S. S. Light Railway Co., Ltd vs Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. and Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 347 of 1955

Decision Date: 9 February 1960

Coram: Das Gupta

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India heard an appeal titled S. S. Light Railway Co., Ltd v. Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. & Another, decided on 9 February 1960. The petition was brought by S. S. Light Railway Co., Ltd as the petitioner against Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. and another respondent. The case concerned the interpretation of provisions of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890), specifically sections 3(14), 32 and 41, with reference to railway rates and the liability of terminal charges fixed by the Central Government.

The headnote explained that, under section 32 of the Act, the Central Government had issued a notification fixing certain rates for terminal charges to be imposed for the loading and unloading of goods transported by railway from one station to another. Initially, the railway company did not levy terminal charges in accordance with the notified rates; instead, it continued to charge only the prevailing rates that did not include any terminal charges. Later the railway company issued a Local Rates Advice that added the prescribed terminal charges to the prevailing rates, causing the total amount payable by the sugar mills to increase significantly. The mills challenged this increase by filing a complaint under section 41(1)(i) of the Act before the Railway Rates Tribunal. The railway company argued that the increase merely reflected the application of the standardized terminal charges prescribed by the Government, and therefore no complaint could be entertained under the cited provision. By a majority decision, the Tribunal held that the matter did not involve the application of a standardized charge and that it possessed jurisdiction to examine the issue; consequently, it ordered a reduction of the terminal charges included in the total amount. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Railway Rates Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to investigate the reasonableness of terminal charges or to order any reduction. The Court observed that the charges sought by the railway administration were indeed “terminal charges” as defined in the Act, and their imposition under the notification of section 32 constituted the application of a standardized charge. The Court further noted that, irrespective of which consignor actually used the stations, sidings or other facilities mentioned in section 3(14), terminal charges were leviable merely because such facilities had been provided by the railway administration, relying on the authority of Hall & Co. v. London Brighton and South Coast Railway Co. (1885) 15 Q.B.D. 505. The judgment was rendered in Civil Appeal No. 347 of 1955, which was filed by special leave against the Railway Rates Tribunal’s order dated 20 April 1955.

Madras, Complaint No. 2 of 1954. Counsel for the appellant included H. N. Sanyal, the Additional Solicitor General of India, together with Niren De, P. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Ghosh. Counsel for respondent No. 1 comprised N. C. Chatterjee, J. P. Aggarwalla, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff. Counsel for respondent No. 2 consisted of B. K. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar. The judgment was dated 9 February 1960 and was delivered by Justice Das Gupta. The central question presented to the Court was whether the Railway Rates Tribunal possessed jurisdiction to examine the reasonableness of a charge when the total amount payable for goods traffic carried by a railway had been increased by the Railway Administration on the basis of terminal rates fixed by the Central Government pursuant to section 32 of the Indian Railways Act.

The first respondent, Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd., operated a sugar‑manufacturing plant located at Shamli. To obtain the raw sugarcane required for its production, the mill procured the crop from various neighbouring localities, relying on the appellant railway company to transport the cane. The railway company conveyed the sugarcane in trucks from a number of stations on its network to the vicinity of Shamli. Because the mill premises were situated a short distance from the station platform, the mill entered into a siding agreement with the Roy Company at the time it commenced operations, enabling the trucks to be delivered into a dedicated mill siding where unloading took place. The nearest point of the mill siding lay approximately one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet from the station platform at Shamli. Railway locomotives brought the sugarcane‑laden trucks to this point, identified as point A in the plan, after which the mill arranged for the trucks to be moved into its own sidings. Over time the charges payable for the conveyance of sugarcane in the railway’s trucks and for the locomotive haulage up to point A were raised on several occasions, although the specific amounts of each increase were not enumerated in the record. As of 30 September 1953 the charges were as follows: from Ailum, Rs 3 and 8 annas per shilling; from Kandhla, Rs 3 and 8; from Khandraoli, Rs 3 and 8; from Hind, Rs 3 and 8; from Thanabhawan, Rs 3 and 8; from Nanautta, Rs 4 and 4; and from Sona Arjunpur, Rs 4 and 4, with each case subject to an additional surcharge of two annas per rupee. Earlier, on 20 February 1950, the Central Government had issued an order under section 32 of the Indian Railways Act, the relevant excerpt of which stated: “In pursuance of section 32 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890) the Central Government is pleased to fix the following rates of terminals, transshipment, short‑distance, percentage on value and percentage on excess‑value charges, namely—1. TERMINAL CHARGES. (a) Goods Traffic (i) General Merchandise—Eight pies per maund at each end where the railway is required to do loading and unloading; six pies per maund at each end where the owners of…” This governmental fixation of terminal rates formed the statutory basis for the charges that were later contested.

In this case the Court recorded that although the Central Government had issued, on 20 February 1950, an order under section 32 of the Indian Railways Act fixing terminal charges of eight annas per maund where the railway performed loading and unloading and six annas per maund where the owners performed those operations, the Railway Company had nevertheless continued to levy terminal charges at a higher rate until September 1953. On 1 August 1953 the Railway Company issued a Local Rate Advice stating that, with effect from 10 October 1953, new station‑to‑station rates would apply and would remain in force until further notice. The advice listed the rates for sugarcane transported from various stations, for example a charge of Rs 2.6 plus a terminal charge of Rs 9.6 from Ailum to Shamli, and similar rates for Khandla, Khandraoli, Hind, Thanabhawan, Harar Siding, Nanautta and Sona Arjunpur. As a result, from October 1953 the total amount payable by the sugar mills increased markedly. Where previously the mills had paid Rs 3‑8 per maund for sugarcane from Ailum, Khandla, Khandraoli, Hind and Thanabhawan, the new charge became Rs 11‑12, Rs 11‑12, Rs 11‑2, Rs 11‑2 and Rs 12‑8 respectively. For shipments from Nanautta and Sona Arjunpur the payable amounts rose to Rs 13‑5 and Rs 14‑1, replacing the former rates of Rs 4‑4 for each. The mills consequently lodged a complaint under section 41(1)(i) of the Indian Railways Act with the Railway Rates Tribunal, seeking relief from the increase. They also initially sought relief on other matters such as rates on molasses, an increase in siding charges, and rates on coal, gunnies, limestone, fire‑wood and sugar, but withdrew all those prayers during the hearing. The Tribunal therefore limited its consideration to the mills’ grievance regarding the increased sugarcane charges. The Railway Company contended that the increase merely reflected the application of the standardized terminal charges prescribed by the Government notification, and therefore no complaint fell within the scope of section 41(1)(i). It further argued that, besides merely transporting the goods, the Company provided substantial services at each end of the journey, and consequently the terminal charge fixed by the Central Government could lawfully be levied. By a majority decision the Tribunal held that the situation did not involve the application of a standardized terminal charge, and therefore it possessed jurisdiction to examine the question. The majority, composed of Shri L.M. Roy and Shri V. Subrahmanyan, concluded that services were rendered only at the loading station and not at Shamli, so that only Rs 4.11 of the Rs 9.6 terminal charge was reasonable. Accordingly, they ordered that the terminal charge be reduced from Rs 9.6 to Rs 4.11. The President of the Tribunal, Mr. Lokur, formed the minority view.

In the minority, the member held that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to examine the reasonableness of the charge. He also maintained that terminal services had been provided by the respondent Railways both at the loading station and after the carriage was completed at Shamli. The Court disagreed with the majority of the tribunal, finding that the tribunal was mistaken in concluding that the situation did not involve standardized terminal charges. The argument that had persuaded the majority and that was reiterated on behalf of the respondent concerned the relationship between the Government notification and the charge imposed by the Railway Company. The Government notification prescribed a terminal charge of six pies per maund at each end where the owner performed loading and unloading, which was the case here. Nevertheless, the Railway Company had fixed a terminal charge of Rs 9.6 for a four‑wheeler truck covering both ends, irrespective of the actual maundage carried. The Court observed that Rs 9.6 is equivalent to one anna, which corresponds to the total of six pies at each end on a basis of 150 maunds. It was argued that some trucks might carry more than 150 maunds and some less, and that a lump‑sum charge of Rs 9.6 therefore did not represent an application of the Government‑fixed rates but a distinct arrangement. The Court found no merit in that contention. It was not disputed that, on average, each four‑wheeler truck carried 200 maunds. Exhibit A‑6 contained a series of bills for the period from February 1953 to 10 February 1953 showing sugarcane shipments from the relevant stations to Shamli, with the number of trucks and the weight carried recorded. In every bill the weight was shown as 200 maunds. The Court noted that this figure was not derived from actual weighing but was based on the truck’s capacity. Regarding the carriage rate, it was common ground that the charge was assessed per truck and not according to maundage, and that the charge was calculated on the assumption of 150 maunds per truck. The Court could not accept the proposition that, because the Central Government fixed a rate per maund, the actual weight had to be ascertained by weighing before the charge could be levied. Nothing prevented the Railway Company and the consignor from agreeing on an accepted weight without actual weighing. Once such an agreed figure was fixed, the amount computed on that figure at the Government‑prescribed rate must be regarded as the proper amount payable under the Government’s rate. The fact that, in some cases, less than 150 maunds might be carried in a

It was observed that whether a truck carries less than 150 maunds or more than 150 maunds does not change the fact that the party required to pay and the party entitled to receive payment have agreed on a specific figure for the weight carried without conducting an actual weighment. Accordingly, when a sum of Rs 9.6 was claimed as the terminal charge, which corresponds to a rate of six pice per maund on a weight of 150 maunds at each end of the journey, the claim represented merely the application of the charge fixed by the Central Government. The Court was not persuaded by the contention that the wording employed in the Local Rate Advice dated 1 August 1953, as reproduced earlier, indicated that a standardized terminal charge was not being imposed but that some other rate was being sought. The Advice does indeed quote a “station to station rate”, the amount being presented in two parts: one part clearly being the rate for carriage and the second part being the terminal charge. The expression “plus terminal charge” actually appears in the Advice. The Railway Act, however, draws a clear distinction between a rate and a terminal charge. The term “rate” is defined in section 3(13) as including “any fare, charge or other payment for the carriage of any passenger, animals or goods”. The term “terminals” is defined in clause 14 of the same section as including “charges in respect of stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters, and of any services rendered thereat”. Furthermore, the phrase “station to station rate” is defined in section 46C(g) as meaning “a special reduced rate applied to a specific commodity booked between two specified stations”. The same section also defines “class rate” and “schedule rate”. The class rate is defined as the rate fixed according to the class assigned to a commodity in the classification of goods, while the schedule rate is defined as “the rate lower than the maximum or class rate applied on a commodity basis”. There is no reason to reject an interpretation of the word “rate” used in section 46C as encompassing “any fare, charge or other payment for the carriage of any passenger, animals or goods” as defined in section 3(13). Consequently, when the term “station to station rate” is interpreted with respect to goods, it denotes only the charge payable for the carriage of goods that may be specially applicable to a particular commodity booked between two specified stations for that carriage. Such a charge does not include any additional amount beyond the carriage charge. Therefore, it must be held that the wording of the Local Advice Order, which states the new station to station rate as a certain amount plus “so much for terminal charge”, is not strictly accurate. The proper method of conveying the information to the parties concerned would be to present the station to station rate as consisting solely of the amount mentioned in the first part – that is, the charge for carriage – and

In this case, the Court observed that the Local Advice Order should have issued a separate announcement concerning the terminal charge. Although the wording in the Order was inaccurate, the Court held that such inaccuracy did not affect the substance of the issue. The inclusion of the terminal charge as part of the station‑to‑station rate did not demonstrate that standardized terminal charges were not being applied. The Court then turned to the argument that the Central Government Notification, which fixed a terminal charge of six pies per maund at each end where loading and unloading were performed by the owner, should be interpreted to permit the levy of such charges only when a service beyond mere carriage was provided. This argument relied on an interpretation of the term “terminals” in section 3(14), which defines “terminals” as charges for certain services rendered. The Court noted that accepting this view would lead to the conclusion that the Government’s fixation of “terminals” authorized charges only for services additional to carriage. Consequently, if it were later found that no such additional services had been rendered, the levy of a charge at that point would not constitute a “standardized terminal charge.” Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a proper construction of “terminals” requires a service beyond carriage, the Court examined whether the majority finding of the Tribunal, which held that no such service was performed at the Shamli end, was correct. The Court stressed that a pure factual finding of this nature would ordinarily not be disturbed, but if that finding were tainted by an error of law, the Court considered it proper and necessary to determine the correct legal conclusion. The Tribunal members, Shri L.M. Roy and Shri Subrahmanian, had argued that the loaded cane specials were taken to a designated point on the map, then pushed into an assisted siding, at which stage the conveyance ended and the terminal began, and that any subsequent services were those of a carrier subject to separate terminal charges. The Court recognized that the distinction between “conveyance” and the carrier’s duty had been examined in many English Railway Acts, and that English courts had often been called upon to decide where conveyance ended and carrier liability began, noting that such decisions were shaped by the historical development of railways in England.

In addressing the issue, the Court observed that while English case law on the point where conveyance ends and the carrier’s duty begins may provide some guidance, the more pertinent task was to examine the framework established by Indian legislation. The Court noted that, under the Indian Railways Act, the primary responsibility for moving goods along the railway line rests with the railway company, and for that service the railway is authorized to levy carriage charges. Moreover, the Act expressly permits the railway to impose additional fees classified as “terminal” charges for services rendered beyond the carriage itself. Consequently, the Court held that determining where carriage terminates requires an inquiry into the extent of the charge that has actually been levied. If the charge covers transport up to the platform of the destination station, then any assistance provided after the goods have reached that platform constitutes a separate terminal service. Conversely, if the charge is limited to transport only to the platform of Shamli station, then moving the wagons from that platform to the point identified as “point A” – where the sidings commence – must be treated as a terminal service. The Court criticized the majority of the Tribunal for not recognizing this distinction, observing that the Tribunal incorrectly assumed that because the siding began at point A, the shunting of trucks from the station platform to point A could not be characterized as a terminal service. The Court emphasized that the crucial question was the precise location up to which the carriage charge was intended to apply. To resolve this, the Court examined clauses 13 and 15 of the siding agreement, which state that freight charges are payable for goods moving to and from Shamli station, with railway receipts and invoices issued accordingly, and that additional charges are imposed for each wagon loaded or empty placed on or removed from the lines labeled A and B, at specified rates per four‑wheeler and eight‑wheeler wagons, together with a fixed fee of rupees 5 for each engine‑assisted placement or removal transaction. By analysing these provisions, the Court concluded that the agreement clearly demarcates carriage charges up to Shamli station, and any subsequent handling of wagons on lines A and B falls within the category of terminal services, thereby correcting the Tribunal’s error in law.

The Firm was required to return a certificate in the form shown in Annexure A. Under clause 5(b), the Railway agreed to handle wagons to and from the lines marked A and B as shown in Plan No 12‑A, or any other point thereafter fixed by written mutual consent of the Firm and the Railway Administration. Clause 5(c) stipulated that when wagons were placed at line A, the Station Master would complete columns 1, 2 and 3 on both foils of Annexure A, obtain the Firm’s signature in column 4 of the inner foil, and then hand the outer foil to the Firm. Once this procedure was completed, the wagons were deemed transferred to the Firm and the period of free time permitted by the rules would commence. In a similar manner, wagons were considered returned to the Railway when they were placed at line B and the Station Master received notice from the Firm, which was effected by the Firm presenting the outer foil with the appropriate column completed. The Station Master would then initial column 5 of the outer foil, fill columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the inner foil, and columns 6, 7 and 8 of the outer foil, thereby recovering any demurrage due. Note 1 explained that the free time was to be calculated according to the rules published from time to time in the Goods Traffic Books of the Railway Administration, and any detention of wagons beyond that free period would attract demurrage charges as laid down in the applicable tariffs. Note 2 clarified that the Firm was responsible for arranging band‑shunting of wagons to and from line A using its own labour, and that the Railway Administration would not be liable for any delay, loss or damage caused by the Firm’s failure to provide such shunting.

The Court observed that clause 13 expressly states, in clear and categorical language, that freight is charged up to and from Shamli station, which the Court interpreted as referring to the station platform. Clause 15 provides that “wagons will be hauled by the Railway to and from the lines marked A and B,” but it contains no provision for any charge for that haulage. Consequently, the Court held that it was impossible to read into clause 15(b) any implication that carriage was chargeable up to point A. A proper reading of the clauses, therefore, led the Court to conclude that the Railway’s charge was limited to carriage up to the station platform only. The subsequent movement of trucks from the platform to point A constituted an additional service rendered by the Railway Company, distinct from the carriage, and thus fell outside the scope of the freight charge.

The Court observed that even if the definition of “terminals” in section 3(14) were taken to mean that no charge could be levied unless the Railway Company performed services beyond mere carriage, a terminal charge was nevertheless applicable at the Shamli end in the present case. Consequently, the argument that the amount of Rs 4.11 charged at Shamli was not truly a terminal charge but some other form of charge masked as a terminal fee lost its basis. The Court then turned to a number of English decisions that appeared to have influenced the members of the Tribunal. In the case of Foster v G E Railway Co. (1920) K.B. 574, the Court examined several provisions of the Great Eastern Railway Company (Rates and Charges) Order Confirmation Act, 1891. Section 2 of that Act declared that the maximum rate for conveyance was the highest rate the company could charge for moving merchandise by a merchandise train, and that, subject to the exceptions and provisions listed in the schedule, this rate also covered locomotive power, trucks and every other expense incident to such conveyance that was not otherwise provided for. Section 3 defined the maximum station‑terminal charge as the greatest amount the company could demand from a trader for the use of the accommodation, exclusive of coal, and for duties performed by the company at the terminal station that were not otherwise covered in the schedule, either before or after conveyance. Section 5 allowed the company to charge a reasonable sum, in addition to the tonnage rate, for services rendered to a trader at his request or for his convenience, including services connected with sidings that did not belong to the company. The Court explained that the purpose of these provisions was to determine where “conveyance” should be deemed to end for rate‑making purposes. It held that, for the purpose of rates, conveyance might or might not coincide with the contractual conveyance, and it could not be said as a matter of law that it always did. Prima facie, the point at which conveyance ended was the location where the goods train detached and deposited the trucks. However, if the trucks were detached and deposited for the railway’s convenience at a point short of the location to which the conveyer was obligated to take them for delivery to a distributing carrier, a charge could not be imposed for haulage between those two points. The Court noted that Indian legislation deliberately avoided using the term “conveyance” and instead prescribed maximum and minimum rates as defined in section 3(13), describing them as charges for “carriage.”

The Court observed that the term “carriage” used in the rates could encompass more than just the physical movement of goods. It could also include activities such as collecting the goods immediately before the train starts moving and delivering the goods right after the train stops. The Court noted that English case law had long distinguished between “conveyance” and “carriage” because of the historical development of the railways and the expansion of their functions. Services performed after a goods train detached and deposited its trucks were, in the English context, regarded as “terminal services”. The Court further explained that if a train detached and deposited the trucks at a location that was short of the point to which the trucks would normally be taken for delivery to a distributing carrier, then the haulage between those two points could not be charged in addition to the conveyance charge. Applying this reasoning to Indian law, the Court held that haulage beyond the point where the trucks would be taken for persons other than the owners of a siding should be classified as a terminal service, except where the extra haulage was done for the Railway’s own convenience or where the rate for carriage already covered the entire route up to the final point of haulage. Consequently, even if the definition of “terminals” were interpreted narrowly to forbid charges where no additional services were rendered beyond the carriage charge, the imposition of a Rs 9.6 terminal charge in the present case was evidently a standardized terminal charge. Since Section 41 expressly excludes standardized terminal charges from the scope of any complaint, the Railway Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to examine the reasonableness of such charges, and therefore the Tribunal’s majority decision had to be set aside.

The Court added that its decision was not to be based solely on the narrow question of haulage from the station platform to point A, because the earlier assumption regarding the definition of “terminals” in Section 3(14) was not justified. The definition, as stated, read: “Terminals” includes “charges in respect of stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters, and of any service rendered thereat.” Accordingly, the definition comprised two distinct categories. The first category covered “charges in respect of stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters.” The second category covered “charges in respect of any services rendered thereat.” The Court then raised a further issue concerning the interpretation of the phrase “in respect of”. It questioned whether this phrase referred only to charges for the mere provision and maintenance of the listed facilities, or whether it also contemplated charges for the use of those facilities. The Court noted that the words “in respect of” were sufficiently broad to allow terminal charges wherever any of the enumerated facilities had been provided and were being maintained. The Court further indicated that, despite the generality of the language, a limited interpretation might be required if a literal, broad reading would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result that the legislature could not have intended. The Court concluded that no such reason existed to curtail the general meaning in the present provision.

In this case the Court examined whether the phrase “in respect of” in the definition of terminals required charges only for the actual use of stations, sidings, depots, wharves, warehouses, cranes and similar facilities, or whether it also covered charges for merely providing and maintaining those facilities. The Court observed that the words “in respect of” were sufficiently broad to allow terminal charges wherever any of the listed facilities had been provided and were being maintained, regardless of whether they were actually used. The Court then considered whether this general language should be narrowed for any reason. It noted that it was well‑settled that even where legislative language is broad, a limited interpretation could be applied if a literal reading would be unreasonable or absurd, implying that the legislature did not intend such an outcome. The Court asked whether any such unreasonable result existed in the present context and concluded in the negative. It recognised that in many instances the listed facilities would indeed be used, and that the legislature might have had users in mind when drafting the phrase “in respect of.” However, the Court also pointed out that the legislature must have been aware that usage varied: at times stations would be used, at other times sidings, wharves, warehouses or cranes, and often only a subset of these facilities would be employed. From a practical standpoint, it would be impossible to set separate terminal charges for each individual facility’s usage. Consequently, when the legislature authorised the Central Government to fix terminals under section 3(14), the Court held that the intention was that the amount of terminal charges should not depend on how many of the facilities were actually used. The Court further observed that the use of a depot, warehouse or crane inevitably involved some service being rendered “thereat.” If terminal charges did not include provisions for these facilities unless they were used, there would be no need to mention them in the first part of the definition, because they would fall within the second part, which covered “any services rendered thereat.” Therefore, there was no reason to restrict the broad language. The Court concluded that the legislature deliberately used the wide phrase “in respect of” to avoid the difficulty of determining, in each case, which specific facilities had been used or whether any had been used at all. innumerable people carry goods over the

Railways, and many of them, used stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar facilities for the purpose of transporting goods, although a considerable number of railways did not use such facilities. At first glance it might appear unfair that a railway which had not actually used a station or a siding should be required to pay the same charge as a railway which had made use of those facilities. The Court observed, however, that allowing the fact of actual use to determine the amount payable would give rise to endless disputes between the Railway Administration and the railway users, and such disputes would be detrimental not only to the administration but also to the public who relied on railway services. Consequently, the sensible approach was to impose a charge simply for the provision of those facilities, regardless of whether any specific user had actually made use of them. That approach explained why the wide expression “in respect of” was employed in the statute. The Court therefore concluded that the words “in respect of” used in section 3(14) should be read as meaning “for the provision of” and not “for the use of”.

The Court then considered the legislative background of the term “terminal charges”. It noted that the definition of “terminal charges” in the Indian Railways Act was a verbatim reproduction of the definition found in the English Railway and Canals Traffic Act of 1888. Moreover, three years before the English Parliament enacted that Act, an English court had decided in Hall & Co. v. London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Co. (2) that, for the purpose of interpreting section 51 of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Act of 1863, the phrase “any service incidental to the duty or business of a carrier” included providing station accommodation, sidings, and the related weighing, checking and labelling activities that were incidental to a carrier’s duty of collecting and handling goods. The Court found it reasonable to infer that the English Parliament, when defining “terminal charges” in the Railway and Canals Act of 1889, intended to give effect to that view, thereby allowing the railway administration to levy terminal charges for the mere provision of station accommodation and sidings. When the Indian Legislature adopted the same definition in its own Act, the Court held that it was proper to assume that the Indian legislators were aware of the reasoning expressed in Hall’s case. This consideration reinforced the Court’s earlier conclusion, reached by examining the scheme of the Indian Act independently of external authorities, that the expression “in respect of” in section 3(14) means “for the provision of” and not “for the use of”. Accordingly, the Court determined that terminal charges become payable solely by reason of the provision of stations, sidings and other facilities mentioned in section 3(14), irrespective of whether any particular consignor actually used those facilities.

In this case the Court noted that the facilities such as stations, sidings and other things had been supplied by the Railway Administration, and therefore the charges of Rs 4‑11 that the Railway Administration attempted to levy at each end in addition to the ordinary carriage charges fell within the definition of “terminal charges” under the Railways Act. The Court further observed that the proposed levy complied with the Government Notification issued under section 32 of the Act and therefore amounted only to the application of the standardised terminal charges prescribed by that provision. Because the levy was a statutory “terminal charge”, the Tribunal was held to have no jurisdiction to examine whether the amount was reasonable or to vary the amount in any way. Consequently the Tribunal’s majority decision could not be sustained. The Court accordingly set aside the order made by the Tribunal. The application made under section 41 concerning an additional levy of Rs 9.6 per four‑wheeler truck, over and above the carriage charge, was rejected. The appeal against the Tribunal’s order was allowed, and the appellant was awarded costs. The final direction was that the appeal was allowed and the costs were to be paid by the respondent.