Thakur Manmohan Deo and Another vs The State of Bihar and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 273 and 274 of 1955

Decision Date: 19 September 1960

Coram: S.K. Das, J.L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this case, the Supreme Court of India heard an appeal titled Thakur Manmohan Deo and Another versus the State of Bihar and Others. The judgment was delivered on 19 September 1960. The bench consisted of Justice S.K. Das, Justice J.L. Kapur, Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioners were Thakur Manmohan Deo and another person; the respondents were the State of Bihar and additional parties. The case concerned a connected appeal arising from two suits, and the citation is 1961 AIR 189 and 1961 SCR (1) 695. The central statutory point involved the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, and its applicability to certain ghatwali tenures known as Rohini and Pathrole ghatwalis. These tenures were originally created under Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814. The Act had been enacted by the Bihar State Legislature and became effective on 25 September 1950. The petitioners argued that the Act should not apply to the government ghatwali tenures because: first, Section 3 of the Act could not be used to acquire such tenures in view of the definition in Section 2 and the provisions of Sections 23(1)(f) and 32(4); second, the Act did not intend to repeal Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814, and a special law dealing with special tenures should not be displaced by a general land‑reform statute; third, the ghatwali tenures were of a quasi‑military character and therefore fell under Entries 1 and 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, rendering the Act beyond the legislative competence of the State. The Court held that all ghatwali tenures, including government ghatwalis, fell within the definition clause of Section 2 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. Although Sections 23(1)(f) and 32(4) might not be directly applicable to the tenures in question, they did not remove those tenures from the operation of the remaining provisions of the Act. The Court further observed that the pith and substance of the Act related to acquisition of property, which placed it under Entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, and it bore no relation to Entries 1 and 2 of List I. Accordingly, the State Legislature possessed the competence to enact the Act. The Court also reiterated the principle that a special law concerning a special tenure is not displaced by a subsequent general law of land reforms, citing the decision in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, [1952] S.C.R. 898.

In this case the Court noted that the earlier observation that the land‑reforms legislation did not apply to the Act because the Act in its essence dealt with acquisition of property was correct, and consequently there was no question of the repeal of Regulation XXIX of 1814. The Court applied the decision in Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U.P. and Another, [1952] S.C.R. 1056, to the present factual situation. The matter before the Court arose from two civil appeals, numbered 273 and 274 of 1955, which were filed against the judgment and order dated 10 December 1954 of the Patna High Court. Those High Court proceedings were themselves appeals from original decrees numbered 309 and 310 of 1954, which had been passed in two separate suits, Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 and Title Suit No. 23 of 1952. Both suits had been tried together before the learned Subordinate Judge of Deoghar and had been dismissed with costs. The plaintiffs in those two suits were the present appellants. One appellant, Thakur Manmohan Deo, held a ghatwali tenure popularly known as the Rohini ghatwali, located in the Deoghar subdivision of the Santhal Parganas district. The other appellant, Tikaitni Faldani Kumari, held the Pathrole ghatwali, also situated in the same subdivision. Both ghatwali tenures had previously been identified as Birbhum ghatwalis and were governed by Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814. In 1950 the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 (Bihar Act 30 of 1950) was enacted and came into force on 25 September 1950. The validity of that Act was challenged before the Patna High Court on the ground that it violated certain fundamental rights, and the High Court held the Act to be unconstitutional on those grounds. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, was subsequently enacted on 18 June 1951. In appeals from the Patna High Court decision, this Court, in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga, held that the Act was not unconstitutional or void on the asserted grounds, except with respect to the provisions of section 4(b) and section 23(f). Accordingly, the validity of the Act could no longer be questioned on those grounds, although one of the suits from which the present appeals arose had contended that the Act was ultra vires the Constitution. The principal issue that remained for determination in the two suits was issue number 3, which asked whether the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, purport to acquire the plaintiffs’ ghatwalis, and if so, whether such application was ultra vires. The Court resolved that issue against the appellants, holding that the provisions did indeed purport to acquire the ghatwalis and that their application was not ultra vires.

The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge was affirmed by the High Court of Patna in a decree dated 10 December 1954, and from that decision the two appeals now before this Court arise. The appellants advanced three principal submissions. First, they argued that a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, shows that the Act does not apply to ghatwali tenures such as the Rohini and Pathrole ghatwalis. Second, they contended that, even if the Act were to apply to those ghatwali tenures, the State legislature lacked the competence to enact it, because the Rohini and Pathrole ghatwalis are of a quasi‑military character and consequently fall within items 1 and 2 of the Union List, rendering the legislation beyond the State’s legislative authority. Third, the appellants asserted that the Act does not purport to repeal Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814; since that Regulation governs special tenures, a special law dealing with such tenures would not be displaced by the general land‑reform legislation embodied in the Act. The Court indicated that it would consider these three contentions in the order presented. However, before addressing them, the Court found it necessary to set out briefly the nature of the ghatwali tenures that form the factual backdrop of the dispute.

To that end, the Court referred to certain provisions of Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814. Section 1 declares that lands held by persons designated as ghatwals in the district of Birbhum constitute a peculiar tenure to which the existing regulations do not expressly apply; it further states that, by usage and the constitution of the country, these ghatwals are entitled to hold their lands in perpetuity, subject to the payment of a fixed rent to the zamindar of Birbhum and to the performance of specified duties for the maintenance of public peace and support of the police. The Regulation then sets out rules to stabilize the arrangement among the ghatwals, embodied in sections 2, 3, 4 and 5. Section 2 provides that, following a recent settlement between the Government and the ghatwals of Birbhum, the ghatwals and their descendants shall retain possession of the lands forever, provided they continue to pay the assessed revenue and are not subjected to any increase in rent so long as they punctually discharge the stipulated rent. Section 3 declares that the ghatwali lands shall be regarded as part of the zamindari of Birbhum, with the rent to be paid directly to the Assistant Collector at Suri or to any other public officer designated by the Board of Revenue. Section 5 stipulates that, should any ghatwal fail to pay the stipulated rent, the State Government may cause the ghatwali tenure of the defaulter to be sold by public auction to satisfy the arrears, or may transfer the tenure to a person approved by the State Government on the condition that the arrears be cleared, or may dispose of the tenure by grant, with revenue assessment adjusted as the Government deems appropriate. These provisions illustrate the distinctive character of ghatwali tenures, which the Court must consider in evaluating the appellants’ arguments.

The Court observed that the ghatwals were required to continue performing the duties of their tenure and to pay the rents that had been fixed for them. Section 3 of the Regulation declared that the lands held under ghatwali tenures were, as at that time, to be treated as part of the zamindari of Birbhum. However, the rent payable by the ghatwals was to be remitted directly to the Assistant Collector stationed at Suri, or to any other public officer that the Board of Revenue might designate to receive such rents. Section 5 provided that if any ghatwal at any time failed to pay the stipulated rent, the State Government possessed the authority to take several actions. First, it could order that the ghatwali tenure of the defaulting ghatwal be sold at a public auction in order to satisfy the arrears, applying the same procedures and rules that governed lands held directly by the Government. Alternatively, the Government could transfer the tenure to any person it approved, on the condition that the new holder would settle the outstanding arrears. The State could also convey the tenure by grant, assessing it with the same revenue as before, or with an increased or reduced assessment, if the Government considered such a modification appropriate. Finally, the Government retained the power to dispose of the tenure in any other manner that it deemed proper. The Court then referred to several Privy Council decisions that had examined the nature of these tenures. In particular, it cited the decision in Satya Narayan Singh v. Satya Niranjan Chakravarti, where Lord Sumner summarized the position on pages 198‑199 of the report. He explained that, in the Santal Parganas, three practical classes of ghatwali tenures existed: (a) government ghatwalis created by the ruling authority; (b) government ghatwalis that, since their creation and generally at the time of the Permanent Settlement, had been incorporated into a zamindari estate and assessed as part of that estate; and (c) zamindari ghatwalis created by a zamindar or his predecessor and alienable with the zamindar’s consent. The second category, according to Lord Sumner, was essentially a branch of the first. He further noted that the term “ghatwal” denoted an office held by a particular individual from time to time, who was bound to perform certain duties in exchange for consideration. Within this definition, a wide variety of conditions could exist. The office might be based on a simple personal contract of employment for wages, taking the form of the use of land or an actual estate in land, which could be hereditary and perpetual but conditioned upon the performance of specific services. The office could be public or private, significant or minor. The ghatwal, as the guard of a mountain pass, might serve as a bulwark protecting an entire countryside against invaders, act merely as a sentry against petty marauders, or function as a game‑keeper protecting crops from wild animals. Ghatwali duties could be divided into police duties and quasi‑military duties, although both categories had largely lost much of their former importance, and the quasi‑military aspect, in any strict sense, had become largely obsolete.

It was observed that the responsibilities attached to the office of ghatwal could be performed in a variety of ways. In some cases the duties required the personal competence of the incumbent, while in other instances the functions could be carried out indirectly through the creation of shikmi tenures or by employing a subordinate force. There were also situations where the obligations were so collective that they could be satisfied only by providing resources in bulk. The court noted that when a grant of the ghatwal office, together with its hereditary rights, was made to a person and his heirs, the actual personal performance of the ghatwali services was not indispensable, provided that the grantee remained responsible for the services and ensured that they were carried out. The authority that appointed the ghatwal might, depending on the circumstances prevailing in Hindostan, be the sovereign power of the country, a customary landholder tasked with maintaining security and order within his estates, or a private individual who required a permanent watchmen establishment for an extensive property. The court further affirmed that there was no dispute that the Rohini and Pathrole ghatwalis were classified as Government ghatwalis and that they were regulated by Regulation XXIX of 1814. The remaining issue for determination was whether the provisions of the Act were applicable to these particular Government ghatwalis.

The court proceeded to examine the relevant sections of the Act. Section 2, the definition clause, contained sub‑clauses (o), (q) and (r). Sub‑clause (o) defined “proprietor” as a person holding in trust or owning for his own benefit an estate or part thereof, and it expressly included the heirs and successors‑in‑interest of a proprietor, as well as the guardian, committee or other legal curator when the proprietor was a minor, of unsound mind or an idiot. Sub‑clause (q) defined “tenure” as the interest of a tenure‑holder or an under‑tenure‑holder and enumerated three categories: (i) a ghatwali tenure, (ii) a tenure created for the maintenance of any person and commonly known as kharposh, babuana, etc., and (iii) a share in or of a tenure, expressly excluding a Mundari Khunt Kattidari tenancy under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, and a bhuinhairi tenancy confirmed under the Chota Nagpur Tenures Act, 1869. Sub‑clause (r) defined “tenure‑holder” as a person who had acquired from a proprietor or from any other tenure‑holder a right to hold land for the purpose of collecting rent or bringing it under cultivation by establishing tenants, and it listed several subclasses, including a ghatwal and the successors‑in‑interest of a ghatwal. The court noted that these definitions had been amended by Bihar Act 20 of 1954, which gave the amendments retrospective effect and stipulated that the amended provisions were to be deemed always to have been in force. The court therefore turned to the question of whether, under these definitions, the Act extended to the Government ghatwalis of Rohini and Pathrole.

The definition in the statute specifies that “land for the purpose of collecting rent or bringing it under cultivation by establishing tenants on it” includes (i) the successors‑in‑interest of persons who have acquired such a right, (ii) a person who holds such a right in trust, (iii) a holder of a tenure created for the maintenance of any person, (iv) a ghatwal and the successors‑in‑interest of a ghatwal, and (v) where a tenure‑holder is a minor, of unsound mind, or an idiot, his guardian, committee or other legal curator. The clauses labelled (q) and (r) expressly state that “tenure” includes a ghatwali tenure and that “tenure‑holder” includes a ghatwal and the successors‑in‑interest of a ghatwal. The appellants argued that these definition clauses should be interpreted to cover only zamindari ghatwalis and not government ghatwalis. Their first point was that clause (r), in its substantive part, defines a “tenure‑holder” as a person who has acquired from a proprietor or from any other tenure‑holder a right to hold land for the purpose of collecting rent or bringing it under cultivation by establishing tenants. The appellants contended that this description cannot apply to a government ghatwal because a government ghatwal does not obtain such a right from a proprietor or another tenure‑holder. They further referred to element (o), which defines a “proprietor”, and cited Lord Sumner’s observation that government ghatwals were created by the ruling power and, at the time of the Permanent Settlement, were incorporated into a zamindari estate as a unit for assessment. Consequently, the appellants maintained that government ghatwalis never acquired any right from a proprietor or another tenure‑holder. Their second argument was that sub‑clause (i) of element (q) and sub‑clause (iv) of clause (r) must be read in light of the substantive portions of those clauses. Although the sub‑clauses expressly state that “tenure” includes a ghatwali tenure and “tenure‑holder” includes a ghatwal, the appellants argued that only a zamindari ghatwal, who acquires his interest from a proprietor, falls within the substantive meaning of the clauses; the substantive part could not apply to a government ghatwal and his tenure. The Court rejected this line of reasoning. It held that when a statute expressly includes “ghatwali tenure” within the definition of “tenure” and “ghatwal” within the definition of “tenure‑holder” together with the successors‑in‑interest, there must be compelling reasons to limit the scope of those expressions. The legislature, being aware of the distinction between government ghatwalis and zamindari ghatwalis, could have easily excluded government ghatwalis if that had been its intention, by adding explicit limiting language. Since no such restriction was inserted, the Court concluded that the definition was meant to encompass all ghatwali tenures and all ghatwals, regardless of whether they are government or zamindari in nature.

In the two definition clauses of the statute, the legislature did not exclude Government ghatwalis. Rather, the legislature made no distinction between Government ghatwalis and zamindari ghatwalis and deliberately incorporated every ghatwali tenure within the scope of those clauses. The language of the definition clauses contains no limiting words, and no justification was found for inserting any limitation that the text itself does not express. It is important to observe that each of the two definition clauses first sets out, in its substantive portion, the general meaning of the expressions “tenure” and “tenure‑holder.” After that, the clauses expressly state that the expressions shall, inter alia, include a ghatwali tenure, a ghatwal, and the successors‑in‑interest of a ghatwal. Consequently, the legislature artificially broadened the clauses so that all ghatwali tenures, all ghatwals and their successors‑in‑interest fell within the definitions, regardless of whether such tenures fit the general meaning initially described in the substantive part. This artificial expansion is further reflected in sub‑clause (v) of element (r) and sub‑clause (iii) of clause (q). Sub‑clause (iii) of element (q) removes from the definition certain tenures that would otherwise be captured by the general meaning of “tenure,” while sub‑clause (v) of clause (r) widens the term “tenure‑holder” to encompass guardians’ committees and curators. When a definition is expressly framed as “means and shall include …,” there is no room for an argument that, despite the explicit inclusion, a particular category must be excluded because it does not fall within the general meaning of the term. The counsel for the appellants also relied on other provisions of the Act to argue that the Act should not apply to Government ghatwalis. He cited Section 23(1)(f) and Section 32(4) of the Act. Section 23 governs the computation of net income for the purpose of preparing a Compensation Assessment‑roll, directing that certain amounts listed in clauses (a) to (f) be deducted from the gross assets of each proprietor or tenure‑holder. It should be noted that what was previously element (g) of Section 23(1) has been re‑labelled as element (f) because the original element (f) was declared unconstitutional by this Court in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga. For the present discussion, Section 23(1) reads: “For the purpose of preparing a Compensation Assessment‑roll, the net income of a proprietor or a tenure‑holder shall be computed by deducting from the gross asset of such proprietor or tenure‑holder, as the case may be, the following, namely: (a) ————; (b) ————; (c) ————; (d) ————; (e) ————; (f) any other tax or legal imposition payable in respect of such estate or tenure not expressly mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) or the value, to be commuted in the prescribed manner, of any services or obligations of.”

The provision states that any other form to be rendered or discharged as a condition precedent to his enjoyment of such estate or tenure may be deducted. The question presented before the Court was whether element (f) of section 23(1) could be applied to a Government ghatwal. It was argued that element (f) could not apply because a Government ghatwal could still be required to perform the services and obligations that he had undertaken by virtue of the office he held. It was further submitted that the Act did not intend to abolish the ghatwali office and that, since the office and the tenure were inseparably connected, the deduction contemplated in element (f) could not be made in the case of a Government ghatwal. The Court’s attention was also drawn to a later decision of the Patna High Court in Election Appeals nos. 7 and 8 of 1958, dated 20 March 1959, in which a distinction was drawn between acquisition and resumption of a ghatwali tenure and the argument that the office lapsed on acquisition of the tenure was rejected. The citation for that decision is (1) [1952] S.C.R. 898. The Court was informed that the decision was then under appeal before this Court, and therefore the Court declined to comment on the correctness of the view expressed in that decision. The Court noted that, assuming the appellants’ contention that element (f) of section 23(1) does not apply is correct, such an assumption does not necessarily mean that the appellants’ ghatwali tenures cannot be acquired by the State Government under section 3 of the Act. Section 23(1)(f) merely provides for the deduction of a particular item from the gross asset of the tenure‑holder for the purpose of computing net income. Even if element (f) does not apply, the statute contains other deductions set out in clauses (a) to (e). Those clauses undeniably apply to a ghatwali tenure, and a Compensation Assessment‑roll can be prepared on their basis. It would be erroneous to conclude that because a specific deduction does not apply to a Government ghatwal, the ghatwal tenure must be excluded from the scope of the Act; such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the scheme of section 23. The scheme of section 23 requires that certain deductions be made to compute net income, and some items may apply in one case while others may not. The section does not require that every item apply to every proprietor or tenure‑holder. The Court then turned to section 32 of the Act. Section 32(4) provides that if the estate or tenure for which compensation is payable is held by a limited owner or a holder of a life‑interest, the Compensation Officer shall keep the amount of compensation in deposit with the Collector of the district, and the Collector shall direct the payment of the interest accruing on the compensation amount to the limited owner or the holder of the life interest during his lifetime. Such amount

The provision of section 32, sub‑section (4), provides that the amount of compensation shall remain deposited with the Collector until the amount of compensation, or any portion thereof after making payments, if any, under the proviso to this sub‑section, is made over to any person or persons becoming absolutely entitled thereto; the provision further provides that nothing in this sub‑section shall be deemed to affect the right of any limited owner or the holder of a life interest to apply to the District Judge for the payment of a part of the amount of compensation to defray any expenses which may be necessary to meet any legal necessity. It was argued that sub‑section (4) of section 32 does not apply to a Government ghatwali because the expression “limited owner” occurring therein has been used in the sense understood in Hindu law, and the holder of a Government ghatwali is not a limited owner in that sense. Counsel for the appellants highlighted the expression “legal necessity” occurring in the proviso to sub‑section (4) in support of the contention that “limited owner” carries the technical meaning attributed to it in Hindu law. On behalf of the respondent State, it was submitted that the expressions “limited owner” and “legal necessity” are not employed in any technical sense and may apply to persons who, owing to the conditions on which they hold the tenure, cannot alienate or divide it. The Court considered it unnecessary to pronounce on the precise scope and effect of sub‑section (4) of section 32. The short question before the Court was whether Government ghatwalis are excluded from the ambit of the Act by reason of sub‑section (4) of section 32. Assuming, without deciding, that sub‑section (4) does not apply to ghatwali tenure, the result would be as follows: section 32 merely provides for the manner of payment of compensation. If sub‑section (4) does not apply, the payment of compensation must be made in accordance with sub‑section (1) of section 32, which states that when the time within which appeals under section 27 may be made in respect of any entry in or omission from a Compensation Assessment‑roll has expired, or where any such appeal has been made and disposed of, the Compensation Officer shall proceed to make payment, in the manner provided in this section, to the proprietors, tenure‑holders and other persons who are shown in such Compensation Assessment‑roll as finally published under section 28 to be entitled to compensation, after deducting from the amount of any compensation so payable any amount which has been ordered by the Collector under clause (c) of section 4 or under any other section to be so deducted. Consequently, the result is not that Government ghatwalis fall outside the Act because sub‑section (4) does not apply; rather, the holders of such tenures would receive compensation in a different manner, while the rights of other persons having a proprietary interest in a ghatwali tenure with respect to the compensation money remain outside the scope of this decision.

The Court observed that compensation would be paid to the ghatwali tenures in a manner different from that prescribed for other categories. It further noted that the rights of persons other than the ghatwali proprietors, who might claim a proprietary interest in the same tenure, were not within the issues that this judgment needed to resolve. Consequently, the Court held that neither section 23(1)(f) nor section 32(4) inevitably produced the result pleaded by the appellants, namely that the appellants’ ghatwali tenures should be excluded from the operation of the Act despite the explicit inclusion of such tenures in the definition clauses. The Court then turned to the second contention raised before it and indicated that this issue could be disposed of swiftly. The appellants argued that if the provisions of the Act were applicable to government ghatwalis, the Act would fall outside the legislative competence of the State Legislature because, in that scenario, the Act would be legislation dealing with items 1 and 2 of the Union List. Those two items are: (i) the defence of India, including preparation for defence and measures conducive to warfare and post‑war demobilisation; and (ii) the naval, military and air forces, and any other armed forces of the Union. The Court found it obvious that the Act bore no connection whatsoever with the defence of India or with the Union’s armed forces. Referring to the observations of Lord Sumner in 1923, the Court noted that although ghatwali duties could historically be divided into police functions and quasi‑military functions, both categories had largely lost their relevance and the quasi‑military duties were rarely, if ever, required. The Court also quoted the earlier decision in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, wherein it was held that the true nature of the legislation was the transfer of ownership of estates to the State Government, falling within legislative head entry 36 of List II. The Court reiterated that there was no comprehensive land‑reform scheme within the statute, only a hopeful expression that a commission might eventually devise one, and that the Bihar Legislature was unquestionably competent to enact the law concerning the transfer of estates, making the Act constitutional. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, in substance, the legislation fell under item 36 of List II as it then stood, and bore no relation to items 1 and 2 of List I.

The Court next addressed the appellants’ final argument, which relied on Regulation XXIX of 1814. It held that, in substance, the Act concerned the acquisition of property, and therefore the question of whether Regulation XXIX of 1814 was repealed did not arise. Moreover, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the principle that a special law dealing with particular tenures is unaffected by a later general land‑reform law, because that principle had no application to the present case. Finally, the Court emphasized that the Act expressly incorporated all ghatwali tenures within its scope and provided for the vesting of the entire interest of such tenures in the State of Bihar.

The Court observed that the statute vested the rights in the land absolutely in the State of Bihar once a notification was issued under section three and section four, and that certain legal consequences automatically arose from such a notification regardless of any other law that might be in force at the time. The Court noted that the Bengal Permanent Settlement Regulation of 1793, referred to as Bengal Regulation 1 of 1793, had not obstructed the acquisition of other estates that were permanently settled, and consequently it was difficult to conceive how Regulation XXIX of 1814 could impede the acquisition of ghatwali tenures. The Court explained that this issue had already been addressed by its earlier decision in Raja Suriya Pat Singh v. The State of U. P., reported in 1952 S.C.R. at page 898 and also at pages 1156, 1078‑79. In that decision the Court had held that the Crown could not deprive a legislature of its legislative authority merely because the Crown, in exercising its prerogative, made a grant of land within the territory over which the legislature possessed authority, and that no court could set aside an enactment of a legislative body acting within its legitimate sovereign competence. The Court further stated that where a Crown grant fell within the competence of a provincial legislature, the legislature was free to legislate on the matter unless the Constitution Act expressly prohibited such legislation either absolutely or conditionally. Applying this reasoning, the Court concluded that none of the three arguments raised by the appellants possessed any substantive merit. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed, costs were awarded, and the parties were directed to pay only a single hearing fee.