Sarjoo Prasad vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 147 of 1959

Decision Date: 16 December, 1960

Coram: J.C. Shah, J.L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah

In the matter of Sarjoo Prasad versus the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 16 December 1960. The Bench consisted of Justice J. C. Shah, Justice J. L. Kapur and Justice M. Hidayatullah. The case was cited as 1961 AIR 631 and 1961 SCR (3) 324, with further citations including R 1966 SC 43 (4), RF 1966 SC 128 (16) and RF 1975 SC 1309 (18). The dispute concerned the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, specifically sections 7 and 16, which address the sale of adulterated oil by a servant and the associated mens rea, the liability of a servant, the treatment of a second offence, and the discretion to impose a sentence lesser than the minimum prescribed.

The appellant, Sarjoo Prasad, was an employee of a vendor identified as T, who dealt in edible oils. The appellant was found to have sold mustard oil that was adulterated with linseed oil, leading to prosecution of both the appellant and T under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. Both were convicted; T received a fine of Rs 200, while the appellant, having a prior conviction for a similar offence, was sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 2,000, which represented the minimum penalty prescribed by section 16(ii). The appellant argued that a servant could not be held liable unless he possessed knowledge that the food sold was adulterated, and that special and adequate reasons existed to justify imposing a penalty lower than the statutory minimum for a second offence. The Court held that section 7 imposes a duty on every person, whether employer or servant, to refrain from selling adulterated food, and that violation of this provision attracts punishment under section 16 without the necessity of proving mens rea. The Court disapproved the earlier authority of S. Moses, I. L. R. (1959) Mad. 418. Furthermore, the Court observed that the appellant’s status as a mere employee, the absence of any personal profit, and the relatively nominal fine imposed on T constituted special and adequate reasons within the meaning of the proviso to section 16(ii) that warranted a sentence below the minimum prescribed. The judgment was delivered by Justice Shah, who noted that the appellant had been convicted by the First Class Magistrate, P. M. Agra, of Allahabad for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The appeal, arising from a special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, was the result of a criminal appeal No. 147 of 1959, involving previous confirmations of conviction by the Sessions Court and the Allahabad High Court.

In this case, the appellant was convicted under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act 37 of 1954). Because he had a previous conviction for a similar offence, the trial court sentenced him to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 2,000. Both the Court of Session at Allahabad and the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad affirmed the conviction and the sentence on appeal and in revision. The appellant subsequently sought special leave to appeal to this Court under article 136 of the Constitution. The appellant was employed as a servant of Thakur Din, who conducted a business as a vendor of edible oils and provisions at 92‑C, Mirganj, Allahabad. On 22 September 1956, a Food Inspector of the Allahabad Municipality purchased a sample of mustard oil that had been displayed for sale in the shop; laboratory analysis showed that the oil was adulterated with linseed oil. Consequently, Thakur Din and the appellant were prosecuted before the First Class Magistrate, Allahabad, for the offence of selling adulterated food. The Magistrate convicted both parties, imposing a fine of Rs 200 on Thakur Din and sentencing the appellant to one year of rigorous imprisonment together with a fine of Rs 2,000. Section 2(xiii) of the Act defines “sale” to include any actual sale, an agreement to sell, an offer to sell, the exposing of an article for sale, possession of an article for sale, and even an attempt to sell, whether the transaction is for cash, on credit, by exchange, wholesale or retail, and whether the article is intended for human consumption, analysis, or any other purpose. At the time the mustard oil was sold to the Food Inspector, the appellant was in charge of the shop, the oil was exposed for sale, it was in his possession, and he actually effected the sale. Counsel for the appellant argued that section 7 of the Act solely prohibits the owner of a shop from selling adulterated food and that an employee who sells food on behalf of the employer is not a “person” within the meaning of the prohibition. According to counsel, an employee who, with knowledge that the food is adulterated, sells it would be guilty of aiding and abetting the employer, but an employee who lacks such knowledge cannot be punished for violating the Act. The relevant portion of section 7 states: “No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf sell any adulterated food.” Similarly, the material part of section 16(1) provides: “If any person, whether by himself or by any person on his behalf, sells any article ….”

In this case the Court observed that the fact that the mustard oil sold by the appellant was adulterated had not been contested in the appeal. The appellant had argued that the mustard oil delivered to the Food Inspector was not intended for sale, but the Trial Magistrate had rejected that argument, a view that was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Session and the High Court. The statute does not define the term “person,” and, in the context in which it occurs, the expression appears to encompass anyone who sells adulterated food. By the phrasing “no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf,” the prohibition is not intended to apply solely to the employer; the legislative intent is clear that every individual, whether an employer or an agent, is barred from selling adulterated food, and any breach of this prohibition is punishable under section 16. Section 19 further provides that, in a prosecution for the sale of any adulterated article of food, it is not a defence merely to claim that the vendor was unaware of the nature or quality of the food sold. Such a defence may succeed only if the accused can demonstrate that the article was purchased with a written warranty in the prescribed form, that it matched the nature, substance and quality demanded by the purchaser, that the accused had no reason to believe at the time of sale that the food was not of that nature, substance and quality, that the food was sold in the same condition as it was purchased, and that the accused submitted a copy of the warranty to the food inspector or the local authority together with a written notice of reliance indicating the name and address of the supplier. The prohibition on the sale of adulterated food is evidently imposed in the larger interest of protecting public health. Consequently, the prohibition applies to all persons who sell adulterated food, and any contravention by any such person attracts the penalty prescribed. Because the legislature has expressly sought to penalise a person who sells adulterated food through his agent, it cannot be inferred that the intent was to punish only those who act directly and not through agents. If the owner of a shop where adulterated food is sold is held liable without proof of mens rea, it would be inconsistent to exempt an agent or servant of the owner from liability for the same breach unless the agent possessed guilty knowledge. The argument that the legislature could not have intended to punish servants who are illiterate and unaware of the true nature of the article sold is untenable. The statutory language, taken as a whole, imposes liability on anyone who participates in the sale of adulterated food, regardless of the level of literacy or awareness, thereby ensuring the protection of public health is upheld.

In delivering the judgment, the Court emphasized that the purpose of the Legislature must be understood by examining the actual wording of the statute, not by making assumptions about the mental capacity of the persons who break the law. The Court observed that there was no reason to presume that workers employed in shops that sell food items are generally illiterate. The statute had been enacted, in the interest of protecting public health, to forbid every person from selling adulterated food. Because the law contains no explicit or necessarily implied clause limiting the ban solely to shop owners, the Court held that it would be improper for a court to interpret the prohibition as applying only to the proprietor and not to the proprietor’s agent who sells adulterated food. The Court further rejected the contrary view expressed by the Madras High Court in Re S. Moses (1), describing that view as erroneous. It also found no merit in the argument that the appellant’s conviction was not for a second offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

The Court noted that the prosecution had produced before it an extract dated 7 April 1956 from a judgment in criminal case No. 208 of 1956. That extract recorded that a person named “Sarjoo Prasad” had been convicted by Magistrate P. N. Jauhari, a first‑class magistrate in Allahabad, of adulterating mustard oil and had been ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 80. The magistrate had identified the convicted individual as the appellant. The appellant’s name, his father’s name and his residence as mentioned in the extract were exactly the same as those of the appellant. All of the particulars set out in the extract corresponded with the appellant’s description. In the memorandum of appeal filed in the Court of Session, the appellant did not dispute that the earlier conviction concerned himself. The appellant, however, was only an employee of a person named Thakur Din. No evidence was shown that the appellant had obtained any profit from the transaction. Thakur Din himself had been ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200. The Court observed that the appellant’s offence was a repeat of a similar offence he had committed a few months earlier. Considering all the circumstances, the Court found special and adequate reasons to impose a penalty lower than the minimum prescribed by section 16(ii) of the Act. Accordingly, the Court reduced the term of imprisonment to three months and remitted the fine. Subject to this modification, the Court dismissed the appeal.