Shrimant Appasaheb Tuljaram Desaiand... vs Bhalchandra Vithalrao Thube

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 716 of 1957

Decision Date: 28 October 1960

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, A.K. Sarkar, Raghubar Dayal

In the matter styled Shrimant Appasaheb Tuljaram Desaiand … versus Bhalchandra Vithalrao Thube decided on 28 October 1960, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment with Justice Syed Jaffer Imam authoring the opinion and the bench comprising Justices Syed Jaffer Imam, A.K. Sarkar and Raghubar Dayal. The case is reported in 1961 AIR 589 and 1961 SCR (2) 163. The petition was filed by Shrimant Appasaheb Tuljaram Desaiand and others against respondent Bhalchandra Vithalrao Thube. The legal question concerned whether a building erected on land held as watan could be treated as watan property for the purposes of Section 4 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act 1874 and consequently whether the building could be attached and sold under Section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including the proviso clauses (b) and (c). The headnote outlines that a decree had been passed against a person identified as “T,” the owner of certain watan lands, and that execution of the decree sought attachment and sale of a building standing on those lands. The appellant, acting as the legal representative of T, argued that the building should not be liable to attachment for two reasons: first, that the building formed part of watan property within the meaning of Section 4 of the 1874 Act and therefore did not constitute saleable property under Section 60(1) of the Code; and second, that the appellant himself was an “agriculturist,” and consequently the building, being his residence, was shielded from attachment by clause (c) of the proviso to Section 60(1). The factual record showed that the building had not existed at the time the watan was created; it was constructed later by one of the watandars, and there was no evidence that the structure was intended to provide remuneration for performing duties attached to a hereditary office. Moreover, the evidence indicated that the appellant was not wholly dependent on income from the home farm; he derived substantial revenue from other lands, and there was no proof that this income resulted from his own cultivation. The Court held that the building was not an accession to the land that would cause it to acquire the character of the land on which it stood, and therefore it did not fall within the definition of watan property under Section 4 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874. The Court further held, with Justices Syed Jaffer Imam and Raghubar Dayal forming the majority and Justice A.K. Sarkar dissenting, that the term “agriculturist” in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 60(1) must be given the same meaning as in clause (b); consequently, to qualify under those provisions a person must be truly dependent on agriculture for his livelihood.

In the judgment the Court observed that a person who lives by tilling the soil and cannot maintain himself by any other means is regarded as dependent on agriculture for his livelihood, although the law does not require that such a person actually till the land with his own hands. Applying this principle to the present case, the Court held that, on the facts, the appellant could not be described as an agriculturist within the meaning of the word employed in section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court then examined the relevant case law. Justice Sarkar explained that, according to the plain meaning of “agriculturist” in clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to sub‑section (1) of section 60, an agriculturist is any person who occupies himself with agriculture. He stressed that clause (c) does not contain any requirement that the agriculturist must depend on agriculture for his living. Consequently, a person who engages in agricultural activities, even if he does not personally cultivate the land and even if he conducts agriculture on a very large scale, qualifies as an agriculturist. Moreover, such a person remains an agriculturist even when he has other sources of livelihood apart from agriculture. Justice Sarkar further clarified that, under clause (c), in order for houses and buildings belonging to an agriculturist to receive protection from attachment and sale, those structures must be occupied by the agriculturist for the purpose of agriculture.

The matter before the Court was a civil appeal numbered 716 of 1957, filed in the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The appeal challenged the judgment and decree dated 29 July 1955 of the former Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 50 of 1953, which itself was an appeal under the Letters Patent against the judgment and decree dated 3 September 1953 of the High Court in First Appeal No. 547 of 1952. The appellants were represented by counsel comprising the Additional Solicitor‑General of India and two other senior legal practitioners, while the respondent was represented by three counsel. The judgment of Justice Jafer Imam and Justice Raghubar Dayal was delivered by Justice Imam, and Justice A. K. Sarkar delivered a separate judgment. Justice Imam set out that the appeal arose from the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 50 of 1953, which had reversed the order of Justice Shah and restored the attachment order originally passed by the executing court. The appeal required determination of two questions: (1) whether the house (referred to as the “Wada”) ordered to be attached by the executing court constituted Watan property and, if so, whether it could be attached in execution of a decree; and (2) if the Wada was not Watan property, whether it was exempt from attachment by virtue of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court then recounted the factual background. Rao Ba. Vithalrao Laxmanrao Thube (hereinafter “Laxmanrao”) had instituted Civil Suit No. 313 of 1943 against Tuljaramarao Narainrao Desai (hereinafter “Tuljaramarao”) to recover a loan of Rs. 80,000. The suit was decreed on 20 December 1943. After Tuljaramarao’s death, his legal representatives, who are the present appellants, were joined to the proceedings on 21 September 1944. In April 1949, Laxmanrao filed an application …

The decree-holder filed an application seeking execution of the decree and asked that certain properties, including the Wada that is the subject of the present appeal, be attached for subsequent sale. The appellants contested the proposed attachment on several grounds. On 17 December 1951 the executing court issued a warrant of attachment directed solely against the Wada in question. The appellants challenged that warrant before the Bombay High Court. Their appeal was heard by Justice Shah, who, by an order dated 23 September 1953, set aside the attachment order, relying on the decision of Justice Chagla in Second Appeal No 760 of 1942. Justice Shah did not express any view on whether section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure conferred protection on the Wada against attachment. An appeal against Justice Shah’s order was then filed under the Letters Patent of the High Court and was heard by a Division Bench. That Division Bench, as already noted, reversed Justice Shah’s judgment and restored the attachment order issued by the executing court. Following that reversal, the High Court issued a certificate stating that the matter was suitable for appeal to this Court.

The record shows that the entire village of Nandi was granted as an inam to the ancestor of Tuljaramarao and to his descendants, as established by the Sanad (Exhibit 54) and the Inam Patrak (Exhibit 57). The Sanad makes no reference to any Wada existing on the inam lands. According to the executing court, the Wada appears to have been constructed after the original grant, and the Division Bench of the High Court arrived at the same conclusion. Justice Shah made no finding to the contrary. Consequently, the Court must proceed on the premise that the Wada in dispute was not part of the original inam grant but was erected later on land that forms part of the inam village of Nandi. The issue to be determined is whether the attributes of “Watan Property” extend to a Wada that was built after the grant on land that is undeniably Watan Property within the meaning of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (Bombay Act No III of 1874). In Appeal No 760 of 1942, Justice Chagla held that a house in that case was an accession to the site on which it stood and therefore shared the character of the underlying land. He explained that the question before him was whether the house qualified as immovable property held for the performance of a duty attached to a hereditary office under section 4 of the Act. Relying on the definition of “immovable property” in the Bombay General Clauses Act, Justice Chagla concluded that the house unquestionably formed part of the immovable property used to discharge the hereditary duty.

In this matter, the Court examined whether the immovable property that is held for the performance of the duty described in section 4 of the Act could consist of both the land and the house situated upon it. The Court observed that once a house is regarded as part of the immovable property, it cannot be separated from the land, and it is therefore untenable to claim that only the land constitutes Watan property while the permanently attached house does not. Justice Shah, relying on the earlier decision of Justice Chagla, concluded that because the land on which the Wada stood was Watan property, the Wada itself must be deemed to have acquired the same character. The Division Bench, hearing the appeal against Justice Shah’s finding, disagreed. It held that although a house built on land is classified as immovable property, this classification alone does not make the house Watan property simply because the land beneath it is Watan property. The Bench emphasized that the transformation of a newly constructed house into immovable property does not, by itself, affect the question of whether the house qualifies as Watan property. Accordingly, for a house to be considered Watan property, it must satisfy the definition set out in section 4 of the Act. If the term “held” is interpreted in the manner suggested by the Division Bench, it would be difficult to accept that a house erected by a watandar on a portion of Watan land could be said to be held by him for the purpose of performing his hereditary duties. Consequently, the Division Bench concluded that Justice Shah had erred in his holding. The Act defines “Watan Property” as movable or immovable property that is held, acquired, or assigned to provide remuneration for the performance of duties attached to a hereditary office; the definition also embraces the right to levy customary fees or perquisites, whether in cash or kind, at fixed or variable times, and includes cash payments made voluntarily by the State Government, which may be periodically modified or withdrawn. The inam lands of Nandi were unquestionably held as remuneration for such hereditary duties and therefore qualified as Watan properties. However, the courts below found that the Wada in question was not the subject of the original grant. In the Court’s view, the Wada was never held for the purpose of providing remuneration for hereditary duties, nor was it acquired for that purpose. The structure had been erected sometime after the grant, either by the original grantee or by his descendants, and the record contains no indication that it was built to serve as remuneration for the performance of any hereditary office.

In this case the Court examined whether the Wada had been constructed for the purpose of providing remuneration for the performance of a hereditary duty and concluded that it had not, and therefore the Wada could not be classified as Watan property under the definition contained in the statute. The remaining issue for determination was whether a structure erected on land that was itself Watan property, and which qualified as immovable property under the Bombay General Clauses Act, could acquire the character of the land on which it stood. The appellants advanced the argument that the Wada should be treated as an accession to the Watan land of village Nandi. The Court rejected this view, explaining that accession implies a gradual, imperceptible addition to the land over time such that the original land becomes indistinguishable from the accreted portion, and that only in such circumstances could the accreted portion share the character of the original land. By contrast, lands that are acquired adjacent to the original parcel and remain distinguishable do not acquire the character of the original land. The appellants also contended that the grant should be interpreted by first looking at the rights, title and interest of the grantor; if the terms of the grant contained no reservation or exception, then all rights that the grantor could convey would pass to the grantee. In the present matter the grantor was the Government, which possessed the authority to build structures such as houses or tube wells on the granted land, and consequently the grantee was likewise permitted to erect a house or any other building on that land. The respondents, however, argued that a watandar was not an absolute owner of the land but held it subject to certain conditions, including the possibility of forfeiture if the watandar committed offences specified in section 60 and Schedule 11 of the Act. Assuming, in the absence of any contrary term in the Sanad, that the grantee was not prohibited from constructing a building, the Court held that such permission did not automatically transform the building into Watan property within the meaning of the Act. The Court observed that if the Government could construct a building on the land it also retained the power to dismantle that building and remove its materials, and similarly the grantee was not restricted from dismantling the house he had built and removing its constituent materials under the terms of the Sanad. Consequently, on a proper construction of the Sanad there was no barrier preventing the grantee from taking down the house, extracting the materials, and disposing of them, indicating that the structure remained separable from the land and did not acquire the character of Watan property.

The Court observed that the house had been constructed and could be sold, and it noted that unless a house built on land is regarded as sharing the character of the land itself, it is difficult to conceive a circumstance in which the grantee is barred from selling or mortgaging the house while retaining the ability to deal with the land on which the house stood. Consequently, the Court held that the Wada in the present dispute, although classified as immovable property, did not acquire the character of the underlying land because it was separable from the land, could be dismantled, and its constituent materials could be removed and sold without contravening any provision of the Act. In the view of the Court, the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court that the Wada was not Watan property was therefore correct. The next issue for determination was whether the Wada qualified as a dwelling belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by that agriculturist within the meaning of clause (c) of the proviso to section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. If it did qualify, the proviso would exempt the dwelling from attachment. It was submitted that the term “agriculturist” is not defined in the Code and must therefore be interpreted according to its ordinary sense. Reference to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary showed that the word can also denote a farmer. The Court noted that the extent of land cultivated by the person or the amount of income derived from cultivation were not relevant considerations for construing the term “agriculturist.” Moreover, the Court rejected any restriction that would require an agriculturist to be someone who tills the land solely by personal effort or with the assistance of family members, excluding the use of hired labour. The respondent, however, argued that the word “agriculturist” in clause (c) of the proviso should bear the same meaning as the word in clause (b) of the same proviso, and therefore it was necessary to interpret clause (b) to understand the legislative intent behind the term in clause (c). On proper construction of clause (b), the Court found that an agriculturist must not only be the tiller of his land but also a small‑scale agriculturist; the clause was not intended to describe a person who cultivated a large tract of land and earned a substantial income. The Court pointed out that in the present case the appellant, Appasaheb, cultivated a very large area of land with the assistance of employed labour and earned an annual income of approximately Rs 30,000 to Rs 35,000. Section 60(1) of the Code enumerates the property of a judgment debtor that is liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree. It was further urged that, but for the proviso, all of Tuljaramarao’s properties would be subject to attachment and sale.

The Court observed that, apart from the Watan property, all other properties of the judgment debtor were subject to attachment and sale in execution of Laxmanrao’s decree. The proviso, while exempting certain categories of property listed therein, in clause (b) expressly indicated that the purpose of the Code was to preserve, for a judgment debtor who is an artisan, his tools, and for an agriculturist, his husbandry implements, cattle and seed‑grains deemed necessary for his livelihood. The provision did not extend an exemption to the agricultural produce itself unless a notification issued under section 61 of the Code specified, by a general or special order, the quantity required until the next harvest for proper cultivation and support of the debtor’s family. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Code intended to exempt only that portion of a farmer’s assets which was essential to enable him to earn his livelihood as an agriculturist. This interpretation has been adopted by various High Courts throughout India, and reference to a few illustrative decisions suffices. In Hanmantrao Annarao v. Dhruvaraj Pandurangrao (1), the Bombay High Court held that the term “agriculturist” in clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to section 60(1) denotes persons who personally till and cultivate the land and whose livelihood depends on the proceeds of such cultivation. The Court further explained that large land proprietors, even if they cultivate through servants, are excluded from the protection because they are not real tillers of the soil. The Madras High Court, in Parvataneni Lakshmayya v. The Official Receiver of Kistna (2), a Full Bench, considered several decisions and observed that the scheme of the section aims to safeguard tools of artisans and, where the debtor is an agriculturist, his implements of husbandry, cattle, seed‑grain, and dwelling houses required for his livelihood. The Court emphasized that protection is intended for those who are actual tillers of the land and whose livelihood truly depends on tillage, rather than for persons whose principal income derives from other sources. According to that judgment, the main or chief source of income is not a proper test, because a person may earn more from other activities yet remain dependent on cultivation for survival. Thus, the courts have adopted a test based on the debtor’s actual dependence on tilling the soil and his inability to maintain himself otherwise, rejecting a strict income‑source criterion. The Court concluded that the exemption under section 60(1) should not be denied merely because the agriculturist has invested in other businesses or earns supplementary income, provided he remains a genuine tiller dependent on agriculture for his livelihood.

The Court observed that mere ownership of land or other sources of income does not, by itself, render a person an “agriculturist” within the meaning of the statutory provision. At the same time, the Court saw no justification for denying a person who qualifies as an “agriculturist” the exemption contemplated by the section merely because that person may have invested money in a business or businesses, as alleged in the present case, and may therefore derive some income from such ventures or may engage in occasional coolie work to augment his earnings during periods of hardship. The Court noted that the citation (1) (1946) 49 B.L.R.867 and (2) I.L.R. [1937] Mad. 777 were placed to illustrate the relevant authorities. The Court warned that if the test of “sole source of income” were applied rigidly, the protection afforded by the section would be stripped away from many who, in reality, depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Consequently, the Court preferred the tests it had already articulated, namely that the person must be a tiller of the soil who is truly dependent for his living on tilling the soil and who is unable to maintain himself otherwise. The Court then referred to the decision in Tirloki Prasad v. Kunj Behari Lal (1), where the Allahabad High Court held that the appropriate test for determining whether a person is an agriculturist is whether his principal source of income is derived from cultivation. The Court further cited Dwarka Prasad v. Municipal Board, Meerut (2), in which the same High Court rejected the view that clause (b) of the proviso to section 60(1) applied only to very small farmers and not to larger ones. The Court explained that clause (b) was intended to protect the implements of every farmer so that each could continue to earn his livelihood in the same manner as before, and that there was no indication that the protection was limited to small farmers. Turning to the judgment of Gowardhandas v. Mohanlal (3), the Court reproduced the Nagpur High Court’s conclusions: (i) the question of whether a person is an agriculturist does not turn on the source of his income but on the nature of his occupation; (ii) a person may engage in several occupations, and if one of those occupations is agriculture and a house or building is occupied for that purpose, he may claim protection; (iii) a person who owns land and lets it on a rent basis, whether in cash or produce, is a landlord and not an agriculturist; (iv) a person who cultivates land as a labourer, without being a landowner or tenant, qualifies as an agriculturist; and (v) a person who cultivates land with his own hands or through labourers whom he directs is an agriculturist, irrespective of the scale of his operations. The Court added that if a person has no connection with the land other than ownership while others work for him, his status as an agriculturist would depend on the surrounding circumstances, as indicated by the citations (1) A.I.R. 1935 All. 448, (2) A.I.R. 1958 All. 561, and (3) I.L.R. [1938] Nag. 461. Finally, the Court referred to Nihal Singh v. Siri Ram (1), where the Lahore High Court held that the term “agriculturist” means a person who personally engages in the occupation of tilling the soil and derives his livelihood from that occupation.

The Court observed that an agriculturist is a person who personally engages in the occupation of tilling the soil and who cannot maintain himself from other sources. Applying that principle, the Court held that a man who merely received rent from tenants or the income from produce obtained through the employment of servants or partners could not be said to depend for his livelihood upon the proceeds derived from his own tillage of the soil. In the decision of Anantalal v. Bibhuti (2), the Patna High Court defined an agriculturist as one who tills the soil, earns his livelihood thereby, and is expected to possess implements of husbandry, cattle and seed‑grain. The Court clarified that this definition did not require the person to till the land with his own hands nor to own his own implements of husbandry. Nevertheless, cultivation must constitute his main source of income, although this is not the sole test. Accordingly, whether a person qualifies as an agriculturist must be decided by examining the facts of each individual case. In the present matter, the evidence of the appellant’s own witness, Balaji, indicated that Tuljaramarao had set aside approximately thirty‑five acres as a home farm about eight years before his death. He maintained around twelve bullocks and eight servants, and derived an annual income of between Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 25,000 from those lands. He kept his cattle in the Wada where his servants also lived, stored his agricultural implements there, and stored the produce of the farm in the same Wada. Tuljaramarao supervised the agricultural operations and the work of his servants. After his death, his son, the appellant Appasaheb, became the owner of the home farm. Appasaheb increased the cultivated area to about sixty acres, kept fourteen bullocks and ten (or twelve) servants, and earned an income of between Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 35,000 per year; the cattle and the produce continued to be stored in the Wada where he resided. The witness further stated that Appasaheb possessed inams in four villages and owned lands in ten or twelve villages, from which he received an additional income of roughly Rs. 35,000 to Rs. 40,000. The appellant and his brother sometimes worked personally in the fields. From this evidence, it is clear that Appasaheb is not wholly dependent on the home farm for his livelihood, because he derives a substantial portion of his income from other lands, and there is no indication that the income from those lands results from his own cultivation. The appellants argued that the Bombay High Court had adopted an extreme view in Hanmantrao Annarao v. Dhruvaraj Pandurangrao (1) and relied on the Allahabad High Court’s decision in Dwarka Prasad v. Meerut Municipality.

In this part of the judgment, the Court referred to a prior decision that classified a tractor as an implement of husbandry and therefore held that it could not be attached, even though the tractor was used to cultivate roughly 1,200 bighas of farmland. The Court also noted that the appellants relied on several earlier judgments: the Madras High Court’s decision in Parvataneni Lakshmayya v. The Official Receiver of Kistna, the Lahore High Court’s decision in Nihar Singh v. Siri Ram and Others, and the Nagpur High Court’s decision in Gowardhandas v. Mohanlal. These authorities were cited to support the proposition that a person could be regarded as an agriculturist without personally working the land, and that the size of the cultivated area or the amount of income derived from it was irrelevant. The Court emphasized that the true test was whether cultivation constituted the person’s principal source of livelihood. Applying this test to the facts before it, the Court observed that the appellant, Appasaheb, earned his living principally from the income generated by the land he cultivated, and that the Wada was occupied by him in the capacity of an agriculturist for the purpose of his own cultivation. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Wada was occupied by an agriculturist and therefore fell within the exemption provided under clause (c) of the proviso to section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 60(1) ordinarily makes every saleable property, whether movable or immovable, that belongs to a judgment debtor and over which he has the power to dispose, liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree. Without the protective language of the proviso, all of the debtor’s lands, houses, buildings, goods, and money could be subjected to attachment. Recognising that such a blanket approach would be impractical, the Legislature inserted the proviso. The Court explained that to understand the term “agriculturist” the relevant provisions were clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso. Clause (b) exempted the tools of an artisan from attachment. Referring to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the Court defined “artisan” as a mechanic, handicraftsman or artificer, and noted that the legislative purpose in protecting an artisan’s tools was to ensure that the artisan could continue to earn a living, since without his tools he would become destitute. By analogy, the Court held that for a judgment debtor who was an agriculturist, the Legislature intended to exempt from attachment the implements of husbandry as well as such cattle and seed‑grain that, in the Court’s opinion, were necessary for the debtor to earn his livelihood as an agriculturist.

The Legislature intended, once again, to ensure that an agriculturist retained enough resources to earn his livelihood as a farmer. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the term “husbandry” includes the business of tilling and cultivating the soil, essentially describing a farmer. The same dictionary defines “livelihood” as the means of living, which may also refer to income, revenue, or stipend. Consequently, for an agriculturist, the implements of husbandry are those tools used to till the soil, and these tools are protected from attachment. With respect to his cattle and seed‑grain, only the portion deemed necessary by the court to enable him to earn his livelihood is exempted. It should be noted that clause (b) does not exempt the land itself that the agriculturist tills from attachment. The agricultural produce of that land is exempted only to the extent specified in the Official Gazette issued under section 61 of the Code. A proper interpretation of clause (b) therefore saves to the agriculturist his tilling implements and such cattle and seed‑grain that the court considers essential for his maintenance. Thus clause (b) characterises the protected agriculturist as a person who tills soil primarily to sustain himself. Clause (c) provides that houses and other buildings, together with their materials, sites, and the land immediately attached and required for their use, belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him, are exempt from attachment. The term “agriculturist” in this clause must be read with the same meaning as in clause (b), and the house must be occupied by him as such. The purpose of the exemption in clause (c) appears to be to ensure that an agriculturist is not left without shelter. In other words, the Legislature aimed through clauses (b) and (c) to prevent an agriculturist from becoming destitute or homeless. The appellants, however, argued that clause (c) contains no limiting language and that any house owned and occupied by an agriculturist is exempt, regardless of any non‑agricultural income. The Wada in dispute was evidently occupied by the appellants for the purpose of tilling the home‑farm land, storing its produce, keeping the husbandry implements, and tethering cattle used in cultivation. From the testimony of the appellants’ own witness, it appears that they themselves do not till the home‑farm land, which is instead worked by labourers.

In this case, the Court observed that Tuljaramarao did not personally cultivate the land himself; rather, he merely supervised the work carried out by a large number of labourers who were employed by him. The evidence presented by a witness indicated that on some occasions Appasaheb and his brother entered the fields and performed work personally. However, the Court described this statement as vague and noted that it did not necessarily demonstrate that they actually engaged in cultivation themselves. The structure that was the subject of the proceedings, referred to as the Wada, was a large building in which the appellants lived. The Court held that if the appellants could not be characterized as agriculturists within the meaning of the term used in Section 60, then the Wada could not enjoy exemption from attachment. The Court further explained that even if it is not essential for a person to till the soil with his own hands to qualify as an “agriculturist,” the person must at least be genuinely dependent on agricultural cultivation for his livelihood and must be unable to sustain himself by any other means. In the present circumstances, the Court found it evident that, even assuming the appellants could be described as agriculturists in the broadest sense, they were not agriculturists whose very maintenance depended upon tilling the soil, nor were they incapable of supporting themselves by other income sources.

The evidence showed that Tuljaramarao derived an annual income of approximately twenty to twenty‑five thousand rupees from the lands cultivated in the home farm. The appellant Appasaheb, by extending the area of that farm, earned an income of between thirty and thirty‑five thousand rupees. In addition, Appasaheb possessed lands in ten or twelve other villages, from which he received a further income of thirty‑five to forty thousand rupees. Assuming that these figures already include the earnings from the home farm, the Court inferred that an additional income of at least five thousand rupees was being earned from lands situated outside Nandi. Moreover, the Court noted that Appasaheb was also receiving a cash allowance of seven hundred to eight hundred rupees per year, together with an amount of four thousand to five thousand rupees from the officers of the four inam villages. In view of these multiple sources of revenue, the Court concluded that it could hardly be said that Appasaheb was truly dependent on agricultural cultivation for his sustenance, nor that he was unable to maintain himself by any other means. Consequently, the Court held that he could not be regarded as an agriculturist within the meaning of Section 60 of the Code.

On the basis of this reasoning, the Court affirmed the decision of the High Court, which had held that the Wada in question was not a Watan property and therefore could not claim exemption from attachment under the provisions of Section 60(1) of the Code. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal with costs, confirming that the attachment and sale of the Wada could proceed in execution of the decree. The judgment was delivered by Justice Sarkap, who noted that the appellants were the legal representatives of the late Tuljaram Desai, owner of certain Watan properties, and that upon his death his son Appasaheb succeeded to those properties. The Court also recounted that in 1943 a decree for eighty thousand rupees had been obtained against Tuljaram by Vithalrao Thube, setting the background for the present dispute over attachment of the Wada.

By the year 1949 both Tuljaram and Vithalrao had passed away, and the respondent had become the successor in interest of Vithalrao. The appeal that was now before the Court arose out of execution proceedings that the respondent had instituted against the appellants in order to enforce a decree. The matter on which the Court focused was a single wada, that is, a building owned by the appellant Appasaheb, which stood on land that was classified as watan property. The respondent sought to have that building attached and sold in order to satisfy the decree. It was not contested that properties described as watan could not be sold, and therefore could not be attached and sold in execution. The building, however, stood upon watan land, and the respondent’s request was to proceed against the structure itself, separate from the underlying land.

The appellant Appasaheb advanced two principal contentions. First, he asserted that he was an agriculturist and that, under clause (c) of the proviso to sub‑section (1) of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the wada that belonged to him and that he occupied was protected from attachment and sale. Second, he maintained that the wada itself constituted watan property and, in view of sub‑section (1) of section 60, was not a saleable property and therefore could not be attached. Section 60, sub‑section (1), declares that all saleable property is liable to attachment and sale in execution. The proviso, to the extent that it is relevant, provides that certain particulars shall not be liable to such attachment or sale, namely: (b) the tools of artisans and, where the judgment‑debtor is an agriculturist, his implements of husbandry together with such cattle and seed‑grain as the court considers necessary for him to earn his livelihood; and (c) houses and other buildings, together with the materials, sites and land immediately appurtenant and necessary for their enjoyment, that belong to an agriculturist and are occupied by him. The Court therefore needed to consider whether the wada fell within the protection of clause (c). For the clause to apply, two conditions had to be satisfied: the person claiming protection must be an agriculturist, and the building must belong to and be occupied by that agriculturist. The first question was whether the appellant Appasaheb qualified as an agriculturist within the meaning of the clause. The plain meaning of “agriculturist” in this context was a person who engages in agriculture, that is, the cultivation of land for the purpose of raising crops. Anyone who cultivates land for crop production would, on its face, satisfy this definition, and there was no difficulty in accepting that meaning. Nevertheless, the Court observed that reported decisions of various High Courts expressed sharply divergent opinions on who, within the meaning of the clause, could be regarded as an agriculturist. The divergence did not concern the basic requirement that an agriculturist must cultivate land; rather, it centered on whether the agriculturist contemplated in clauses (b) and (c) must cultivate with his own hands and whether every person who conducts agricultural operations falls within the clause.

In this appeal the Court observed that the divergent judicial opinions on who qualifies as an agriculturist under the statutory clauses did not stem from uncertainty about the ordinary meaning of the word “agriculturist.” Instead, the differences arose from attempts to infer the legislature’s intention by examining the other words used in the clauses. Both parties had relied on various authorities to support their respective positions, and the Court therefore found it necessary to review those views and decide whether the term should be given its plain meaning or be qualified in some manner.

The Court noted that, in general, one High Court had adopted the view that an agriculturist is a person whose principal source of livelihood is agriculture, as stated in Tirloki Prasad v. Kunj Behari Lal (1). That view treated “agriculturist” as someone whose profession is agriculture. The Court explained that a person’s principal source of livelihood may change over time; consequently a person might be regarded as an agriculturist at one stage and not at another. The Court found it unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended such a fluctuating result. Moreover, the Court pointed out the difficulty of determining which activity constitutes a person’s main source of livelihood, especially when the term “main” is undefined. The clauses, the Court observed, contain no reference to agriculture being a person’s main source of livelihood in any sense of the word “main.” Accepting that view, the Court argued, could lead to a paradox where a wealthy farmer who derives a larger portion of his income from non‑agricultural sources would still be protected, while a poorer cultivator who earns slightly more from day‑labour than from farming would be excluded. The Court could not accept a result that disadvantaged poorer peasants while favouring richer owners.

The Court further examined another position, which held that an agriculturist must rely exclusively on cultivation of land for livelihood, thereby excluding persons who engage in farming on a large scale, as expressed in Muthuvenkatarama Reddiar v. The Official Receiver of South Arcot (1). The Court referenced a later full‑bench decision of the same High Court in Parvataneni Lakshmayya v. The Official Receiver of Kistna (2), which had discarded the earlier view. The Court found no support in the statutory clauses for the restrictive interpretation. It gave the example of a small cultivator who, to meet his basic needs, supplements his agricultural income with other work. The Court emphasized that the clauses do not indicate that such a cultivator should be denied protection. It further observed that agricultural activities do not occupy a person throughout the year, and many small cultivators rely on additional employment when they are not in the fields. The Court concluded that there is no language in the clauses to suggest that these persons were intended to be excluded, and therefore there is no reason to deprive them of the benefit. The Court also indicated that it found no textual basis to exclude large farmers from the protection, a point that would be examined later in the judgment.

In this case the Court observed that the statutory clauses contained no provision by which a small cultivator could be denied the protection intended by the legislation. It was recognised that agricultural activities are not performed throughout the entire year, and for many cultivators the earnings from farming are insufficient to meet their basic needs. Consequently, a considerable number of small cultivators are compelled to engage in other occupations during periods when they are not working in the fields, thereby supplementing their agricultural income. The Court noted that nothing in the language of the clauses indicated that such persons were excluded from the protection. It further held that there was no justification for depriving these cultivators of the benefit of the protection. Likewise, the Court found no wording in the clauses that would support the view that large farmers should be excluded from the protection; this issue would be examined in greater detail at a later stage. The Court therefore concluded that the interpretation advanced in Muthuvenkatarama Reddiar’s case (1) was not well founded.

The Court then turned to the decision in Nihal Singh v. Siri Ram (3), where a full bench of the Lahore High Court had held that an “agriculturist” must be a person who personally tills the land, does not employ servants for the work, and does not derive his maintenance from any source other than agriculture. The Lahore court based this view on the premise that the term “agriculturist” should have the same meaning in clauses (b) and (c) and that, in clause (b), the word appears alongside the term “artisan.” According to that reasoning, an artisan is someone who practices a handicraft with his own hands and does so as a means of livelihood, not merely as a hobby. Consequently, the Lahore court concluded that, by analogy, an “agriculturist” must also be a person who tills the land personally, without the aid of servants, and who lives solely on agricultural income. The present Court expressed dissatisfaction with this line of reasoning. It observed that if the ordinary meaning of “agriculturist” is a person who must till with his own hands, then reference to the juxtaposition with “artisan” is unnecessary to reach the same conclusion. Only if the ordinary meaning of “agriculturist” were to include persons who conduct agricultural operations through hired labour would it be necessary to invoke the comparison with “artisan.” The Court found the logic of the Lahore High Court’s argument unpersuasive. It pointed out that even if an artisan is defined as a person who works with his own hands, it does not follow that an “agriculturist” must, by virtue of being mentioned alongside “artisan,” be limited to personal tillage. The juxtaposition, the Court held, provides no ground for departing from the normal meaning of “agriculturist.” The Court also referenced the decision in Hanmantrao v. Dhruvraj (1), which similarly described an “agriculturist” within the meaning of the clauses as one who tills the land with his own hands.

In this case the Court considered the meaning of the term “agriculturist” in clause (b). It noted that the clause refers to implements of husbandry, cattle and seed‑grain that are necessary for earning a livelihood as a cultivator. From this reference the Court observed that, prima facie, the clause appears to describe only an agriculturist who cultivates with his own hands. The Court expressed difficulty with the reasoning that a person who lives on cultivation carried out by hired labour would also require such implements. It reiterated that an agriculturist is anyone who carries on cultivation, whether he does so personally or through hired labour. Consequently, excluding from the clause an agriculturist who does not till with his own hands would create an unreasonable result, denying protection to old and incapacitated small farmers and to most women. The Court further noted that a cultivator who, because of ill health, is compelled for a few years to employ labour to till his land, as reflected in I.L.R. [1947] Bom. 687, would cease to be an agriculturist during that period if the narrow view were accepted. Such a consequence, the Court held, could not have been intended. Turning to the view expressed in Parvataneni Lakshmayya v. The Official Receiver of Kistna, the Court quoted the earlier observation that the exemption in the section is meant to protect “real tillers of the land,” defining an agriculturist as a person truly dependent for his living on tilling the soil and unable to maintain himself otherwise. The Court found this view untenable because it leads to obvious anomalies. For example, a person whose sole means of living is agriculture and who cultivates on a large scale, earning a substantial income, would still be dependent on agriculture and therefore, under that definition, would be protected. Yet the same reasoning would also exclude a small farmer who, despite earning a modest amount from agriculture, supplements his income from other sources and could otherwise maintain himself, thereby denying him protection. The Court concluded that the language of the clause does not support such a restrictive interpretation.

The Court considered two contrasting agricultural situations to illustrate the problem in the earlier decision. It first described a farmer whose entire livelihood depended on agriculture and who earned a substantial annual income of twenty‑five thousand rupees. By contrast, the Court examined a small farmer who earned only one thousand rupees a year from agricultural activity but also derived one thousand five hundred rupees from other sources, enabling him to support himself from that additional income. According to the interpretation advanced in Parvataneni’s case, cited as I.L.R. [1937] Mad. 777, such a small farmer would not qualify as an “agriculturist” for the purposes of the relevant clauses and therefore would receive no protection under them. The Court found this result untenable, reasoning that the legislature could not have intended to exclude a person who, although he earned a portion of his living from agriculture, still relied on that activity as part of his livelihood. Moreover, the Court observed that nothing in the language of the clauses expressly supports the narrow view adopted in Parvataneni’s case. The only reference to a living appears in clause (b), which mentions “such cattle and seed‑grain as may… be necessary to enable him to earn his living as such,” meaning as an agriculturist. The Court held that these words define the scope of protection for cattle and seed‑grain, indicating that they are necessary for an agriculturist to obtain his livelihood from agriculture when agriculture is his sole means of support. If a person derives his livelihood from agriculture plus other sources, it would be impossible to determine what cattle and seed‑grain are required for his agricultural livelihood, because he does not depend exclusively on agriculture. Yet Parvataneni’s case accepts that a person may be deemed an agriculturist even when he has additional income, a view the Court could not endorse. The Court also noted additional reasons why the Parvataneni interpretation was flawed. Regarding the tools of an artisan, clause (b) does not restrict protection to those tools essential for earning a living as an artisan, showing that an artisan need not depend solely on his handicraft for his livelihood. Similarly, all implements of husbandry belonging to an agriculturist are exempt from attachment and sale. The presence of the word “such” before “cattle and seed‑grain” in clause (b) demonstrates that protection is limited to those items to the extent indicated, but it does not impose a broader limitation on the protection of other husbandry implements.

In considering the language of the statutory provision, it appears impossible to conclude that an agriculturist whose implements of husbandry are intended to be protected must be someone who is unable to sustain himself apart from agricultural activity. Likewise, paragraph (c) contains no indication that the agriculturist referred to therein is required to depend exclusively on agriculture for his livelihood. Another view that has been raised suggests that the term agriculturist should be limited to a very small farmer, as argued in Muthuvenkatarama Reddiar v. The Official Receiver of South Arcot (1925) I.L.R. 49 Mad. 227. Upon examination, this qualification finds no support in the wording of the clauses or elsewhere in section 60. Although the various clauses in the proviso to section 60, sub‑section (1) exempt a range of items from attachment and sale for reasons of public policy, the policy considerations differ from clause to clause. It is therefore untenable to assert that a single overarching purpose, such as the protection of the indigent or the prevention of destitution, governs all the exemptions. For example, clause (a) safeguards essential clothing, cooking vessels, beds and bedding of the debtor, and even a debtor of considerable means is entitled to this protection. Clause (d) preserves books of account, a protection that is not confined to the poor and whose deprivation would not necessarily render a person destitute. Clause (g) shields political pensions, which may be substantial, and clause (h) protects the wages of labourers and domestic servants, a measure clearly aimed at relieving poverty. Because no single central idea runs through every exemption, each clause must be interpreted independently.

Turning to clauses (b) and (c), there is no justification for the view that they apply only to impoverished individuals or that they are intended solely to avert destitution. Nothing in clause (b) suggests that protection is limited to the tools of poor artisans, and the same reasoning applies to an agriculturist. The fact that the clause protects cattle and seed‑grain to the extent necessary for the agriculturist to earn a livelihood does not imply that the protected agriculturist must be poor. On the contrary, the language accommodates an agriculturist who possesses more cattle and seed‑grain than is needed for subsistence, thereby encompassing a wealthy and large‑scale farmer. Consequently, there is no basis for imposing any additional qualification on the plain meaning of the word “agriculturist” in clauses (b) and (c). In this view, an agriculturist is any person who engages in agricultural activity, a position endorsed in Gowardhandas v. Mohan Lal (1960) 71 CLR 353, which the Court adopts. A person who occupies himself with agriculture qualifies as an agriculturist even if he does not personally till the land and conducts his farming on a large scale, and even if he has other sources of income besides agriculture.

Even though a person does not work the land with his own hands and carries on agriculture on a very large scale, he remains an agriculturist if he has other sources of livelihood besides farming. The Court then turned to the facts of the present dispute to determine whether Appasaheb satisfied this description. The evidence on record established conclusively, and it was not contested in the lower courts, that Appasaheb supervised agricultural operations on fifty to sixty acres of land using his own cattle, implements and labour hired by him. The records further showed that the income he derived from agriculture was between Rs 30,000 and Rs 35,000 per year. In addition, he received cash allowances of Rs 700 to Rs 800 per year in respect of the watan and Rs 4,000 to Rs 5,000 per year from village officials of the watan villages; these amounts were not agricultural income. Accordingly, the Court held that these facts made Appasaheb an agriculturist within the meaning of clauses (b) and (c), even though he was not dependent on agriculture for his livelihood and did not till the land himself. The Court also noted that there was undisputed testimony that Appasaheb personally participated in the farming activities.

Clause (c) shields from attachment and sale the houses, other buildings with their sites, and the land immediately adjoining them that belong to an agriculturist and are occupied by him. The Court interpreted this provision to require that such premises be occupied for agricultural purposes, because the clause’s purpose is to protect only that portion of the agriculturist’s property necessary for his farming operations. A dwelling used merely as a holiday resort, for example, would not fall within the protection. Consequently, the Court examined whether Appasaheb occupied the wada for agricultural purposes. The evidence demonstrated that the majority of the wada was used for storing crops, keeping implements, housing farm servants and tethering cattle employed in farming. Although Appasaheb and his family resided in a portion of the wada, that residence also served agricultural functions, as it was from there that he supervised the farming activities. On this basis, the Court concluded that the wada is exempt from attachment and sale in execution pursuant to clause (c) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court further found that the appellants’ alternative argument, relying on the maxim of accession, was not tenable.

In the proceedings, the appellant argued that the maxim accession cedit principali applied, contending that because the wada had been erected by a watandar it had become an accession to the watan and therefore acquired the inalienable character of watan property. The Court observed that it was not disputed that the wada did not exist at the time the watan was originally created; rather it had been constructed later by one of the watandars. The appellant further maintained that the original grant of the watan conveyed full ownership rights over the subject matter, allowing the grantee to use the land in any manner that an owner could, and that consequently the wada, having been lawfully erected by the watandar, became part of the watan as an accession. The Court acknowledged that the construction of the wada was lawful and that, upon its erection, the structure might be regarded as part of the land on which it stood and could be characterised as immovable property. However, the Court could not accept that such a construction automatically conferred upon the wada the inalienable status attached to watan property. The Court explained that the maxim accession cedit principali did not transform a structure built on watan land into watan itself. A watan is a creation of a government grant and is rendered inalienable by a specific statute; that statutory protection applies only to the property expressly granted by the government. The Court held that this special inalienable character could not be extended to other property merely by applying the maxim. Consequently, the Court concluded that although the wada was situated on inalienable watan land, the wada itself remained alienable and therefore was not protected by the inalienable character of the watan. For this reason, the Court rejected the appellant’s contention. Nonetheless, the Court affirmed that the wada was protected from attachment and sale in execution under clause (c) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and accordingly the judge expressed that he would allow the appeal. In view of the majority judgment, however, the appeal was dismissed with costs.