952, submitted a report to the District Magistrate recommending that the respondent be transferred to another station. On 17 November 1952, the District Magistrate forwarded an endorsement to the Superintendent of Police stating that the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate had found substantial allegations against the respondent’s integrity, that the respondent’s general reputation for integrity was poor, but that any transfer should be deferred and that his work should be closely monitored in the interim. The respondent was asked by the Superintendent of Police to provide an explanation for his conduct, which he did on 29 November 1952. On 17 December 1952, the respondent was placed on a compulsory two‑month leave. Before the leave ended, he was restored to his substantive position as head constable and transferred to Sitapur. He was subsequently promoted to the rank of officiating Sub‑Inspector on 17 February 1953 and posted as Station Officer at Sidholi. The record notes that on 27 February 1953 the Superintendent of Police made a further endorsement, the details of which continue in the subsequent portion of the judgment.

The Superintendent of Police entered an endorsement in the respondent’s character roll, stating that he was “a strong officer with plenty of push in him and met with a strong opposition in this new charge. Crime control was very good but complaints of corruption were received which could not be substantiated. Integrity certified.” Subsequently, the Central Investigation Department received further complaints and conducted a deeper probe. On 26 July 1953, the Superintendent of Police, Investigation Branch, C.I.D., reported that the respondent was a habitual bribetaker. Two days later, on 28 July 1953, the respondent was placed under suspension. On 18 August 1953, he was formally charged under section 7 of the Police Act for remissness in the discharge of his duty and for being unfit for service. The charge alleged that, while serving as Station Officer at the Police Station, Intiathok, he had been guilty of dishonesty, corruption and misbehaviour, specifically that on nine occasions he had accepted bribes, the particulars of which were listed in the charge. It is noted that a magisterial inquiry related to seven of those nine alleged offences.

The trial of the charges was conducted by the Superintendent of Police, who also received the respondent’s written explanation on 12 September 1953. During the trial, the Superintendent examined numerous witnesses and concluded that seven of the nine charges were proven. Following this finding, he issued a notice to the respondent requiring him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from the police force. The respondent filed his explanation on 20 February 1954. By order dated 22 February 1954, the Superintendent dismissed the respondent from service, effective from that date. The respondent appealed this dismissal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, but the appeal was rejected by an order dated 2 June 1954. Thereafter, on 5 August 1954, the respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, seeking to set aside the dismissal order. Before the High Court, three main points were raised: first, that because the respondent was officiating as Sub‑Inspector of Police at the time of the departmental trial, the Superintendent lacked authority to dismiss him, as such power could only be exercised by an officer senior to a Superintendent; second, that the trial suffered from serious procedural irregularities; and third, that the specific acts alleged against the respondent were cognizable offences, and therefore the Superintendent could not proceed with a departmental trial without complying with sub‑paragraph (1) of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations. The High Court held that the respondent had indeed been charged with cognizable offences, bringing sub‑paragraph (1) of paragraph 486 into operation. Since no case, as required by that sub‑paragraph, had been registered against the respondent at the police station, the Court concluded that the dismissal order was invalid. The Court further observed that the case did not fall within the first proviso to sub‑paragraph (1) of paragraph 486, as the information about the alleged offences was not initially received by a Magistrate and forwarded to the police for inquiry. Consequently, the High Court issued a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned dismissal orders.

The Court observed that sub‑paragraph (1) of paragraph 486 did not apply because, in its view, the information concerning the alleged offences had not initially been received by a Magistrate and consequently not been sent to the police for inquiry. Because of this finding, the Court considered it unnecessary to comment on any of the other arguments that had been presented on behalf of the respondent. Accordingly, the Court issued a writ of certiorari that set aside the orders that had been challenged, and that decision gave rise to the present appeal. Counsel appearing for the appellants put forward four separate points. The first point contended that the Governor exercised his pleasure through the Superintendent of Police and that, since the Police Regulations were merely administrative directions, any failure to comply with them could not affect the validity of the dismissal order. The second point argued that, even if the dismissal order was made under the statutory authority of the Superintendent of Police, the regulations prescribing an investigation under chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code were only directory, and because no prejudice was caused to the respondent, non‑compliance with those regulations should not invalidate the dismissal. The third point maintained that the Superintendent of Police was empowered to follow the alternative procedure set out in sub‑paragraph (3) of paragraph 486, and therefore an inquiry conducted without observing the procedure prescribed by rule I could not be considered defective. The fourth point asserted that, because a magisterial inquiry had been held concerning practically all of the charges that formed the subject‑matter of the departmental trial, the case fell outside the scope of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations. The Court noted that in the earlier decision of The State of U. P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya the first three submissions had already been examined and rejected for the reasons explained in that judgment, and that the appellants now needed to succeed only on the fourth submission.

From the material already placed on record, it emerged that the conduct of the respondent while he was the officer in charge of the Intiathok police station had been the subject of a magisterial inquiry, a matter also referred to in Civil Appeal No. 119 of 1950; [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679. The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate conducted an inquiry into seven of the charges that later formed the basis of the departmental trial and forwarded a report of that inquiry to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate endorsed the report and communicated it to the Superintendent of Police, recommending that the respondent be transferred and that his work be closely monitored in the interim. Although the Superintendent initially issued a favorable certificate in respect of the respondent, a further investigation was ordered through the Central Investigation Department. Following that investigation, the Superintendent of Police proceeded to conduct a departmental trial covering the same seven charges as well as two additional charges of a similar nature. The departmental trial concluded with the respondent’s dismissal from service. In these circumstances, the Court noted that it would be overly technical to hold that …

It was observed that no magisterial inquiry had been conducted with respect to the issue that later formed the basis of the departmental trial. The Court held that the departmental inquiry represented only an additional step addressing the misconduct of the respondent, for which a magisterial inquiry had already been held at an earlier stage. Consequently, the Court was required to determine whether the provisions of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations applied to the present inquiry or whether the matter fell outside the scope of that provision. Paragraph 486 provides that when an offence alleged against a police officer is punishable solely under section 7 of the Police Act, a magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be ordered, and in such circumstances an inquiry shall be made under the direction of the Superintendent of Police in accordance with specified rules. Paragraph 489, on the other hand, stipulates that a police officer may be tried departmentally under section 7 of the Police Act after (i) a judicial trial, (ii) a magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code, or (iii) a police investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code or a departmental enquiry under paragraph 486. A combined reading of these provisions indicated that paragraph 486 does not apply where a magisterial inquiry has been ordered, and that a departmental trial may lawfully proceed after a magisterial inquiry. In the case at hand, the departmental trial was held after the completion of the magisterial inquiry and therefore fell squarely within the express terms of paragraph 489(2). The Court noted that intervening complaints to the police or further investigations by the CID did not alter the analysis, provided that the substantive subject‑matter of the magisterial inquiry and the departmental trial remained essentially the same. Having found that the two proceedings dealt with substantially the same allegations, the Court concluded that the departmental trial was validly conducted. Accordingly, the order of the High Court was set aside. The Court further observed that the High Court had not expressed its opinion on the other questions raised before it, and therefore remanded the matter to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The costs of the appeal were directed to follow the result. Justice Wanchoo, after reviewing the judgment delivered by Justice Subba Rao, expressed agreement with the proposed order and affirmed that his reasons were the same as those given in Civil Appeal 119 of 1959, The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya. The appeal was allowed and the case was remanded.