The Management Of Itakhoolie Tea Estate vs Its Workmen on 14 January, 1960

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 14 January, 1960

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, K.C. Das Gupta

The appeal, taken by special leave, challenged the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India which had set aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal of Assam in an industrial dispute involving the Management of Itakhoolie Tea Estate and its workmen. The Government of Assam, by a Gazette notification dated 13 October 1952, referred the dispute to the Judge of the Industrial Tribunal, Assam, invoking Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Tribunal was asked to consider two questions: first, whether the estate’s management was justified in imposing a lock‑out on the garden from 13 September to 25 September 1952; second, if the lock‑out was unjustified, whether the workmen were entitled to wages for that period.

The factual background was relatively narrow. On 5 September 1952 at noon, labourers sought leave because of rain, but the estate manager denied the request and ordered them to continue plucking in the afternoon; the labourers therefore performed no work that afternoon. On 11 September 1952, thirty‑nine male labourers left the plucking work at 3:20 p.m., earlier than the scheduled cessation time of approximately 4:30 p.m., without permission. These men were weighed after the rest of the labour force, each was fined two annas, and they were instructed to weed instead of pluck the following day. On 12 September 1952, the remaining men also abandoned plucking, joined the weeders, and later resumed plucking. At midday that day, the women labourers were weighed, but the men refused to be weighed unless the weeders were also weighed; the manager refused this condition. A similar dispute arose in the evening. In the afternoon of 12 September 1952, the Zonal Secretary, Mr Alien, and the Government Labour Officer, Dibrugarh, arrived at the garden at 3 p.m. and were informed of the manager’s intention to close the garden for garden labour from 13 September and for factory labour from 14 September. Following their intervention, the manager agreed not to close the garden provided there were no further instances of insubordination. On the morning of 13 September 1952, by 9 a.m. only 402 of the 1,542 labourers had reported for work. The customary practice in the garden allowed labourers who arrived late to work, provided they compensated for the lateness by working after the scheduled stoppage time in the evening.

In this case, labourers who arrived after the scheduled start time were permitted to work provided they compensated for the delay by continuing after the normal evening stoppage. The Manager declared a lock‑out of garden labour at nine on 13 September 1952, which continued until 25 September 1952, after which it reopened on 26 September 1952. The lock‑out continued until 25 September 1952, and the garden reopened on the morning of 26 September 1952. On the first issue, the Tribunal examined the material and concluded that the Manager’s decision to impose a lock‑out at nine a.m. was made hastily. The Tribunal further held that it was neither just nor equitable to punish all workers for the indiscipline of a few, and consequently concluded that the lock‑out lacked legal justification and could not be sustained as a proper response to the labour unrest. On the second issue, the Tribunal observed that there was no evidence showing that workers who reported for duty were denied employment on days from 14 to 27 September 1952. Nevertheless, because 402 labourers attended work on 13 September 1952, the Tribunal directed that their wages for that day be paid. The Tribunal ordered payment to the women weighed on 11 and 12 September 1952 and to the men whose leaves were weighed on 11 September 1952. The workmen appealed this award to the Appellate Tribunal of India insofar as the award affected them, while the management chose not to file any appeal. The Appellate Tribunal held that, because the lock‑out was unjustified, the entire body of workmen was entitled to compensation for the period of lock‑out. Counsel for the management then sought to sustain the Tribunal’s award on the ground that the lock‑out was justified. The Appellate Tribunal rejected this contention, holding that “it is not open to the party‑respondent to challenge a finding where on the challenged finding disappearing, the relief given against it would be affected.” Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal filed by the workmen and set aside the management’s position on the basis that the lock‑out had been unlawfully imposed. The management subsequently filed the present appeal, contending that the Appellate Tribunal’s order was incorrect and should be set aside. The learned Attorney‑General, who appeared on behalf of the management, raised two substantive points before this Court for consideration. (i) The management argued that, although it had not appealed the Appellate Tribunal’s award, it was entitled under Order XLI, Rule 22, of the Code of Civil Procedure to support that award. The management further contended that it could rely on any of the grounds on which the original Tribunal had decided against it, and therefore the Appellate Tribunal was wrong in rejecting this contention. (ii) The management contended that the labourers had refused to attend the conciliation proceedings on 17 September 1952, and therefore they should not be entitled to compensation for any period after that date. The first question therefore required a determination of the scope and effect of Order XLI, Rule 22, of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In this matter the Court examined the divergent judicial opinions concerning the construction of Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court observed that a split existed among authorities. One line of authority was articulated by a division bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar, reported in ILR 50 Mad 866 and AIR 1927 Mad 801. In that decision Justice Srinivasa Ayyangar explained that when the relief sought depends on the lower court’s determination of rights or causes of action, it would be inconceivable for an appellate court to entertain an attack on that determination without giving any notice to the opposite party. He further noted that although the term “decree” appears in Rule 22, the rule actually contemplates the decision rendered by the lower court that is to be supported on grounds different from those on which the lower court originally proceeded. Consequently, the judge concluded that a respondent could not obtain a fresh adjudication by the appellate court on rights or causes of action that had already been decided against him in the lower court where he had filed no appeal or memorandum of objection. The opposite view was expressed by a Full Bench of the same High Court in Venkata Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthy, reported in ILR (1944) Mad 147 and AIR 1943 Mad 698, which held that under Order XLI, Rule 22 a defendant‑respondent who had not raised any cross‑objections to a partial decree could, in opposing the plaintiff’s appeal, raise a contention that, if accepted by the trial court, would have required the total dismissal of the suit. The Court noted that several other High Courts had aligned themselves with the earlier division‑bench view. The Court stated that it was unnecessary to declare a preference for either approach because, even assuming that the Full Bench ruling articulated the correct law, the appellant in the present case would still not succeed. The Court then clarified the operative principle of Rule 22: any respondent may support the decree on any ground that was decided against him in the lower court, but this support does not grant him a right superior to that which he would possess if he had filed an appeal on that ground. In other words, a respondent cannot rely on a ground that would not have been available to him as an appellant. Applying this principle, the Court observed that the Tribunal had found the lock‑out to be unjustified and consequently granted a partial decree in favour of the labourers. The Court posed the hypothetical question whether, had the appellant lodged an appeal against that award on the portion adverse to it, it could have contested the Tribunal’s finding that the lock‑out was not justified.

In this case the Court examined whether an appeal could be filed against the Tribunal’s finding that the lock‑out was not justified. The Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950 provides that an appeal may be made to the Appellate Tribunal from any award or decision of an industrial tribunal if the appeal involves a substantial question of law, or if the award or decision concerns any of the matters listed in Section 7, paragraph (1). Those matters include wages, bonus, contributions to pension or provident funds, sums paid for special expenses, gratuity, classification, retrenchment, and any other matter that may be prescribed. Accordingly, the Appellate Tribunal could entertain an appeal only on one or more of those specified grounds. The appellant conceded that, in the present dispute, an appeal could be pursued only under sub‑section (1)(a), that is, if the issue raised a substantial question of law. The Court therefore considered whether the Tribunal’s determination that the lock‑out was not justified raised such a question. Upon reviewing the Tribunal’s judgment, the Court observed that the Tribunal had examined all material placed before it and reached a conclusion that the lock‑out lacked justification. That conclusion was characterised as a factual finding. The learned Attorney‑General attempted to argue that the factual finding was erroneous, but the Court found no basis for treating the finding as a question of law, let alone a substantial one. Consequently, the appellant could not challenge the Tribunal’s finding before the Appellate Tribunal, and the Court rejected the appellant’s first contention.

The Court then turned to the second contention, for which it set out the relevant factual background. The Government Labour Officer, having been informed of the situation in the garden, sought to initiate conciliation. On 15 September 1952 the employer’s representative requested a one‑day postponement so that the employer could take part in the conciliation process, noting that his own representative would be coming from the head office in Calcutta. The employer’s representative arrived on 17 September 1952 and participated in the conciliation proceedings. However, the workmen’s representative refused to attend the conciliation on that date, asserting that there was no dispute requiring settlement. Based on these facts, the appellant contended before the Appellate Tribunal that, in any event, the workmen were not entitled to any compensation for the period of lock‑out following 17 September 1952. The Tribunal rejected this contention, holding that the argument rested on the assumption that, had the workmen’s representative taken part in the conciliation, the dispute would have been resolved and the lock‑out lifted—a premise the Tribunal regarded as mere speculation. The same line of argument was later advanced by the learned Attorney‑General, but it had not been raised before the Tribunal. The Court agreed with the Tribunal’s view and further held that the question raised could not be entertained under Article 136 of the Constitution. As a result, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

In this case the appellant claimed that the workmen were entitled to compensation for the period of lock‑out that began after 17 September 1952. The Appellate Tribunal examined that claim and rejected it. The Tribunal held that the claim relied on an assumption that, if the workmen’s representative had participated in the conciliation proceedings, the dispute would have been resolved and the lock‑out would have ended. The Tribunal found that this assumption was merely a conjecture and not supported by evidence. The same line of argument was later presented before this Court by the learned Attorney‑General. The Court noted that the point concerning the assumed effect of the workmen’s participation had not been put forward before the Tribunal. Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the Tribunal’s reasoning that the contention was unfounded. Moreover, the Court observed that the matter raised by the appellant could not be entertained under Article 136 of the Constitution, which does not permit a reference of this nature. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeal did not disclose any error in law or fact that would justify interference. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the costs of the proceedings were awarded against the appellant. The decision therefore affirmed the position taken by the lower tribunal and concluded the litigation. No further relief was granted to the appellant.