Shri Ambica Mills Co., Ltd vs Shri S. B. Bhatt And Another
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: supreme-court
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 243 of 1959
Decision Date: 12 December 1960
Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta
In this matter the petitioner, Shri Ambica Mills Co., Ltd, challenged a decision involving the respondents, Shri S. B. Bhatt and another, which was rendered on 12 December 1960 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was delivered by a Bench consisting of P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo and K. C. Das Gupta, and the report of the case appears in the 1961 volume of the All India Reporter (AIR 970) as well as in the 1961 Supreme Court Reports (SCR 3 220). The dispute centered on the application of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, specifically sections 15 and 16, and the constitutional provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution, which confer jurisdiction on the High Court to issue writs.
The factual backdrop involved an award known as the Standardisation Award, which had fixed wage rates for various categories of employees in the textile mills located in Ahmedabad. While the award set wages for most workers, the wages for clerical staff were later fixed by a separate agreement concluded between the Ahmedabad Mill Owners’ Association and the Textile Labour Association. Clause 2 of that agreement stated that it would apply to all clerks employed in the local mills, describing clerks as persons who performed routine writing, copying or calculation work and also including qualified compounders and assistant compounders. Clause 5 provided a distinct wage scale for employees who occupied positions below that of a full‑fledged clerk but above that of an operative; the scale listed specific rates and enumerated categories such as ticket‑checkers, coupon‑sellers, tally‑boys, scale‑boys, production‑checkers, third counters, cloth measurers, yard‑counters, fine‑reporters, cloth or yarn examiners, department‑store men, cut‑lookers and others who could properly be placed in that intermediate category.
The respondents filed applications under section 16 of the Payment of Wages Act, seeking an order directing the petitioner to pay their delayed wages. They contended that they were “semi‑clerks,” meaning that they fell beneath the full clerk category but above the operative level, and therefore their claims should be governed by clause 5 of the agreement. The Authority, followed by the appellate Authority, rejected this contention, holding that clause 2 of the agreement defined the scope of clause 5, and because the respondents did not satisfy the definition in clause 2, they could not rely on clause 5 for their wage claim. The High Court, however, entertained an application under Articles 226 and 227, disagreed with the lower authorities, set aside their orders, and directed that the matter be reheard.
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued two points: first, that the High Court had exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 by overturning the decision of the appellate Authority; and second, that the Authority itself had acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act in hearing the respondents’ applications under section 16. The Court was therefore called upon to consider whether either of these contentions was viable and to determine the proper limits of jurisdiction both of the High Court and of the wage‑settlement authorities under the Act.
The Court observed that the High Court possessed jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari not only when a tribunal or authority acted beyond its legal power but also when it made a mistake of law that was evident on the face of the record. The Court clarified, however, that such a power did not extend to correcting errors of fact, even if those factual errors appeared obvious. It further explained that no absolute rule could be formulated for determining when a legal error was plainly apparent, but a practical test was that the error should be self‑evident and should not require an extensive examination of the documents. The Court illustrated this principle by referring to the authorities in Rex v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [1952] 1 K.B. 338 and Nagendra Nath Bora v Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, [1958] S.C.R. 1340, and also considered the decision in Viswanath Tukaram v The General Manager, Central Railway, V.T., Bombay, (1957) 59 Bom. L.R. 892.
Turning to the specific dispute, the Court noted that a simple comparison of the two contractual clauses in question was sufficient to demonstrate that the Appellate Authority had committed a clear and manifest error of law in its interpretation. The Court explained that the two clauses were intended to apply to two separate categories of employees, and that individuals who fell within clause 5 could not simultaneously be governed by clause 2 nor were they required to satisfy the criteria set out in clause 2. Under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the Authority exercised an exclusive jurisdiction conferred by section 22 of the same Act and was obligated to consider every question closely connected with the wage claims presented before it. Although the Court warned against establishing a rigid rule for the scope of such incidental questions, it emphasized that the Authority must avoid both an undue extension and an unreasonable restriction of its jurisdiction. Consequently, determining whether a particular employee was an operative, or occupied a position above that of an operative yet below that of a clerk and therefore fell within clause 5 of the agreement, was an issue intimately linked to the definition of wages under the Act. As a result, this issue fell squarely within the Authority’s jurisdiction under section 15. The Court rejected the contention that an employee classified among the “others” described in the latter part of clause 5, for whom no specific designation was provided, could be excluded from the application of section 15. The Court cited A.V. D’Costa v B.C. Patel, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1353, in support of this view and distinguished the earlier decision of Anthony Sabastin Almeda v R.M.T. Taylor, (1956) 58 Bom. L.R. 899.
The judgment was rendered in the civil appellate jurisdiction for Civil Appeal No. 243 of 1959, which had been filed by special leave from the Bombay High Court’s order dated 24 April 1958 in Special Civil Application No. 874 of 1958. The parties appearing for the appellant were counsel for the Attorney‑General of India, while the respondents were represented by counsel for Vithalbhai Patel, S.S. Shukla, C.T. Daru and E. Udayarathnam.
On 12 December 1960 the judgment was pronounced by Justice Gajendragadkar. The appeal, which had been granted special leave, required the Court to decide what power the authority derived from section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (referred to as the Act) possessed and how far that power extended. The matter arose because the appellant, Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd., a textile mill situated in Ahmedabad, was confronted with an application filed by three of its workers—Punamchand, Shamaldas and Vishnuprasad. These employees had invoked section 16 of the Act and asked the authority to issue an order compelling the mill to pay their wages that had been delayed. To understand the arguments presented by the appellant, who challenged the legitimacy of the claim made by the respondents, it was necessary to recount the factual background in some detail. An award known as the Standardisation Award, which governed the mill industry in Ahmedabad, had been issued by the Industrial Tribunal on 21 April 1948 under Industrial Reference No. 18 of 1947. That award fixed wage rates for various categories of workers employed in the Ahmedabad textile mills but deferred the determination of wages for clerks to a later date. Among the operative categories whose wages were fixed, the situation of hand‑folders was specifically examined before the Tribunal. The Labour Association argued that the award‑granted rate of Rs 36‑9‑0 was insufficient and highlighted that hand‑folders performed the same work as cut‑lookers in Bombay, where a head cut‑looker received Rs 52 and a cut‑looker received Rs 42‑4‑0. Conversely, the mill owners contended that the appropriate rate should have been Rs 34‑2‑0 rather than Rs 36‑9‑0. The Tribunal found that it could not resolve the issue because the evidence presented did not clearly establish the nature of the work performed by hand‑folders in Ahmedabad; consequently, it could not raise their wage to the level received by out‑lookers in Bombay. Nevertheless, the Tribunal issued an important directive, stating: “At the same time we desire to make it clear that if there are persons who are doing cut‑looking as well as folding, they should be paid the rate earned by the out‑lookers in Bombay.” This point was recorded in paragraph 16 of the award. The matter concerning clerks had initially been postponed by the Tribunal, but it was later revisited and an award was made. That award, however, was withdrawn by the clerks in 1949, which prompted the Ahmedabad Mill Owners’ Association and the Textile Labour Association to negotiate an agreement on clerk wages. The agreement was concluded on 22 June 1949, and clauses 2 and 5 of that agreement were deemed material to the present appeal. The court therefore read those two clauses in order to assess their relevance to the dispute.
The agreement that was reached on 22 June 1949 contained two clauses that were material for the present appeal. Clause 2 provided that the agreement would apply to all clerks employed in the local mills, meaning persons who performed routine clerical work such as writing, copying or making calculations, and it would also include qualified compounders and assistant compounders employed in the local mills. Clause 5 stipulated that a separate wage scale would be applicable to employees who occupied a position lower than that of a full‑fledged clerk but higher than that of an operative; the scale listed specific rates of Rs 40‑3, Rs 70‑EB‑4, Rs 90‑5 and Rs 105 and it was intended to cover categories such as ticket‑boy, ticket‑checker, coupons‑seller, talley‑boy, scale‑boy, production‑checker, thread‑counter, cloth‑measurer or yard‑counter, fine‑reporter, cloth or yarn examiner, department store man, cut‑looker and any other persons who could properly be placed in that category. After the agreement was concluded, persons engaged in cut‑looking began to assert that they were entitled to the benefit of clause 5 and they filed claims against their employers on that basis. Accordingly, Vishnuprasad and Punamchand filed applications numbered 39 and 40 of 1954 before the authority, alleging that they were owed delayed wages because they should have been paid at the higher rate prescribed in paragraph 16 of the 1947 arbitration award referred to as Reference No. 18. The appellant opposed the applications, contending that the claims were not maintainable under the Act, that they were barred by an existing arbitration award, and that, on the merits, the applicants were not engaged in cut‑looking. The authority rejected all of these contentions. After examining the duties performed by the two applicants, the authority concluded that both Vishnuprasad and Punamchand were indeed folders who also performed cut‑looking, and therefore each was entitled to a wage of Rs 42‑4‑0 per month. The authority further held that the applicants were entitled to recover the difference between the amount actually paid, namely Rs 36‑9‑0 per month, and the amount due, Rs 42‑4‑0 per month. This decision was announced on 2 September 1954. Subsequently, on 11 July 1955, the present respondents moved the authority invoking section 16 of the Act. They asserted that they were semi‑clerks occupying a position lower than a full‑fledged clerk but higher than an operative, and therefore fell within the ambit of clause 5 of the agreement, which entitled them to the prescribed increment. The appellant disputed these applications on several grounds, arguing that they were barred by res judicata, that the authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain them, and that, on the merits, the respondents were not the semi‑clerks contemplated by clause 5. In response, the authority framed four points of issue. After considering the submissions, the authority ruled against the respondents and in favour of the appellant on the first two issues, which related to the claim of res judicata and the status of the respondents. Consequently, the authority found it unnecessary to address the remaining two issues concerning the quantum of the amount claimed by the respondents.
In the proceedings before the authority, two of the issues that were finally decided related to the plea of res judicata and to the classification of the respondents. Because the authority had already resolved those matters, it deemed it unnecessary to address the remaining two issues that concerned the amount of money claimed by the respondents. Although the appellant had argued that the authority lacked jurisdiction, that question was never formally framed as an issue and consequently was not examined by the authority.
The authority recorded a finding of res judicata against the applications of Punamchand and Vishnuprasad, holding that their claims had already been finally determined. Shamaldas, on the other hand, had not previously filed an application; therefore no question of res judicata arose in his case. His application was dismissed solely on the ground that he could not be considered a semi‑clerk. The same conclusion—that the two other respondents were not semi‑clerks—was also recorded against them.
During the trial, the parties submitted a joint Pursis that listed the duties performed by the respondents in paragraphs two through seven. The authority examined that list and concluded that the duties performed by the respondents could not be described as the routine work of writing, copying, and making calculations that is typical of clerks. Accordingly, the authority held that the respondents were governed by the Standardisation Award and did not fall within the later agreement.
The respondents appealed this decision to the District Judge, who acted as the appellate authority under the Act. In that appeal, the appellate authority was also asked to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the applications. After reviewing the relevant provisions of the Act, the appellate authority held that it indeed possessed jurisdiction to consider the respondents’ applications. On the issue of res judicata, the appellate authority concurred with the findings of the lower authority and affirmed that the claims of Punamchand and Vishnuprasad were barred. Likewise, it agreed that the respondents were not semi‑clerks.
In reaching its conclusion on status, the appellate authority applied the same test employed by the authority below, namely, whether the duties performed by the respondents were comparable to those performed by clerks. That test is pertinent to employees who fall under clause two of the agreement. Because the respondents did not satisfy the criteria of clause two, the appellate authority held that clause five was inapplicable to them. Both the authority and the appellate authority therefore treated clause two as the decisive factor; an employee who does not fall within clause two cannot claim any benefit of the agreement, including clause five. Consequently, the appellate authority dismissed the respondents’ appeals on 2 September 1954. The respondents subsequently challenged those appellate decisions.
In this matter, the respondents had filed a writ petition invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court. The High Court examined the decision of the appellate authority and declared that the decision was manifestly erroneous in law because the appellate authority had proceeded on the assumption that clause 2 of the agreement must be satisfied before clause 5 could be applied. The Court further held that the finding recorded simultaneously by the lower authorities on the issue of res judicata as it pertained to two of the respondents was also plainly erroneous. On the basis of these two findings, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents, set aside the orders that had been passed by the authorities below, and directed that the matter be remitted to the original authority for reconsideration in accordance with law, taking into account the judgment rendered by the High Court.
The appellant challenged this decision by filing the present appeal by way of special leave. The first argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, by the counsel representing the State, was that the Bombay High Court had acted beyond its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 when it interfered with the judgment of the appellate authority. The counsel contended that, although the error committed by the appellate authority was indeed a question of law, it was not an error that was apparent on the face of the record. He further argued that the High Court did not have the competence to function as an appellate body reviewing the judgment of the appellate authority and to scrutinise meticulously the correctness or propriety of the conclusions reached by that authority.
The question of the nature and scope of the High Courts’ jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been the subject of several decisions of this Court. It is now well settled that such a writ may be issued not only in cases of illegal exercise of jurisdiction but also to correct errors of law that are apparent on the face of the record. In support of this principle, reference may be made to the observations of Lord Justice Denning in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal [1952] 1 KB 338, where he noted that while earlier authority had confined the writ to the correction of excess of jurisdiction, the Lord Chief Justice restored certiorari to its proper position, allowing it to be used to correct errors of law that appear on the face of the record even though they do not go to jurisdiction. It is undisputed that only errors of law that are apparent on the face of the record are amenable to correction by a writ of certiorari; errors of fact, even if evident on the face of the record, cannot be corrected in this manner, as affirmed in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam.
It was observed that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued merely to correct a factual error when the challenged finding of fact lacks any legal evidence, and that the true legal position on the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction to grant such a writ can be set out with relative ease. Nonetheless, difficulty arises when the Court attempts to formulate a test for deciding when an error of law qualifies as an error apparent on the face of the record. Some authorities contend that only errors which are self‑evident—meaning they are clear without a detailed examination of the merits—may be corrected, while errors that emerge only after an extensive argument cannot be remedied in this manner. In effect, an error of law that may be corrected by a writ of certiorari must be self‑evident; this is what is meant by an error apparent on the face of the record, and, from that perspective, a requirement that the error be obvious without a lengthy scrutiny of the record serves as a workable test in most cases. However, as Justice Venkatarama Ayyar noted in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, “there must be cases in which even this test might break down because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that may be considered by one judge as self‑evident might not be so considered by another” (1) [1958] S.C.R. 1240; (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104, 1123. Judicial experience nevertheless shows that, although it is not simple to devise a flawless universal test, the Court can usually determine with little difficulty whether the impugned error of law is apparent on the face of the record. The question, therefore, was what error apparent on the face of the record the High Court had corrected by issuing a writ of certiorari in the present matter. The High Court held that the appellate authority’s construction of clauses 2 and 5 of the agreement was patently and manifestly erroneous. The appellate authority had construed those two clauses to mean that clause 2 was the determinative clause and that an employee could not invoke the benefit of clause 5 unless he satisfied the requirements of clause 2. To decide whether the High Court was justified in granting the writ, it was necessary to examine those two clauses. A careful reading of the clauses makes it inescapable that the error committed by the appellate authority was both manifest and obvious. Clause 2 relates to clerks employed in the local mills and therefore sets out the nature of the work to be performed by persons falling within that clause. Clause 5, by contrast, deals with a distinct category of employees, and its terms are clearly separate from those of clause 2.
The Court observed that clause five of the agreement created a distinct wage scale for employees who were neither clerks nor operatives; these workers held positions above those of operatives and below those of full‑fledged clerks. Consequently, the Court held that there was no doubt that persons falling under clause five could not also fall under element two, and therefore they could not be required to satisfy the test laid down in that element. A simple examination of the roster of designations listed under element five demonstrated that applying the test relevant to element two to those employees would be wholly inappropriate and irrelevant. In the Court’s view, the error made by the appellate authority was so manifest that the High Court was rightly justified in correcting it by issuing a writ of certiorari. The dispute, the Court noted, was not primarily a matter of interpreting the document but of giving effect to its plain terms. Since element five expressly provided for employees not covered by element two, and because that intention was clarified by the list of designations falling under element five, any reading that made element five subject to clause two was a patent error apparent on the face of the record. The Court emphasized that the situation did not allow two alternative conclusions; rather, it involved a clear misreading of the two provisions, ignoring the purpose for which the separate provisions were created. Accordingly, the Court found that the argument advanced by counsel for the Attorney‑General, claiming that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ, was without merit. The Court then turned to the principal contention raised by the same counsel, namely that the applications submitted by the respondents’ union on behalf of three employees were incompetent under section fifteen of the Act and that the authority had exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining them. Although this point had not been specifically raised before the authority, the Court noted that it had been argued before both the appellate authority and the High Court, bringing into focus the task of construing section fifteen of the Act. The appellant contended that the jurisdiction conferred on the authority by section fifteen was limited and could not be extended by implication or inference. The Court explained that the purpose of the Act was clear: it was enacted to regulate wage payment to certain classes of industrial workers and to provide a swift and effective remedy for employees whose wages had been illegally deducted or unjustly delayed. In further support of this scheme, the Court referred to section two‑vi, which defined wages, section four, which fixed the wage period, and section five, which prescribed the timing of wage payments.
Section 7 of the Act permits the employer to make certain deductions that are specifically enumerated in the statute. Section 15 gives the authority appointed under that provision the power to hear and decide claims arising in a designated area where wages have been deducted or payment delayed. Consequently, only claims that relate to deductions from wages or to delays in the payment of wages may be entertained by that authority. The jurisdiction granted by Section 15 is exclusive, because Section 22 provides that any matter falling within the authority’s jurisdiction is excluded from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. Thus the authority’s power is limited by the textual scope of Section 15, yet it is exclusive as defined by Section 22. When the authority examines a claim concerning a deduction or a delay, it inevitably must consider questions that are incidental to those core issues. While identifying the incidental questions, the authority must ensure that it does not extend its limited jurisdiction in an unreasonable or undue manner. At the same time, the authority must avoid restricting the incidental questions so narrowly that it would impair the jurisdiction it has been granted. To decide which matters may be treated as incidental, the court refers to the definition of “wages” contained in Section 2(vi) of the Act.
Section 2(vi), as it then stood, defined wages as all remuneration capable of being expressed in monetary terms that, if the expressed or implied terms of the employment contract were fulfilled, would be payable to a person for his employment or work performed. The definition also included any bonus or additional remuneration of the same nature, as well as any sum payable because of the termination of the employment relationship. Additionally, Section 2(vi) listed five categories of payments, set out in clauses (a) to (e), which are expressly excluded from the meaning of “wages.” When an employee files a claim alleging an illegal deduction or a delay in wage payment, several factual matters must be examined. The first issue is to determine whether the claimant is actually an employee of the respondent, which involves assessing the existence of an employer‑employee relationship. If that relationship is established, the next inquiry concerns the terms of employment, specifically whether a written contract exists or the agreement is oral. Where the parties do not dispute the existence of a contract, the authority must then examine the specific terms that have been admitted as part of that contract. In certain situations, a further question may arise as to whether the contract that was in force at an earlier time had ceased to exist at the relevant period, thereby ending the employment relationship.
The Court observed that questions may arise concerning whether a previously existing employment relationship had terminated at the relevant time, whether a lock‑out declared by an employer in the context of an alleged illegal wage deduction was lawful, or which of two conflicting contracts of service was operative when parties assert rival agreements. Such issues have previously been examined by various courts, for example in A. R. Sarin v. B. C. Patil, Vishwanath Tukaram v. The General Manager, Central Railway, V. T. Bombay, and Maharaja Sri Umaid Mills, Ltd. v. Collector of Pali. However, the Court declined to address these general questions in the present appeal. It reasoned that it would be inappropriate to formulate a rigid, universal rule that would delineate which incidental facts an authority may consider and which it may not. Accordingly, the Court confined its analysis to the specific facts of the case before it, without venturing into broader doctrinal formulations.
The factual matrix revealed that there was no dispute about the existence of an employer‑employee relationship. It was admitted that three workmen were employed by the appellant and performed the duties of bleach‑folders, a class of work divided into Uttarnars and Chadhavnars, with the respective tasks for each category fully accepted by both sides. The appellant argued that the employment of these three workmen was governed by the existing Award, citing the relevant authorities. In contrast, the respondent union contended that their employment fell under clause 5 of a subsequent agreement. Both parties agreed that the Award and the later agreement were concurrently operative for the persons to whom each applied, and that the appellant did not dispute that individuals designated under clause 5 were entitled to the benefits of that clause and were therefore excluded from the Award’s ambit. The Court noted that any employee described as a “cut‑looker” by a mill would automatically be covered by clause 5, meaning that all categories expressly named in that clause were not subject to the Award, even if they had previously been treated as operatives, and such a person could correctly seek relief under section 15 of the Act. The appellant, however, argued that the final portion of clause 5 refers to “other employees who have not been included above but who can properly fall under the above category,” a class for which no specific designation is provided, raising the question of how such employees should be treated.
In the appeal, it was contended that to determine whether a particular employee fell within the category described in clause five, the authority would first have to inquire into the suitability of that employee for the category. It was argued that such an inquiry would deprive the employee of the right to invoke section 15 of the Act, compelling him to approach the industrial court under the ordinary industrial law. Accordingly, the dispute between the parties was confined to a very narrow question. The Court observed that an employee who was expressly designated as a cut‑looker could invoke section 15 and obtain relief from the authority, whereas an employee who was not so designated but who performed work that, according to the appellant, placed him within the same category, could not invoke section 15 because the authority was said to be unable to decide whether the employee properly fell within that category. The Court expressed the view that, on the facts, the issue of whether a particular employee was an operative covered by the Award or an employee who was positioned above an operative and below a clerk, as contemplated in clause five, was inseparably linked to the question of wages as defined in section 2(vi). To exclude the authority’s power to decide that question would be unreasonable. The Court noted that whenever a contract of employment was admitted and there was a dispute about the construction of its terms, such a dispute undeniably fell within the jurisdiction of section 15. The Court then asked what principled difference existed where the contract was admitted, its terms were not contested, and the only controversy concerned which of the two existing contracts applied to the employee in question. The Court warned that accepting the appellant’s argument would produce an anomalous result. If a general contract of employment provided for payment of wages to various categories of employees and described those categories by reference to the duties performed, then, under the appellant’s construction, no employee could ever obtain the speedy remedy afforded by section 15. In such a situation, every disagreement about the duties assigned to a particular employee would have to be resolved before the question of wages could be decided. The Court found that imposing such an artificial restriction on the jurisdiction created by section 15 was wholly unreasonable. The Court further stated that this reasoning concurred with the view expressed by the High Court in the present case, and therefore there was no reason to depart from that view. The Court also referred to its earlier decision in A. V. D’Costa v. B. C. Patel, wherein the nature and scope of the limited jurisdiction under section 15 had been examined. In that case, Justice Sinha, speaking for the majority, had held that an employee who claimed to receive a certain amount as actual wages but argued that he was entitled to a higher amount under a different wage scheme was dealing with a matter that lay outside the authority’s jurisdiction, because the authority could determine the actual terms of the contract but not the question of potential wages.
The Court observed that if an employee’s request to be placed under a higher‑wage scheme had been recognised and given effect, such a matter would lie beyond the jurisdiction of the authority. The authority’s jurisdiction, according to the Court, is confined to deciding what the actual terms of the contract between the parties are, that is, to determine the actual wages that are payable. The authority, however, lacks jurisdiction to decide questions of potential or prospective wages. The Court then noted that the employee’s complaint in the earlier case cited as (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1353 fell within the latter category, that is, a question of potential wages.
From this decision the Court inferred that the authority may determine the terms of the contract between employer and employee, and if those terms are admitted, any remaining dispute as to whether a particular employee falls within one class or another is merely incidental to the principal issue of what the contract terms are. The Court held that this incidental issue mirrors the nature of the dispute between the parties in the present matter.
The learned Attorney‑General heavily relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Anthony Sabastin Almeda v. R. M. T. Taylor (1). In that case the employer and the employee appeared before the court on the basis of two different contracts, and the Bombay High Court held that the authority was not empowered to decide which of the two contracts was controlling, which contract subsisted, or under which contract the employer was liable to pay wages. The facts showed that the parties pleaded two rival contracts, each claiming that only its own contract subsisted, and the question for determination was which contract truly subsisted. The Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the correctness of the Bombay High Court’s view on that point.
The Court emphasized that the present appeal presented a substantially different factual scenario. Both contracts in the present case are admittedly subsisting. The sole point of dispute is whether the three workmen in question fall within the category of “cut‑lookers” as defined in clause 5, or whether they do not. If the workmen are classified as cut‑lookers, clause 5 applies; if they are not, the applicable award would come into operation. Consequently, the Court found that the decision in Almeda’s case does not assist the appellant.
The Court further observed that it is a common understanding that Ahmedabad textile mills do not have a separate class of employees called “cut‑lookers” as exists in Bombay. In Ahmedabad, the work of cut‑looking together with other work is performed by “bleach‑folders” and other similar employees, as reflected in the earlier finding of the authority when Punamchand and Vishnuprasad had moved the authority under section 15 of the Act. The learned Attorney‑General vigorously argued that it is unfair to give the three workmen the same pay as cut‑lookers when they perform cut‑looking only part of the time and primarily work as bleach‑folders; however, the Court noted that this argument has no relevance to the determination of the present dispute.
The argument that the three workmen should receive the same remuneration as cut‑lookers, even though they performed cut‑looking duties only intermittently and spent the majority of their time carrying out the work of bleach‑folders, was held to be irrelevant to the dispute before the Court. The sole issue requiring determination was whether the activities performed by the three respondents placed them within the definition of “cut‑lookers” as prescribed in clause 5. The Court noted that, on a previous occasion, the authority had ruled in favour of two of the three respondents by concluding that they were in fact bleach‑folders who occasionally performed cut‑looking work. Should that earlier determination constitute res judicata, its effect would be to benefit the two respondents rather than the appellant. Consequently, the learned Attorney‑General did not seriously contest the High Court’s ruling on the applicability of res judicata. In light of this reasoning, the Court concluded that the appeal could not succeed. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to bear costs. The dismissal of the appeal was thereby confirmed.