State of Vindhya Pradesh (Now Madhya Pradesh) vs Moradhwaj Singh and Others
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 40 to 110 of 1955
Decision Date: 24 February 1960
Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam, A.K. Sarkar, J.C. Shah
In this case, the Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952 (Act XI of 1952). The petition was filed by the State of Vindhya Pradesh, which is now Madhya Pradesh, and the respondents were Moradhwaj Singh and others. The judgment was delivered on 24 February 1960 by a bench consisting of Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Chief Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, Justice A.K. Sarkar and Justice J.C. Shah. The reported citation is 1960 AIR 796 and 1960 SCR (3) 106. The Act contained several provisions that were challenged, namely section 22(1), section 37, and clause (4)(e) of the Schedule, together with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, section 9, and Article 31 A of the Constitution.
The petitioners had approached the Judicial Commissioner under Article 226 of the Constitution, alleging that the impugned provisions placed unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Judicial Commissioner held that, except for sections 22(1), 37 and clause (4)(e) of the Schedule, the Act was constitutionally valid. The State appealed the portion of the order that declared those three provisions unconstitutional, while one of the respondents appealed the portion that upheld the remainder of the Act.
The Court held that the appeal filed by the State must be allowed and the appeal filed by the respondent must be dismissed. The Court explained that section 22 of the Act, which provides the procedure for giving effect to section 7(a) allowing jagirdars to retain possession of certain lands after the abolition of their jagirs, could not be characterized as colourable legislation and therefore was not ultra vires the Legislature. The Court observed that section 22 did not discriminate between jagirdars and other land occupants covered by section 28(1) because the two groups belong to distinct and different classes. Even if the two groups were regarded as belonging to the same class and section 22 were deemed discriminatory, the provision was protected by Article 31 A of the Constitution.
The Court further noted that the question of “colourable legislation” related to legislative competence, and there was no doubt that the Vindhya Pradesh Legislature was competent to enact the challenged provisions under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The Court relied on the precedents set in K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa [1954] SCR i and Raghubir Singh v. State of Ajmer (now Rajasthan) [1959] SCR 478. Regarding section 37, the Court rejected the contention that it conflicted with section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was therefore ultra vires, affirming that the Vindhya Pradesh Legislature possessed the authority under Entry 3 of List II to make such a provision. The Court also rejected the claim that clause (4)(e) of the Schedule deprived a jagirdar of his proprietary interest without compensation, noting that any rent payable and the cessation of revenue liability were taken into account when assessing compensation.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the entire Act fell within the protection of Article 31 A of the Constitution, and in view of the authorities cited, its constitutional validity could not be questioned. The Court’s decision thereby affirmed the validity of the challenged sections and rejected the arguments advanced by the respondents.
The Court observed that the Vindhya Pradesh Legislature possessed authority under Entry 3 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to enact a provision such as section 37 of the Act. Once that provision was in force, the latter portion of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure would become applicable, thereby barring the jurisdiction of the civil courts in accordance with the combined operation of section 9 of the Code read with section 37 of the Act. The Court also rejected the contention that clause (4)(e) of the Schedule stripped a jagirdar of his proprietary interest without any compensation. It held that although the jagirdar might be required to pay rent on the portion of land that remained in his possession, he no longer paid any revenue on that land, and the revenue that had previously been payable was taken into consideration when assessing compensation. Consequently, the entire Act was found to fall within the protection afforded by Article 31A of the Constitution, and, in light of the precedents set by this Court, its constitutional validity was deemed unequivocal.
The judgment recorded the case as arising under the civil appellate jurisdiction, specifically Civil Appeals Nos. 40 to 110 of 1955. These appeals emanated from a judgment and order dated 12 November 1953 rendered by the former Judicial Commissioner’s Court in Vindhya Pradesh, Rewa, concerning miscellaneous writ applications numbered 51 to 119 and 121 of 1953. Counsel appearing for the parties included the Solicitor‑General of India, the Advocate‑General for the State of Madhya Pradesh, and other counsel representing both the appellants and respondents in the various numbered appeals. The judgment was delivered on 24 February 1960 by Justice Wanchoo, who noted that the seventy‑one appeals were filed on certificates granted by the Judicial Commissioner and originated from seventy petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution that challenged the constitutionality of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, No. XI of 1952 (hereinafter “the Act”). The Court indicated that it would dispose of these appeals by a single common judgment.
The background of the proceedings was that sixty‑seven of the appeals, numbered 40 to 109, were filed by the State of Vindhya Pradesh (now Madhya Pradesh), while appeal No. 110 was filed by Brijindar Singh, a jagirdar. In the Judicial Commissioner’s Court, the petitioners had argued that the Act was unconstitutional because certain provisions imposed unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. The Judicial Commissioner had upheld the constitutionality of the Act except for three specific provisions: section 22(1), section 37, and clause (4)(e) of the Schedule. The appeals by the State sought to overturn the portion of the Commissioner’s order that declared these three provisions unconstitutional, whereas Brijindar Singh’s appeal challenged the part of the order that had held the remainder of the Act to be constitutional. The Court disclosed that it would first address the appeal brought by Brijindar Singh before proceeding to the other matters.
In the appeal filed by Brijindar Singh, the counsel representing him was unable – and, in the Court’s view, rightly unable – to challenge the constitutionality of the Act in its entirety because of the protection afforded by article 31‑A of the Constitution and because of the authority of this Court’s earlier decisions in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh, Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U.P., K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa, Thakur Amar Singhji v. The State of Rajasthan, Raja Bhairebendra Narayan Bhup v. The State of Assam, Sri Ram Narain v. The State of Bombay, Raghubir Singh v. The State of Ajmer (now Rajasthan) and Atma Ram v. The State of Punjab, all of which dealt with similar legislation in the states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Assam, Bombay, Ajmer and Punjab. The citations for these authorities are respectively [1952] S.C.R. 889, [1952] S.C.R. 1020, [1952] S.C.R. 1056, [1954] S.C.R. i, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303, [1956] S.C.R. 303, [1939] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 499, [1959] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 478 and [1959] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 748. Because of these precedents, the Court found it unnecessary to examine the specific provisions of the Act in detail. Consequently, Appeal No. 110 was dismissed; the Court also ordered that, since the appeal was not pressed, each side should bear its own costs.
The discussion then proceeded to the appeals filed by the State. The principal purpose of the legislation was to resume jagir‑lands. Section 5 authorized the government, by notification, to fix a date for the resumption of any class of jagir‑land and permitted the State Government to assign different dates to different classes. Section 6 dealt with the consequences that would follow such a resumption. However, Section 7 provided that, notwithstanding anything in Section 6, certain lands would continue to remain in the possession of the jagirdars. Clause (a) of that section was quoted: “The jagirdar shall continue to remain in possession of his sir and khudkasht to the extent and subject to the conditions and restrictions specified in Chapter IV.” Sections 10 and the subsequent provisions of Chapter III prescribed the manner of compensation, and the Schedule laid down the formula for computing that compensation. Chapter IV addressed sir and khudkasht lands. Section 20 required a jagirdar to make an application for allotment of land for personal cultivation. Section 21 mandated that the Tahsildar conduct an enquiry on such an application in the prescribed manner, after which land would be allotted and a patta issued to the jagirdar in accordance with the remaining provisions of the chapter. Finally, Section 22 was reproduced in full: “(1) A jagirdar shall be allotted all sir and khudkasht lands which he was cultivating personally for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the date of resumption.”
In this provision a jagirdar whose jagir‑lands had been resumed under the Act was provided for. If the jagirdar either (a) was not allotted any sir or khudkasht land under sub‑section (1), or (b) was allotted such land but the area received was less than the minimum area, the law allowed him, upon application, to be allotted any other sir or khudkasht land that he cultivated personally on the date of resumption. Where no such land existed or the available area was insufficient, the provision permitted the assignment of any unoccupied cultivable waste land within the jagir‑land, subject to the availability of such land, so that in case (a) the total area allotted under this sub‑section would be equal to the minimum area, and in case (b) the area allotted under this sub‑section together with the area allotted under sub‑section (1) would be equal to the minimum area. The Explanation clarified that the expression “minimum” meant ten per cent of the total cultivated land in the jagir‑land on the date of resumption, or thirty acres, whichever was greater, provided that in no case could the minimum exceed two hundred and fifty acres. Chapter V of the Act dealt with the rights of tenants, grove‑holders and occupants in jagir‑land and conferred certain benefits on them, while Chapter VI set out the machinery and procedure for implementing the purposes of the Act, and section 42 empowered the State Government to make rules to give effect to the Act. The learned Judicial Commissioner had held that section 22(1) was a colourable piece of legislation. The scheme of section 22 was intended to give effect to section 7(a), which allowed certain lands to remain in the jagirdar’s possession. Section 22(1) stipulated that all sir and khudkasht lands which a jagirdar had cultivated personally for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the date of resumption were to be allotted to him by the Tahsildar. Sub‑section (2) addressed situations where no land could be allotted under sub‑section (1) or where the land allotted under sub‑section (1) was less than the minimum area defined in the section. In such cases the jagirdar could be allotted any other sir or khudkasht land in his personal cultivation on the date of resumption up to the minimum area. If, however, the minimum area was still not reached after such an allotment, the jagirdar could be allotted, under sub‑section (2), any unoccupied cultivable waste land in the jagir, subject to its availability, up to the required area. The minimum area, as defined, meant ten per cent of the total cultivated area in the jagir at the date of resumption or thirty acres, whichever was greater, with the proviso that the minimum could not exceed two hundred and fifty acres. In other words, section 22(1) provided that, in the first instance, the jagirdar would receive all his sir and khudkasht land which he had cultivated personally for the requisite three‑year period.
The provision stipulated that a jagirdar could retain any sir or khudkasht land that he had cultivated continuously for a period of three years immediately preceding the date of resumption. If, however, there was no such land available, or if the land that could be allotted under that condition was insufficient to meet the statutory minimum area, the jagirdar was entitled to receive an additional allotment drawn from the sir or khudkasht land that he possessed for a period of less than three years, so that the minimum area requirement could be satisfied. In the event that the minimum area could still not be attained even after assigning such land held for less than three years, the jagirdar could then be allotted unoccupied cultivable waste land, provided such waste land was available, to make up the shortfall. Nevertheless, the provisions of sub‑section (2) were subject to a ceiling of 250 acres, meaning that the total minimum area could never exceed that limit. The Court expressed difficulty in understanding how these provisions could be characterized as colourable legislation.
The learned Judicial Commissioner observed that because section 22(1) imposed a requirement of three years’ continuous cultivation, a distinction arose between jagirdars and other occupants of land, the latter being governed by section 28(1), which declares that every person entered in the revenue record as an occupant of any jagir‑land at the date of resumption shall be deemed a pattadar tenant and his land shall be assessed at the village rate. Although the Judicial Commissioner acknowledged that article 31‑A of the Constitution prevents striking down legislation on the ground of discrimination under article 14, he nevertheless considered the three‑year cultivation condition to be an additional requirement designed to deprive jagirdars of as much sir and khudkasht land as possible, thereby creating inconvenience to a class that the legislature purportedly disfavored. Consequently, he concluded that the legislation was beyond the legislature’s authority and was invalid as a colourable piece of legislation. The Court, however, rejected the notion that any discrimination existed, noting that jagirdars constitute one distinct class while other land occupants form another class. Even if one were to treat both groups as a single class, any differential treatment under section 22(1) compared with section 28(1) could not justify invalidating section 22(1) because article 31‑A expressly shields such legislation from being struck down on grounds of discrimination. Owing to this difficulty, the Judicial Commissioner refrained from striking down section 22(1) on the basis of discrimination and instead held it to be colourable legislation. The Court then referred to its earlier pronouncement in K. O. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, which defined the doctrine of colourable legislation.
The Court explained that a provision is declared void on the ground of colourable legislation not because of the legislature’s motives or good‑faith intentions, but because of the legislature’s lack of competence to enact that provision. The essential inquiry, according to the Court, is whether the legislature, while ostensibly acting within its constitutional limits, in fact exceeds those limits in substance, disguising the excess by a mere pretence. The Court reiterated the established maxim that a legislature may not achieve indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly. Applying this principle, the Court found that the Vindhya Pradesh legislature possessed full competence to enact the provision in question under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Consequently, there was no transgression of legislative power concealed by any pretence. The Court also held that it was improper for the Judicial Commissioner to attribute motives to the legislature, such as suggesting that the law was intended to inconvenience a class the legislature disliked. Moreover, the Court rejected the contention that Article 31‑A was inapplicable to land‑allotment provisions, observing that sections 7 and 22 of the Act form part of the scheme for acquiring estates and are incidental provisions protected by Article 31‑A, just as the principal provisions in sections 5 and 6 are safeguarded, citing precedent. In the Court’s view, the entirety of section 22 provides a constitutional framework for implementing the legislature’s intent expressed in section 7(a) of the Act.
The Court then turned to section 37 of the Act, which lies in the procedural chapter. Section 37(1) states that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide, or deal with any question that the Act requires to be addressed by the Tahsildar, the Deputy Commissioner, the Land Reform Commissioner, or the Board of Revenue. Section 37(2) adds that, unless the Act provides otherwise, no order issued by any of those authorities may be challenged in any court. Accordingly, subsection (1) removes the civil court’s jurisdiction over matters that the Act designates to the named officials, while subsection 2) bars judicial scrutiny of any order passed by those officials. The learned Judicial Commissioner had declared this section invalid, reasoning that it conflicted with section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure because it removed the jurisdiction of civil courts. The Court noted this contention and prepared to address whether the provision of section 37, as an express bar, falls within the permissible legislative power over court jurisdiction under Entry 3 of List II.
In analysing the effect of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court observed that this provision declares that civil courts possess jurisdiction to try every suit of a civil nature except those suits whose cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred by another law. The Court cited the authority “(1) (1959] Suppl (1) C.R. 478” to stress that Section 9 therefore confers jurisdiction on civil courts to entertain all civil suits unless a specific statute places an express or implied bar on such jurisdiction. The Court noted that Section 37 of the Vindhya Pradesh Land Reform Act constitutes an express bar, because it prohibits civil courts from hearing matters that are to be dealt with under the Act. The learned Judicial Commissioner had argued that Section 9 deprives the legislature of the Part State, Vindhya Pradesh, of its power to legislate on court jurisdiction. The Court rejected this view, explaining that the legislature’s competence is derived from Entry 3 of List 11 and that this competence is not overridden by Section 9. In fact, Section 9 recognises that when a competent legislature enacts a law that bars civil‑court jurisdiction, the courts’ power to take cognizance of the suit is ousted. The Court considered it unnecessary to examine Section 22 of the Government of Part C States Act, No XLIX of 1951, or to compare it with Article 254 of the Constitution for this purpose. The Court further held that Section 37 does not affect Section 9; rather, it simply declares that civil courts shall have no jurisdiction to hear certain civil matters, and Section 9 expressly acknowledges that any statutory provision of this nature removes the courts’ jurisdiction. Consequently, there is no repugnancy between Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 37 of the Act. The legislature was within its authority to enact Section 37, and once that provision was in place, the latter part of Section 9 applies, rendering civil‑court jurisdiction barred by virtue of Section 9 read together with Section 37. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Judicial Commissioner’s finding that Section 37 was ultra vires the Vindhya Pradesh legislature was erroneous.
The Court then turned to element (4)(e) of the Schedule attached to the Act, which deals with the method of computing compensation. The Schedule outlines the calculation of a jagirdar’s income. Clause (3) sets out the method for arriving at the gross income of a jagirdar, while Clause (4) describes how the net income is to be determined after permitting certain deductions. One of those deductions is specified in sub‑clause (e) of Clause (4). The wording of that sub‑clause reads: “Where the jagirdar is allotted any sir or khudkasht or other land or any grove under this Act an amount equal to the valuation of rent for such land or grove for the basic year at the current settlement rates (less the land revenue paid by him in”. This provision functions as a contra‑entry to sub‑clause (b)(i) of Clause (3). The method prescribed requires first calculating the gross income without considering the land that remains with the jagirdar under Section 7(a). Subsequently, to determine the net income for compensation purposes, the rent value of the sir or khudkasht land that remains with the jagirdar is computed according to element (3)(b)(i), reduced by the land revenue payable on that land, and this amount is then deducted from the gross income because the land continues to be in the jagirdar’s possession. The Court noted that the Judicial Commissioner had interpreted the arithmetic result of this provision as causing the landlord to lose his proprietary interest, to pay rent to the government, and yet receive no compensation; the Court, however, refrained from endorsing that conclusion in this passage.
The provision in sub‑clause (e) of element (4) of the Schedule stated that the value of rent for a sir, khudkasht or any other land or grove allotted to a jagirdar would be determined for the basic year in a manner prescribed by law. This sub‑clause operated as a contra entry to sub‑clause (b)(i) of clause (3). According to the method laid down in these two clauses, the first step was to calculate the gross income of the jagirdar without considering the land that remained in his possession under section 7(a). After obtaining the gross figure, the next step was to arrive at the net income that would be used for compensation. For this purpose the rent attributable to the sir and khudkasht land that continued to be held by the jagirdar was taken into account; its value was determined pursuant to element (3)(b)(i) and the revenue payable on that land was subtracted. The resulting amount was then deducted from the previously computed gross income because the land in question still belonged to the jagirdar. The learned Judicial Commissioner had interpreted the arithmetic outcome of this scheme to mean that, with respect to those lands, the landlord lost his proprietary interest, was required to pay rent to the government, and yet received no compensation. The Court observed, however, that although the landlord might be obliged to pay rent in the future for the land he still possessed, he no longer had to pay the land revenue that had previously been his liability. Consequently, it could not be said that he was deprived of his proprietary interest without any compensation, since he was relieved of the revenue charge, which had already been considered in computing the net assets for compensation, and the land remained in his possession for all other purposes. In view of this analysis the Court held that there was nothing unconstitutional in element (4)(e) of the Schedule. Accordingly, Appeal No. 110 was dismissed with each party ordered to bear its own costs. Appeals Nos. 40 to 109 were allowed, and the Court affirmed the validity and constitutionality of section 22(1), section 37 and clause (4)(e) of the Schedule. Because the respondents in those appeals had not seriously contested the provisions, the Court also ordered each side to bear its own costs. Appeal No. 110 was dismissed, while Appeals Nos. 40 to 109 were allowed.