Smt. Shanno Devi vs Mangal Sain

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 247 of 1960

Decision Date: 7 September 1960

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, S.K. Das, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this case the matter was titled Smt Shanno Devi versus Mangal Sain and the judgment was delivered on 7 September 1960 by the Supreme Court of India. The author of the judgment was K C Das Gupta and the bench comprised Justice K C Das Gupta, Justice S K Das, Justice M Hidayatullah, Justice J C Shah and Justice N Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner was identified as Smt Shanno Devi and the respondent as Mangal Sain. The decision was recorded in the official law reports with citations 1961 AIR 58, 1961 SCR (1) 576 and additional references to later citations. The case involved the statutory provision concerning migration to India and citizenship, the intention of residing permanently, and an election dispute arising under the Constitution of India, article 6. The headnote of the judgment described that the respondent had been the successful candidate in the general election for the Punjab Legislative Assembly held in March 1957, while the appellant, who had been one of the unsuccessful candidates, filed an election petition challenging the respondent’s election on the ground that the respondent was not a citizen of India and therefore not qualified to contest the election.

The Court observed that the respondent was born to Indian parents around the year 1927 in a village that, at the time of his birth, lay within the territory defined by the Government of India Act 1935, but that after the partition of 15 August 1947 the village became part of Pakistan. In 1944 the respondent left his home district and moved to Jullunder, which after partition formed part of the Indian territory, and after 15 August 1947 he consciously decided to settle in India with the intention of making his residence permanent. Evidence was also placed before the Court indicating that the respondent travelled to Burma in January 1950 and unsuccessfully sought permission from the Burmese Government to stay there permanently. The legal question before the Court was whether, under article 6 of the Constitution, the respondent could be regarded as a citizen of India. The Court held that the phrase “migrated to the territory of India” in article 6 meant migration at any time before the Constitution came into force to a place that now forms part of the Indian territory, and that the words also required that the migration be made with the intention of residing permanently. The Court further explained that when a person moves from one country to another with only a temporary intention but later forms a permanent intention, the law treats the later point as the effective time of migration. Regarding the test of being “ordinarily resident in the territory of India since the date of his migration” under article 6(b)(i), the Court clarified that it is sufficient to show that during the period beginning with the date migration became complete and ending with 26 November 1949 the person was ordinarily resident, meaning residence without any serious interruption, and that it is not necessary for the individual to be present in the country every single day of that period. The Court concluded that the respondent satisfied all requirements of article 6, and accordingly his claim to be deemed a citizen of India was upheld.

The Court explained that the relevant period began on the date when the migration was deemed complete and extended up to 26 November 1949. For the purpose of determining citizenship, the person must be regarded as having been “ordinarily resident in the territory of India” throughout that entire interval, considered as a single, continuous span. The Court held that it was immaterial whether the individual was physically absent from India on 26 January 1950 or whether, at that moment, he had formed an intention to settle permanently in Burma after leaving India. What mattered was the status of residence during the earlier period. The expression “ordinarily resident” in the Constitution was interpreted to mean residence during the specified period without any serious interruption. The Court clarified that it was not required for the person to have been present in India on every single day of that period; occasional short absences did not defeat the requirement of ordinary residence. Applying this interpretation, the Court found that the respondent satisfied the conditions laid down in Article 6 of the Constitution, and consequently his claim to be deemed a citizen of India under that provision was upheld.

The judgment concerned Civil Appeal No 247 of 1960, an appeal from the Punjab High Court’s order dated 3 October 1958, which itself arose from a dispute over the 1957 Punjab Legislative Assembly election. The appellant, Shanno Devi, had been an unsuccessful candidate in the general election held in March 1957, while the respondent, Mangal Sain, had been declared the winner. The nomination papers of all candidates were examined and accepted on 1 February 1957. Voting was conducted on 12 March 1957, and after the count on 14 March 1957, Mangal Sain was officially declared elected. On 27 March 1957, Shanno Devi filed an election petition challenging the result on several grounds, the principal allegation being that the Returning Officer had incorrectly accepted the respondent’s nomination because he was not a citizen of India and therefore was ineligible to contest. The petition raised additional grounds, but after the Election Tribunal dismissed those grounds, they were not pursued before the High Court nor before this Court. The Tribunal had held that Mangal Sain was not an Indian citizen at the time of his voter enrolment, at the acceptance of his nomination papers, and at the time of his election, and consequently declared his election void. On appeal to the High Court, the sole issue presented was whether the respondent was a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution. The Court noted that if the respondent was a citizen at that moment, his citizenship would have continued unbroken; if not, he could not claim citizenship thereafter, rendering his election invalid. The respondent contended that he was a citizen under Article 5 and, alternatively, that he should be deemed a citizen under Article 6. While the High Court was inclined to doubt the Article 5 claim, it held that his entitlement to citizenship under Article 6 must prevail.

In this case, the Court examined whether the respondent was a citizen of India on the dates that were relevant to his election – namely the date on which he was enrolled as a voter, the date on which his nomination was accepted, and the date on which he was elected. The argument advanced by the respondent was that he was a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution under Article 5, and that, even if that premise failed, he should be treated as a citizen at that time under Article 6. The Election Tribunal had already rejected both of those contentions. The learned judges of the High Court, while indicating a tentative view that the respondent’s claim to citizenship under Article 5 could not be sustained, did not analyse that claim in detail. Instead, the High Court held that the respondent’s reliance on Article 6 – the provision that deem‑s him a citizen at the commencement of the Constitution – must prevail. Thus, the High Court’s decision rested on the premise that Article 6 gave the respondent the status of citizenship at the relevant times, notwithstanding the Tribunal’s earlier rejection of his arguments.

The Tribunal, after hearing evidence presented by both parties, summarized the primary facts as follows: Mangal Sain was born to Indian parents in the village of Jhawarian, District Sargodha, sometime in 1927. When he was two years old, his parents took him from Jhawarian to Mandalay in Burma. The family returned to Jullundur, Punjab, in 1942 after the Japanese occupation of Burma during the Second World War. After a brief stay in Jullundur, the family moved back to Sargodha, where they lived for roughly two to two and a half years. During that period, Mangal Sain passed his Matriculation examination from Punjab University. Following his matriculation, he again went to Jullundur and was employed in the Field Military Accounts Office from 8 December 1944 to 7 August 1946, when his services were terminated for continuous absence. The Tribunal also found that his parents and brother returned from Sargodha to Jullundur and lived there for about two and a half years from sometime in 1945 before returning to Burma, which they had left in 1942. While serving in the Field Military Accounts Office, Mangal Sain joined the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh movement and became an active worker. After his employment ended, he shifted his activities to the districts of Hisar and Rohtak, moving from place to place to organise the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. During this period he had no fixed residence and he used to reside

During the period under consideration, Mangal Sain did not have a permanent home. He stayed in the offices of the Jan Sangh and took his meals at various roadside eateries known as dhabas. From June to September 1948, for about four months, he worked as a teacher in Arya Lower Middle School located in Rohtak. In July 1948, he submitted an admission form to Punjab University for the University Prabhakar examination; the form was properly attested by Professor Kanshi Ram Narang of Government College, Rohtak. In January 1949, he was arrested in connection with the activities of the Rastriya Swayam Sevak Sangh movement. Following his arrest, he was detained in Rohtak District Jail from 10 January 1949 until 30 May 1949. In August 1949 he again appeared for the Prabhakar examination and was placed in a particular compartment. The record also shows that during the years 1948‑49 he continued to organise the Rastriya Swayam Sevak Sangh in the districts of Rohtak and Hissar, and he moved from place to place without any fixed place of abode.

The Tribunal further found that at the end of 1949 or in January 1950, Mangal Sain left India and went to Burma, where his parents and other brothers were already residing. While in Burma he sought permission to remain there permanently, but the Burmese Government refused his request and ordered him to leave the country. He applied for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Burma, but his petition was dismissed. On 29 October 1951, he deposited with the appropriate Burmese authority the registration certificate that had been issued to him under the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1948, and a few days later he returned to India. Since his return he has lived in India and has continued to organise the Rastriya Swayam Sevak Sangh in the districts of Hissar and Rohtak. In 1953 he was again arrested and detained as a detainee in Rohtak jail from 8 February to 8 May 1953, after which he was transferred to Ambala jail. Based on these facts, the Tribunal held that it could not be said that the respondent intended to settle permanently in India or that he had no intention of ever leaving it. Considering the respondent’s own declaration in affidavit Ex. 5 and his conduct of travelling to Burma and attempting to settle there permanently, the Tribunal concluded that these actions provided convincing proof that his intention was to join his parents and other relatives in Burma and to reside there permanently. The Tribunal finally observed that it was clear the respondent did not hold the sole idea of remaining in India without being influenced by any certain or uncertain event that might cause him to change his residence, and on these findings of fact the Tribunal held that

The Court held that, based on the facts previously mentioned, the respondent could not be regarded as a citizen of India under Article 6 of the Constitution. Relying on the same primary facts, Justice Dua, who delivered the leading judgment of the High Court, stated that only one conclusion could be drawn from the evidence: the appellant, having moved from his home district to Jullunder, possessed no intention after 15 August 1947 other than to make the Dominion of India his permanent abode. Consequently, the appellant’s migration from Jhawarian to Indian territory was complete on 15 August 1947, notwithstanding any earlier doubts, and Justice Dua even suggested that the appellant might have left his village in 1944 and migrated to the eastern districts of Punjab. Justice Falshaw concurred with this conclusion. On the basis of these findings, the learned judges determined that the respondent’s claim to be deemed a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution should succeed. The appellant’s principal argument was that the High Court’s finding—that the respondent migrated from his village in 1944 and, at any rate after 15 August 1947, intended only to settle in the Dominion of India—was arbitrary. The appellant also contended that, for Article 6, migration must occur after the territory of India, as defined by the Constitution, came into existence, and further argued, albeit weakly, that the respondent had never satisfied the ordinary residence requirement in India since his migration. The respondent’s counsel, besides challenging these contentions, urged that the phrase “migrated to the territory of India” in Article 6 merely meant “came to the territory of India” and did not necessarily imply an intention to reside permanently. The Court rejected the extreme contention, raised by counsel for the appellant, that migration under Article 6 must happen only after the territory of India was established under the Constitution. It observed that Article 6 concerns the determination of who shall be deemed a citizen at the Constitution’s commencement, which implies, absent evidence of contrary intent, that the required migration must have occurred before that commencement. Moreover, the Court noted that clause (b) of Article 6, which sets out two conditions—one of which must be satisfied in addition to birth as described in clause (a), and the “migration” requirement in the main portion of the Article—speaks in its first sub‑clause of migration occurring before the nineteenth day of July 1948, reinforcing the view that the act of migration must precede the Constitution’s effective date.

Clause (b) of Article 6 provides two distinct time limits for the act of migration: the first sub‑clause requires that migration be completed before the nineteenth day of July 1948, while the second sub‑clause requires migration to have occurred after that date. The second sub‑clause further obliges the applicant to be registered as a citizen of India by an officer appointed for that purpose by the Government of the Dominion of India, and the application for such registration must be made before the Constitution came into force. The proviso appended to Article 6 adds that no person shall be entered in the register unless he has resided within the territory of India for at least six months immediately preceding the date of his application. These provisions together make it clear that, for the purposes of Article 6, the act of migration must have taken place prior to the commencement of the Constitution. Consequently, the phrase “migrated to the territory of India” must be understood as meaning that the person migrated at any time before the Constitution became operative to a place that now lies within the territory of India.

The next important issue is whether the expression “migrated to the territory of India” merely signifies that a person came to the territory, or whether it implies that the person came with the intention of remaining there permanently. The word “migrate,” when read in isolation, is capable of a broader construction meaning “to move from one place to another,” irrespective of any intention to settle permanently. It is also widely accepted that “migrate” can be used in a narrower sense, denoting “to move from one place to another with the intention of residing permanently in the latter place.” Webster’s Dictionary, Second Edition (1937), defines “migrate” as “to go from one place to another; especially, to move from one country, region, or place of abode or sojourn to another, with a view to residence; to move; as the Moors who migrated from Africa to Spain.” The legal encyclopedia Corpus Juris Secundum (1948) gives a similar definition and adds “to change one’s place of residence” as another meaning. The terms “immigrate,” “immigrant,” and “immigration,” which denote migration into a country, have been examined by courts in Australia and the United States. Australian courts, considering the scheme of the Immigrant Registration Act, 1901, and section 51 of the Australian Constitution, held that “immigrant” refers to a person who enters Australia whether or not he intends to settle there (see Chia Gee v. Martin (1)). By contrast, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Burke (2), Moffitt v. United States (3), and United States v. Atlantic Fruit Co. (4), interpreted “immigrant” to mean a person who comes to the United States with a view to residing there permanently. These authorities illustrate that the word “migrate” can, in some contexts, carry the wider sense of merely moving to a place without an intention to stay permanently, and in other contexts, the narrower sense of moving with the intention of permanent residence. The Constitution‑makers did not include the phrase “with the intention to reside permanently” in Article 6, but that omission does not automatically indicate that the broader meaning was intended; the appropriate sense must be determined by examining the context and purpose of the provision.

The Court noted that the United States cases of United States v. Atlantic Fruit Co. and the earlier decisions cited as (1) (1905) 3 C.L.R. 649, (2) (1899) 99 Federal Reports 895, (3) (1904) 128 Federal Reports 375, and (4) (1914) 212 Federal Reports 711, interpreted the term “immigrant” by looking at the purpose and scheme of the legislation, concluding that an immigrant is a person who comes to the United States with a view to reside there permanently. By referring to those cases, the Court explained that the word “migrate” can, depending on context, carry a broader meaning of moving to a place without any intention of permanent residence, or a narrower meaning of moving to a place with the intention of residing there permanently. The Court observed that the fact that the framers of the Constitution did not expressly include the words “with the intention to reside permanently” in Article 6 does not by itself indicate that the broader meaning was intended. Accordingly, in order to determine whether the term “migrate” in the constitutional text should be read in its wider or narrower sense, it is necessary to examine carefully the purpose and scheme of the constitutional provisions concerning citizenship. The Constitution first defines the territory of India and prescribes the manner in which the territory may be enlarged or altered in the four articles of its first Chapter. It then proceeds, in the second Chapter, to address citizenship in a series of seven articles. The final article of that Chapter, Article 11, expressly reserves to Parliament the power to make laws regarding the acquisition, termination, and other matters relating to citizenship. Of the remaining six articles, Article 5 specifies who shall be citizens of India at the commencement of the Constitution; Articles 6 and 8 describe persons who, although not citizens under Article 5, shall be deemed to be citizens of India. Article 10 provides that a person who is a citizen or deemed citizen of India shall continue to be so, subject to any subsequent law made by Parliament. Article 9 states that a person who voluntarily acquires the citizenship of a foreign state shall not be a citizen, nor deemed to be a citizen, of India. Article 7 excludes from citizenship certain persons who would otherwise qualify under Articles 5 or 6. The primary provision for citizenship, therefore, lies in Article 5, which follows the usual principle that citizenship is based on birth or domicile—terms that, in brief, mean residence with the intention of living and dying in the country. Accordingly, citizenship is conferred on a person who satisfies this residence requirement and also meets an additional condition relating to birth within the territory now constituting India.

The Constitution provided that a person would be deemed a citizen of India if he was born in India, or if any of his parents were born in this area, or if he had an ordinary residence in this area for a continuous period of five years immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution. If the entire undivided India had remained intact and no part of the old India had been lost, this provision would have been sufficient to confer citizenship, except for the special provision that gave rights to persons of Indian origin residing outside India. However, part of the territory that was defined as India under the Government of India Act, 1935, ceased to be India and became Pakistan. This created a serious problem as to whether to treat as citizens of India the hundreds of thousands of persons who were of Indian origin—in the sense that they themselves or any of their parents or any of their grandparents had been born in India—but who would not become citizens under Article 5. The Constitution‑makers, by the provisions of Article 6, decided to treat some of these persons as citizens but not all. Those who had not come to the new India before the date of the commencement of the Constitution were excluded; those who had come were divided into two categories—those who had come before 19 July 1948 and those who had come on or after 19 July 1948. Persons in the first category, in order to be treated as citizens, had to satisfy a further requirement of “migration”, whatever that meant, and also have ordinary residence in the territory of India since they “migrated” to India. Those in the second category, in addition to having migrated, were required to reside in India for not less than six months preceding the date of the application for registration as a citizen, and such an application had to be filed before the date of the commencement of the Constitution. While the primary provisions of the Constitution concerning citizenship for people born in a place now included in India and for people whose parents were born in a place now in India insist on the requirement of intention to reside permanently by using the word “domicile”, Article 6, which under the scheme of the Constitution deals with what may be called “secondary citizenship” and says that certain persons will be deemed to be citizens of India, does not mention “domicile” as a requirement. The Court considered whether it could be that the Constitution‑makers thought that, although domicile was required in the case of persons born in what has now become India or whose parents were born there, and also in the case of a person who had been residing here for not less than five years, it was not necessary in the case of persons whose parents or any of whose grandparents had been born in what was formerly India but is no longer part of India.

In the Court’s view, the framers of the Constitution could not have intended to treat the requirement of domicile differently for persons born outside the present territory of India than for those born within it. The members of the Constituent Assembly were aware that the prevailing rule in almost every country was to require either birth within the territory or a domicile as a fundamental condition for acquiring citizenship. They also knew that, when addressing a comparable problem concerning the citizenship of individuals born in the former Irish Free State, the Constitution of that State expressly required domicile in the Irish Free State as a qualification for citizenship. Consequently, there is no conceivable rationale for the Constitution‑makers to have omitted a similar requirement in the Indian context for persons born abroad or for those whose parents or grandparents were born abroad. The Court further noted the puzzling consequences that would arise if Article 6 were interpreted to mean merely an intention to reside permanently in India, without the element of domicile. For example, consider two individuals: one who was born in the territory that now constitutes India and has lived there continuously, and another who, although also born in the present Indian territory, left to reside in the area that later became Pakistan and subsequently returned to India. Under an interpretation that makes domicile a prerequisite at the commencement of the Constitution, the first individual would have to satisfy the domicile requirement to be a citizen, whereas the second individual would not be required to do so. Such an outcome would be unreasonable and unlikely to have been intended by the Constitution‑makers. Therefore, the Court concluded that when the Constitution uses the expression “migrated to the territory of India,” it necessarily conveys the meaning “came to the territory of India with the intention of residing there permanently.” The absence of an explicit reference to “domicile” or “intention to reside permanently” in Article 6 is explained by the framers’ confidence that, within the overall scheme of the Constitution, the term “migrated” could only be understood in that sense. The Court also referred to the proviso to Article 7, which states that a person who would be a citizen under Articles 5 and 6 shall not be deemed a citizen if he migrated from the territory to Pakistan after 1 March 1947. The proviso deals with individuals who, after such migration, return to India under a permit for resettlement or permanent return—that is, with the purpose of residing permanently in India. In such cases, the main provisions of Article 7 do not apply, and under Article 6 the individual is deemed to have migrated to India after 19 July 1948. This requirement that the return be effected under a resettlement or permanent return permit, in order to avoid the loss of citizenship, strongly supports the interpretation that the intention to reside permanently is implicit in the phrase “migrated to the territory of India” within Article 6.

In interpreting the Constitution, the Court observed that any person who returned to India after 19 July 1948 would be deemed, for constitutional purposes, to have migrated to India. The requirement that such a return be made under a permit for resettlement or permanent return—so that the person could avoid the loss of citizenship—provided a strong indication that Article 6 contemplated an intention to reside permanently in India within the expression “migrated to the territory of India.” The Court further explained that it is possible for a person who moves from one place to another, or from one country to another, to possess only a temporary intention at the moment of moving, and later to develop a permanent intention to remain in the new location. When such a change of intention occurs, the Court held that the later intention must be recognised as evidence that the person “came to the country with the intention of residing there permanently.” In other words, although at the exact moment of his relocation the individual might not be regarded as having migrated to the new place, the law should deem him to have migrated at the later point when he forms a definitive intention to reside permanently. This legal approach was adopted both by the Election Tribunal and by the High Court, and neither tribunal nor court faced serious opposition to this view during the present proceedings.

The Election Tribunal and the High Court therefore turned their attention to the factual question of whether, in 1944, when Mangal Sain first arrived in Jullunder—now part of Indian territory—from his home in Jhawarian, presently in Pakistan, he possessed the intention of residing permanently in India. The tribunals also considered the alternative scenario: even if Mangal Sain lacked such an intention in 1944, did he later develop a permanent intention after his arrival in what is now Indian territory? As previously noted, the two authorities reached divergent conclusions on this point. The Election Tribunal concluded that Mangal Sain never possessed an intention to reside permanently in India at any time. By contrast, the High Court was prepared to hold that, when he moved from his home in 1944 to the eastern districts of Punjab, he already harboured a permanent intention, and that, at least after 15 August 1947, he entertained no intention other than making the Dominion of India his permanent abode. The High Court’s conclusion was subsequently challenged on the ground that it had been reached arbitrarily and that the tribunal had disregarded important evidence which, according to the challengers, clearly demonstrated that the respondent had no intention of residing permanently in India. In evaluating that contention, the Court indicated that it was proper to keep in mind the provisions of s. 116 B of the Representation of

In this case, the Court referred to the Representation of the People Act, which provides that a High Court decision on appeal from an Election Tribunal order in an election petition shall be “final and conclusive.” The Court noted that previous decisions of this Court have observed that, although those provisions do not absolutely prevent this Court from reviewing a High Court decision in a suitable case, they must nevertheless be kept in mind when the correctness of such a decision is challenged before this Court. The Court stated that it was unnecessary to examine whether the High Court’s finding that, even in 1944, Mangal Sain could be said to have migrated to the eastern districts of Punjab was open to successful challenge. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that that particular conclusion might be set aside, the Court explained that the High Court’s further finding – that after moving from his home district to Jullunder in 1944, Mangal Sain, after 15 August 1947, had no intention other than to make the territory of India his permanent abode – would be sufficient to establish his migration to India from the area that is now Pakistan. The Court reviewed the material placed on record concerning this question and observed that nothing in the record justified interfering with the High Court’s conclusion on that point. Counsel for the appellant emphasized that Mangal Sain left Indian territory for Burma in January 1950 and, upon arrival, filed an application under section 7(1) of the Union Citizenship Act, 1948 (Burma), indicating his intention to apply for a certificate of naturalisation and stating that he intended to reside permanently within the Union of Burma. Even if it were assumed that, in October 1950 or even in January 1950 when he departed for Burma, Mangal Sain formed the intention of taking up permanent residence there, the Court held that such a later intention was wholly irrelevant to the question of whether, in 1947, he intended to reside permanently in India. The appellant’s counsel also drew attention to a statement in that same application asserting that Mangal Sain had returned to Burma with his mother in 1947. The High Court, after considering that statement, found that he had not returned to Burma in 1947, and the Court saw no reason to depart from that finding. In the Court’s opinion, there was nothing on the record that would create any doubt about the correctness of the High Court’s determination that, after 15 August 1947, Mangal Sain – who had earlier moved from a place now in Pakistan to Jullunder in India – definitively decided to make India his permanent home. Whether or not he altered that intention in January 1950 was irrelevant for the purpose of the present proceeding. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in holding that Mangal Sain satisfied the first requirement of Article 6 of the Constitution concerning migration to the territory of India from the territory now included in Pakistan.

In this part of the judgment the Court examined the requirement of article 6 of the Constitution, which concerns “migration to the territory of India from the territory now included in Pakistan.” The Court observed that it was not disputed, and never appeared to have been disputed, that Mangal Sain was born in India as defined by the Government of India Act, 1935, and therefore satisfied clause (a) of article 6. The Court further noted that, from the date of his migration—a date the Court treated as 15 August 1947—Mangal Sain had been ordinarily residing in the territory of India. Counsel for the respondent argued that to meet the test of being “ordinarily resident in the territory of India since the date of his migration” it was necessary to demonstrate that Mangal Sain was physically present in India on 26 January 1950. The Court rejected that contention. First, the Court observed that article 6 of the Constitution became operative on 26 November 1949. Consequently, when applying the test of ordinary residence, the relevant period extended only from the date of migration up to 26 November 1949. The Court clarified that it was not required for the person to be residing in India on that exact date or immediately before it. What was required, the Court explained, was that during the whole interval starting from the completion of migration and ending on 26 November 1949, the individual was “ordinarily resident” in India. The Court emphasized that ordinary residence does not demand physical presence on every single day of the period; rather, in the absence of a constitutional definition, the term should be understood as residence during the period without any serious interruption. The record, the Court found, showed no material break in Mangal Sain’s residence in India from at least 15 August 1947 through 26 November 1949. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in sustaining Mangal Sain’s claim to be deemed a citizen of India under article 6 of the Constitution, and that the High Court was also correct in allowing his appeal and dismissing the election petition. Since the Court’s decision rested on the validity of the article 6 claim, it did not need to consider the separate question of Mangal Sain’s entitlement to citizenship under article 5. The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs, and the order of dismissal of the election petition was affirmed.