Thakur Brij Raj Singh And Another vs Thakur Laxman Singh And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 8/1955

Decision Date: 8 September, 1960

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, S.K. Das, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter titled Thakur Brij Raj Singh and Another versus Thakur Laxman Singh and Another, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 8 September 1960. The judgment was authored by Justice M. Hidayatullah, and the bench was composed of Justices M. Hidayatullah, S. K. Das, K. C. Das Gupta and J. C. Shah. The petitioners were Thakur Brij Raj Singh and another individual, while the respondents were Thakur Laxman Singh and another individual. The case was reported in the official law reports as 1961 AIR 149 and 1961 SCR (1) 616.

The central question before the Court concerned the maintainability of a suit relating to an istimrari estate, the adoption of a son by the widow of the former estate holder, and the effect of a statutory provision that required confirmation of such an adoption by the Central Government. After the death of the estate holder, identified only as “B,” on 28 September 1947, no male heir survived. Consequently, the Court of Wards assumed control of the estate and issued a notice under Regulation 11 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation 1877, inviting claims to the property. While the claim process was ongoing, an application was filed asserting that the appellant had been adopted on 24 February 1948 by the widow of B. The applicant further requested that the adoption be confirmed in accordance with the third proviso to Section 23 of the Regulation. On 10 September 1951, the President of India confirmed the adoption.

Subsequently, the first respondent instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that the appellant was not, in fact, adopted, and alternatively, that the adoption was invalid and illegal. In defence, the appellant argued that the confirmation by the Central Government, being a conclusive determination of the fact and legality of the adoption, barred any further challenge in a civil court under Section 119 read with Section 23 of the Regulation. The appellant contended that the suit was therefore not maintainable.

The Court examined the statutory scheme and the scope of the Central Government’s confirmation power. Justice S. K. Das, delivering a dissenting opinion, held that although Section 23 provides that an adoption made by a widow does not become effective until it receives confirmation from the Central Government, such confirmation cannot sanctify an adoption that is otherwise invalid under general law. Moreover, Justice Das observed that Section 119(1) of the Regulation precludes the impeachment of the specific act of confirmation, but the act of granting confirmation does not exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts to examine the underlying facts and actions that preceded the confirmation proceeding. Consequently, the suit, which sought a declaration that the adoption was invalid and did not rely solely on the confirmation, was not barred by Sections 23 and 119 of the Regulation.

Justice Das concluded his dissent by stating that the confirmation mentioned in the third proviso to Section 23 necessarily involves a determination of two factual questions: whether the widow possessed the authority to adopt, and whether she in fact adopted a son to the late istimrardar. He emphasized that without addressing these factual determinations, the confirmation cannot have intelligible meaning, and that, on a proper construction of Sections 23 and 119, the present suit was barred.

S. 23 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation required the court to decide two distinct factual questions: first, whether the widow possessed the legal authority to adopt; and second, whether in reality she had adopted a son to the late istimrardar. The judgment explained that without resolving these two questions, any confirmation of adoption would lack meaning and could not be understood. Consequently, the court observed that Section 119 prohibited a suit that sought a decision contrary to the order of confirmation. By interpreting Sections 23 and 119 together, the court concluded that the present suit was barred by the statutory scheme.

The case proceeded to the civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1955, filed by special leave against the judgment and decree dated 7 January 1954 of the former Judicial Commissioner’s Court at Ajmar, arising out of Civil First Appeal No. 28 of 1953. Counsel for the appellants consisted of senior advocates, while counsel for the respondents represented the opposing side. The appeal was heard on 8 September 1960, and the judgment was delivered by Justices M Hidayatullah, K C Das Gupta, J C Shah and N Rajagopala Ayyangar, with Justice S K Das delivering a separate opinion.

The factual background disclosed that Thakur Banspradip Singh, the Istimrardar of Sawar, died on 28 September 1947 without any male heirs either by birth or adoption. Following his death, the Court of Wards assumed control of his estate and issued a notice under Section 24 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation, 1877, inviting claims to the estate. Thakur Khuman Singh, the father of Thakur Laxman Singh (respondent 1), Thakur Brij Raj Singh (appellant 1) and Thakur Inder Singh of Rudh (respondent 2), presented claims. While the inquiry was ongoing, Thakur Khuman Singh died and his son Thakur Laxman Singh was substituted in his place. During the inquiry, the Deputy Commissioner referred certain interlocutory matters to the Chief Commissioner, who scheduled a hearing for 25 February 1948. On that date, an application was filed stating that Thakur Brij Raj Singh had been adopted on 24 February 1948 by Rani Bagheliji, the widow of Thakur Banspradip Singh, and that the Chief Commissioner should seek confirmation of the adoption from the Governor‑General under the third proviso to Section 23 of the Regulation. The Senior Subordinate Judge’s record indicated that the application faced opposition, and the matter was apparently referred to the Governor‑General. Subsequently, on 10 September 1951, the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, informed the Chief Commissioner that the President of India had consented to confirm the adoption. Following this communication, Thakur Laxman Singh filed the present suit, joining Thakur Brij Raj Singh, Rani Bagheliji of Sawar and Inder Singh of Rudh as defendants.

In this suit, Thakur Brij Raj Singh filed a suit that named Rani Bagheliji of Sawar and Inder Singh of Rudh as defendants. The plaintiff sought two principal reliefs among other claims. First, the plaintiff asked that the court declare that Defendant No. 1 had not been adopted by Defendant No. 2 and therefore was not the adopted son of Defendant No. 2; alternatively, the plaintiff requested that the court hold that any adoption of Defendant 1 by Defendant 2 was void and illegal. Second, the plaintiff contended that he was the nearest kin and heir of the deceased Thakur Banspradip Singh. The learned Subordinate Judge did not frame any issues directly addressing these two reliefs. Instead, the Judge framed a preliminary question: whether the suit was barred by sections 24 and 119 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation of 1877. Relying on that question, the Judge held that the two sections barred the suit, dismissed it, and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs. On appeal, the Judicial Commissioner at Ajmer set aside the Subordinate Judge’s decision and reversed it. After that reversal, Thakur Brij Raj Singh and Rani Bagheliji Singh moved the Judicial Commissioner for a certificate under articles 133(1)(a) and ( c) of the Constitution. The Commissioner refused, holding that his judgment was not yet final. The present appeal was brought before this Court after special leave was granted. The matters before this Court now are the interpretation of sections 23, 24 and 119 of the Regulation in light of the pleadings and the nature of the claim. Before analysing those sections, the Court wishes to review other relevant provisions of the Regulation. The Regulation is divided into six parts, and Part XI deals with certain interests in land, including the rules of succession for holders of such lands. Part XI contains nine sections; section C deals with Istimrari estates. Section 20 defines an “Istimrari estate” as one for which an Istimrari sanad was issued by the Chief Commissioner with prior sanction of the Governor‑General‑in‑Council before the Regulation was enacted. That definition has been amended by later Adaptation Orders, a development that is now well known. An “istimrardar” is defined as a person to whom such a sanad has been granted or any other person who becomes entitled to the Istimrari estate in succession as provided later. The rules of succession are set out in sections 23 and 24. Section 23 governs succession where there is male issue, while section 24 applies where there is no male issue. The remaining provisions of section C relate to tenants, alienation, maintenance, expropriation and similar matters, which are not relevant to the present dispute. Accordingly, succession to an Istimrari estate is regulated by sections 23 and 24, and any dispute concerning succession must be resolved according to those provisions. Section 23 reads as follows: “Succession to estate where there is male issue…”.

Section 23 provides that when an istimrari holder dies leaving sons or other male descendants who are related to him through the male line—whether those male descendants are born or adopted—or when, after the holder’s death, his widow possesses the authority to adopt a son and actually does so, the istimrari estate shall pass, as closely as possible, in accordance with the customs of the deceased’s family. The section imposes three specific conditions. First, the rule of primogeniture applies, meaning that the estate must in every case descend to a single heir who is the firstborn male according to that rule. Second, an adoption is considered valid only if a written document of the adoption is lodged with either the Collector or the Registrar of the district. Third, an adoption made by a widow is not deemed valid until it receives confirmation from the Central Government. The parties to the present dispute differ on how the third condition should be understood together with the introductory words of the section. One side argues that once the Central Government has confirmed an adoption made by a widow, no further dispute can arise that is admissible before a civil court, invoking the prohibition contained in Section 119, which will be discussed later. The opposite side contends that the introductory language of Section 24 allows a question arising under Section 23 to be presented to a civil court for adjudication and that Section 119 does not bar such a suit. For clarity, the Court excerpts the full text of Sections 24 and 119. Section 24 states that any question concerning the right to succeed to an istimrari estate that is not covered by Section 23 shall be decided by the Central Government or by an officer appointed by it. However, the Central Government may, if it deems appropriate, issue a certificate to any claimant declaring that the matter is suitable for determination by a civil court. The holder of such a certificate may then institute a suit in any competent court, and that court may entertain the suit upon production of the certificate. Section 119, on the other hand, declares that, except as expressly provided otherwise, all actions taken under the regulation by the Central Government, State Government, or a revenue officer shall be deemed legally and rightly done and shall not be subject to attack. Moreover, it limits the jurisdiction of civil courts by providing that no civil court shall entertain any suit or application seeking an order or decision that the Central Government, State Government or a revenue officer is empowered to make or pronounce under the regulation. Before proceeding to analyse the effect of these provisions, the Court notes that Sections 23 and 24 address different categories of succession cases, and therefore a brief examination of the factual nature of the present case is required.

In this case the Court noted that the principal reliefs sought by the plaintiff had already been listed earlier in the judgment. It observed that two declaratory reliefs were part of the pleadings. The first declaratory relief, which was split into two parts, asked the Court to hold that Thakur Brij Raj Singh had not been lawfully adopted by Rani Baheliji and that the adoption was therefore invalid and illegal. The Court pointed out that this question fell within the scope of section 23 of the Regulation and not within section 24. The second declaratory relief asked for a declaration that the plaintiff was the closest living relative and heir of the late Thakur Banspradip Singh. The Court explained that if Thakur Banspradip Singh had left no male descendants, either by birth or by adoption, the issue of succession would, on its face, be governed by section 24. That provision required that any dispute of that nature be decided by the Central Government or by an officer appointed by the Government for that purpose. However, the provision also contained a proviso allowing the Central Government, instead of deciding the matter itself or appointing an officer, to issue a certificate stating that the dispute was suitable for determination by a civil court. Consequently, if the matter fell solely under section 24, the plaintiff could not have instituted the suit without first obtaining such a certificate, as contemplated by the proviso. The Court further stated that it was not required to pass any judgment on the merits of arguments that might later be presented, because the present stage was before such pleas could be properly raised. The Court then turned to the third relief that had originally been claimed. That relief sought a perpetual injunction against Thakur Brij Raj Singh, on the basis that if the adoption issue were decided against him, he would have to contest the original dispute for which a notice under section 24 of the Regulation had already been issued. The Court noted that this injunctionary relief was removed when an amended plaint was filed. The Court explained that section 24 expressly excludes from its operation cases that fall within section 23. Section 23 deals with succession where a male heir exists by birth or by adoption and provides that the estate of the lstimrari should, as far as possible, pass according to the customs of the deceased’s family. To identify the proper heir, it may be necessary to examine those family customs, a task taken out of section 24 by the opening words of that section. No other forum was indicated for resolving disputes that might arise between competing claimants or where a pretender claimed succession as a male issue. Such a dispute, the Court held, would therefore be brought before a civil court, whose jurisdiction was not removed unless the law expressly or clearly implied such a removal. The Court observed that section 23 contained no explicit language withdrawing civil‑court jurisdiction, and the question was whether any clear intent in the provision removed that jurisdiction.

In this case the appellants argued that the third proviso to section 23 obliges a widow who makes an adoption to obtain confirmation from the Central Government. They contended that the Central Government, in considering the matter, must decide two points – whether the widow had the power to adopt and whether she actually adopted a son to the deceased – and that the Government’s decision on those points is deemed to be a decision made by the Central Government when it granted confirmation of the adoption. The appellants relied on the first clause of section 119, which declares that anything “done, ordered or decided by the Central Government” shall be deemed to have been legally and rightly done, ordered or decided. They also noted that when the adoption deed was first presented to the Chief Commissioner and confirmation was sought, the opposite parties opposed the request. Accordingly the appellants submitted that, because confirmation was ultimately granted, no dispute remained for the Civil Court to decide. The Court then examined sections 33 and 34, which deal with succession to “Bhum”, meaning land for which a Bhum sanad may have been issued. Section 33 states that when a Bhumia dies leaving male issue, whether by birth or adoption, or when after the Bhumia’s death his widow has power to adopt and does so, the Bhum shall devolve according to the custom of the family. Section 34, mirroring section 24, uses identical wording but substitutes the term “Bhum” for “Istimrari estate”. Reading sections 33 and 34 together shows that a matter falling within section 33 is excepted from the operation of section 34, and the opening words of the latter do not affect a suit concerning such a matter. Comparing section 23 with section 33, the Court observed that section 23 contains three conditions. The first condition applies the law of primogeniture, the second requires a written deed deposited with the Collector or the district Registrar, and the third requires confirmation of the adoption by the Central Government when the adoption is made by a widow. The Court held that matters within section 23 may also be brought before a Civil Court in the same manner as under section 33. The last two provisos to section 23 create two prerequisites that the widow must satisfy before her adoption can be regarded as valid. For an adoption to be valid it must comply with Hindu law, and the legislature has added these two additional requirements.

In this case the Court explained that the two additional conditions imposed by the statute are merely procedural requirements that must be satisfied before an adoption can be regarded as valid. The first condition mandates that the adoption be documented in a written instrument which must be deposited with either the Collector or the Registrar of the district. The second condition requires that the adoption receive confirmation from the Central Government. The Court stressed that the mere deposit of the deed, even though it is a statutory requirement, does not by itself render an adoption valid if the adoption fails to meet the substantive requirements of Hindu law. Likewise, the confirmation by the Central Government does not, on its own, confer validity on an adoption that is otherwise invalid under the general law; it merely satisfies the additional statutory condition created by the legislature. If either of these statutory conditions remains unfulfilled, the adoption cannot be treated as valid, even though it may appear valid on all other grounds. The Court observed that the proviso is expressed in the negative, indicating that confirmation does not automatically make the adoption valid. While an adoption that lacks confirmation cannot be deemed valid, an adoption that has been confirmed remains susceptible to challenge on any ground other than the lack of confirmation. The appellants contended that once the Central Government confirms the adoption, its validity cannot be questioned because of section 119 of the Regulation. The Court clarified that section 119 merely excludes anything done, ordered, or decided by the Central Government from judicial scrutiny. The heading of that provision makes clear that the intent of the first clause is to prevent impeachment of proceedings under the Regulation. The only act that falls within the scope of “done, ordered or decided” is the confirmation itself, and although the confirmation cannot be impeached, any acts that occurred before the initiation of confirmation proceedings are not protected. When the confirmation process begins, the applicant approaches the Central Government with a completed fact, and although the Government may be satisfied with those facts, the decision to grant confirmation does not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to examine the earlier facts and actions of the parties. The legislature, by section 23, has not expressly or implicitly removed the Civil Court’s power to review the validity of the adoption. Although the widow’s capacity to adopt and the actual adoption of a son may be relevant for the purpose of obtaining confirmation, the substantive validity of the adoption remains a matter that the Civil Court may examine, because the statute contains no clear or implied words that the adoption’s validity is conclusively settled. The first clause of section 119 merely upholds the confirmation as a decision of the Central Government that must be considered legally done, ordered, or decided; it does not affect the adoption itself because the adoption was not an act of the Central Government under the Regulation. The second clause of section 119, which limits the Civil Court’s jurisdiction in certain respects, likewise does not apply to the present issue.

The Court observed that the second clause of section 119 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation was not applicable to the present suit. It explained that the first question raised in the suit did not require any order or decision that the Central Government is empowered to make under the Regulation. Although the Central Government had already confirmed the adoption, the plaintiff was not seeking a further confirmation order from the Civil Court. Instead, the plaintiff asked the Court to examine whether the adoption was valid. The Court pointed out that the Central Government’s confirmation did not settle the question of validity, because the Regulation does not make the Government’s decision conclusive on that point. Consequently, the Court held that the request for a declaration of invalidity fell within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The second relief claimed by the plaintiff invoked section 24 of the Regulation, and the Court noted that this relief must satisfy the conditions laid down in that provision. Having examined the matters, the Court concluded that the suit should proceed. It affirmed that the order of the Judicial Commissioner, given the facts of the case, was correct and found no reason to set it aside. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded against the appellant.

Justice S. K. Das expressed a contrary view with great regret, stating that he reached a different conclusion on the question of whether the suit was barred by section 119 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation, 1877 (Regulation No. 11 of 1877). He briefly outlined the reasons for his conclusion, noting that the essential facts had already been set out in the judgment of his colleagues and did not need to be repeated. He summarised that the plaintiff, who is now respondent No. 1 before this Court, had instituted the suit to obtain a declaration that defendant No. 1 (now appellant No. 1) had not been lawfully adopted by defendant No. 2 (now appellant No. 2); that even if the adoption were proven, it was invalid and illegal; that respondent No. 1 was the nearest kin and heir of Thakur Banspradip Singh and therefore entitled to succeed to the estate of Sawar and all its movable and immovable assets; that appellant No. 1 should be permanently restrained from interfering with the Sawar estate; and that a receiver should be appointed for the estate and its assets. He noted that the plaint had later been amended and that the claims for permanent injunction and declaration of entitlement to the Sawar estate were abandoned, apparently because such claims would be barred by section 24 of the Regulation. Justice Das indicated that the remaining issue was whether, even on the amended plaint, the suit was barred by the combined operation of sections 119 and 23 of the Regulation.

In the present matter the question to be examined was whether, even after the amendment of the plaint, the suit was barred by the operation of section 119 read together with section 23 of the Regulation. To answer this question the Court first turned to the provisions of the Regulation that are directly relevant. Section 20 of the Regulation provides a definition of an “istimrari estate”, and it was not contested that the estate of Sawar falls within that definition. Section 21 then lays down the status of tenants who hold an istimrari estate, and section 22 deals with the alienation of such an estate. The next provision, section 23, contains the substantive rules governing succession where there is a male issue. The full text of section 23 reads as follows: “S. 23. Succession to estate where there is male issue: When an Istimrardar dies leaving sons or male issue descended from him through males only whether by birth or adoption or when after the death of an Istimrardar his widow has power to adopt and adopts a son to him, the istimrari estate shall devolve as nearly as may be according to the custom of the family of the deceased. Provided‑ 1st, Rule of primogeniture‑ that the descent shall in all cases be to a single heir according to the rule of primogeniture; 2nd, What adoptions valid‑ that no adoption shall be deemed valid unless it is made by a written document deposited with the Collector or the Registrar of the district; 3rd, Adoption by widow‑ that no adoption made by a widow shall be deemed valid until confirmed by the Central Government.” Section 24 then addresses the situation where there is no male issue. It states: “S. 24. Succession of estate when there is no male issue: Any question as to the right to succeed to an istimrari estate arising in a case not provided for by section 23 shall be decided by the Central Government, or by such officer as it may appoint in this behalf. Provided that the Central Government, if it thinks fit, instead of deciding such question itself or appointing any officer to decide the same, may grant to any person claiming to succeed as aforesaid a certificate declaring that the matter is one proper to be determined by a Civil Court. The person to whom such certificate is granted may institute a suit to establish his right in any Court otherwise competent under the law for the time being in force to try the same, and such Court may, upon the production of such certificate before it, entertain such suit.” The Court then omitted the provisions that were not directly material to the point under consideration and proceeded to section 119, which reads: “S. 119. Except as hereinbefore expressly provided‑ (a) Proceedings under Regulation not to be impeached:‑ everything done, ordered, or decided by the Central Government, State Government or a Revenue officer under this Regulation, shall be deemed to have been legally and rightly done or ordered or decided; (b) Limitation of jurisdiction of Civil Courts‑ no Civil Courts shall entertain any suit or application instituted or presented with a view to obtaining any order or decision which the Central Government, the State Government or a Revenue officer …” The excerpt of subsection (b) was left incomplete in the record, but the provision clearly limits the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain suits that seek to obtain orders or decisions that fall within the competence of the Government or a revenue officer under the Regulation.

In the matter before the Court, the issue to be decided was whether the suit was barred by the operation of section 119 read together with section 23 of the Regulation. The Senior Subordinate Judge, who had considered this preliminary question, held that the suit was indeed barred, whereas the learned Judicial Commissioner, on appeal, reached the opposite conclusion. The resolution of the question depended upon a proper interpretation of the true scope and effect of the two aforesaid sections. The Court proceeded on the well‑settled principle that when a plaintiff alleges a legal right and its infringement, a cause of action is disclosed and, unless a specific bar exists, the ordinary civil courts are obligated to entertain the claim. Such a bar may be expressed in clear terms or may arise by necessary implication. Upon a careful construction, the Court found that sections 23 and 119 of the Regulation did create a bar to the suit. The substantive portion of section 23, as relevant to the present dispute, referred to two factual circumstances: first, that the widow possessed the power to adopt, and second, that she had in fact adopted a son of the deceased istimrardar. When both of these facts were established, section 23 provided that the estate should devolve, as far as possible, in accordance with the custom of the deceased’s family. Following this substantive clause were three provisos, of which the Court was concerned only with the third. The third proviso stipulated that no adoption made by a widow would be deemed valid until it received confirmation by the Central Government. In the present case, such a confirmation order had been issued. The language of the proviso, expressed as a double negative, when read positively meant that an adoption by a widow became valid for the purposes of section 23 only upon its confirmation by the Central Government. This condition could be viewed either as an additional prerequisite or as encompassing within it a determination of both the widow’s power to adopt and the fact of adoption itself; logically, a confirmation could not exist in a vacuum, because an adoption must first occur before it can be confirmed. Consequently, the Court held that the third proviso must be read in conjunction with the substantive provision of section 23 to grasp the true meaning and effect of the confirmation order. In confirming an adoption, the Central Government—formerly the Governor‑General—had to examine the two preliminary facts: whether the widow possessed the authority to adopt and whether she had actually adopted a son of the late istimrardar. Thus, the confirmation contemplated in the third proviso necessarily involved a determination of those two facts, and divorced from them the confirmation would lack any intelligible content. The factual record of the case also clearly demonstrated that, upon a notice under section 24, several claimants advanced their claims.

The widow subsequently adopted appellant number one and an application was filed seeking confirmation of that adoption. That application faced opposition, and after an inquiry the President was satisfied and confirmed the adoption. Respondent number one then applied to the President requesting a reconsideration of the confirmation order, but the President replied that there were no reasons to alter the confirmation.

The Court observed that, if the confirmation order is understood to include the two preliminary facts—namely, whether the widow possessed the power to adopt and whether she actually adopted the son of the deceased istimrari—then section 119 unequivocally bars any suit that seeks a decision contrary to the confirmation. Under clause (a) of section 119, a confirmation order that, as the Court believes, determines those two preliminary facts is deemed to have been both legally and rightly made; under clause (b), no suit may be brought to challenge that determination. The Court explained that the term “legally” signifies that the order is validly made according to law, while “rightly” indicates that the order is factually correct and proper. Consequently, the essential question becomes whether the confirmation referred to in the third proviso to section 23 encompasses a determination of (1) the power to adopt and (2) the fact of adoption. The Court held that it does, and therefore section 119 precludes the present suit. The Court further noted that any interpretation denying this result would render the third proviso to section 23 meaningless. Sections 23 and 24 together govern the entire field of succession to an istimrari estate. Section 24 provides that any question of succession not covered by section 23 shall be decided by the Central Government, subject to its own proviso, and that the Government’s power under section 24 is unrestricted. If, despite a confirmation order under the third proviso to section 23, a suit were permitted to challenge the adoption and a civil court declared the adoption invalid, the confirmation itself could not be attacked, yet the case would fall either under section 23 or section 24. Should it fall under section 24, the Central Government would again have to decide the succession question, leading to a deadlock if the Government does not disregard its own confirmation order. Reading sections 23 and 24 together, the Court concluded that Parliament did not intend for a suit to be allowed to challenge a widow’s adoption after confirmation, as such a suit would nullify the effect of the confirmation. The Court also found that sections 33 and 34 relating to Bhum lands are not applicable, noting that section 33 lacks a proviso similar to the third proviso to section 23.

In this case, the Court observed that the third proviso to section 23, which confirms an adoption made by a widow, does not by itself create a barrier under the regulations. It further noted that the entire issue remained open under section 33, and that section 119 of the Regulation did not, with reference to that section, impose any prohibition on the matter. The Court recorded that there had been an argument presented before it concerning whether the suit in question related to property that was not part of the istimrari estate. Upon review, the Court found that no such point had been raised before the learned Subordinate Judge, and that, as far as could be discerned from the amended plaint, the suit indeed concerned the istimrari estate together with the movable and immovable properties belonging to that estate. The Court also mentioned that an application had been made urging a constitutional question, namely that if section 119 were to be interpreted so as to bar a suit of the present character, such an interpretation would be violative of article 14 of the Constitution. Since that constitutional point had not been pressed before the Court, the Court deemed it unnecessary to set out the nature and incidents of the istimrari estates or to explain the reasons for their classification. The argument before the Court therefore rested solely on a pure question of statutory construction, and the Court limited its discussion to that issue alone. After considering the relevant provisions, the Court held, for the reasons previously articulated, that a proper construction of sections 23 and 119 of the Regulation demonstrates that the present suit is barred by law. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, dismissed the suit and ordered that the costs be awarded to the appellant. By the order of the Court, in accordance with the majority judgment, the appeal was dismissed with costs, and the suit was set aside.