State of Andhra vs Gaddam Venkatappayya

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 506 of 1957

Decision Date: 8 December 1960

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled State of Andhra versus Gaddam Venkatappayya, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 8 December 1960. The judgment was authored by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and the bench was composed of Justices N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar and J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioner was the State of Andhra and the respondent was Gaddam Venkatappayya. The case was reported in the 1961 Annual Issue Reports at page 779 and in the Supreme Court Reporter (Third Series) at volume 45. The dispute involved provisions of the Police Service‑Officiating Sub‑Inspector rules, specifically the validity of an order of reversion to the rank of Head Constable under the service rules governing the Madras Police Subordinate Service, rules numbered three, four and five.

The respondent, who served as a Head Constable in the Madras Police Service, had been promoted to act as a probationary Sub‑Inspector. After successfully completing the probationary period, he was placed in the category of approved probationers awaiting confirmation whenever a substantive vacancy arose. However, when a vacancy for Sub‑Inspector did not become available, the government, for administrative reasons, reverted him to his substantive rank of Head Constable. The respondent was unable to obtain any relief from the government and consequently filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court.

Annexure 1 to rule 3 of the service regulations stated that promotions from the rank of Head Constable to Sub‑Inspector could not exceed “up to not more than 30 % of the cadre.” The same rule made no numeric limit on appointments made by direct recruitment. Rule 4 specified that a vacancy could not be filled by a person who had not yet begun his probation when an approved probationer or a probationer was available. Clause (a) of rule 5 provided that, in the event of insufficient vacancies, the discharge of probationers should occur first according to seniority, followed by the discharge of approved probationers in order of seniority. Clause (b) of rule 5 allowed departure from this order in cases of exceptional administrative inconvenience.

The single judge who heard the writ petition concluded that rule 3 had been breached and ordered the State not to implement the reversion order, holding that the respondent’s seniority would have placed him within the 30 % ceiling for rank‑promotees. On appeal, the division bench disagreed with the trial judge’s interpretation of rule 3 but dismissed the appeal, finding that the requirements of rule 5 concerning seniority had not been strictly complied with. The State subsequently obtained a certificate of appeal from the High Court and appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the expression “up to and not more than 30 % of the cadre” in Annexure 1 to rule 3, when read in the context of the provision for direct recruits that imposes no ceiling, unequivocally fixed the maximum proportion of promotions from Head Constable to Sub‑Inspector at thirty percent, while leaving the appointing authority free to select any lower percentage.

The Court explained that the phrase “up to and not more than 30 % of the cadre” in Annexure 1 to rule 3, when read together with the rule governing direct recruits which imposes no numerical ceiling, establishes thirty per cent as the absolute maximum share of promotions that may be made from the rank of Head Constable to Sub‑Inspector. Consequently, any figure that falls short of that thirty‑per‑cent ceiling does not breach the rule. In other words, if the proportion of rank‑promotees among the total number of Sub‑Inspectors on the date of a particular reversion is less than thirty per cent, the rule is satisfied. The Court further noted that rule 4, which deals with the right of probationers and approved probationers to be confirmed, is applicable only to the stage before confirmation, when the two groups—rank‑promotees and direct recruits—are combined to form a single service and the percentage limitation prescribed by rule 3 becomes operative. This rule must be applied separately to each of the two categories, and therefore appointing direct recruits to substantive posts ahead of the respondent did not constitute a violation of rule 4. With respect to rule 5(a), the Court held that the determination of junior‑seniority for the purpose of reversion must also be carried out separately for direct recruits and for rank‑promotees, since they constitute distinct classes. Even if that approach were not adopted, the Court found that the impugned order could still be upheld under rule 5(b) because the Government had demonstrated a case of administrative inconvenience, a position that had been accepted by the lower courts.

The judgment concerned a civil appeal, numbered 506 of 1957, filed by the State of Andhra against a decision of the High Court of Andhra dated 21 July 1955, issued on a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. The appellant was represented by counsel, while the respondent was also represented by counsel. The judgment was delivered on 8 December 1960. The respondent had entered the Madras Police Force as a Constable on 1 September 1939, became a permanent Head Constable in 1946, and was promoted to officiate as a Sub‑Inspector on 1 October 1947, at which time his probation began. By an order dated 24 September 1950, he was declared to have satisfactorily completed his probation and was placed on the “A” list with effect from 10 September 1950. Although he remained only an officiating Sub‑Inspector, his inclusion in List “A” meant that he was an “approved probationer,” eligible for confirmation as a Sub‑Inspector when a substantive vacancy arose. On 3 August 1952, the District Superintendent of Police, Krishna, issued an order reverting the respondent to the rank of Head Constable effective 14 August 1952, stating that there were insufficient Sub‑Inspector vacancies to accommodate him. The Court observed that this reversion was not limited to the respondent but applied to a large number of officiating Sub‑Inspectors who had also been promoted from the rank of Head Constable. The reverted officers subsequently petitioned the Inspector‑General of Police, who, in a memorandum dated 15 January 1953, explained that seniority between directly recruited Sub‑Inspectors and those promoted from Head Constables must be determined separately because directly recruited Sub‑Inspectors are appointed against vacancies reserved for them and cannot be reverted for lack of vacancies. The memorandum further rejected the contention that the reverted officers should not have been placed back in favor of direct recruits, concluding that their reversion to Head Constable was proper. The respondent later filed a memorial challenging the Government’s view that directly recruited Sub‑Inspectors formed a separate category, but after obtaining no relief, he approached the High Court of Madras with a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a mandamus directing the State to address the grievance.

In this case the Court recorded that the Inspector‑General of Police, Madras, issued a memorandum on 15 January 1953 stating: “MEMORANDUM. Sub: Officiating Sub‑Inspector Reverting as Head Constables‑Seniority over direct recruits Petitions. As direct recruits are recruited against vacancies specially reserved for them and cannot be reverted for want of vacancies, seniority between directly recruited Sub‑Inspectors and promoted Sub‑Inspectors should be determined separately. Their contention that they should not have been reverted in preference to direct recruits is not, therefore, correct. Their reversion as Head Constables is in order.” Subsequently the respondent filed a memorial before the Government challenging the view that directly recruited Sub‑Inspectors constituted a category distinct from the promotee‑Sub‑Inspectors, contending that such a distinction was not supported by the rules governing the constitution of the Police Establishment. Because his memorial did not obtain any relief, the respondent instituted before the Madras High Court a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution (Writ Petition No 524 of 1953) seeking a mandamus directing the State of Madras to refrain from giving effect to the order reverting him to Head Constable and to consider his claim for confirmation as Sub‑Inspector on the basis of his seniority among the approved probationers. Justice Balakrishna Iyer, who heard the petition, allowed it and ordered the State to forbear from implementing the reversion order if, by virtue of the respondent’s seniority among promoters, he could be included in the thirty‑percent quota already referred to. The Court indicated that it would later examine in detail the nature and scope of the rule concerning that thirty‑percent quota, which formed the basis of the learned judge’s order, without interrupting the narration of events leading to the present appeal. The State appealed the judgment, and the appeal was transferred to the High Court of Andhra after that Court’s formation. The learned judges hearing the appeal differed from the single judge regarding the scope of the thirty‑percent rule but ultimately dismissed the appeal, holding that the Government, in directing the reversion of the promotee‑probationers, had failed to strictly observe the rule of junior‑seniority prescribed in Rule 5 of the Service Rules, a rule to which reference will be made in due course. The State of Andhra then obtained a certificate from the High Court and filed the present appeal. Although in his original writ petition the petitioner had alleged that his reversion from the officiating post of Sub‑Inspector to his substantive post as Head Constable amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution—i.e., a punitive reduction imposed without an opportunity to show cause—this contention was abandoned early in the proceedings.

The proceedings before the Court proceeded on the premise that the respondent’s reversion to the rank of Head Constable was undertaken solely for administrative reasons and was not intended as a punitive measure for misconduct. It may be noted that, when the respondent became eligible for promotion to the substantive post of Sub‑Inspector, he was duly promoted to that post irrespective of the High Court’s judgment and presently occupies the Sub‑Inspector position, receiving the corresponding increments and salary. Consequently, Article 311(2) of the Constitution was not the basis of the dispute. The matters raised before the Court fall into two distinct questions: first, whether the re‑version of the respondent to Head Constable contravened the applicable Service Rules; and second, if such a contravention existed, whether a breach of Service Rules alone amounts to an infringement of the legal rights of the officer, thereby authorising the officer to seek judicial relief.

The answer to the first question depends upon the construction of the rules framed, inter alia, under section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which are titled “Rules relating to the Madras Police Subordinate Service.” Rule 3, which deals with recruitment and was held by the learned Single Judge to have been violated, reads as follows: “Rule 3. Method of appointment and promotions – (a) Appointment to the several classes and categories shall be made as indicated in Annexure I. ANNEXURE I Category 2 Method of Limitation Appointing appointment authority (1) (2) (3) (4) Sub‑Inspector Promotion Up to not In the… more than… D.I.G. Constables 30 % of the Police Cadre concerned Direct recruitment Nil ….” This provision is followed by Rule 4 and Rule 5, which read respectively: “Rule 4. Right of probationers and approved probationers to appointment to vacancies – A vacancy in any class or category shall not be filled by the appointment of a person who has not yet commenced his probation in such class or category when an approved probationer or a probationer therein is available for such appointment.” and “Rule 5. Order of discharge of probationers and approved probationers – (a) The order in which probationers and approved probationers shall be discharged for want of vacancies shall be, first, the probationers in order of juniority; and, second, the approved probationers in order of juniority. (b) The order of discharge laid down in sub‑rule (a) may be departed from in cases where such order would involve excessive expenditure on traveling allowance or exceptional administrative inconvenience.” The remaining rules merely elaborate the principles embodied in the quoted provisions and therefore need not be reproduced. To appreciate the arguments presented by counsel for the appellant‑State concerning the proper interpretation of these rules, it is necessary to set out the respective contentions raised by the two parties in the lower courts and how those contentions were addressed. On behalf of the respondent, the principal contention advanced was that, upon a proper construction of Rule 3, promotee‑Sub‑Inspectors—distinguished from directly recruited officers—are entitled to comprise a minimum of thirty per cent of the cadre, and that this requirement had been violated because, at the time of the respondent’s reversion, rank‑promotees constituted less than twenty‑five per cent of the force while directly recruited personnel formed more than seventy‑five per cent.

The respondent submitted that inspectors who were called rank‑promotees in departmental language, as opposed to those recruited directly, were entitled under Rule 3 to occupy at least thirty per cent of the total cadre strength. He argued that this requirement had been breached because, at the time of his reversion, the force consisted of less than twenty‑five per cent rank‑promotees and more than seventy‑five per cent directly recruited personnel. According to the respondent, if the proportion stipulated in Rule 3 had been observed strictly, there would have been no reason to revert him to the post of Head Constable. He further contended that the thirty‑per‑cent and seventy‑per‑cent ratios specified in Rule 3 applied solely at the stage of initial recruitment of Sub‑Inspectors. Once recruitment was completed and the officers entered probation, the rules no longer distinguished between the two classes; instead, all officers formed a single, unified force. Under that view, appointment to substantive posts should have been based only on inter‑se seniority, except where misconduct or inefficiency was proven. Consequently, the respondent claimed that appointing directly recruited officers to substantive positions ahead of him, although his probation had begun earlier, violated Rule 4 of the Service Rules. He also argued that if the overall cadre strength were reduced by eliminating temporary posts, any reversion of officers had to follow the seniority rule laid down in Rule 5(a). That rule made no distinction between directly recruited Sub‑Inspectors and rank‑promotees; it required that those who had not completed probation be reverted first, followed by approved probationers, each in order of seniority. The respondent maintained that approved probationers like himself, who were senior to several directly recruited officiating Sub‑Inspectors, were reverted out of turn, contrary to Rule 5(a). Finally, he submitted that, given the circumstances later explained by the Government, the directly recruited Sub‑Inspectors could not be properly reverted because of assurances given to them. Accordingly, the Government was obliged to retain all rank‑promotee approved probationers as officiating Sub‑Inspectors until substantive vacancies arose that would allow their appointment as full members of the Service.

The State countered by asserting that the proportion rule in Rule 3, read together with the Annexure, established only an upper limit for the number of rank‑promotees. The expression “up to, not more than” was interpreted to mean that the maximum allowable share of rank‑promotees was thirty per cent, without imposing any minimum requirement for that group. The State emphasized that the rule placed no ceiling on the share of direct recruits, thereby indicating that the thirty‑per‑cent figure functioned as a ceiling rather than a floor, guaranteeing that direct recruits would constitute at least seventy per cent of the cadre. Consequently, the State argued that there was no breach of Rule 3 when the proportion of rank‑promotees fell slightly below twenty‑five per cent at the relevant date. It further observed that even if Rule 3 had been applied strictly, the respondent would not have benefited, because the number of rank‑promotees eligible for absorption was far below the level required for his appointment. The State noted that this consideration explained why the earlier order directed the Government to refrain from effecting the reversion if, based on his seniority among promotees, the petitioner could be counted within the thirty‑per‑cent ceiling.

In the State’s submission it was argued that the ceiling of thirty per cent set out in rule three, read with the annexure, represented only a maximum proportion of rank‑promotees and did not create any minimum requirement. The expression “up to, not more than” was therefore interpreted to mean that at most thirty per cent of the Sub‑Inspectors could be rank‑promotees, while the remaining seventy per cent had to be filled by direct recruits. Consequently, the rule guaranteed that direct recruits would constitute at least seventy per cent of the strength. Because the proportion of rank‑promotees on the relevant date fell to slightly below twenty‑five per cent, the State maintained that there was no breach of rule three. The State further contended that even if rule three had been strictly observed, the respondent would have derived no advantage from its operation, since his own rank‑promotee percentage was well beneath the level at which any absorption obligation would arise. The State cited the order of Balakrishna Iyer, J., which directed the Government to refrain from implementing a reversion order if, by virtue of seniority among promotees, the petitioner could be counted within the thirty‑per‑cent ceiling. On a proper reading, the State asserted that the proportions prescribed in rule three applied not only at the stage of initial recruitment but also at the stage of appointments to substantive posts, that is, when officers were absorbed as full members of the permanent cadre. Building on this construction, the State argued that for purposes of confirmations under rule four, the category of direct recruits must be treated as a distinct class separate from rank‑promotees, so that seniority would be considered only within each class and not between the two groups. Accordingly, the State urged that at the absorption stage governed by rule four, the proportion calculation must be performed, and therefore no violation of rule four had occurred. Regarding rule five, the State put forward two grounds for claiming no breach. First, it denied the existence of a single unified category of Sub‑Inspectors, insisting that the Service comprised two separate categories—direct recruits and rank‑promotees—each to be treated independently. Second, even assuming that the two groups formed a single category after their initial appointments, the State maintained that rule five(a) was not violated because the special circumstances of the case brought the respondent within the scope of rule five(b). In support of this latter point, the State noted that at the time of the police action in Hyderabad a large number of individuals had been directly recruited as Sub‑Inspectors with an assurance that they would not be reverted. When temporary posts were later abolished, these directly recruited Sub‑Inspectors required substantive positions, creating an administrative problem that could be resolved only by reverting rank‑promotees. The Court then proceeded to consider the issues raised by the parties, the first of which was whether there had been an infringement of rule three due to the proportion of rank‑promotees being less than thirty per cent of the total Sub‑Inspectors on the date of the respondent’s reversion.

In this case the Court examined whether there had been a breach of rule 3 of the Service Rules because the proportion of rank‑promotees was less than thirty per cent of the total number of Sub‑Inspectors serving at the date of the respondent’s reversion. The learned Single Judge had based his decision in favour of the respondent on an alleged violation of that rule, whereas the learned Judges of the High Court on appeal reached a different conclusion. Counsel for the respondent argued that the expression “up to, not more than 30 per cent” in the rule should be understood to mean a maximum of thirty per cent, with the words “not more than” serving only to eliminate fractions and to allow the figure to be rounded down to the nearest whole number. It was observed that the Single Judge had emphasised the term “up to” and had effectively ignored the impact of the words “not more than” in his construction. The Court considered that construction to be incorrect, especially when the provision is read in relation to direct recruits, for whom the rule imposes no ceiling on their proportion in the Service. In the Court’s view the words “up to, not more than” simply set the upper limit for the percentage of rank‑promotees, leaving the appointing authority free to keep the proportion at any lower figure. Consequently the Court endorsed the view of the Andhra High Court judges who dissented from the Single Judge’s interpretation of rule 3. The Court therefore held that the respondent’s reversion could not be challenged on the basis that rule 3 of the Service Rules had been infringed. The next issue considered was whether rule 4 of the Service Rules, which governs confirmations, had been breached by promoting junior direct recruits to substantive posts ahead of rank‑promotees such as the respondent, who were senior in service because their probation as officiating Sub‑Inspectors began earlier. The application of rule 4 depended largely on whether rank‑promotees and directly recruited officers constituted a single class or two distinct categories at the time of their initial appointment, before they were absorbed as full members of a unified Service. It was undisputed that the two groups became a single, integrated Service after they attained full membership. The controversy was confined to the period between the date of their initial appointment and their absorption as full members. If, during that interval, they remained separate categories with seniority calculated separately within each group, the Government’s order would be proper and would not contravene the rules. However, if the two groups were regarded as forming an integrated, unified force from the very commencement of their appointments, then rule 4 would require that confirmations be based on overall seniority, subject only to considerations of merit or demerit, without regard to the mode of original appointment. Although the Single Judge did not expressly pronounce on the effect of rule 4, the Andhra High Court concluded that the seniority provision prescribed by the rule had been violated. The High Court also expressed disagreement with the Single Judge’s view that the thirty‑per‑cent minimum under rule 3 had been breached and rejected the Government Pleader’s contention that, irrespective of the percentage of promoters at any time, all vacancies could be filled by direct recruits if the Government so desired.

On the other hand, officers who were recruited either by promotion from the ranks of Head Constables and Sub‑Inspectors or by direct recruitment formed an integrated and unified force from the very moment of their appointment. Consequently, when rule 4 was applied, confirmations of officers should have been based solely on seniority, subject only to considerations of merit or demerit, and should not have taken into account the original mode of appointment of the officiating Sub‑Inspectors. Although the learned Single Judge did not expressly rule on the effect of rule 4, the Andhra High Court held that the seniority provision contained in that rule had been infringed. The High Court, after indicating its disagreement with the learned Single Judge’s view that the minimum thirty per cent. prescribed by rule 3 had been breached, made the following observation: “Nor does it follow that we can countenance the argument of the learned Government Pleader that irrespective of the percentage of promoters on the cadre at a given time, all vacancies can be filled up, if the Government so chooses, only with direct recruits. We think that from both the classes of approved probationers, be it direct recruits or be it candidates from the ranks, selection should be made without any distinction, provided of course that so far as promotees are concerned the percentage of 30 is not exceeded. Now, it is admitted by the Government that the percentage of promotees was only 24.5 at the time when the petitioner was sent back as Head Constable. That being so, it cannot be contended for the State that the ceiling will be exceeded if the petitioner is promoted. As we read the rules, when once an officer qualifies as an approved probationer, no distinction can be made between him and a direct recruit approved probationer.” The Court stated that it could not agree with the reasoning or the conclusion expressed in that passage. The Court observed that the learned Judges, albeit tacitly, had accepted the Government’s position and, in the Court’s view, correctly held that the integration of the two groups occurred only after they were absorbed as full members of the Service, at which point the proportional rule set out in the annexure to rule 3 became operative. The Court further noted that if the thirty per cent. ceiling applicable to rank‑promotees for absorption as full members was merely a limit intended to protect the interests of direct recruits, as the learned Judges had correctly held, it was difficult to conceive how the rule could be said to have been violated merely because the proportion of rank‑promotees confirmed fell below thirty per cent. Accordingly, the Court concluded that there was no breach of the seniority requirement prescribed by rule 4 in the appointment of direct recruits to substantive posts before the absorption of rank‑promotees such as the respondent. The Court then indicated that it would next consider rule 5, which relates to the Government’s power to effect reversions and the conditions and limitations that rule 5 imposes.

It was observed that clause (a) of rule 5 effectively reverses, for the purpose of discharge or reversion, the sequence of confirmations prescribed in rule 4. The Court had previously held that the respondent could not rely on the rules to demand confirmation, when rule 4 was read in conjunction with rule 3. Applying the same reasoning, the Court concluded that because direct recruits and rank‑promotees constituted separate classes, the determination of seniority for reversion had to be made independently for each class rather than on the basis of a single unified force prior to confirmation. When this test was applied, it could not be said that the respondent’s reversion violated clause (a) of rule 5. Apart from that, the order under challenge could also be upheld on the ground of clause (b) of rule 5, which provides that “the order of discharge laid down in sub‑rule (a) may be departed from in cases where such order would involve excessive expenditure on travelling allowance or exceptional administrative inconvenience.” In the facts of the present case, the Government explained the reason for reverting rank‑promotees in an affidavit filed with the writ petition. The affidavit stated that the reversion was necessitated by the return of a large number of Sub‑Inspectors who had been on other duties in Hyderabad State, and by the need to abolish a number of temporary posts that had been created for special purposes during the disturbed period following the police action in Hyderabad. Because the directly recruited Sub‑Inspectors could not be assigned to any lower post, they had to be absorbed as Sub‑Inspectors, and consequently the reversion of rank‑promoted Sub‑Inspectors became absolutely necessary to meet the exigencies of service and administrative requirements. The Government asserted that this reversion was not arbitrary, not contrary to the rules, and not a punitive measure as alleged by the petitioner. This circumstance was highlighted before the Madras High Court in the writ petition as bringing the impugned order of reversion within the “exceptional administrative inconvenience” contemplated in the final words of clause (b). The learned single judge accepted the Government’s factual explanation as correct and recorded that the Government was in a difficult position because of the large number of members taken in connection with the police action in Hyderabad. The judge noted that many persons had been directly recruited as Sub‑Inspectors with the assurance that they would not be removed, and expressed reluctance to suggest that the Government should renege on any such assurance or act in bad faith. Nevertheless, the judge indicated that the Government needed to maintain its ability to keep the service functional, thereby supporting the view that the reversion fell within the scope of the exception provided by clause (b) of rule 5.

In this case the Court noted that, having accepted the factual matrix presented by the Government and recognizing that those facts had never been contested either before the High Court or before the present Court, the order of reversion could be deemed justified under the concluding words of clause (b) even though it might appear to contravene the provisions of rule 5(a). The Court therefore questioned the observation made by the learned Single Judge that “the Government do not rest their case on Rule 5(b),” because the factual circumstances acknowledged by the Government placed their action squarely within the scope of that very clause. The State, in its memorandum of grounds filed in Writ Appeal No 122 of 1954, contended that the learned Judge had failed to appreciate the special circumstances that rendered the reversion necessary in the present case. When the matter reached the High Court of Andhra, the learned Judges recorded that the learned Judge had stated in his judgment that the Government did not rest its case on Rule 5(b). Nevertheless, the High Court also accepted the Government’s explanation of the difficult position created by the measures taken in connection with the police action in Hyderabad, namely that a large number of persons had been directly recruited as Sub‑Inspectors on the assurance of permanent employment. To preserve that assurance, the Government argued that it was compelled to revert those who had been promoted, even though no specific rule authorised such a reversion. The Court expressed dissent from the High Court’s concluding sentence that “there is no rule which enables the Government to do so,” because rule 5(b) expressly provides for departure from the discharge order of clause (a) where an “exceptional administrative inconvenience” would result, and the facts accepted by both the Single Judge and the High Court satisfied that condition.

Before turning away from rule 5, the Court turned to another point raised by the High Court’s judgment, which seemed to suggest that the Government, faced with difficulty arising from the assurances given to directly recruited officers, could have resolved the problem not by reverting the rank‑promotees but by allowing them to continue in their officiating posts until they could be regularised as full members of the Service. The respondent had advanced this contention, and the learned Judges observed that it appeared clear whether the rule imposed merely a ceiling or imposed an obligation upon the Government to fill thirty per cent of vacancies from among the promotees. The Court found it impossible to sustain this view on any construction of the rules, because it would imply either that temporary posts could not be abolished or that approved probationers could not be reverted. The first alternative was not intended, and the second was plainly contrary to the terms of rule 5(a), which expressly contemplates the reversion of approved probationers. While the Court recognized that, as a matter of administrative relief, the Government might retain personnel in their officiating positions to avoid hardship, it rejected the notion that the rules impose a binding legal duty on the Government to do so. Consequently, the Court concluded that there was no breach of the Service Rules in ordering the reversion of the respondent from the position of Head Constable.

The Court observed that the assertion by the State that no vacancies existed for promotees could not be sustained on any construction of the Service Rules. The State had relied on a statement that only thirty per cent of the vacancies could be filled from among promotees, and it then claimed that, in the present case, there were no vacancies for promotees at all. The Court found this position untenable. Interpreting the rules, the Court explained that the proposition advanced by the State would lead to one of two logical conclusions: either temporary posts could never be abolished, or approved probationers could never be reverted to their original rank. The first alternative was clearly not intended by the legislature, and the second alternative directly contradicted Rule 5(a), which expressly provides for the reversion of approved probationers. While the Court acknowledged that, as a measure of administrative relief and to avoid hardship to subordinates, the Government might temporarily retain persons in officiating posts, it stressed that such a practice did not create a legal and enforceable duty upon the Government to do so. Accordingly, the Court held that the order effecting the reversion of the respondent to the rank of Head Constable did not breach the Service Rules.

Having concluded that no breach of the Service Rules occurred, the Court determined that the question of whether an infringement of a Service Rule would give rise to a legal right enforceable in this Court did not arise. The Court therefore declined to examine that issue and noted that it had not called upon counsel for the appellant to argue that aspect of the case. On this basis, the appeal was allowed, the judgment of the High Court was set aside, and Writ Petition No. 524 of 1953 was dismissed. In view of the High Court order dated 3 February 1956, which had granted the appellant a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution subject to the condition that the respondent would be entitled to recover his taxed costs incurred in this Court from the appellant, the Court ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the respondents in this appeal.