The Bata Shoe Co. (P) Ltd vs D. N. Ganguly and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 32 and 33 of 1960

Decision Date: 15 December 1960

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar

On 15 December 1960 the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment in the matter of The Bata Shoe Co. (P) Ltd versus D N Ganguly and Others. The opinion was authored by Justice K N Wanchoo, with Justice P B Gajendragadkar sitting on the bench. The petitioner in the proceeding was The Bata Shoe Co. (P) Ltd and the respondents were D N Ganguly together with several other individuals. The case is reported as 1961 AIR 1158 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reporter at 1961 SCR (3) 308, with additional citations recorded in the legal citators as R 1970 SC 1851 (14) RF, 1972 SC 1895 (5) R, 1978 SC 828 (10) RF, and 1980 SC 1896 (132). The dispute concerned the application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, particularly sections 12 and 18, to a question of an illegal strike, a managerial enquiry, the dismissal of workmen, and the competence of a reference made to a tribunal after a settlement that had not been approved by a conciliation officer.

During the conciliation process that was underway between the Bata company and its workmen, the parties arrived at a settlement on 18 February 1954. In spite of that settlement a group of workmen commenced a strike on 23 February 1954; the strike continued for several weeks and was finally called off on 19 and 20 March 1954. The employer, alleging that the strike was unlawful because it occurred while a settlement was in force, served charge‑sheets on those workmen who participated in the strike. After completing a managerial enquiry, the company dismissed sixty of the striking workers. The dismissals were later the subject of conciliation proceedings before the Labour Commissioner, and on 2 September 1954 the employer and the union reached another agreement concerning the reinstatement of the dismissed employees. The Labour Commissioner was informed of this September settlement, but he discovered that the union was refusing to accept the reinstatement of certain workmen. Consequently, the Commissioner proposed to conduct further conciliation proceedings. The employer opposed the idea of additional conciliation, and the Commissioner consequently reported the matter to the Government under section 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A reference was then made to the industrial tribunal, which delivered an award ordering the reinstatement of all sixty dismissed workmen. The tribunal’s reasoning highlighted that the workers had not been shown to have engaged in violent conduct, that they had been misled into joining the strike for the purpose of removing the incumbent union office‑bearers, and that, although a larger number of workers had taken part in the illegal strike, only the sixty individuals had been dismissed while the remainder had already been reinstated.

The appellant challenged the tribunal’s award on three principal grounds. First, it contended that the September 2 1954 settlement, having been reached during conciliation proceedings and dealing specifically with the sixty dismissed workmen, rendered the reference incompetent under section 18 of the Act because the settlement had not received the approval of the conciliation officer. Second, the appellant argued that the reference was improper because the dispute was essentially between the employer and individual workmen rather than an industrial dispute within the meaning of the statute. Third, the appellant maintained that, irrespective of the procedural questions, the tribunal’s order for reinstatement was unfounded and could not be justified.

The appellant contended that the Tribunal’s order of reinstatement was unwarranted for three reasons. First, it was argued that under sections 12 and 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a settlement that is binding under section 18 must have been reached with the assistance and concurrence of the conciliation officer. Accordingly, a settlement that does not enjoy the binding effect of section 18 cannot prevent the Government from making a reference. In the present case the agreement dated 2 September 1954 lacked the approval of the conciliation officer; therefore, the reference that was based on the conciliation officer’s report under section 12 was held to be competent. Second, the appellant submitted that the reference was not improper merely because an individual dispute was brought before the Tribunal, since the dispute had originally been sponsored by the union and was connected with the dismissal of a far larger group of workmen. Consequently, the reference was not considered bad on that ground. Third, the appellant argued that where the Tribunal found that the employees had committed misconduct justifying dismissal under the Standing Orders and that a proper managerial inquiry had been conducted, the Tribunal was not empowered to interfere with the management’s action unless it identified unreasonable discrimination, an unfair labour practice, or victimisation of the employees. The Court accepted this reasoning, following the authority of Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Another v. Their Workmen, [1958] S.C.R. 667, and distinguished I. G. N. and Railway Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 1.

The judgment concerned two connected civil appeals, numbered 32 and 33 of 1960, filed by special leave against the award dated 24 February 1959 of the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, in References 10 of 1959 and 1 of 1955. The counsel for the appellant included the Attorney‑General for India and two other representatives, while counsel for the respondents were also listed. The judgment was delivered on 15 December 1960 by Justice Wanchoo. The appeals related to the dismissal of sixty workmen employed by the appellant company. The dispute had been referred to the Tribunal on two separate occasions: one reference involving thirty‑one workmen and the other involving twenty‑nine workmen. Although two references were made, the Tribunal disposed of both matters by a single common award, which gave rise to the two appeals presently before the Court.

In accordance with the strike notice that had been served by Shri Bari, the work stoppage continued for approximately one month and was finally called off on the nineteenth and twentieth days of March 1954. The appellant asserted that the strike which commenced on the twenty‑third of February 1954 was unlawful because it occurred while a settlement, which had been reached during conciliation proceedings assisted by the Labour Commissioner acting as the conciliation officer, was still in force. Acting on that position, the appellant proceeded to serve charge‑sheets on the workmen who had participated in the illegal strike on the fourth day of March 1954. Following the service of those charge‑sheets, the appellant conducted a managerial inquiry and consequently dismissed the sixty workmen concerned. After the dismissals, further conciliation efforts were undertaken, but those proceedings did not succeed, and as a result the two references that are before this Court were made.

The tribunal’s principal findings were that the settlement dated the eighteenth of February 1954 was a genuine and bona fide agreement arrived at during the course of the conciliation process, and therefore it bound the workmen. Because the strike began on the twenty‑third of February 1954, it was in direct breach of the terms of that settlement and was consequently illegal. The tribunal further observed that the strike had been launched in a hurried manner and that the management had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to the demands before the strike was commenced. It also identified the election of Shri Bari and the new office‑bearers as a source of the dispute. The matter was referred to the Registrar of Trade Unions, who held that the meeting at which Shri Bari and the new office‑bearers were elected was irregular; consequently, the former office‑bearers of the union remained the validly elected executives. That decision was rendered on the twenty‑second of February 1954, and the strike was launched the very next day, on the twenty‑third of February. Although the tribunal was uncertain whether the decision of the Registrar had been communicated to Shri Bari before the strike began, it nevertheless concluded that there was no justification for the precipitous launch of the strike after the settlement of February 18, 1954. Having determined that the strike was illegal and unjustifiably rushed, the tribunal then examined the dismissals of the sixty workmen. It found that no allegation of violence had been leveled against those workmen, and even the original charge‑sheets did not contain any charge of violent conduct. The tribunal classified the sixty workmen into three groups: a group of forty‑seven, a group of eleven, and a group of two. For the forty‑seven workmen, the tribunal assumed that charge‑sheets had been served, noting that those men had refused to accept the documents, and it held that a proper inquiry into the charges had been conducted despite the workmen’s absence. Regarding the eleven workmen, the tribunal expressed the opinion that charge‑sheets had not been served on them, and therefore any inquiry conducted in their absence was of

The tribunal observed that, for two of the dismissed workmen, no attempt had been made to serve any charge‑sheet. Consequently, it set aside the dismissal orders for those two individuals. Regarding thirteen other workmen, the tribunal found that either no charge‑sheet had been served on them or no charge‑sheet had been issued at all, and therefore it also vacated the dismissal orders concerning them. For the remaining forty‑seven workmen, the tribunal noted that charge‑sheets had indeed been issued, but the workmen had refused to accept them and an inquiry had been conducted in their absence. Nevertheless, the tribunal held that the dismissals of these forty‑seven could not be sustained because none of them had been proven to have participated in any violent act, and there were mitigating factors: the workmen had been misled into joining the strike with the purpose of removing the existing union office bearers so that new candidates could be elected. The tribunal further pointed out that although a far larger number of employees had taken part in the illegal strike and the union had represented them, only the sixty workmen under consideration had been dismissed while the others had been reinstated. It concluded that there was no justification for the appellant to differentiate between these sixty and the reinstated employees. Accordingly, the tribunal ordered that the forty‑seven workmen whose charge‑sheets had been refused also be reinstated. Finally, the tribunal held that the workmen had already suffered sufficient penalty by being out of employment from March 1954 until February 1959, the date of the award, and therefore there was no reason to continue their dismissal. In terms of monetary relief, the tribunal awarded back basic wages equal to fifty percent of the amount due to the two workmen for whom no charge‑sheet was issued, twenty‑five percent to the eleven workmen who were not served with charge‑sheets, and no back wages to the forty‑seven workmen who had declined to accept the charge‑sheets.

Three issues were raised by the appellant for consideration. First, the appellant contended that a settlement reached during conciliation proceedings on 2 September 1954, which specifically addressed the fate of these sixty workmen, rendered the tribunal’s references incompetent. Second, the appellant argued that the references were incompetent because the matter concerned a dispute between the employer and individual workmen rather than an industrial dispute. Third, the appellant asserted that the tribunal’s order of reinstatement was unjustified. Regarding the first point, the record shows that after a large number of workmen were dismissed following the illegal strike of 23 February 1954, conciliation proceedings were initiated before the Labour Commissioner of Bihar concerning those dismissals and related matters. These proceedings appear to have commenced before 1 May 1954, as on that date the Labour Commissioner wrote to the appellant stating that the appellant’s objection that the conciliation proceedings were illegal and beyond jurisdiction was unfounded. Further correspondence dated 31 August indicates that the conciliation efforts continued up to the end of August 1954.

On 31 August 1954 the Labour Commissioner sent a letter to the appellant stating that he had learned that mutual negotiations were taking place between the appellant and its workmen for the settlement of their dispute and that 2 September had been fixed as the date for that settlement. Consequently, the Labour Commissioner gave notice to the appellant that, should the disputes not be mutually resolved before that date, he would convene conciliation proceedings on 3 September at 3 p.m. in his office.

It appears that an agreement was indeed reached between the appellant and the union on 2 September. The agreement recorded that 76 dismissed workmen had already been re‑employed and further provided that 110 workmen would also be employed in the same manner as those seventy‑six. The agreement also stipulated that 31 dismissed workmen would remain dismissed and would not be considered for any further employment or any other benefit. In addition, 30 other dismissed workmen would, for the time being, remain dismissed; their future would be decided later by the union and the appellant, either to confirm their dismissal like the thirty‑one mentioned, to allow them to wait for vacancies as they arose, or to treat them as retired on the date of dismissal so that they could receive gratuity and a refund of their provident‑fund contributions. The present references, it was noted, concerned sixty workmen out of a total of sixty‑one.

The Labour Commissioner, having been apprised of this settlement, wrote to the appellant on 3 September 1954 informing him that the conciliation proceedings scheduled for that day were cancelled. He further pointed out that the union was opposing the reinstatement of certain workmen and therefore proposed to hold additional conciliation proceedings concerning those workmen on 6 September 1954 at 3 p.m., before making his final recommendations to the government in the matter. The appellant protested to the Labour Commissioner against holding any further conciliation after the 2 September agreement and apparently did not attend the meeting fixed for 6 September. No further action therefore appears to have taken place in the conciliation process.

Presumably the Labour Commissioner subsequently reported the matter to the government under section 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947. Following that report, the government issued two references: the first on 8 October 1954 relating to the thirty‑one workmen, and the second on 15 January 1955 relating to twenty‑nine workmen. On the basis of these facts, the appellant contended that the references were incompetent because of the agreement made on 2 September 1954. The appellant relied upon sections 18 and 19 of the Act, as they stood at the relevant time. Section 18 provided that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings would be binding on all parties to the industrial dispute and on others specified therein, and section 19…

According to the provision, a settlement became effective on the date that the parties mutually agreed; if the parties did not agree on a date, the settlement became effective on the date on which the parties signed the memorandum of settlement. The same provision stated that the settlement would remain binding for the period expressly agreed by the parties, and if the parties failed to specify any period, the settlement would be binding for six months. After the end of that period, the settlement would continue to bind the parties until two months elapsed from the moment a written notice of termination was served by one party to the other party or parties to the settlement. The appellant argued that the agreement reached on 2 September 1954, which was concluded during the conciliation proceedings between the appellant and the union, bound all workmen and therefore prohibited the government from referring the dispute to the court within six months of that date. This argument raised the interpretative issue of what the phrase “in the course of conciliation proceedings” meant in section 18 of the Act. The Court observed that the phrase plainly referred to the period during which the conciliation proceedings were pending, and it accepted that the conciliation proceedings concerning the dismissals, which had begun before 1 May 1954, were certainly pending up to 6 September 1954 and possibly a short time thereafter, as indicated by two letters issued by the Labour Commissioner. The Court then considered whether any agreement reached by the parties during that pending period automatically became binding under section 18, or whether the provision required that the settlement be reached with the concurrence of the conciliation officer. The Court interpreted the legislature’s intent to be that a settlement reached “during the course of conciliation proceedings” was binding not only on the parties to the settlement but also on all present and future workmen only when the settlement was arrived at with the assistance and endorsement of the conciliation officer, who was expected to deem it reasonable. Section 12 of the Act, the Court noted, assigned specific duties to the conciliation officer, directing him to investigate the dispute and all matters affecting its merits and to take any steps he deemed appropriate to bring about a fair and amicable settlement without delay, as prescribed in section 12(2). Section 12(3) further required that, if a settlement of the dispute or any of its matters was reached during the conciliation proceedings, the conciliation officer must forward a report of that settlement, together with the signed memorandum, to the appropriate government authority.

The Court examined the provision that required the Government, together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute, to be sent. When this provision was read together with section 18 of the Act, the Court found it clearly indicated that a settlement made binding under section 18 had to be one that was arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings with the assistance and concurrence of the conciliation officer. The duty of the conciliation officer, under section 12, was to promote a correct settlement and to do everything necessary to induce the parties to reach a fair and amicable settlement. Consequently, only a settlement reached while the conciliation proceedings were still pending and with the officer’s assistance could be binding under section 18.

In the facts before the Court, it was evident that the Labour Commissioner had taken no steps to promote the actual agreement that the appellant and the union had reached on 2 September. The letter dated 31 August indicated that the Labour Commissioner would act under section 12(2) on 3 September if no mutual agreement was reached between the appellant and the union. The Court observed that a mutual agreement had indeed been reached between the appellant and the union without the Labour Commissioner’s assistance, and that the Commissioner did not later give his approval. Evidence showed that the Commissioner disapproved of the settlement because it excluded the reinstatement of a large group of workmen, and therefore he did not act under section 12(3). Under these circumstances, the Court held that such a mutual agreement could not be described as a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, even though it was concluded while the proceedings were still pending.

The Court clarified that a settlement deemed to be arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings must satisfy two conditions: it must be concluded during the period when the proceedings are pending, and it must be reached with the assistance and concurrence of the conciliation officer, after which it would be reported to the appropriate Government under section 12(3). The agreement of 2 September 1954 was not achieved with the assistance and concurrence of the Labour Commissioner, as demonstrated by his letter of 3 September 1954. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the agreement was not a settlement binding under section 18 of the Act and therefore could not prevent the Government from referring the matter concerning the sixty workmen.

Regarding the second contention raised, the Court considered the argument that the dispute was not an industrial dispute but merely a disagreement between the employer and individual workmen, and that therefore the Government lacked jurisdiction to make references. The Court rejected this argument, stating that there was no merit in the contention. The Court recalled that it had already set out the history of the conciliation proceedings in this case, which demonstrated that the matter fell within the scope of an industrial dispute, giving the Government appropriate jurisdiction to make the references.

From the Labour Commissioner’s letter dated 3 September 1954, it was clear that he had prepared a report for the Government pursuant to section 12(4) of the Act, and that the references subsequently made under section 12(5) read with section 10(1) were based on that report. The record showed that, although the dismissal of a considerably larger group of workmen had originally been the subject of the conciliation proceedings, on 2 September 1954 the appellant and the union reached a mutual agreement which effectively excluded the case of the sixty workmen in question. The Labour Commissioner, as indicated by his 3 September letter, was not prepared to concur with the parties’ action; consequently, he must have forwarded a report to the Government under section 12(4), which led to the two references made under section 10(1). In these circumstances the Court could not comprehend how a dispute that began as an industrial dispute, was sponsored by the union, involved the dismissal of a much larger number of workmen (including the sixty), and became the subject of conciliation proceedings under section 12(1), could later be transformed into an individual dispute merely because the appellant and the union had reached a mutual agreement that the Labour Commissioner did not fully accept. The Commissioner’s report under section 12(4) and the ensuing references under section 10(1) therefore did not render the references improper on the ground that an individual dispute had been referred to the tribunal for adjudication.

Turning to the merits, the Court examined the sixty workmen in three groups, following the same approach adopted by the tribunal. The first group consisted of forty‑seven workmen. The tribunal had found that these workmen participated in an illegal strike and that there was no justification for conducting such a strike in a hurried manner. It also observed that charge‑sheets had been issued to them, which they refused to accept. According to the Standing Orders, a workman who declines to accept a charge‑sheet or to provide an explanation when charged is deemed to have admitted the charge, and a workman who refuses any communication from the company is liable to disciplinary action for insubordination. The tribunal further concluded that a proper inquiry had been held, albeit in the absence of the workmen, and that the conduct of the forty‑seven workmen amounted to misconduct warranting dismissal under the Standing Orders. On the basis of these findings, the Court was of the view that the tribunal would not have interfered with the dismissal orders, as the case fell squarely within the principles governing the limits of the tribunal’s power of interference.

The Court referred to the principles laid down in the managerial inquiry case of Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and another v. Their Workmen (1). Counsel for the respondent‑workmen relied on the decision in Indian General Navigation and Railway Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (2). In that earlier case the Court had observed that, for the purpose of deciding a punishment, a clear distinction must be drawn between workmen who not only joined a strike but also obstructed loyal employees, participated in violent demonstrations, or acted in defiance of law and order, and those workmen who were essentially silent participants in the strike. The present judgment stressed that those observations had to be understood in the factual context of the earlier case, where two essential points were established: first, it was not demonstrated that an employee who merely took part in an illegal strike could be dismissed under the Standing Orders; second, the case had no proper managerial inquiry, and consequently the extent of the punishment fell within the jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal. In contrast, the tribunal in the present matter found that the conduct of the forty‑seven workmen amounted to misconduct that justified dismissal under the Standing Orders and that a proper managerial inquiry had been conducted. Because the factual matrix here differed, the Court held that the earlier observations could not be transplanted to the present facts. Accordingly, the tribunal’s reasoning that the appellant was not justified in dismissing the workmen merely because they had not engaged in violence could not be accepted.

The tribunal also based its decision on the allegation that the appellant had reinstated a large number of other employees who had likewise participated in the illegal strike, and therefore it could not discriminate against the forty‑seven workmen. The Court noted that the tribunal’s award made clear that no discrimination was made on the ground that these workmen had supported Shri Bari; indeed, a number of other workmen who also supported Shri Bari were reinstated. The Court referred to the authority of Messrs. Burn and Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1), which held that mere participation in an illegal strike could not, by itself, justify suspension or dismissal, especially where a clear distinction could not be drawn between those participants and a large number of workmen who were reinstated despite similar conduct. While the Court recognised that an employer’s unreasonable discrimination in reinstating employees could give the industrial tribunal cause to interfere, it stressed that each case must be examined on its own facts. In the present case, the appellant had shown a willingness to take back even those who had supported Shri Bari and had, in fact, reinstated many such employees. Consequently, the claim of discrimination advanced by the tribunal did not merit acceptance.

The Court observed that before a tribunal may set aside an employer’s order issued after a duly held managerial inquiry, it must carefully examine the factual circumstances of each individual case to determine whether discrimination is established. The Court referred to the earlier decision in Burn & Co.’s case (1) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 529, noting that in that matter no justification for discrimination could be found. In contrast, the Court found that the present case presented a different factual matrix. The employer, referred to as the appellant, had not itself engaged in discriminatory conduct; rather, the appellant was prepared to reinstate workers who had supported Shri Bari and indeed reinstated a considerable number of such employees. The difficulty originated from an internal dispute within the union that precipitated the illegal strike, a history already explained by the Court. A mutual agreement dated 2 September 1954 demonstrated that the union representing the workmen opposed the reinstatement of sixty‑one workers, of which forty‑seven formed the subset now under consideration. Consequently, the appellant faced a choice between accommodating the wishes of the majority of the workforce and complying with the union’s demand that the sixty‑one workers should not be taken back. In light of this dilemma, the appellant elected not to reinstate the sixty‑one workers, including the forty‑seven in question. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the allegation of discrimination could not be properly directed at the appellant; if any responsibility lay elsewhere, it rested with the union. Since the managerial inquiry was deemed properly conducted and the misconduct of the forty‑seven workers warranted dismissal under the applicable Standing Orders, the tribunal had no ground to interfere with the appellant’s dismissal order. The Court further clarified that participation in an illegal strike does not automatically require dismissal in every case, but where a fair inquiry has been held and dismissal is imposed for joining an illegal strike, the tribunal should not intervene unless it discovers evidence of unfair labour practice or victimisation of the employee.

The Court then turned to the situation of two workmen, identified as Jagdish Lal (respondent 31) and L. Choudhary (respondent 60), for whom no charge‑sheets had been issued. The fact that no charge‑sheets were served to these individuals was not contested. The appellant argued that, under the Standing Orders, a charge‑sheet was not required in their cases. The Standing Orders state that any workman charged with an offence, except in cases of lateness and absenteeism, shall receive a copy of the charge and shall be given an opportunity to explain before any decision is made. The appellant maintained that the only allegation against these two workmen was unauthorized absence, and therefore a formal charge‑sheet was unnecessary. The Court noted this contention while emphasizing that the Standing Orders still require an opportunity to be heard before a dismissal can be effected, even when a charge‑sheet is not prepared. Consequently, the Court found that no opportunity to present an explanation had been provided to either Jagdish Lal or L. Choudhary prior to the dismissal decision. Accordingly, the dismissals of these two workmen were held to be contrary to the provisions of the Standing Orders, and the tribunal’s orders concerning them were to be upheld.

The Court observed that, although the Standing Orders state that a charge‑sheet is not required when the alleged misconduct concerns mere absence, this proposition does not correctly apply to the case of Jagdish Lal. The dismissal letter sent to him demonstrates that a charge‑sheet was, in fact, contemplated. Moreover, the Standing Orders provide that even where a charge‑sheet is not issued, no disciplinary action may be taken against a workman unless he is first afforded an opportunity to present his explanation before any decision is reached. The record shows that no such opportunity was afforded to either Jagdish Lal or L. Choudhary prior to the pronouncement of their dismissals. Consequently, although a formal charge‑sheet might not have been required for these two employees, the manner of their dismissal violated the provisions of the Standing Orders because they were not heard before the decision was taken. The Court therefore concluded that the tribunal’s order concerning these two workmen must be confirmed, since their dismissals were procedurally infirm under the Standing Orders.

The Court then turned to the matter of eleven other workmen—namely Mohd. Mansoor (respondent 6), Ram Kuber Das (respondent 9), Ramasis (respondent 15), Mohd. Zafir (respondent 19), Mohd. Islam (respondent 20), Mohd. Zafir (respondent 22), Rajeshwar Prasad (respondent 26), Chirkut (respondent 27), Lal Das (respondent 43), Inderdip (respondent 47) and Mohd. Nazir (respondent 58). The tribunal had held that charge‑sheets, although issued, could not be served on these men and that the subsequent inquiry was conducted without their knowledge of either the charges or the date of the hearing. In those circumstances, the tribunal declared that the proceeding did not constitute a genuine inquiry and ordered the reinstatement of the eleven workmen. The appellant argued that this situation was analogous to that of forty‑seven employees who had refused to accept charge‑sheets sent by registered post, and submitted that posting the charge‑sheets on the company’s notice‑board and publishing notices in newspapers satisfied the requirements of service, relying on the precedent set in Mckenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1). In that precedent, the Standing Orders permitted service by oral communication and/or by affixing notices on the notice‑board, and the court held that the employer had done all that was practicable under the Orders. However, the Court noted that the present facts differ: the Standing Orders only require that a workman charged with an offence receive a copy of the charge and deem a refusal to accept the charge‑sheet as an admission of guilt. They do not authorize service by notice‑board posting. The charge‑sheets in this case were mailed by registered post, returned unserved because the workmen could not be located in their villages, and on the same day newspaper notices were issued stating that a group of workmen had participated in an illegal strike from 23 February 1954 and were liable to strict disciplinary action, as reflected in the citation [1959] SUPPl. 1 S.C.R. 222.

In this case the Court observed that the earlier decision, which held that affixing notices on a notice‑board amounted to sufficient service, could not be applied because the present circumstances were different. The Standing Orders of the appellant company required only that a workman who was charged with an offence should receive a copy of the charge and provided that a workman who refused to accept the charge‑sheet would be deemed to have admitted the charge. The Standing Orders did not contain any rule permitting the charge‑sheets to be posted on the company’s notice‑board. Accordingly, the charge‑sheets addressed to eleven workmen were dispatched by registered post, but they were returned unserved because the intended recipients could not be located in their villages. On the same day that the registered letters were sent, the company caused notices to appear in certain newspapers stating that a group of workmen, acting in concert, had taken part in an illegal strike commencing on 23 February 1954, that they were liable to stringent disciplinary action, and that they had been charged under the company’s Standing Orders and Rules. The notices further alleged that individual charge‑sheets had been sent to each workman by registered post with acknowledgment due, that the same charge‑sheets had also been displayed on notice‑boards inside and outside the factory gate, and that the workmen were required to submit explanations by 9 March 1954. However, these newspaper notices did not identify the names of the workmen whose charge‑sheets were sent or whose charge‑sheets were displayed on the notice‑boards. Consequently, it was hard to argue that the eleven workmen actually knew that they were among those charged or that the charge‑sheets had been exhibited on the boards. The Court held that the proper procedure, given the return of the registered notices as unserved, would have been to publish notices naming the eleven workmen in a regional‑language newspaper having wide circulation in Bihar, together with the specific charges framed against them. The Court noted that if the Standing Orders had expressly authorized service of charge‑sheets by notice‑board display, the company’s actions might have been deemed sufficient. In the absence of such a provision, the company should have adopted the newspaper route. Because it failed to do so, the Court agreed with the tribunal that the eleven workmen had received no notice of the charges, the deadline for submitting explanations, or the date of the inquiry. Accordingly, the tribunal’s order concerning those eleven workmen was affirmed. The Court therefore allowed the appeal insofar as it related to the first group of forty‑seven workmen, set aside the tribunal’s order reinstating them, and dismissed the appeals as to the remaining thirteen workmen.

In the matter before the Court, the parties were identified as respondents and their names were listed as follows. Jagdish Lal, respondent 31; L. Choudhary, respondent 60; Mohd. Mansoor, respondent 6; Ram Kuber Das, respondent 9; Ramasis, respondent 15; Mohd. Zafir, respondent 19; and Mohd. Islam, respondent 20. Mohd. Zafir, respondent 22; Rajeshwar Prasad, respondent 26; Chirkut, respondent 27; Lal Das, respondent 43; Inderdip, respondent 47; and Mohd. Nazir, respondent 58. The Court examined the order issued by the tribunal concerning each of these individuals and found that the tribunal’s decision was correct, thereby affirming that order with respect to each named respondent. Having reached this conclusion, the Court addressed the allocation of costs and observed that each party would bear its own costs incurred in these proceedings before the Court. Accordingly, the Court recorded that the appeal was partly allowed, meaning that the relief sought succeeded for the first group of workmen but failed for the remaining thirteen respondents. Thus, the tribunal’s order remains in force for each of the listed respondents and consequently the parties each bear their own costs incurred. The judgment was thereby rendered, concluding the proceedings on the matter and confirming the tribunal’s determinations for the respondents named above.