Shri Balwantrai Chimanlal Trivedi vs M. N. Nagrashna And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: 1960 AIR 1292

Decision Date: 3 August 1960

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In this matter the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 3 August 1960 in the case titled Shri Balwantrai Chimanlal Trivedi versus M N Nagrashna and others. The bench that heard the appeal comprised Justice K N Wanchoo, Justice Bhuvneshwar P Sinha, Justice J L Kapur and Justice P B Gajendragadkar. The petitioner was Shri Balwantrai Chimanlal Trivedi and the respondents were M N Nagrashna together with several other parties. The citation for the decision was reported as 1960 AIR 1292 and it was later referenced in subsequent reports such as D 1974 SC 471, R 1977 SC 2031, and F 1978 SC 533. The case involved a special leave appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution regarding the jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority, which had been questioned in a writ petition filed under Article 226 before the Bombay High Court. The Court observed that although the powers under Article 136 are wide, they remain discretionary; consequently, the Supreme Court was not obliged to resolve the jurisdictional question of the lower tribunal when the appeal did not reveal any failure of justice. The Court further held that the presence of a higher tribunal with competent jurisdiction, from which the special leave was granted, obviated the need to examine the lower authority’s jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion the Court relied upon the precedent set in A M Allison v B L Sen, reported in 1957 S C R 359.

The matter before the Court was a review petition numbered 37 of 1959, seeking reconsideration of the Court’s own judgment and order dated 29 October 1959 in Civil Appeal No 38 of 1958. Counsel appearing for the petitioner included the Solicitor‑General of India and senior advocates, while the respondents were represented by counsel specializing in appellate practice. Additional interveners were also represented by counsel. The judgment was delivered by Justice Wanchoo, who noted that the application for review was premised on the allegation of apparent mistakes or errors on the face of the record, and therefore the judgment should be revisited. The petitioner further argued that the original judgment had addressed issues concerning writs under Article 226, which constitutionally required a bench of not less than five judges, and that the review should thus be heard before a full bench. Moreover, the petitioner contended that the Court ought to have decided the jurisdictional question because other parties had agreed to be bound by the decision, which would have avoided multiplicity of proceedings. The Court then proceeded to examine these contentions in the context of the powers conferred by Article 136.

The Court noted that the review application had been placed before a bench of five judges because the matter involved the issue of writs issued by High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, a question that could only be considered by a bench of at least five judges. The petitioners also argued that the Court should have resolved the question of jurisdiction, since other parties had consented to be bound by the decision in this case, which would have avoided multiple proceedings. Before addressing the arguments raised in support of the petition, the Court set out precisely what the judgment under review had decided. The appeal that produced the judgment under review had arisen on special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution from a decision of the Bombay High Court in a writ petition filed there under Article 226 against an order of the Payment of Wages Authority. The jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority had been raised before the Court, and reliance was placed on the decision in A. V. D’Costa v. B. C. Patel. The judgment under review observed that there seemed to be some merit in the contention concerning the Authority’s jurisdiction; however, the Court did not proceed to decide the jurisdictional issue because it found no failure of justice and therefore declined to interfere under its powers under Article 136, particularly since the matter originated from a decision of the Bombay High Court and not directly from the Authority. In that context, the Court referred to A. M. Allison v. B. L. Sen, where, in similar circumstances, it had refused to decide the jurisdictional question because it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice. Consequently, the judgment under review held that when the Court is of the view that there is no failure of justice, it is not bound to intervene under Article 136. The reference to Allison’s case was made merely to illustrate that, in almost identical circumstances—except that Allison’s case came before the Court on a certificate under Article 133(1)(c)—the Court had also declined to decide the jurisdictional issue due to the absence of a failure of justice. The judgment under review did not address the powers of the High Court under Article 226, nor did it contain any proposition that conflicted with the earlier decision of the Court in H. V. Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others. Thus, the narrow point that the judgment under review actually determined was that, in an appeal under Article 136, if the Court concludes that there is no failure of justice, it is not obligated to decide or interfere even when the jurisdiction of the original court or tribunal is raised.

In an appeal that was presented under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Court explained that when it arrives at the conclusion that there has been no failure of justice, it is not bound to interfere even if a question is raised concerning the jurisdiction of the original court or tribunal, so long as the matter had already been examined by a higher tribunal that unquestionably possessed jurisdiction and the present appeal originates from the decision of that higher tribunal. This holding formed the basis of the judgment under review, and the Court first examined whether any reason existed to revisit that judgment on the grounds raised in the petition. Before addressing the principal ground asserted for review, the Court observed that the fact that other parties had consented to be governed by the decision rendered in the judgment under review could not, by itself, furnish a basis for review. The Court then asked whether any mistakes or errors plainly apparent on the face of the record might justify a review of the earlier decision. It was submitted that, in determining whether a failure of justice had occurred, the Court had failed to consider certain provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. Assuming that allegation to be correct, the Court considered whether, even after taking those provisions into account, its conclusion that no failure of justice had taken place would have been different. Upon a further examination of the reasons set out in the judgment under review for holding that there was no failure of justice, the Court found that its decision would have remained the same even if the cited provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act had been examined. Consequently, the Court expressed the view that no ground for review existed, even on the hypothetical assumption that relevant provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, had been omitted from consideration. The petitioner’s principal contention, however, was that the Court was obligated to address the question of jurisdiction, and that the issue of whether a failure of justice had occurred was inseparable from the jurisdictional question, so that a decision on jurisdiction was necessary to reach the conclusion that no failure of justice existed. The Court rejected this contention, especially in view of the narrow point that had been decided in the judgment under review. The Court further noted that it is well settled in law that the decisions of original courts and tribunals may be allowed to stand even where some doubt remains about the jurisdiction of those courts or tribunals. For example, revenue statutes contain provisions—such as sections 290 and 291 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939—stating that when doubt exists as to whether a civil court or a revenue court has jurisdiction, the decision of the original court may be upheld in certain circumstances provided that no failure of justice has occurred. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, in the present case, it was not bound to decide the jurisdictional issue because the appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 was exercised only where the higher tribunal had already exercised its jurisdiction and no failure of justice was found.

Consequently the Court did not exercise the power granted by Article 136, and this does not constitute an act contrary to established law. It must be remembered that, although Article 136 provides broad powers, the exercise of those powers is discretionary. The parties conceded during argument that the Court could have dismissed the appellant’s special‑leave application on the ground that the order appealed against had already effected substantial justice. Therefore it is unreasonable to argue that once leave is granted the Court is compelled to examine the merits in every case, when it is satisfied that the ends of justice do not warrant interference. Accordingly, the Court held that it was not obligated to determine the question of jurisdiction on the facts of this case, having concluded, in exercise of Article 136, that there was no failure of justice. For these reasons, the application for review was rejected and the Court ordered that the costs of the proceedings be borne by the applicant. Consequently each party shall bear its own costs, except for the costs expressly ordered against the applicant in this proceeding. Thus the petition is closed and no further relief will be granted in this matter by any authority. The review application was dismissed.