Shrimant Dattaji Raobahirojirao... vs Shrimant Vijayasinhrao And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1960

Decision Date: 29 April 1960

Coram: S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah

In this case the petitioner, Shrimant Dattaji Raobahirojirao Ghorpade, appealed against the respondents, Shrimant Vijayasinhrao and another, before the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was delivered on 29 April 1960 by a bench consisting of Justice S K Das, Justice A K Sarkar and Justice M Hidayatullah. The citation of the decision is 1960 AIR 1272. The matters before the Court involved the Saranjam Estate and the maintenance grant that had been given to a junior member of the family, the power of the Government to resume and re‑grant such estate, the custom of lineal primogeniture and its scope, and whether the suit challenging the Government’s order of resumption and re‑grant was time‑barred under section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (Bombay X of 1876).

According to the factual backdrop, the holder of the Gajendragad Saranjam died in 1932. By an order dated 7 June 1932 the Government of Bombay resumed the estate and re‑granted it to the deceased holder’s eldest son. The same order also allowed the continuation of an assignment of certain lands from the estate in favour of a younger family member identified as B, the assignment being intended as a maintenance grant. B died on 14 May 1940, leaving behind his widow A and his undivided brother D. A applied to the Government for permission to adopt a son, but the permission was not granted; nevertheless she proceeded to adopt V on 10 July 1941. Subsequently, by an order dated 17 December 1941, the Government continued the maintenance grant, also described as a Saranjam potgi, in favour of D. The adopted son V then instituted a suit against both the Government and D seeking recovery of the lands on two grounds. First, he alleged that the Government’s order of 17 December 1941 was ultra vires, null and void. Second, he contended that the family custom of lineal primogeniture, which he claimed prevailed, entitled him, as the adopted son of A, to the lands in preference to D.

The respondents contested the suit on several points. They argued that under the applicable Saranjam Rules the interest of B terminated upon his death and could not pass to V despite the December 1941 order. They also submitted that the alleged custom of lineal primogeniture did not apply to maintenance grants, and that the suit was barred by section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876.

The Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the lands either under the Saranjam Rules or under the claimed custom. The Court further concluded that the suit was barred by section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. It explained that the maintenance grant, being part of the Saranjam, was governed by the incidents of Saranjam tenure and the relevant Saranjam Rules. Saranjam grants were conveyed at the will and pleasure of the sovereign power and could be interrupted or revoked through resumption, whether temporary or absolute. On B’s death, the Government was within its authority to resume the grant and re‑grant it to D, which it did by the order of 17 December 1941. The Court therefore found that the adoption of the plaintiff by the widow could not affect the operation of the Government’s order. The Court also observed that even under the alleged custom of lineal primogeniture, D was entitled to the properties after B’s death, and that no pleading or evidence showed that the custom extinguished the Government’s right to resume the maintenance grant and issue a fresh grant. Consequently, the plaintiff’s request for a declaration that the December 1941 order was void and that he should recover possession of the lands was rejected.

The Court observed that the adoption of the plaintiff by the widow of the deceased could not alter the effect of the Government order dated December 17, 1941. The decision in Daulatrao Malojiyao v. Province of Bombay (1946) 49 Bom. L.R. 270 was cited in support of this view. The plaintiff had relied on a custom of lineal primogeniture, contending that under that custom the remaining brother, referred to as D, was entitled to succeed to the properties after the death of the deceased brother, B. However, the plaintiff did not plead, nor did he produce any evidence, that the properties once vested in D were divested by the subsequent adoption undertaken by the widow. In addition, the plaintiff failed to plead or prove that the alleged custom extinguished the Government’s authority to resume the maintenance grant (potgi holding) and to issue a fresh grant. Sub‑clause 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, expressly barred the civil courts from hearing “claims against the Government relating to lands granted or held as Saranjam.” The plaintiff sought a declaration that the order of December 17, 1941, was null and void and that it did not affect the properties that were the subject of the suit. The Court noted that unless the order was found to be beyond the powers of the Government, the plaintiff could not claim recovery of possession. The nature of the claim fell squarely within the mischief that subsection 4 was intended to address, and consequently the suit was deemed barred under that provision.

The judgment concerned Civil Appeal No 37 of 1960, an appeal taken on a certificate from the Bombay High Court. The High Court’s judgment and decree dated November 12, 1952, had reversed the decision of the First Class Civil Judge at Dharwar rendered on April 20, 1949, in Special Civil Suit No 16 of 1943. Counsel for the appellant included S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, while Naunit Lal represented respondent No 1 and B. R. L. Iyengar together with T. M. Sen acted for respondent No 2. The appeal was heard on April 29, 1960, and the judgment was delivered by Justice S. K. Das. The material facts recited that Gajendragad, located in Taluk Ron of Dharwar district, was a Saranjam estate listed as number 91 in the Government’s Saranjam register. Within this estate lay the village of Dindur and Survey Field No 302 of Unachgeri, which constituted the properties in dispute. At the relevant time, the holder of the Saranjam estate was Bhujangarao Daulatrao Ghorpade. In 1932, the Government of Bombay, through the Political Department, issued Resolution No 8969 dated June 7, 1932, which resumed and re‑granted the Gajendragad Saranjam to Bhujangarao Daulatrao Ghorpade, describing him as the eldest son of the late Saranjamdar Daulatrao Bhujangarao Ghorpade, and directed that the estate be entered in his sole name. The resolution further mandated that the Collector of Dharwar take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages that had been in the possession of the deceased Saranjamdar and confirmed that the assignments held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders were to continue as before.

According to the resolution, the Collector of Dharwar was to record the accounts of the Saranjam with effect from the date of death of the last holder, and to take steps to restore possession of the villages that formed part of the estate to the Saranjamdar who succeeded the deceased holder. The Governor in Council concurred with the Commissioner of the Southern Division that the assignments held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders should continue in the same manner as they were at that time. One of the younger branches of the Ghorpade family was Babasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade, hereinafter referred to as Babasaheb, who held the village of Dindur and Survey Field No. 302 of Unachgeri as a potgi holder for maintenance. Babasaheb had an undivided brother named Dattajirao, who was named as defendant No. 2 in the suit and who appeared before the Court as the appellant. Babasaheb died on 14 May 1940, leaving a widow, Abayabai, and his undivided brother. On 10 July 1941, Abayabai adopted a boy, Vijayasinhrao, as a son of her deceased husband. Vijayasinhrao was the plaintiff who instituted the suit and, in the present proceedings, was the principal respondent; for convenience he is called the plaintiff‑respondent. He was the natural son of Bhujangarao’s younger brother, another Dattajirao, who is to be distinguished from the appellant despite sharing the same name. After Babasaheb’s death, Abayabai applied to the Government for sanction to adopt the boy, an application that was opposed by the appellant. On 17 December 1941 the Government of Bombay issued a resolution directing that the Saranjam potgi holding of Dindur and Survey No. 302 of Unachgeri, which had been assigned for maintenance to the deceased potgi holder Babasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade at the time of the 1932 re‑grant of the Gajendragad Saranjam, should be continued to his undivided brother, Dattajirao Babirojirao Ghorpade. The resolution further directed, under Rule 7 of the Saranjam Rules, that the new potgi holder, Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade, should pay an annual maintenance allowance of Rs 300 to Bai Abayabai, widow of Babasaheb, for the duration of her life. These orders were to take effect from 14 May 1940, the date of Babasaheb’s death, and the Commissioner S.D. was instructed to communicate the orders to Bai Abayabai, referring to her petitions, and also to the Rayats of Dindur, referring to their petition dated 12 May 1941, as well as to the present Saranjamdar of Gajendragad. Subsequently, on 8 February 1943, the plaintiff‑respondent instituted the suit against the Province of Bombay as defendant No. 1, the appellant as defendant No. 2 and Abayabai as defendant No. 3. The suit was contested by the Province of Bombay, now represented by the State of Bombay, and by the appellant, while Abayabai, who had supported the plaintiff‑respondent’s case, died during the pendency of the suit.

In this case the plaintiff‑respondent’s claim was that, following his adoption, the estate of his deceased adoptive father had passed to him under the rule of lineal primogeniture, thereby giving him a better right to the property than the appellant. The plaintiff‑respondent’s principal allegation was set out in paragraph 6 of the plaint, which stated that the Government Resolution issued by defendant No 1 in 1941 was ultra vires and void for two reasons. First, defendant No 1 had re‑granted the Saranjam estate to Shrimant Sardar Bhujaragarao Ghorpade in 1932 and, according to defendant No 1, the suit properties were continued to the adoptive father of the plaintiff; under the Saranjam Rules there had been no occasion for Government interference, the re‑grant was only effective during the life of the grantee, and the grantee had not been consulted before the resolution was made. Second, the custom of the family dictated that a deceased person’s estate devolved by lineal primogeniture; consequently, after the death of the plaintiff’s adoptive father and the plaintiff’s own adoption, the entire estate should have vested in the plaintiff, outranking the rights of defendant No 2, and the action of defendant No 1 in ignoring this customary rule was ultra vires and void. On the basis of these pleas the plaintiff‑respondent prayed for the recovery of possession of the suit properties from the appellant, for mesne profits, and for costs. In response, the Province of Bombay put forward several defenses. The chief defenses were: (1) assuming the adoption was valid, the plaintiff‑respondent still had no legal claim because, under the relevant Saranjam Rules, the interest of Babasabeb terminated on his death and did not pass to the plaintiff despite the Government Resolution of 17 December 1941; (2) the alleged family custom did not extend to maintenance grants; and (3) the suit was barred by section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The appellant, while supporting these defenses, also argued that there was no valid adoption of the plaintiff‑respondent and that Abayabai had been expressly prohibited by her husband from adopting a son. Several issues were framed on the basis of these pleadings. The trial court initially dismissed the suit on a preliminary ground, holding that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. The learned Civil Judge reasoned that the properties were governed by the Saranjam Rules and, having examined those rules, concluded that because the plaintiff‑respondent, by virtue of his adoption, had become a nephew of the appellant and was thereby claiming maintenance from the appellant, the suit failed to disclose a valid cause of action.

The Court observed that it was essential for the plaintiff‑respondent to set out the specific facts that would bring a member of a Saranjam Family within the ambit of Rule 7 of the Saranjam Rules, which governs the right to claim maintenance. Because the plaintiff‑respondent failed to allege those facts, the trial court concluded that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. The High Court correctly noted, however, that the plaintiff‑respondent was not asserting a maintenance claim under Rule 7; rather, he contended that the properties forming the subject of the suit had descended to him by virtue of his adoption and the custom of lineal primogeniture. Consequently, the High Court held that the plaintiff‑respondent’s claim was far more fundamental than a simple maintenance request and that the trial judge had misapprehended the true nature of the suit. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the dismissal order and directed that the suit be heard on all of the issues that had been raised.

Following the High Court’s direction, the trial judge proceeded to hear each issue. The first two matters concerned the adoption: (1) whether the adoption ceremony had been properly proved and (2) whether Babasaheb, during his lifetime, had prohibited his wife from adopting a son. The trial judge found in favour of the plaintiff‑respondent on the first point but against him on the second. The High Court affirmed the finding on the first issue and, after a careful and detailed examination of the evidence, held that the trial judge was incorrect in concluding that the adoption was invalid because of an alleged prohibition by Babasaheb. The High Court thereby concluded that no such prohibition existed and that the adoption was valid. The Supreme Court expressed the view that this finding of the High Court could not be successfully challenged before it. Accordingly, the appeal was considered on the basis that the plaintiff‑respondent had been validly adopted by Abayabai on 10 July 1941. The Court then identified the issues material to the appeal: (i) whether the plaintiff proved his title to the suit property; (ii) whether the Government Resolution (D. G.) No. 8969 dated 17 December 1941 was ultra vires and void as alleged; (iii) whether the suit was barred under section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act; and (iv) whether the custom pleaded in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint was proved. The trial judge had ruled against the plaintiff‑respondent on all of these points, holding that he was not entitled to recover possession of the properties, that he had failed to prove the custom, that the Government Resolution was not ultra vires, and that the suit was barred by section 4 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act. The High Court, however, reversed the trial judge’s decisions on each of these issues.

The High Court had held that the properties that were the subject of the suit had originally been granted to the junior branch of Babasaheb for its maintenance, that those properties were impartible and that they were governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture. Consequently, the Court found that the properties had devolved upon the appellant upon the death of Babasaheb. The Court further observed that when Babasaheb’s widow executed a valid adoption, the properties were consequently divested from the appellant. Because the plaintiff‑respondent then became the eldest member of the senior branch of Babasaheb’s family, the High Court concluded that he acquired rights to the properties by the combined operation of the family custom pleaded in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint and the ordinary principles of Hindu law. In this view, the Court saw no issue requiring examination of the validity of the Government Resolution dated 17 December 1941, and it noted that no relief for possession had been claimed against the Government; therefore, the suit was not barred by section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876.

The appellant, however, argued very strongly that the High Court’s reasoning was erroneous. He contended that the properties formed part of a Saranjam and that they vested in him simply by operation of the death of Babasaheb, and that such a vesting could not be undone by a later adoption. He further asserted that this conclusion conflicted with the nature of a Saranjam tenure, because the properties had also vested in the appellant by virtue of the re‑grant made on 17 December 1941, and therefore could not be divested by the adoption that took place on 10 July 1941. Moreover, the appellant disputed the inference that the family custom set out in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint necessarily caused divestment of the appellant’s rights upon a valid adoption, regardless of whether that custom had been proved. In addition, the appellant maintained that the High Court erred in holding that no claim existed against the Government within the meaning of the fourth sub‑clause of section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The appellant submitted that such a claim did indeed exist and that, consequently, no civil court possessed jurisdiction to determine the dispute. The Court found these submissions persuasive and accepted them.

The plaintiff‑respondent’s claim that the properties had devolved upon him by adoption may be examined either through the lens of the Saranjam Rules or through the custom pleaded in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint. The Court first considered the claim in relation to the Saranjam Rules, assuming that those rules are applicable, as far as practicable, to maintenance grants (potgis) situated within a Saranjam. In the Government of Bombay’s Resolution of 7 June 1932, which had been quoted earlier, the potgi holders were treated as being within the Saranjam and specific provisions were made for them. The later Resolution of 17 December 1941 likewise proceeded on the same footing, treating the potgi holders as part of the Saranjam. Two earlier resolutions—one dated 1891 (Exhibit 100) and another dated 1936 (Exhibit 101)—also treated the whole of Gajendragad and portions of it as a Saranjam, thereby establishing a consistent governmental view of the status of the lands in question.

Saranjam was the subject of discussion. The judgment noted that during Babasaheb’s lifetime he desired to surrender the grant that had been made in his favour to the Saranjamdar, but the Government refused to accept such relinquishment. The judgment also recorded that Abayabai had sought Government permission to adopt a boy, a permission that she never obtained. These circumstances, according to the Court, demonstrate that the potgi holding formed part of the Saranjam and was treated as such by all parties involved. The Court then turned to explain the meaning of the term “Saranjam.” It observed that the word literally signifies apparatus, provisions or materials. In Wilson’s Glossary, Saranjam is defined as temporary assignments of revenue from villages or lands for the support of troops or for personal service, usually for the lifetime of the grantee. The Court further cited Dr. G. D. Patel’s work, “The Indian Land Problem and Legislation,” in which Patel explained that, as described by Colonel Etheridge in the pre‑face to the Saranjam List, former Muslim and Maratha governments maintained a feudal aristocracy for state purposes by temporarily assigning revenue either for troop support, personal service, maintenance of official dignity or other specific reasons. Holders of such lands were given the necessary powers to collect, appropriate the revenue and manage the lands generally. Under Muslim rule these holdings were called Jahagirs, while under Maratha rule they were termed Saranjam. Patel further noted that during the Maratha period this distinction ceased to exist, and with the advent of British rule the two tenures became interchangeable, so that all such grants were commonly referred to as “saranjam.” In addition to the Deccan‑specific Saranjam grants, the Court explained, there were other politically motivated grants scattered throughout the State whose origins were not materially different, leading the British to subject them to the same regulations known as the Saranjam Rules.

The judgment then set out the statutory basis for the Saranjam Rules, stating that they were made under the powers referred to in rule 10 of Schedule B of Act XI of 1852 and the second sub‑clause of element 3 of section 2 of Bombay Act VII of 1863. The Court reproduced several of these rules to illustrate their content. Rule I provided that Saranjams would ordinarily continue in accordance with decisions already passed or that might later be passed by the Provincial Government in each case. Rule 2‑A specified that a Saranjam deemed hereditarily continuable should ordinarily descend to the eldest male representative, following the order of primogeniture, of the senior branch of the family descended from the first British grantee or any of his brothers who held an undivided interest. However, the Provincial Government retained the right, for sufficient reasons, to direct the continuance of the Saranjam to any other member of the same family, or, as an act of grace, to a person adopted into the family with the Government’s sanction. These extracted rules formed the basis for the Court’s later analysis of the claim concerning the potgi holding and its status within the Saranjam framework.

The Court explained that when a saranjam was transferred to a member of the same family or, as an act of grace, to a person adopted into that family with the approval of the Provincial Government, the adopted son became liable to pay the Provincial Government a nazarana. This nazarana could not exceed the value of one year’s income from the saranjam, and it could be collected in instalments as directed by the Provincial Government in each individual case. The Court then set out Rule 5, which stated that every saranjam was to be treated as a life estate. Upon the death of the holder, the saranjam would be formally resumed. If the saranjam could be continued, the Provincial Government would grant it anew to the next holder, free from any debts or charges except those that the Provincial Government might expressly impose. Under Rule 7, every saranjamdar was required to make appropriate provisions for the maintenance of the widow or widows of the previous saranjamdar, his own brothers, or any other family member who, because of infancy, mental or physical disability, or other valid claim, could not earn a livelihood. If a saranjamdar failed to fulfil this duty, the Provincial Government could order him to provide suitable support and could determine the amount payable, provided that a person who had independent means or was, in the Government’s opinion, otherwise adequately provided for, could not claim maintenance from the saranjamdar. Rule 8 clarified that any order issued by the Provincial Government under the preceding rule for granting maintenance would remain effective only during the lifetime of the saranjamdar who received the order. The Court then referred to a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Daulatrao Malojirao v. Province of Bombay (1946) 49 Bom. L.R. 270, which, after citing earlier decisions in Shekh Sultan Sani v. Shekh Ajmodin (1892) L.R. 20 I.A. 50 and Raghojirao v. Laxmanrao (1912) 14 Bom. L.R. 1226, observed that the entire structure of a saranjam tenure rested on the sovereign right, which could be altered only by conquest or treaty. Consequently, jagirs and saranjams, together with their feudal incidents, were granted or withheld at the sovereign’s pleasure, and even when granted, their tenure could be interrupted or revoked by resumption, whether temporary or absolute. No ordinary incident of private law between subjects could limit or disturb the sovereign will. Applying this principle, the Court found it manifestly clear that the Saranjam Rules did not support the plaintiff‑respondent’s claim. The plaintiff, Abayabai, had sought Government sanction to adopt a boy, but no such sanction had been granted. Upon the death of Babasaheb, the Government was therefore entitled to resume the grant.

The Government, by a resolution dated 17 December 1941, directed that the Saranjam potgi holding of village Dindur and Survey No. 302 of Unachgeri should be continued to the appellant. In effect, this resolution operated as a resumption of the grant and a fresh conferral of the holdings. The Court disagreed with the view of the High Court that the order merely recognised the legal position under the rule of succession and was equivalent to an ordinary mutation order. The High Court had stressed the presence of the word “continued” in the 1941 resolution and had contrasted it with an earlier resolution dated 7 June 1932, which was clearly described as effecting a resumption and regrant of the Gajendragad Saranjam. The Court observed, however, that paragraph 2 of the 1932 resolution also employed the word “continued” in reference to maintenance grants, specifically potgi holdings within a Saranjam. Consequently, the meaning of the term “continued” could not be decisive. When the 1941 resolution is read in its entirety, it becomes evident that the potgi of village Dindur and Survey No. 302 of Unachgeri was granted to the appellant. The Government possessed the authority to issue such an order and there was no basis for declaring it null and void. The High Court had not held the order to be invalid; on the contrary, it described the order as valid and effective from the death of Babasaheb. Nonetheless, the High Court erroneously concluded that the subsequent adoption extinguished the effect of the order. It is important to note that the adoption occurred on 10 July 1941, whereas the resolution was passed on 17 December 1941, although it was made retrospective to the date of Babasaheb’s death. There was no justification for a valid governmental order to lose its effect because of an adoption undertaken by Abayabai without governmental sanction. To hold that a governmental order ceased because of a private act would contradict the very nature of a Saranjam tenure. The Court then examined the plaintiff‑respondent’s claim based on the custom pleaded in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint, which asserted the rule of lineal primogeniture. In its written statement, the Government denied the existence of such a custom and rejected its applicability to maintenance grants. The Government further explained that under Rule 7 of the Saranjam Rules, which merely embody customary law relating to Saranjams, it retained absolute discretion to decide whether to issue an order, the nature of any provision, and the beneficiary. The appellant reiterated that the contents of paragraph 6(b) of the plaint were incorrect, denying the custom of descent by primogeniture and contending that the defendant became the owner by survivorship after Babasaheb’s death.

In the present case the plaintiff’s allegation set out in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint was found to be inaccurate. The plaintiff claimed that the family custom of descent followed the rule of primogeniture, but that claim was expressly denied. The defendant, on the other hand, asserted that he became the owner of the disputed properties by survivorship after the death of Babasaheb. The learned Civil Judge concluded that the custom pleaded in paragraph 6(b) had not been proved. Although the High Court did not cite any specific evidence establishing the custom, it observed that “it is common ground that the properties which had been assigned to this branch for its maintenance is impartable and goes by primogeniture.” Even assuming that observation to be correct, the High Court’s remark is difficult to accept as “common ground” because both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s written statements expressly denied the existence of such a custom. Moreover, the observation does not aid the plaintiff‑respondent. According to the rule of lineal primogeniture, after Babasaheb’s death the appellant became entitled to, and indeed received, the properties. The plaint never alleged that the properties, once vested by the customary rule of lineal primogeniture, were subsequently divested by a later valid adoption by the widow. No specific plea of such divestment was made, although the High Court relied on a concession by counsel for the appellant that, under ordinary Hindu law, properties vested in the appellant would be divested by a subsequent valid adoption by the widow. The Court considered it unnecessary to engage in the complex question of whether a later valid adoption by the widow could divest an estate, because the plaint did not raise that issue, nor did it present evidence of such a case. Consequently, the plaintiff‑respondent was not permitted to introduce a new cause of action for the first time on appeal. The plaintiff‑respondent attempted to rely on a family custom of lineal primogeniture that purportedly differed from the ordinary law of inheritance. It was therefore incumbent upon him to allege and prove the existence of that custom, to delineate its precise scope, and to demonstrate how it superseded ordinary Hindu law. In the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff‑respondent failed to plead or prove any such family custom that would cause the properties to devolve upon him. Furthermore, to succeed, the plaintiff‑respondent needed to establish that the custom was of a nature that would bind the Government. Neither the appellant nor the Government conceded that a custom of lineal primogeniture, even if it existed within the family, would deprive the Government of its right to resume the maintenance grant— which formed part of a Saranjam— and to issue a fresh grant in accordance with the Saranjam Rules. Turning to section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, the relevant portion of that provision provides: “Section 4—Subject to the exceptions hereinafter appearing, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to any of the following matters: (a) claims against the Government relating to any property appertaining to the office of any hereditary officer appointed or recognised under Bombay Act No III of 1874 or any other law for the time being in force, or of any other village‑officer or servant, or claims to perform the duties of any such officer or servant, or in respect of any injury caused by, exclusion from such office or service, or suits to set aside or avoid any order under the same Act or any other law relating to the same subject for the time being in force passed by the State Government or any officer duly authorized in that behalf, or claims against the Government relating to lands held under treaty, or to lands granted or held as Saranjam, or on other political tenure, or to lands declared by the Provincial Government or any officer duly authorized in that behalf to be held for service.”

The Court examined the provision of section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, which barred civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over certain matters. The provision listed several categories, including claims against the Government concerning hereditary officers appointed under Bombay Act III of 1874 or any other law then in force, claims relating to village officers or servants, claims arising from injury caused by exclusion from such office or service, and suits seeking to set aside or avoid any order issued under the same Act or any other law on the same subject passed by the State Government or an authorized officer. The section further barred claims against the Government concerning lands held under treaty, lands granted or held as Saranjam, lands on other political tenure, and lands declared by the Provincial Government or an authorized officer to be held for service.

The Court noted that in the precedent Mallappa alias Annasaheb Basvantrao Desai Nadgouda v. Tukko Narshimha Mutalik Desai and Others, the distinction made in the section between “claims” and “suits” was emphasized. The Court focused on the fourth sub‑clause, which expressly referred to “claims against the Government relating to lands granted or held as Saranjam.” The High Court had held that no claim against the Government had been made in the present case. The Court disagreed with that conclusion. It observed that the plaintiff‑respondent explicitly prayed for a declaration that the Government Resolution dated 17 December 1941 was null and void and that it did not affect the properties in dispute because the Government either lacked authority to make the order or had no occasion to do so. The plaintiff‑respondent also sought possession of those properties notwithstanding the Government’s orders.

From those pleadings, the Court concluded that the Government was more than a mere formal party and that a genuine claim against it was raised with respect to the orders contained in the 17 December 1941 Resolution. The Court held that, unless the Resolution was set aside, the plaintiff‑respondent could not claim recovery of possession from the appellant along with mesne profits or other relief. Consequently, the Court found that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to determine any claim against the Government concerning the Resolution affecting Saranjam lands, and that the suit was therefore barred under section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 12 November 1952, and restored the decree of the learned Civil Judge dated 20 April 1949. The appellant was awarded costs throughout the proceedings against the plaintiff‑respondent. The appeal was thus allowed.