The State of Madhya Pradesh vs The Gwalior Sugar Co., Ltd.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 30 November, 1960

Coram: B.P. Sinha, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar

The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a petition against the Gwalior Sugar Co., Ltd. and other respondents, and the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 30 November 1960. The bench consisted of Justices B. P. Sinha, S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J. R. Mudholkar, and the case concerned the constitutional validity of a cess‑levy imposed on sugar cane under Article 14, Article 265 and Article 373 of the Constitution of India. The factual background was that, to place the sugar industry on a stable footing and to develop the cane area, the Ruler of the former Gwalior State issued an order dated 27 July 1946 authorising the levy of a cess of one anna per maund on all sugar cane purchased by the respondent company. When the Government of Madhya Bharat, the successor to the Gwalior State, later demanded payment of the cess, the respondent filed a petition before the High Court of Madhya Bharat challenging the legality of the levy on two grounds. First, it argued that the 27 July 1946 order was merely an executive direction and not a law within the meaning of Article 265; consequently, after 26 January 1950 there was no authority to impose the cess. Second, it contended that the levy was discriminatory and violated Article 14 because, while the respondent was made to pay the cess, other sugar factories in the State were exempt. The Court observed that at the time the cess was first imposed there was no sugar factory in the Gwalion State other than the respondent’s. The Court held that the Ruler of an Indian State functioned as an absolute monarch, possessing the powers of the legislature, judiciary and executive, and therefore his order of 27 July 1946 constituted a law enacted by him and became an existing law under Article 372. Accordingly, the levy was authorised by law within the meaning of Article 265, following the precedent set in Madhaorao Phalke v. State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 957. The Court further held that the cess did not contravene Article 14 because its purpose was the development of cane in a specific geographical area and such classification based on historical factors was permissible; moreover, a tax cannot be struck down as discriminatory unless it is shown that it was imposed with a deliberate intention to differentiate. The judgment also noted that, as a matter of administrative procedure, where an order is passed by the Sub‑divisional Animal Husbandry Officer under sub‑rule (5) to the District Animal Husbandry Officer, or where the authority prescribed under sub‑rule (1) passes an order to the Sub‑divisional Officer, the appeal shall not be decided against the appellant unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

The Court noted that the procedural rule required that an appeal could be directed to the Sub‑divisional Animal Husbandry Officer; if that officer was not the appropriate authority, the appeal should be made to the District Animal Husbandry Officer. Moreover, the rule stipulated that an appeal could not be decided against the appellant unless the appellant had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The petitioners put forward the argument that they belonged to the caste called “Kassais” and that their livelihood consisted exclusively of slaughtering cattle, whereas goats and sheep were slaughtered by persons identified as “Chiks”. They asserted that they possessed a fundamental right to carry on their profession and trade, and that Section 3 of the Act, read together with Rule 3, imposed unreasonable restrictions that were not in the interest of the general public. Consequently, they claimed that these restrictions could not be justified by clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court observed that some of these contentions had been examined earlier in Md. Hanif Quareshi v. The State of Bihar, where it was held that the test of reasonableness must be applied to each specific statute that is challenged and that no single abstract standard of reasonableness could be prescribed for all cases. The Court also referred to the decision in State of Madras v. V. G. Row, recalling the statement that “the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict.” Another consideration, the Court said, was that “the legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community, by whose suffrage it comes into existence…”, citing The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga. However, the Court emphasized that the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of the law rested with the judiciary and that the Court must not evade the solemn duty assigned by the Constitution. Applying the principles laid down by the Court, the most pertinent question was whether the age limit of twenty‑five years prescribed in Section 3 represented a reasonable restriction on the petitioners’ right in the interests of the general public. The Court was unable to reach a conclusion that the limit was reasonable. In addition to the affidavits submitted by both the petitioners and the State, the Court considered a large volume of authoritative and expert evidence showing conclusively that a bull, bullock or she‑buffalo ceased to be useful after fourteen or fifteen years, and that only a few specimens reached the age of twenty‑five. The Report of the Cattle Preservation and Development Committee, issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, recommended that animals over fourteen years of age and unfit for work, as well as animals of any age permanently incapable of work because of injury or deformity, should be permitted to be slaughtered.

In the Report on the Marketing of Meat in India, issued by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, a draft Bill was cited on page one‑twelve that permitted the slaughter of animals older than fourteen years and unfit for work, provided a veterinary officer issued a certificate authorising such slaughter. The same Ministry’s Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India contained a passage describing how the market price of draught animals varied with age. It explained that very young draught animals up to four years old, being raw and untrained, fetched comparatively low prices; animals between four and eight years were regarded as being in the prime of their youth, offering the best service and therefore commanding the highest prices; and from the eighth year onward, the effects of old age began to reduce their capacity to work, leading to a marked depreciation in price.

A study published by the Food and Agricultural Organisation on cattle in India and Pakistan, titled Zebu Cattle of India and Pakistan (page ninety‑four), estimated that the active breeding life of a bull was about ten years. Black’s Veterinary Dictionary, fifth edition edited by W. C. Miller and G. P. West, stated that pedigree bulls might reach twelve or fourteen years before being discarded, while cattle in general seldom lived beyond fifteen or sixteen years, and when they did, their age was of little practical significance. A separate Ministry of Agriculture publication called Problems of Cattle Insurance under Indian conditions noted that the lifespan of cattle was comparatively short, with a maximum age of roughly fifteen years.

Another Ministry publication, Cattle Development in Uttar Pradesh by R. L. Kaura, Director of Animal Husbandry, presented a chart for determining the age of cattle based on dental characteristics. The chart indicated that at two years incisors appeared smaller because of wear, that at twelve years a space emerged between the teeth, and that after twelve years the teeth continued to wear and the roots remained widely spaced.

Contrary to this body of expert opinion, the respondent State relied on a chart prepared by Major A. C. Aggarwala, Director of Veterinary Services, Punjab, and R. R. Gulati, Superintendent, Veterinary Department, Jullandur. That chart showed the sterility age of a buffalo at fifteen years with an average lifespan of twenty‑five years, and the sterility age of a cow at fifteen years with an average lifespan of twenty‑two years.

The Court, exercising original jurisdiction, concluded that the overwhelming consensus among experts was that after fifteen years bulls, bullocks and buffaloes ceased to be useful for breeding, draught or other purposes. The Court observed that any residual utility remaining after that age was far outweighed by the economic disadvantages of feeding and maintaining cattle that were no longer serviceable, disadvantages that had been previously highlighted.

In the earlier judgment of Md. Hanif Quareshi (1), the Court examined the effect of Section 3 of the Bihar Act, which had raised the permissible age for bulls, bullocks and she‑buffaloes to twenty‑five years. The Court held that this increase imposed an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ fundamental right. The restriction could not be said to serve the interests of the general public, and consequently the provision was declared void. The Court reiterated the principle it had stated in Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1), observing that the expression “reasonable restriction” requires that any limitation on a constitutional right must not be arbitrary or excessive and must be justified by public interest. The Court explained that “reasonable” entails careful and deliberate consideration, and that legislation which arbitrarily or excessively infringes a right fails to meet the requirement of reasonableness. Such legislation must strike an appropriate balance between the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by Clause (6) of Article 19; otherwise it lacks the quality of reasonableness.

The petitioners raised specific grievances concerning Rule 3 of the Act. Under this rule, the authority authorized to issue a slaughter certificate consisted of two officers: the Veterinary Officer and either the Chairman or the Chief Officer of a District Board, Municipality or similar body. Both officers had to agree before a certificate could be issued. The petitioners argued that the Chairman or Chief Officer would typically be a layperson lacking the technical expertise to assess the age or utility of the cattle. Consequently, an animal for which a certificate was sought might have to be presented separately to the Veterinary Officer and to the Chairman or Chief Officer, who might be located at different places. If the two officers disagreed, the matter would be referred to the Sub‑Divisional Animal Husbandry Officer. The petitioners contended that this procedure would entail considerable expense and delay, making it impractical to obtain a certificate or to proceed with slaughter even after a certificate was granted. They noted that animals older than fifteen years or those that had become unserviceable usually commanded a lower market price than younger, productive animals, and that the cost of complying with the procedure prescribed by Rule 3 would force them to abandon their trade.

Regarding the right of appeal from an order refusing a slaughter certificate, the petitioners argued that the appeal was merely illusory in practice. They explained that appealing would require taking the animal to the Deputy Director of Animal Husbandry, the District Animal Husbandry Officer, or the Sub‑Divisional Animal Husbandry Officer, as appropriate, and then maintaining and feeding the animal throughout the appellate process and its hearing. Citing the decisions in Md. Hanif Quareshi (1) and in the earlier case reported at [1950] S.C.R. 759, 763, the petitioners emphasized that the expenses and logistical burdens associated with such an appeal would exceed the value of the animal itself.

The Court observed that keeping the animal during the appeal and feeding it would cost more than the animal’s own value. It found that the petitioners’ complaints were genuine and, when viewed from a practical standpoint, the requirements of rule three placed excessive limitations on the petitioners’ rights. The Court questioned why a Veterinary Officer, who possesses the necessary technical expertise, could not be relied upon to issue the required certificate, and why a complex procedure involving a possible disagreement between two officers—and a still costlier appeal—should be required. Consequently, the Court held that rule three was unacceptable to the extent that it imposed the disproportionate restrictions described, thereby infringing on the petitioners’ entitlement.

The Court then turned its attention to the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter (Amendment) Act, 1958. It noted that following the decision in Md. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, an ordinance titled the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958, was enacted, later repealed, and replaced by the present Act. The petitioners contended that the original Bill had set the age limit for prohibited slaughter at fifteen years, but that the Select Committee had raised this limit to twenty years. For the sake of clarity, the Court chose not to reproduce the entire Act, as doing so would be overly lengthy; instead, it reproduced only the portions of Section 3 directly relevant to the dispute. Section 3(1) prohibits any person from slaughtering, causing to be slaughtered, or offering for slaughter a bull or bullock unless a written certificate, issued by the competent authority of the area where the slaughter is to occur, certifies that the animal is fit for slaughter. Section 3(2) provides that an animal for which a certificate has been issued may be slaughtered only at the place specified in the certificate and only within twenty days of the certificate’s issuance. Section 3(3) requires the competent authority to issue a certificate only after recording in writing that the animal is over twenty years of age and, in the case of a bull, has become permanently unfit for breeding, or, in the case of a bullock, has become permanently unfit for draught or any agricultural work, provided that such permanent unfitness was not caused deliberately. Section 4 mandates that the competent authority record its order, whether granting or refusing the certificate, in writing, and that any aggrieved person may thereafter seek redress as provided by the statute.

The statute provides that any person aggrieved by the order of the competent authority may, within twenty days of the date of the order, appeal to the State Government, which may pass such orders as it deems fit. The same section further empowers the State Government to call for and examine the record of any case at any time, in order to satisfy itself of the legality or propriety of the action taken. After examining the record, the State Government may pass any orders it considers appropriate. The provision also states that any action taken under this section shall be final and conclusive, and shall not be called into question, subject to the other provisions contained therein. The petitioners argued that Section 3 of the Act imposed several unreasonable restrictions on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks. First, they contended that the statutory age limit of twenty years for bulls or bullocks was excessively high. The Court had previously examined a similar provision in the Bihar Act and had reached conclusions that applied equally to the Uttar Pradesh Act. According to the Eighth Livestock Census of 1956, Uttar Pradesh recorded 126,201 bulls and bullocks aged over three years that were not used for breeding or work, compared with 162,746 in 1951. The Municipal Manual of Uttar Pradesh, Volume 1, directed that bullocks and male buffaloes in good health and below ten years of age should be included for slaughter. Second, the petitioners pointed out that the provision imposed a double restriction, requiring the animal both to be over twenty years old and to be permanently unfit and unserviceable. In the case of a bullock, the statute demanded unfitness for any kind of agricultural operation, not merely for draught purposes. Consequently, even if an animal became permanently unserviceable at an earlier age, it could not be slaughtered unless it had reached the twenty‑year threshold. Thus, before a certificate could be issued, the animal had to satisfy two conditions: the age requirement and the condition of permanent unfitness. The petitioners maintained that this dual requirement was demonstrably unreasonable. In Md. Hanif Quareshi’s case (1), the Court had previously observed that a total ban on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks after they ceased to be capable of breeding. The Court further held that such a blanket prohibition was not in the public interest when the animals were no longer useful for draught purposes. The petitioners argued that the impugned provision duplicated this effect by imposing a double restriction, effectively preventing issuance of a certificate unless the animal was over twenty years old. They asserted that this requirement would, in practice, eliminate the petitioners’ trade in bulls and bullocks. Third, the provision stipulated that an animal could not be slaughtered within twenty days of the certificate’s issuance, and that any person could appeal the competent authority’s order.

The Court observed that any person who is dissatisfied with an order issued by the competent authority may file an appeal to the State Government within a period of twenty days. The Court emphasized that the right of appeal is not limited solely to situations where a certificate is denied, as had been the case under the Bihar Act; rather, the appellate right extends to any individual who is aggrieved by the order of the competent authority. Consequently, even when a certificate for slaughter has been granted, any member of the public who objects to that certificate may lodge an appeal, thereby potentially delaying the slaughter of the animal for an extended period. From a practical standpoint, the Court noted that such provisions effectively create an outright prohibition on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks even after they have ceased to be useful. Applying the reasoning set out in Md. Hanif Quareshi’s case (1), the Court held that section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Act, insofar as it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners’ right to slaughter bulls and bullocks, infringes their fundamental right and is consequently void. Turning to the Madhya Pradesh Act, the Court explained that several of its provisions have been challenged on the basis that they impose unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners’ fundamental rights. Section 4 of that Act pertains to the prohibition of slaughter of “agricultural cattle,” a term defined in the schedule to include cows of all ages, calves of cows, calves of she‑buffaloes, bulls, bullocks, and both male and female buffaloes. The Court clarified that the present disputes focus on the validity of restrictions affecting the slaughter of bulls, bullocks, and buffaloes. Section 4(1) states that, notwithstanding any other law, custom, or usage, no person may slaughter, cause to be slaughtered, offer, or cause to be offered for slaughter any cow, calf of a cow, calf of a she‑buffalo, or any other agricultural cattle unless a written certificate has been obtained from the competent authority of the area where the slaughter is to take place, certifying that the animal is fit for slaughter. The citation for this provision is (1) [1959] S.C.R. 29. Section 4(2) further provides that a certificate under clause (b) of sub‑section (1) will not be issued unless a veterinary officer, after examining the animal, certifies that the animal is over twenty years of age and is unfit for work or breeding, or has become permanently incapacitated due to age, injury, deformity, or an incurable disease, and that the animal does not suffer from any disease that would render its meat unwholesome for human consumption. Section 4(3) requires the competent authority, before issuing or refusing to issue a certificate, to record its order in writing. Finally, the Court noted that any person aggrieved by the order of the competent authority under this section may, within ten days, seek redress as provided by the statute.

The Court explained that when a person was dissatisfied with an order of the Competent Authority, the law required that the person file an appeal within ten days of the date of that order. The appeal had to be made to the Collector of the district or to another officer who might be authorised by a notification of the State Government to act in that capacity. The Collector or the authorised officer possessed the discretionary power to pass any order that he thought appropriate in the circumstances of the appeal. The Court noted that, subject to any orders made on appeal under sub‑section (3), the order originally issued by the Competent Authority was deemed final and could not be questioned in any Court. Section 5 of the Act, the Court observed, imposed a restriction on both the place and the time of slaughter. The specific objection before the Court concerned the temporal restriction rather than the geographic limitation. In effect, Section 5 provided that no cattle for which a certificate had been issued under Section 4 could be slaughtered within ten days from the date the certificate was issued, and that slaughter could not take place until any appeal against the grant of that certificate had been finally decided. The Court reiterated that the appeal mechanism was set out in sub‑section (3) of Section 4, which expressly permitted an aggrieved person to prefer an appeal to the Collector or an authorised officer within ten days of the order, thereby reiterating the procedural safeguards embedded in the statute.

The Court then turned to the remaining provisions of the Act. Section 6 prohibited any person from transporting, offering to transport, or causing to be transported any agricultural cattle from any place within the State to any place outside the State for the purpose of slaughter if such transport contravened the Act or if the person knew or had reason to believe that the cattle would be slaughtered in violation of the Act. Section 7 barred the purchase, sale, or any other disposal of cows, calves of cows, or calves of she‑buffaloes for slaughter, or the facilitation of such transactions, where the seller or buyer knew or had reason to believe that the animals would be slaughtered. Section 8 declared that, notwithstanding any other law then in force, no person could possess the flesh of any agricultural cattle that had been slaughtered in contravention of the Act. The Court further noted that Section 10 prescribed a penalty for a breach of Section 4(1)(a), while Section 11 prescribed penalties for violations of any other provision of the Act. On behalf of the petitioners, the Court acknowledged the argument that clause (a) of sub‑section (2) of Section 4 imposed an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ right, a point the Court agreed was well‑taken.

The Court observed that clause (a) of sub‑section (2) of section 4 of the Act required, in its first part, that cattle other than cows and calves be more than twenty years old and also be unfit for work or breeding. The second part of the clause added that the animal could be “permanently incapacitated from work or breeding due to age, injury, deformity or an incurable disease.” The Court found it difficult to understand why these two requirements were placed side by side. In every view, the Court said, the demand that an animal be both over twenty years of age and unfit for work or breeding imposed an excessive and unreasonable restriction, a view the Court had already expressed when discussing a similar provision in the Uttar Pradesh Act. The Court noted that the second part of the clause would not be objectionable if it stood alone. However, when it was combined with the age limit of the first part, the same objection arose. If an animal had to be over twenty years old and also permanently incapacitated, the age limitation became essentially meaningless, and the phrase “due to age” in the second part lost its significance. Consequently, the Court concluded that clause (a) of sub‑section (2) of section 4 was badly drafted because it created a disproportionate restriction on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes. The restriction was excessive in nature and did not serve the interests of the general public. The test prescribed by the clause was not merely permanent incapacity or unfitness for work or breeding; rather, it combined age and unfitness, thereby imposing a stricter standard than necessary.

The Court recorded that counsel for the petitioners had submitted a reply made by the Deputy Minister during the debate on the Bill in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly (Madhya Pradesh Assembly Proceedings, Vol. 5, Serial No. 34, dated 14 April 1959, page 3201). The Deputy Minister had stated that the age fixed in the provision was far higher than any animal could normally survive. The Court clarified that this observation was not offered to aid in interpreting the statutory language but to show the Deputy Minister’s view on an appropriate age limit. On behalf of the State, the Court noted references to a book titled The Miracle of Life (Home Library Club), which claimed that oxen, when kept under good conditions, could live about forty years. The Court also referred to extracts from a Hindi work called Godhan by Girish Chandra Chakravarti, which indicated that cows and bullocks might live up to twenty or twenty‑five years. The Court recognized that these matters had already been addressed and emphasized that the issue before it was not the maximum possible age that bulls, bullocks and buffaloes might attain in exceptional cases, but rather their average lifespan and the age at which they become useless for work or breeding.

In addressing the question of the average lifespan of cattle and the age at which they cease to be productive, the Court observed that the prevailing view among experts was virtually unanimous and that the opinion expressed by the Deputy Minister on this matter was not erroneous. Regarding Section 5, which imposes a temporal limitation on the slaughter of cattle, the Court noted that the provision faces the same objection previously identified in relation to a comparable clause in the Uttar Pradesh legislation. The Court explained that Section 5 creates a statutory right of appeal for any person who feels aggrieved by an order granting a slaughter certificate; consequently, a member of the public could file an appeal and thereby delay the slaughter of the animal for an extended period. The Court pointed out that, in practical terms, such a restriction would effectively halt the petitioners’ trade, and therefore it could not be regarded as a reasonable restriction within the meaning of clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. Turning to Section 6, the Court held that the provision, considered in isolation, did not present any serious objection. It was characterised as ancillary, intended to give effect to the prohibition on slaughter contained in the Act. Similarly, Section 7, which bans the sale, purchase and related transactions involving cows and calves, was found to be consistent with the overall ban on slaughter of cows and calves, including both cattle and she‑buffaloes, and therefore attracted no objection. Section 8 was also described as ancillary, and, assuming the validity of the other provisions, it too could not be challenged. The Court affirmed the validity of Sections 10 and 11, which prescribe penalties, stating that their constitutionality could not be seriously disputed. The Court then turned to Section 12, which had been contested. Section 12 provides that in any trial for an offence punishable under Section 11 for contravening Sections 5, 6 or 7, the burden of proving that the slaughter, transport or sale of agricultural cattle did not violate the Act rests on the accused. The petitioners argued that this provision infringed their fundamental rights by shifting the burden of proof not only for the accused’s own knowledge or intent but also for the knowledge or intent of others. The Court rejected this contention, observing that for offences under Sections 5 and 7 the accused must be the individual who actually slaughtered, purchased, sold or otherwise disposed of the animal, so the relevant question concerns only the accused’s own knowledge. Accordingly, the legislature was competent to place the burden of proof on that person. So far as

Section six deals specifically with the knowledge of the person who has transported, offered for transport, or caused to be transported any agricultural cattle from any place within the State to any place outside the State. Consequently, whenever the provision refers to knowledge, it is referring solely to the knowledge of that particular transporter and not to the knowledge of any other individual. The Court therefore concluded that the challenge to section twelve on the ground that it places an improper burden of proof on persons other than the accused is untenable.

Having examined the various sections of the Act, the Court found that the provisions contained in clause (a) of sub‑section (2) of section four, sub‑section (3) of section four which deals with the right of appeal by any person aggrieved by an order, and section five which regulates the time of slaughter, impose restrictions that are unreasonable and disproportionate. Accordingly, those provisions were held to be unconstitutional.

With regard to the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Rules, rule three stipulates that “an application for a certificate under s. 4 shall be made to the competent authority.” Rule four further provides that upon receipt of the application, the competent authority shall, by an order, direct the person keeping the animal to submit it for examination by the Veterinary Officer. Rule five reproduces the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of sub‑section (2) of section four. Because the Court has declared the provision in clause (a) of sub‑section (2) of section four unconstitutional, the corresponding rule must also be struck down.

The Court also noted that the legislature retains the power to enact ancillary provisions to further the main purpose of the Act, which is to prevent the slaughter of bulls, bullocks or buffaloes that remain useful for their customary purposes. It was observed that actions which are innocent in themselves may be prohibited, and such restrictions can be deemed reasonable if they are necessary for the effective enforcement of valid provisions. For instance, the legislature may, if it deems it necessary, enact measures designed to minimise evasion and thereby give effect to the primary objective of the legislation.

The Court emphasized that it had not disregarded this legislative prerogative and remained mindful of the undisputed right of the legislature to determine what measures are required to achieve the Act’s main aim. The petitioners contended that the true purpose of the impugned provisions was not merely the prohibition of slaughter of animals that are still useful; rather, the wording of those provisions, in the petitioners’ view, effectively imposed an absolute ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes, thereby halting the petitioners’ profession and trade.

The Court observed that the impugned provisions directly affected the profession and trade of the petitioners. After reviewing the material placed before it, the Court concluded that the petitioners’ grievance was well founded with respect to the principal provisions contained in each of the three statutes that were challenged. Consequently, the Court permitted the three writ petitions and issued an order, following the precedent set in Md. Hanif Quareshi’s case (1), directing the respondent State governments to refrain from enforcing or giving effect to any portion of the Acts or the subordinate rules that this judgment has declared to be void. Accordingly, the petitioners were awarded the costs of the hearing before this Court. The petitions were therefore allowed. (1) [1959] S.C.R. 629.