The State Of Madhya Pradesh And Another vs Baldeo Prasad

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 271 of 1956

Decision Date: 3 October 1960

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, K.N. Wanchoo

The case titled The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another versus Baldeo Prasad was decided on 3 October 1960 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice P B Gajendragadkar, and the bench comprised Justice P B Gajendragadkar, Justice Bhuvneshwar P Sinha, Justice J L Kapur and Justice K N Wanchoo. In the proceedings the State of Madhya Pradesh and another entity were the petitioners and Baldeo Prasad was the respondent. The date of the judgment is recorded as 03 October 1960. The bench is identified in the record as the Gajendragadkar bench headed by Justice P B Gajendragadkar, with Justice Sinha, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. (Chief Justice), Justice Kapur, Justice J L Subbarao and Justice K N Wanchoo. The case citation appears as 1961 AIR 293 and 1961 S C R (1) 970. Subsequent citator references listed include RF 1962 SC 1371 (42), R 1971 SC 481 (47), R 1971 SC 1667 (29) and RF 1982 SC 710 (60). The statutory provision under consideration is the Central Provinces and Berar Goondas Act of 1946, as amended by the Madhya Pradesh Act XLIX of 1950, specifically sections 4 and 4‑A. The constitutional issues raised concern the validity of the enactment under Articles 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(e) of the Constitution of India and the bar of Article 13.

The headnote summarizes the factual and procedural background. By an order issued under section 4‑A of the Central Provinces and Berar Goondas Act, 1946, as amended by the Madhya Pradesh Act, the State of Madhya Pradesh ordered the respondent to vacate the district of Chhindwara, which had been declared a proclaimed area under the Act. The District Magistrate issued a subsequent order communicating the same directive to the respondent. The respondent challenged both orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that the Act infringed his fundamental rights protected by Articles 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(e) and that, on the basis of Article 13, the Act should be declared invalid. The High Court held that sections 4 and 4‑A of the impugned Act were invalid, and because these sections formed the principal operative provisions of the legislation, the Court concluded that the entire Act was invalid.

The judgment further observes that when a statute authorises preventive action against citizens, it must expressly require the designated authority to be satisfied that the statutory conditions precedent exist before taking action. A failure to incorporate such a requirement for any condition precedent renders the statute infirm and removes it from the protection of Article 19(5). Although sections 4 and 4‑A clearly intended that the person targeted by the Act be a “goonda,” the statute does not mandate that the District Magistrate first determine that the individual is a goonda, nor does it provide any guidance or opportunity for the individual to demonstrate that he is not a goonda. The definition of “goonda” in the Act is inclusive and does not set out any criteria for deciding whether a person falls within its first component. The judgment refers to earlier authorities, including Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay, Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. District Magistrate, Thana, and Hari Khenu Gawali v. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay, to support this analysis.

The Court noted that the case of Hari Kulshreshtha v. Police, Bombay [1956] S.C.R. 506 had been cited. It observed that, although the purpose of the impugned legislation was commendable and could potentially fall within the protective ambit of Article 19(5) of the Constitution, the Act failed to incorporate adequate safeguards for protecting fundamental rights. Consequently, the operative provisions of the statute were deemed invalid, leading the Court to conclude that the entire Act must be held void.

The matter before the Court was a civil appeal, numbered 271 of 1956, arising from a judgment and order dated 2 August 1955 issued by the former Nagpur High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 249 of 1955. The appeal was presented by counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh, who acted as Advocate‑General, and by additional counsel representing the appellants, while counsel for the respondent represented the petitioner. The judgment was pronounced on 3 October 1960, with Justice Gajendragadkar delivering the opinion.

The appeal, which carried a certificate from the Nagpur High Court under Article 132(1) of the Constitution, raised the question of the validity of the Central Provinces and Berar Goondas Act X of 1946 as amended by the Madhya Pradesh Act XLIX of 1950. The factual background disclosed that the State of Madhya Pradesh, identified as appellant 1, issued an order on 16 June 1955 against the respondent, Baldeo Prasad, invoking Section 4‑A of the Act. Subsequently, the District Magistrate of Chhindwara, appellant 2, issued a second order on 22 June 1955, informing the respondent of the initial externment order. The respondent then instituted a writ petition before the High Court (Petition No. 249 of 1955) under Article 226, challenging the legality of those orders and contending that the underlying Act itself was ultra vires. The State contested this challenge, asserting the constitutionality of the Act.

The High Court, however, upheld the respondent’s challenge, holding that Sections 4 and 4‑A of the Act were invalid. Since those sections comprised the principal operative provisions of the legislation, the High Court concluded that the entire Act was rendered invalid. The appellants now appealed against that conclusion, seeking a declaration that the High Court’s determination was erroneous and that the Act, or at least its operative sections, should be sustained.

The provision empowers the State Government to issue a proclamation when it is satisfied that public peace or tranquillity in any area has been disturbed or is likely to be disturbed. The area covered by such a proclamation is termed the “proclaimed area” under the Act. Section 3(2) then restricts the duration of a proclamation to a period of three months from the date it is issued. The same section also allows the proclamation to be renewed, but each renewal may extend the proclamation for only another three‑month period. Consequently, the initial step in activating the operative provisions of the Act is the issuance of a proclamation that clearly specifies the proclaimed areas. The State Government may issue this proclamation only after it is satisfied, as required by Section 3(1), that disturbance of public peace or tranquillity exists or is imminent, and the proclamation cannot remain in force for more than three months at a stretch without renewal.

Section 4 of the Act sets out the powers of a District Magistrate once a proclamation of emergency is in operation. The text of the section reads as follows: “ 4(1). During the period the proclamation of emergency issued or renewed under Section 3 is in operation, the District Magistrate having jurisdiction in or in any part of the proclaimed area, if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the presence, movements or acts of any goonda in the proclaimed area is prejudicial to the interests of the general public or that a reasonable suspicion exists that any goonda is committing or is likely to commit acts calculated to disturb the public peace or tranquillity may make an order- (i) directing such goonda to notify his residence and any change of or absence from such residence during the term specified and to report his movements in such manner and to such authority as may be specified; (ii) directing that he shall not remain in the proclaimed area within his jurisdiction or any specified part thereof and shall not enter such area; and (iii) directing him so to conduct himself during the period specified as the District Magistrate shall deem necessary in the interests of public order: Provided that no order under clause (ii) which directs the exclusion of any goonda from a place in which he ordinarily resides shall be made except with the previous approval of the State Government: Provided further that no such order shall be made directing exclusion of any goonda from the district in which he ordinarily resides. (2) No order under sub-section (1) shall be made by a District Magistrate in respect of a goonda without giving to such goonda a copy of the grounds on which the order is proposed to be made and without giving an opportunity to be heard: Provided that where the District Magistrate is of opinion that it is necessary to make an order without any delay he may for reasons to be recorded in writing, make the order and shall, as soon as may be within ten days from the date on which the order is served on”.

The provision mandates that the District Magistrate must first give the goonda a copy of the grounds for any proposed order and must afford the goonda an opportunity to be heard. After the hearing, the District Magistrate is empowered under sub‑section (3) to either cancel the order or modify it as he deems appropriate. This section therefore confers jurisdiction on the District Magistrate to issue an order against a goonda where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the goonda’s presence, movements or acts within any proclaimed area are likely to be prejudicial to the general public, or where there is a reasonable suspicion that the goonda is committing or is likely to commit such prejudicial acts. The three sub‑clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) describe the type of directions that may be issued and the extent of restrictions that can be imposed on a goonda under section 4. Sub‑section (2) reiterates that the District Magistrate must supply the goonda with a copy of the grounds on which the order is proposed and must provide an opportunity to be heard as to why the order should not be made. The proviso to the section addresses situations of emergency that require immediate action. Following the hearing, the District Magistrate may, pursuant to sub‑section (3), either cancel or modify the order as he sees fit. Section 4‑A provides further powers. Clause (1) states that where the District Magistrate, aiming to preserve peace and tranquillity in a proclaimed area, considers it necessary to direct a goonda to remove himself from the district containing that area or to require him to reside elsewhere, the Magistrate may, after granting the goonda the hearing required by section 4, forward a report and accompanying documents to the State Government with a recommendation. Clause (2) provides that on receipt of such a report, the State Government, if satisfied that the recommendation serves the public interest, may issue an order directing the goonda either (a) not to remain in any specified area or place in Madhya Pradesh, except where permitted by the order or an authorized person, or (b) to reside in a specified place or area in Madhya Pradesh and, if not already there, to move there within a time prescribed in the order, subject to the proviso that no order may be made to exclude or remove from the State any person who ordinarily resides in the State. Consequently, a more stringent order can be issued under this section, but the safeguard remains that the District Magistrate must first give the goonda an opportunity to be heard and must subsequently make a report to the State Government.

Section 4‑A of the Act required the District Magistrate, after issuing a notice under Section 4, to submit a report to the State Government together with the documents on which the District Magistrate’s recommendation was based. Sub‑section (2) of Section 4‑A then obliged the State Government to examine the matter and gave it the authority to issue an order either under clause (a) or clause (b) of that sub‑section. The proviso to the section expressly prohibited the making of any order that would result in the exclusion or removal from the State of a person who ordinarily resides in that State. The last provision that could be invoked was Section 6, which allowed any goonda who was aggrieved by an order made under Section 4 or Section 4‑A to present a representation to the State Government within a prescribed period; the State Government was then required to consider the representation and to pass such further orders as it deemed appropriate. This summary outlines the operative framework of the legislation. At this stage it is necessary to set out the factual background that led to the writ petition filed by the respondent. The first appellant issued a proclamation under Section 3 on 10 August 1954, designating the areas covered by the Police Stations of Parasia and Jamai and the town of Chhindwara as the proclaimed area. That proclamation was renewed in November 1954 and again in February 1955. Subsequently, on 9 May 1955, the first appellant issued a fresh proclamation extending the proclaimed area to the whole of Chhindwara District, and that proclamation was directed to remain in force until 8 August 1955. While the second proclamation was operative, the second appellant received reports from the District Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara, alleging that the respondent was a goonda, and consequently ordered that a notice be served on the respondent demanding that he show cause why action should not be taken against him under Section 4. The notice required the respondent to appear before the second appellant on 29 April 1955. Although the notice was served, the respondent failed to appear.

Following the respondent’s non‑appearance, the second appellant forwarded a report to the first appellant on 30 April 1955, attaching the case against the respondent together with a draft order for the first appellant’s approval, as required by the proviso to Section 4(1). In the interval, the first appellant issued a third notification under Section 3. The second appellant then issued a new notice to the respondent under Section 4 on 24 May 1955. The respondent personally appeared before the second appellant on 30 May 1955 and was given an opportunity to file a written statement, which he did on 4 June 1955. The matter was scheduled for hearing on 22 June 1955. Meanwhile, on 16 June 1955 the State Government issued an order directing that the respondent, except insofar as he might be permitted by the second appellant from time to time, was not to remain in any place within Chhindwara District. This order was to remain effective until 8 August 1955. On 22 June 1955 the second appellant communicated this order to the respondent and directed him to vacate the district before 10 a.m. on 23 June 1955.

In this case the respondent applied to the first appellant on June 23, 1955, asking that the order directing him to leave the district be cancelled. The first appellant treated the application as a representation made under section 6 and rejected it on July 9, 1955. A day before that rejection the respondent had filed a writ petition in the High Court, from which the present appeal arose. The respondent challenged the validity of the Act on the ground that it violated his fundamental rights under article 19 (1)(d) and (e) and, therefore, was invalid under article 13 of the Constitution. The High Court upheld that challenge. On behalf of the appellants the learned Advocate‑General of Madhya Pradesh argued that the High Court was wrong to conclude that the restrictions imposed by the Act did not fall within article 19 (5). He maintained that the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the Act could not be questioned because the Act dealt with public order, which was entry I in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935. He further asserted that the State Legislature was clearly competent to enact a law protecting the general public from prejudicial acts that disturbed public peace and order. Section 3 of the Act, he explained, authorized the State Government to issue a proclamation only when public peace or tranquillity was threatened in a particular area of the State, and that, as noted, orders could be passed against goondas whose prejudicial activities added to the disturbance in the proclaimed areas for the limited period prescribed by section 3 (2). Consequently, the purpose of the Act was, in broad terms, to safeguard individual rights and to protect innocent, peaceful citizens from the harmful actions of goondas, and in that sense the Act could prima facie rely on the protection offered by article 19 (5). This viewpoint was not seriously contested. However, the argument against the Act’s validity rested on a serious defect in sections 4 and 4‑A, which contain the operative provisions of the Act. The defect was common to both sections, so the discussion of section 4 applied equally to section 4‑A. Section 4 envisaged preventive action provided two conditions were satisfied: first, that the presence, movements or acts of any person sought to be proceeded against appeared to the District Magistrate to be prejudicial to the interests of the general public, or that a reasonable suspicion existed that such a person was committing or likely to commit acts calculated to disturb public peace or tranquillity; and second, that the person concerned was a goonda. Thus, it was clear that action under section 4 could be taken only when prejudicial acts could be attributed to a goonda. In other words, satisfying the first condition alone was insufficient; both conditions had to be met before any action could be taken against any person.

In this case, the Court observed that section 4 of the Act can become operative only when the conduct that is complained of can be attributed to a person who falls within the meaning of “goonda”. The Court stressed that the first condition – that the presence, movements or acts of a person appear to be prejudicial to public interest or that there is a reasonable suspicion of disturbing public peace – is not sufficient by itself. Both statutory conditions must be satisfied before any preventive action may be taken. Consequently, the principal antecedent for invoking section 4 is that the individual against whom action is contemplated must be a goonda. The Court identified a serious infirmity in this requirement because the provision does not compel the District Magistrate to first determine, as a matter of law, that the person is a goonda, nor does it offer any guidance or assistance to the Magistrate in making such a determination.

The Court noted that, while section 4 does afford a goonda the right to be heard after being served with a copy of the grounds on which the order is proposed, the scope of that hearing is limited to allowing the person to contest the correctness of those grounds. The inquiry prescribed by the statute does not envisage an investigation into whether the person actually qualifies as a goonda. Accordingly, the Magistrate may proceed against an individual without being required to reach a formal conclusion on the person’s status as a goonda, and the legislation does not provide any opportunity for the individual to demonstrate that he is not a goonda. The Court held that this omission represents a serious defect in the scheme of the provision.

The Court further pointed out that the definition of “goonda” contained in the Act offers no assistance in deciding which citizen may be placed within that category. The definition is inclusive and does not specify the tests to be applied to determine whether a person falls within its first part. Relying on ordinary dictionary meanings, the Court observed, would scarcely aid in this determination. Since the Act authorises the District Magistrate to deprive a citizen of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) and (e), the Court stressed that, although the object of the Act may fall within the scope of Article 19(5), any exercise of the power must be accompanied by adequate safeguards to prevent casual, capricious or malicious use. The Court observed that the relevant provisions of the Act are initially triggered at a level lower than that of the District Magistrate, making it essential that the statute incorporate sufficient protections to shield innocent citizens from unwarranted harassment and to preserve their fundamental rights. This need for safeguards underlies the Court’s concern regarding the operative provisions of the Act.

In this case the Court observed that the definition of the term “goonda” should have assisted the District Magistrate in determining whether a particular citizen fell within that category, and the absence of such assistance represented another flaw in the legislation. The Court reiterated that section 4‑A suffers from the same defects as section 4. Considering these two defects, the Court concluded that it could not accept the learned Advocate‑General’s contention that the operative portion of the Act could be justified under Article 19(5) of the Constitution. The Court further noted that a person against whom action may be taken under the Act is not entitled to know the source of the information on which the District Magistrate relied; the individual is informed only of the alleged prejudicial activities that formed the basis of the Magistrate’s satisfaction that action should be taken under section 4 or section 4‑A. Consequently, the Court held that the Act must contain a clear definition, or an equivalent provision, indicating the circumstances in which a person may be labeled a “goonda”. Moreover, the Act must impose a duty on the District Magistrate to consciously evaluate whether the individual against whom a complaint has been made truly qualifies as a “goonda”. The Court rejected the argument that such a duty was merely implicit in sections 4 and 4‑A, emphasizing that when a statute authorises specified authorities to take preventive measures against citizens, it is essential that the statute expressly requires those authorities to be satisfied that the statutory conditions precedent to exercising the power exist. If the statute remains silent on any of those prerequisite conditions, the Court stated that this silence creates a serious defect that removes the provision from the protection of Article 19(5). As a result, the Court found that the defect leaves unchecked and unfettered discretion to the authority, allowing it to designate any citizen as a “goonda”. In this manner, the restrictions imposed on the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) and (e) become unreasonable, an assessment that aligns with the view of the High Court, which the Court saw no reason to depart from.

The Court then referred to the corresponding legislation in Bombay, noting that the material provisions of that statute have been examined and upheld by this Court. Specifically, the Court cited section 27 of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902 (Act 4 of 1902), which authorises the dispersal of gangs and groups of persons, and observed that this provision was upheld in Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay. The Court also mentioned sections 56 and 57 of the later Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Act 22 of 1951), which were respectively affirmed in Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. the State. These precedents demonstrate that clear, specific provisions can effectively address the mischief of undesirable characters while providing adequate safeguards for innocent citizens, thereby satisfying constitutional requirements.

In this case the Court referred to the decisions of District Magistrate, Thana (2) and Hari Khemu Gawali v. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay (3). The cited authorities were (1) [1952] S.C.R. 737, (2) [1956] S.C.R. 533 and (3) [1956] S.C.R. 506. The Court observed that the provisions of the later Act, whose validity had been upheld by this Court, demonstrated how the mischief feared from the conduct of undesirable persons could be effectively restrained by clear and specific statutory language, and how the statute could also incorporate adequate safeguards to protect innocent citizens while addressing threats to public peace and order. The Court noted that it was uncertain whether the hearing right guaranteed by section 4(2) of the Act included a right for the affected person to lead evidence. However, the Court pointed out that such a right to lead evidence was expressly provided by section 59(1) of the Bombay Police Act of 1951. The Court further stated that there was no doubt that the purpose and object of the Act were commendable and that it was the responsibility of the State Legislature to ensure that public peace and tranquillity were not disturbed by the harmful activities of criminals and other undesirable elements in society. Nevertheless, the Court held that this consideration could not assist the appellants because the deficiencies in the operative sections of the Act were so grave that the Act could not be sustained under Article 19(5) of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that if the operative sections were invalid, the entire Act would collapse. Consequently, the Court confirmed the order of the High Court, dismissed the appeal, and awarded costs to the respondents. The appeal was therefore dismissed.