The Lord Krishna Textile Mills vs Its Workmen

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 427 of 1959

Decision Date: 12 December 1960

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In this case the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 12 December 1960 in the dispute between The Lord Krishna Textile Mills and its workmen. The judgment was authored by Justice P B Gajendragadkar and the bench also included Justice K N Wanchoo. The decision is reported in 1961 AIR 860 and 1961 SCR (3) 204, with later citations including R 1969 SC 983 (3), R 1972 SC 1031 (23‑24) and R 1978 SC 1004 (9). The operative statutory provisions were Section 6 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U‑P Act 28 of 1947) and Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947).

The factual backdrop was that two officers of the mill were assaulted by a group of workmen. In response the employer issued notices to eight of those workmen, requiring them to explain their conduct and to show cause why they should not be dismissed. The workmen submitted explanations in which they denied the allegations. The employer then conducted a domestic enquiry in accordance with the applicable Standing Orders. The enquiry concluded that the charges against the workmen were proved, and consequently the employer dismissed the eight workmen, offering them their final dues together with one month’s wages in lieu of notice. At the same time a dispute concerning bonus payments was pending before the Industrial Tribunal.

Because the dismissal was on the ground of misconduct that was not connected with the pending bonus dispute, the employer filed an application with the Industrial Tribunal under Section 6E(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Act for approval of the dismissals. The Tribunal declined to grant approval and ordered the employer to reinstate the workmen from the date of their suspension and to pay them full wages for the period of unemployment. The employer contended that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by assuming the powers of an appellate court over the employer’s decision.

The Court held that the Tribunal had indeed assumed jurisdiction that was not vested in it and that its refusal to grant approval was patently erroneous in law. The Court explained that the requirement of obtaining approval under Section 6E(2)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Act (or Section 33(2) of the Central Act) applies to dismissals for misconduct not connected with a pending dispute, and that this requirement is less rigid than the one in Section 6E(1) (or Section 33(1)) which applies when misconduct is connected with a pending dispute. Accordingly, the power to give or withhold permission under Section 6E(2) is prima facie broader than the power under Section 6E(1). Since the employer had conducted a proper domestic enquiry and dismissed the workmen based on that enquiry, the Tribunal’s role was limited to examining (i) whether the Standing Orders justified the dismissals, (ii) whether the enquiry had been conducted as prescribed by those Standing Orders, (iii) whether the employer had paid the one‑month wages in lieu of notice, and (iv) whether an application for approval had been made in the manner prescribed by law. The Court found that all these conditions were satisfied, and that the Tribunal had overstepped its authority by acting as an appellate body and probing factual issues beyond its remit.

The Court observed that the required application for approval had been filed in accordance with the statutory prescription. In the facts before the Tribunal all the prescribed conditions were satisfied, yet the Tribunal overstepped its limited remit. It acted as though it possessed appellate jurisdiction, examining matters of fact that are beyond its authority. The Tribunal’s approach was contrasted with the principle set out in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1960] S.C.R. 806, which was referred to for guidance. A precise issue was then framed: whether an application for approval under section 6E(2)(b) of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act or under section 33(2)(b) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act must be filed before the dismissal order is passed, or whether it may be filed after such an order has been made. The Court noted that section 6E of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, mirrors in language the provisions of section 33 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The judgment proceeded under the heading “Civil Appellate Jurisdiction” and recorded that this was Civil Appeal No. 427 of 1959, filed by special leave from an award dated 18 February 1958 rendered by the Industrial Tribunal (Textiles), United Provinces, Allahabad, in connection with petitions filed under section 6‑E, namely petitions (Tex.) 3 and 4 of 1957 and petition 1 of 1958. The appellant was represented by counsel for the Attorney‑General for India and another counsel, while the respondents were represented by their counsel. The judgment, delivered on 12 December 1960 by Justice Gajendragadkar, began by stating that three separate applications made by the appellant, the Lord Krishna Textile Mills, under section 6‑E(2)(b) of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XXVIII of 1947), seeking the Tribunal’s approval for the dismissal of eight workmen, had been rejected. Consequently, the Tribunal declined to grant the approval sought for the employer’s disciplinary action. The appeal, taken by special leave, contested the legality, validity, and propriety of that refusal, focusing primarily on the permissible scope of enquiry under section 6‑E(2)(b) and the extent of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to conduct such an enquiry.

The Court further explained that section 6‑E(2) of the United Provinces Act is word‑for‑word identical to section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (referred to as “the Act”). For ease of reference, the Court indicated that the analysis would be conducted on the basis of the latter provision, because any ruling made would apply equally to cases governed by either section 6‑E(2)(b) of the United Provinces Act or section 33(2)(b) of the Central Act. The factual backdrop of the dispute was then set out. On 12 October 1957, the Controller of Production of the appellant’s mill and the General Superintendent were engaged in a discussion within the mill’s office. During this meeting, Har Prasad, who was one of the eight workmen later dismissed, entered the office accompanied by several other workmen. The visiting workmen presented a series of grievances before the Controller. When the Controller responded to Har Prasad, the leader of the group, stating that the grievances were unfounded, Har Prasad retorted that the Controller, as the manager of the mill, was entitled to act as he saw fit, but he also asserted that the management’s methods were improper and warned that “it may bring very unsatisfactory results.” After delivering this admonition, Har Prasad and his companions departed from the Controller’s office. This interaction formed part of the factual matrix that the Tribunal was required to consider when determining whether the dismissal of the eight workmen was justified under the statutory scheme, and it underscored the central question in the appeal concerning the proper timing and procedural requirements for filing an application for approval under the relevant industrial dispute legislation.

Har Prasad and his companions left the Controller’s office after stating that the management’s methods were improper and would produce very unsatisfactory results. Two days later Har Prasad and another workman, Mool Chand, again approached the Controller to complain that a back‑sizer named Yamin had reported the Controller’s beating of him; the Controller denied the allegation and the two workmen thereafter left his office. At about six in the evening on the same day a number of workmen of the appellant mills surrounded the General Superintendent, Mr Contractor, and Mr Surti as they were returning to their bungalows from the mills and assaulted and beat them. The two officers lodged a First Information Report at Thana Sadar Bazar, Saharanpur at about nine o’clock, after which the Inspector of Police proceeded to the scene, made local inquiries and arrested two workmen, Ramesh Chander Kaushik and Tika Ram. The incident caused grave disorder in the mills, aroused strong resentment among the mill officers and resulted in the mills being closed for three days. The mill management then initiated its own investigation and on 17 October suspended five workmen—Har Prasad, Majid, Zinda, Yamin and Manak Chand—serving each a notice requiring them to explain their conduct and to show cause why they should not be dismissed. Following further inquiry the management suspended two additional workmen, Om Parkash and Satnam, on 24 October and served them similar notices. The two workmen who had been arrested, Ramesh Chander Kaushik and Tika Ram, were released from police custody and on 24 November were served notices asking them to show cause why their services should not be terminated. All of the workmen who received notices submitted explanations and denied the charges. An enquiry was then conducted in accordance with the Standing Orders; at the enquiry the workmen concerned, as well as union representatives, were present, and the accused workmen were given full opportunity to call witnesses and to cross‑examine witnesses produced by the management. After the enquiry the management held that the charges against the workmen were proved and, on 19 November, dismissed Om Parkash, Satnam, Majid, Yamin, Zinda and Har Prasad, directing them to receive their final dues together with one month’s pay in lieu of notice as required by the Standing Orders. The enquiry against Tika Ram and Ramesh Chander concluded on 20 December, and the findings likewise proved the charges; consequently those two workmen were dismissed and instructed to take their final dues with one month’s wages in lieu of notice. At that time an industrial dispute concerning the bonus for the relevant year was pending before the Industrial Tribunal (Textile) of Uttar Pradesh.

In Allahabad the appellant filed three separate applications before the Industrial Tribunal under section 6‑E(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act on 21 November, 27 November and 21 December 1957. Each application sought the Tribunal’s approval for the dismissal of the workmen who had been terminated by the appellant. On 18 February 1958 the Tribunal examined the applications and concluded that the appellant had not established any justification for dismissing the workmen in question. Consequently the Tribunal refused to give its approval for the dismissals and ordered that the appellant reinstate the workmen to the positions they held before their suspension, with continuity of service dating from the suspension dates, and that the appellant pay the full wages that had been lost during the period of unemployment. The factual backdrop presented above gave rise to the question of how to interpret subsection (b) of section 6‑E(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Act. As previously observed, the substantive provisions of section 6‑E of the Uttar Pradesh Act are identical to those of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act after the amendment effected by Act 36 of 1956; because the latter provision has general application, the Court chose to read the relevant provisions of section 33 of the Act and to apply the same reasoning to the corresponding provisions of section 6‑E of the Uttar Pradesh Act. Section 33 is situated in Chapter VII of the Act, which contains miscellaneous provisions. The clear purpose of section 33 is to ensure that industrial proceedings pending before any authority designated by the Act may continue in a calm and peaceful environment, undisturbed by any other industrial dispute. In other words, the provision aims to preserve the status‑quo as far as reasonably possible while the proceedings are pending. Before its amendment by Act 36 of 1956, section 33 applied in a blanket manner to all situations in which an employer intended to alter the conditions of service or intended to pass an order of discharge or dismissal against an employee, without regard to whether such alteration or proposed dismissal was connected with the dispute that was pending before an industrial authority. Effectively, the unamended provision barred an employer, during the pendency of any industrial dispute, from making any alteration to the conditions of service that would prejudice the workmen, and also prohibited the employer from dismissing any employee, even when the proposed alteration or dismissal had no relationship whatsoever with the dispute in question. Employers complained that this broad application forced them to obtain permission from the prescribed authority for matters that were unrelated to the dispute then before adjudication, and that, in urgent cases where a change in service conditions was necessary or immediate disciplinary action against an offending workman was required, the employers were left powerless and had to endure the delay caused by filing applications and awaiting the Tribunal’s consent.

When an employer needed to make an immediate alteration in service conditions or to take disciplinary action against a workman for the sake of discipline, the employer could not act freely because the existing law required the employer to apply for permission from the industrial tribunal and to wait for the tribunal’s written consent. This procedural requirement caused delays that were detrimental to the employer’s ability to maintain order. To address this difficulty, the legislature introduced an amendment to section 33 in 1956 that created a clear distinction between actions that are connected with an industrial dispute and actions that are unrelated to the dispute pending before the authority. Section 33(1) now provides that, while an industrial proceeding is pending, an employer shall not, with respect to any matter that is part of the dispute, (a) alter the conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen concerned, or (b) dismiss or otherwise punish any workman for misconduct that is connected with the dispute, unless the employer obtains the express written permission of the authority before which the dispute is being heard. Consequently, the earlier version of the provision, which applied broadly, has been limited to situations where the employer’s proposed action concerns a matter that is part of the pending dispute. Under the current wording, if an employer wishes to change service conditions or to take disciplinary action on the basis of misconduct that is linked to the ongoing dispute, he must first secure written approval from the appropriate industrial authority before proceeding.

The purpose of this restriction on the employer’s power during the pendency of an industrial dispute has been examined by this Court on several occasions. In the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Its Workmen, the Court reviewed its earlier rulings on the subject and considered the type of inquiry that the appropriate authority may conduct when an employer files an application under section 33(1). The Court observed that “the purpose the Legislature had in view in enacting s. 33 was to maintain the status quo by placing a ban on any action by the employer pending adjudication,” and further noted that “the jurisdiction conferred on the Industrial Tribunal by s. 33 was a limited one. Where a proper enquiry had been held and no victimisation or unfair labour practice had been resorted to, the Tribunal in granting permission had only to satisfy itself that there was a prima facie case against the employee and not to …” Thus, the Tribunal’s role is restricted to determining whether a preliminary case exists; it does not assess the propriety or adequacy of the proposed action, nor may it impose conditions on its permission. If permission is granted, it merely removes the statutory ban imposed by section 33; it does not automatically validate the dismissal or shield it from being challenged in the industrial dispute. The present dispute before the Court concerns the nature of the enquiry and the extent of the authority’s jurisdiction in conducting such an enquiry under section 33(2), which deals with alterations in service conditions and discharge or dismissal of workmen when the matter giving rise to the proposed action is unrelated to the pending dispute.

The Court explained that the Tribunal, when considering an employer’s request under section 33, is not permitted to attach any conditions to its decision; it must either grant permission or refuse it outright. The Court further noted that the effect of a granted permission is limited to lifting the prohibition created by section 33, and that such permission does not automatically validate the dismissal or bar the dismissal from being contested in an industrial dispute. The Court observed that this limited effect of permission is not contested before it. What remains in dispute, however, is the character of the enquiry that the authority must conduct and the breadth of the authority’s power to conduct such an enquiry under section 33(2). Section 33(2) governs both alterations in service conditions and the discharge or dismissal of workmen who are involved in a pending dispute, provided that the alteration or the discharge concerns a matter that is unrelated to the dispute that is pending. The Court pointed out that cases in which the reason for the proposed action is unrelated to the industrial dispute have been removed from the ambit of section 33(1) and are now dealt with separately under section 33(2) and the succeeding subsections of section 33, as illustrated by the cited authority. Section 33(2) states: “During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute, (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman, provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.” The Court observed that even while an industrial dispute is ongoing, the employer’s right to modify the conditions of service is recognised, provided the modification does not relate to any matter that is part of the pending dispute, and that this right can be exercised in conformity with the applicable standing orders. For such modifications, the employer need not submit an application nor obtain any prior approval. However, when the employer seeks to dismiss or discharge a workman for alleged misconduct that is unrelated to the dispute, the employer may act in accordance with the standing orders but must comply with the prohibition imposed by the proviso. The proviso mandates that no workman may be discharged or dismissed unless two conditions are fulfilled: first, the workman must have received wages for a period of one month, and second, the employer must have filed an application with the appropriate authority seeking approval of the proposed dismissal.

In that portion of the judgment, the Court explained that when an employer wishes to act under section 33 sub‑section (1), he must first obtain the express written permission of the appropriate authority before taking any step. By contrast, when the employer’s contemplated action falls within section 33 sub‑section (2), the statute only obliges him to satisfy the conditions listed in that sub‑section; it does not compel him to secure prior written consent. The Court interpreted the requirement of “approval” as distinct from the requirement of “previous permission,” and concluded that the prohibition imposed by sub‑section (2) was less strict than the prohibition under sub‑section (1). The power of the industrial authority to grant or deny permission therefore was broader than its power to grant or deny approval.

The Court further observed that, for cases governed by section 33 sub‑section (2), the industrial authority was entitled to examine whether the proposed action complied with the standing orders, whether the employee had received wages for at least one month, and whether an application for approval had been filed as prescribed by the sub‑section. The Court noted that where the employer sought to alter conditions of service under sub‑section (2)(a), no approval was required, and the employer’s right remained intact despite any statutory ban. Consequently, the Court held that the authority’s power to conduct an enquiry under sub‑section (2)(b) could not be broader than, and was in fact more limited than, the power allowed under sub‑section (1). In exercising its functions under sub‑section (2), the authority had to keep in mind the deliberate legislative distinction between the two classes of cases, the former demanding express permission and the latter only approval.

The Court also affirmed that the authority could, in appropriate circumstances, refuse to grant approval because section 33 sub‑section (5) expressly empowered it to pass such a refusal in response to an application made under the proviso to sub‑section (2)(b). The authority could either approve or reject the application, but it could not impose conditions or issue a conditional order. Regarding protected workmen, the Court explained that section 33 sub‑section (3) treated alterations of service conditions or orders of discharge for such workmen as falling within the regime of section 33 (1). Thus, any employer action affecting a protected workman was subject to the same stringent ban that applied under section 33 (1). Section 33 sub‑section (4) dealt with the recognition and numerical limitation of protected workmen, while sub‑section (5) required the authority, upon receiving an application under the proviso to sub‑section (2), to hear the matter without delay and to render a decision as promptly as possible.

The provision required the authority to hear any application made under the proviso to section 33 (2)(b) and to pass the appropriate orders as quickly as possible. This language reflected the legislative intent that, although a written permission in advance was not mandatory for cases covered by the proviso, the law sought to avoid any delay between the employer’s action and the authority’s decision in the ensuing enquiry. Before the Court could address the substantive issues of the dispute, it observed that a subsidiary question of construction arose concerning the timing of the employer’s application under section 33 (2)(b). Two alternative interpretations were presented. The first interpretation held that the proviso set two conditions precedent for the employer’s right to dismiss or discharge a workman while a dispute was pending. Under this view, the word “unless” was read as imposing a pre‑condition: the employer must first pay the workman wages for one month and must also submit an application for approval. Once both conditions were satisfied, the employer could proceed with dismissal without awaiting the authority’s final order, because the statute expressly required the application to be dealt with “as expeditiously as possible,” signalling that the legislature intended no time gap between filing the application and its disposal. This approach treated the word “unless” as meaning “until” and thereby created a condition precedent. The second interpretation contended that the employer need not file the application before taking any action; rather, the application served to obtain approval for an action that had already been carried out. The term “approval,” as understood in ordinary language, implied ratification of a completed act, distinguishing it from “previous permission,” which would denote prior consent. Consequently, the phrase “action taken,” emphasized by the Court, was argued to indicate that the order of discharge or dismissal had already been issued and that the employer was now seeking approval for that already‑taken action. Under this construction, the words “action taken” were given their plain, literal meaning, contrasting with the first view in which they were read as “action proposed to be taken.” Both constructions were set out for consideration before the Court proceeded to the merits of the case.

In this case, the Court examined whether the expression “action taken” referred to a dismissal that had already occurred or to a dismissal that was only proposed. The first interpretation treated “action taken” as meaning “action proposed to be taken,” arguing that the condition concerning payment of wages could not be read literally. Under that view, “paid wages” would signify wages that were tendered to the workman, even if the workman had not accepted them, and “action taken” would denote an action that the employer intended to carry out but had not yet executed. The Court observed that a literal construction of those terms would create an inconsistency with the use of the word “unless” in the provision, because the literal meaning would allow the employer to act first and seek approval later. This line of reasoning further suggested that, if the prohibition in the proviso did not require an application before any employer action, the employer would be free to file the application at any time of his choosing, since the statute did not prescribe a specific period for filing the application nor did it prescribe a penalty for failure to do so within a particular time frame.

The Court then considered the counter‑argument that the requirement of an application before taking any action functioned as a condition precedent. It referred to section 33A of the Act, noting that if an employer delayed filing the required application, the employee could treat the delay as a violation of section 33(2)(b) and lodge a complaint under section 33A, which would be tried as an industrial dispute. Conversely, an employer might attempt to neutralise such a complaint by promptly filing the statutory application, leaving the authority to decide whether the employer’s delay itself breached section 33(2)(b). The Court held that such an enquiry into the employer’s delay was not likely intended by the Legislature, supporting the view that the application must be made before the employer actually dismisses or discharges the workman, just as money must be tendered before termination. However, if the requirement were not a condition precedent, the employer could first issue a dismissal order and later file the application within a reasonable period. The Court therefore set out the opposing contentions regarding the construction of the proviso but did not yet determine which interpretation should prevail.

The Court indicated that it would not render a decision on the preliminary point because, based on the pleadings, the respondents could not be allowed to raise that issue for determination in the present appeal. It observed that the material presented before the Tribunal and the specific allegations made by the respondents in their statement of case before this Court showed that both sides conceded that the application in question had been properly filed under the proviso. Consequently, the sole matter in dispute was the validity and propriety of the order that was under appeal, considering the limited jurisdiction of the enquiry prescribed by section 33(2)(b). The Court therefore focused its attention on that question. Before addressing it, the Court noted that its attention had been drawn to three earlier decisions of this Court in which, without any discussion of the issue, the validity of employers’ applications made under section 33(2)(b) appeared to have been taken for granted, even though those applications were apparently filed after the employers had dismissed their employees. The cited cases were Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd v. Kushal Bhan (1), The Management of Swatantra Bharat Mills, New Delhi v. Ratan Lal (2), and The Central India Coal Fields Ltd., Calcutta v. Ram Bilas Shobnath (3). The Court clarified that these decisions should not be construed as having settled the point either way, since the issue was not argued before the Court and had not been examined in those cases.

The Court explained that, given the limited nature and scope of the enquiry permitted under section 33(2)(b), the authority concerned could only determine whether the employer had established a prima fa case for approval of the application. If, prior to dismissing an employee, the employer had conducted a proper domestic enquiry and subsequently issued the impugned dismissal order as a result of that enquiry, the authority’s role was confined to examining whether the conditions laid down in section 33(2)(b) and the proviso were satisfied. Specifically, the authority needed to consider whether the standing orders justified the dismissal, whether an enquiry had been conducted in accordance with the standing order, whether the wages for the relevant month had been paid as required by the proviso, and whether an application had been filed as prescribed by the proviso. The Court noted that the question of whether the application was made after dismissal did not arise for determination in the present appeal because it was undisputed that the application had been properly made. The Court further observed that Standing Order 21 enumerated acts of omission that would be treated as misconduct, and that, under clause 21(s), threatening or intimidating any operative or employee within the factory premises constituted misconduct punishable by dismissal. This position was not contested, and there was no dispute that proper charge‑sheets had been issued to the employees concerned.

In this case the Tribunal held that a proper inquiry had been conducted with respect to the employees who were the subject of the proceedings. The inquiry was described as regular and it gave the employees a full opportunity to present their evidence and to cross‑examine the evidence that had been produced against them. After completing the inquiry, the officer who conducted it concluded that the charges that had been framed were proved against the workmen concerned, and accordingly dismissed those workmen. The Tribunal nevertheless refused to approve the dismissal orders passed by the employer. The appellant argued before the Court that the Tribunal, in refusing approval, had assumed the powers of an appellate court and had examined every question of fact, a step that was beyond its jurisdiction. The Court agreed with this criticism. A reading of the Tribunal’s order shows that it went beyond the limits set by section 33(2)(b) by trying to reassess whether the factual conclusions recorded in the inquiry were justified on the merits. The Tribunal did not find the inquiry itself to be defective, nor did it say that any requirement of natural justice had been breached. Instead, it explicitly embarked on a factual review and gave reasons that would be appropriate only to a higher court hearing an appeal.

The Tribunal’s reasons included observations that the script in which the statements were recorded was “not clear and fully decipherable,” and that the evidence presented was “not adequate” and had not been properly discussed. It further held that the charge‑sheets should have been more specific and that the evidence should have been more satisfactory. The Tribunal examined the evidence, noted discrepancies in the witnesses’ statements, and concluded that the domestic inquiry should not have recorded a finding that the charges were proved against the workmen. In the Court’s view, by making these comments the Tribunal lost sight of the statutory limits on its authority under section 33(2)(b). While questions about the adequacy, sufficiency, or satisfactory nature of evidence can be raised before a court of facts or an appellate court with the power to re‑examine facts, such considerations are irrelevant when the tribunal’s jurisdiction is confined by section 33(2)(b). The Court noted that even under that section, an authority may intervene only if it is satisfied that the finding of the domestic inquiry is perverse, that is, not supported by any legal evidence at all. The Tribunal’s approach went beyond this narrow ground and therefore exceeded its statutory jurisdiction.

It is clear that a finding which is not supported by any legal evidence may justify a review of the employer’s approval, whereas a finding that merely appears to lack sufficient, adequate, or satisfactory evidence does not permit such a review. After a careful examination of the reasons provided by the Tribunal in the appealed award, the Court found no doubt that the appellant was rightly asserting that the Tribunal had assumed jurisdiction that the law does not grant it, and that the Tribunal’s refusal to grant approval to the appellant’s action was manifestly erroneous in law. Counsel for the appellant then urged the Court to consider the matter of Har Prasad, contending that Har Prasad had suffered victimisation by the employer because of his trade‑union activities. Har Prasad held the position of President of the Kapra Mill Mazdoor Union in Saharanpur, and the appellant’s dislike of him stemmed from his role as union president. Both parties agreed that, at the relevant time, Har Prasad was not classified as a protected workman; consequently, his situation did not fall within the ambit of section 33(3). The Tribunal observed that no witness had identified Har Prasad as participating in any assault and therefore inclined to view his dismissal as victimisation. The Court, having examined this workman’s case in detail, concluded that the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to grant approval even for his dismissal. It is also undisputed that Har Prasad led delegations to the Controller of Production on both 12 October and 14 October, and that he did not deny having issued a threat on the earlier date, warning the Controller that his conduct would cause trouble. Importantly, several workers who assaulted officers on 14 October had accompanied Har Prasad and were present when he issued that warning. The appellant’s Controller of Production testified about the threat, and the chronology of events on 14 October clearly shows that Har Prasad’s threat and his incitement directly led to the assault that evening. The Controller’s evidence appeared straightforward and honest; he openly admitted that Har Prasad had previously cooperated with him and had never before instigated any attack on officers. Although Har Prasad denied any heated exchange during his interview with the officers, he did not contest the Controller’s testimony that he had issued a warning at that time, and his main contention was that …

The Court observed that once the workman had issued the threat, disciplinary action ought to have been initiated against him without delay. Relying on the material presented at the enquiry, the enquiry officer concluded that the charge framed against the workman was proved beyond doubt. The specific accusation stated that the workman had deliberately plotted and organised a conspiracy to assault several senior officials, namely the General Superintendent, the Weaving Master, the Chief Engineer, the Factory Manager and the Controller of Production. The charge sheet set out these particulars in detail, and the enquiry affirmed that the evidence established each element of the alleged conspiracy. The Court noted that, if such charges are proved, they unquestionably merit dismissal under the applicable standing orders. Nonetheless, the Tribunal attempted to review the correctness of the finding recorded against Har Prasad and held that the finding was not supported by the merits. The Court reiterated that the Tribunal possessed no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the findings of the enquiry, a jurisdictional limitation it had overstepped. Consequently, the Tribunal’s conclusion with respect to all the workmen was deemed both unjustified and ultra vires. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order issued by the Tribunal, and affirmed the validity of the action taken by the appellant under section 6E. No order as to costs was made. The appeal was therefore allowed.