Ram Prasad Vishwakarma vs The Chairman, Industrial Tribunal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1960

Decision Date: 12 December 1960

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In the matter styled Ram Prasad Vishwakarma versus the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal, the Supreme Court of India issued its judgment on 12 December 1960. The opinion was authored by Justice K C Das Gupta and was delivered by a bench consisting of Justices K C Das Gupta, P B Gajendragadkar and K N Wanchoo. The petitioner was Ram Prasad Vishwakarma and the respondent was the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal. The case is reported in the 1961 volume of the All India Reporter at page 857 and also appears in the 1961 Supreme Court Reports (third series) at page 196, with a citator reference of D 1985 SC 311 (20). The dispute concerned the dismissal of a workman, the raising of an industrial dispute by his union, the question of representation of the workman before the tribunal, and the application of sections 2(k) and 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After the employer terminated the appellant’s services, the union raised an industrial dispute that was referred, together with several other matters, to the Industrial Tribunal of Bihar. Following numerous adjournments, the management and the union jointly filed a petition of compromise that settled all points of dispute out of court. Before the compromise was finalized, the appellant applied to the tribunal requesting that he be permitted to be represented by two of his co‑workers rather than by the union secretary, whom he distrusted and who he believed lacked authority to bind him in any settlement. The tribunal refused this request and proceeded to make an award based on the agreed compromise. The appellant then approached the Patna High Court, seeking a writ to set aside the tribunal’s order which had denied him his chosen representation and also asked that the compromise not be recorded. The High Court dismissed the writ petition summarily. On special leave, the Supreme Court examined whether the appellant was entitled to separate representation when the union secretary was already representing his interests. The Court held that the appellant was not entitled to a separate representative because the union secretary, as the officer of the trade union that had taken up the dispute, was the proper representative absent any exceptional circumstances. The Court explained that a dispute between an individual workman and his employer does not become an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act unless it is taken up by a union of workmen or by a substantial number of workmen. When an individual workman becomes a party to a dispute under the Act, he does so as a party of the union that has espoused his cause, not independently. The decision relied on the earlier authority of Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Palwardhan, [1954] S C R 956, which was followed. While the Court acknowledged that no rigid rule could be laid down for all cases, it emphasized that the ordinary rule should be that representation by an officer of the trade union continues throughout the proceedings unless there are exceptional circumstances that justify a different representative for the workman. The judgment was rendered in Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1960, a special leave appeal from the judgment and order dated 14 March 1957 of the Patna High Court in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 165 of 1957. Counsel for the appellant was identified, as were counsel for respondents numbered one and four, and counsel for respondent number two.

This appeal, granted by special leave, challenged an order of the Patna High Court that had dismissed summarily an application filed by the appellant under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The appellant had been employed as a workman at the Digha factory of Bata Shoo Company (Private) Limited since October 1943. On 13 January 1954 the company’s management served him with a charge‑sheet accusing him of engaging in anti‑union activities during working hours, an allegation that was said to constitute a breach of section 12B(1) of the company’s Standing Orders and Rules. The appellant responded in writing on 14 January, denying the charge and requesting exemption from any disciplinary action. The following day, 15 January, management issued an order terminating his employment, to take effect from 18 January 1954.

The dismissal gave rise to an industrial dispute that was taken up by the Union of workmen. By a notification dated 29 April 1955, the dispute, together with several others, was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar. After the Union and the management filed their written statements, a hearing date was fixed for 20 February 1956 at Patna. The Tribunal subsequently granted numerous adjournments on a joint petition for time filed by both parties, who indicated that the various disputes were likely to be settled by compromise. On 16 November 1956 the Tribunal ordered that the matter be listed for either filing a compromise or for hearing on 20 December 1956. On that date a fresh application for an extension of time was filed, stating that an agreement had already been reached on some issues and that additional time was needed to settle the remaining matters. The Tribunal adjourned the case to 21 January 1957 for filing a compromise or for hearing. On that day another petition for further time was presented and the Tribunal allowed the matter to remain pending until 1 February 1957. On 31 January 1957 the management and the Union jointly filed a petition of compromise, claiming that all points of dispute had been settled out of court.

Prior to the filing of the joint compromise, on 12 January 1957 the appellant submitted an application requesting that two of his co‑workers, D N Ganguli and M P Gupta, be permitted to represent him before the Tribunal in place of Fateh Singh, the Secretary of the Union, on the ground that he had no confidence in Fateh Singh. The Tribunal dismissed this application by an order dated 26 February 1957. Subsequently, on 7 March 1957 the appellant filed another petition asserting that he had never authorised Fateh Singh to enter into any settlement on his behalf and praying that the compromise filed concerning his case should not be accepted and that he and his chosen agents should be heard before any disposal of the case. The Tribunal refused to grant this prayer and, by an order dated 11 March 1957, made an award pursuant to the petition of compromise. The appellant then approached the Patna High Court on 13 March 1957, seeking a writ or direction to quash the Tribunal’s order of 26 February 1957 that had rejected his request for representation by a person of his own choosing, and also requesting that the Tribunal’s award not be based on the compromise relating to his case but rather on a proper adjudication. The High Court dismissed the application summarily, and the present special‑leave appeal was filed against that dismissal.

On 11 March 1957 the Tribunal issued an award in accordance with the petition of compromise that had been filed. Two days later, on 13 March 1957, the appellant submitted an application to the Patna High Court requesting a writ or appropriate direction to set aside the Tribunal’s order dated 26 February 1957. In that petition the appellant sought to overturn the Tribunal’s refusal to allow him to be represented by a person of his own choosing instead of Fateh Singh, the Union Secretary. The same petition also asked the Tribunal not to record the compromise insofar as it related to the appellant’s case and to render its award without reference to that settlement, thereby ensuring a proper adjudication of the matter. The Patna High Court dismissed the appellant’s application summarily, providing no detailed reasons for its decision. The appellant has challenged that dismissal by filing the present appeal under special leave. He contends that the Tribunal erred gravely in refusing his request for separate representation and subsequently in granting an award based on the reference. It should be observed that when the appellant filed his application before the High Court, the award had already been issued, making the request to prevent the award impossible. Nevertheless, if his claim that the Tribunal wrongfully denied him separate representation is correct, he would have been entitled to relief concerning both the representation issue and the already‑made award. Consequently, the sole question for determination is whether the appellant was entitled to independent representation despite the Union, which had taken up his cause, being represented by its Secretary, Fateh Singh. The appellant argues that he was a party to the dispute in his own right and therefore should have been allowed to choose his own representative. The issue of whether an individual workman, whose grievance is presented by the Union as a matter affecting all workmen, may be heard separately from the Union is of clear importance. Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act governs the right of a workman who is a party to a dispute to be represented in any proceeding under the Act. That provision states that the workman may be represented by (a) an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member, (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which that union is affiliated, and (c) where the workman is not a member of any trade

Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act allows a workman who is a party to a dispute to be represented either by an officer of any trade union that is concerned with the industry or by any other workman employed in that industry. In the present case the appellant was a member of a trade union and his representation before the Tribunal was undertaken by the Secretary of that union, Fateh Singh. The union, through this officer, filed a written statement on behalf of the appellant. Up to 12 January 1957, when the appellant submitted an application seeking separate representation, the officer continued to manage the conduct of the proceedings on the appellant’s behalf. There is no record of the appellant raising any objection to this representation before that date. The issue before the Court was whether, after the appellant believed that his interests were being sacrificed by his representative, he could withdraw that representation and request to be represented by another person. In addressing this issue the Court had to balance two considerations. First, the importance of collective bargaining in the settlement of industrial disputes, and second, the principle that a party to a dispute must be afforded a fair hearing. To evaluate the latter principle, it was necessary to note that when an individual workman becomes a party to a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, he does so not independently of the union that has taken up his cause. It is now well‑settled that a dispute between a single workman and his employer does not qualify as an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Act unless it is taken up by a trade union of the workmen or by a considerable number of workmen. In the decision of Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan, Justice Venkatarama Ayyar, speaking for the Court, observed after reviewing numerous decisions that the majority view of the judiciary was that a dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but it may become one if a union or a number of workmen assume it. He further explained that although the language of section 2(k) is broad enough to encompass disputes between an employer and a single employee, the scheme of the Act clearly envisages that its machinery is intended to resolve disputes that affect the rights of workmen as a class, and that a dispute concerning only the individual rights of a workman was not meant to be adjudicated under the Act unless the dispute had been taken up by a union or a group of workmen. This position, reaffirmed in several later judgments, underscores the great significance of collective bargaining in modern industrial relations. It is well known that before the advent of collective bargaining labour was at a marked disadvantage in obtaining reasonable terms of service from employers.

In this case the Court observed that as trade unions grew in the country and collective bargaining became the established practice, employers found it more convenient to deal with the representatives of workmen rather than with individual employees for the making or amendment of contracts, for imposing disciplinary action on one or more workmen, and for all other disputes. The necessary implication of this development was that an individual workman was not, of his own accord, a party to an industrial dispute unless the dispute had been taken up by the Union or by workmen who, by their sponsoring, had converted the individual dispute into an industrial dispute. The Court noted that section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act recognised this position by providing that a workman who was a party to a dispute was entitled to be represented by an officer of a registered trade union of which he was a member. While the Court admitted that it would be imprudent to formulate a rigid general rule, it held that the ordinary rule should be that such representation by a trade‑union officer continued throughout the proceedings unless exceptional circumstances existed that would justify the Tribunal allowing the workman to be represented by someone else. The Court found no such exceptional circumstances in the present matter.

The Court also considered the suggestion that the Union’s Secretary, Fateh Singh, himself had lodged the complaint that led to the appellant’s dismissal. It observed that, despite this, the Union had nevertheless taken up the appellant’s case as its own, and at that time Fateh Singh was the Secretary. The Court reasoned that if the Union had not intervened, there would have been no reference before the Tribunal. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in refusing the appellant’s request to be represented by persons of his own choosing instead of by the Union’s Secretary. As a final argument, counsel for the appellant contended that the Secretary lacked authority to enter into any compromise on behalf of the Union. The Court noted that no such allegation was raised in the appellant’s application before the Tribunal nor in his petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to the High Court. Whether the Secretary actually possessed authority to compromise was a factual issue that could not be entertained at this stage. The High Court proceedings also contained a claim that the compromise was collusive and mala fide. The terms of the compromise of the dispute regarding the appellant’s dismissal were that he would

In this case, the settlement provided that the appellant would not be re‑employed, but that, as a humanitarian consideration, the company would, without prejudice, pay an ex‑gratia amount of Rs 1,000 (Rupees one thousand) only to him. The record contains no material that would allow a conclusion that the compromise was not made in the best interests of the workman. The Court observed that there was no documentary or testimonial evidence showing that the workman had been coerced or that the amount was inadequately low, and therefore the settlement appeared reasonable. Consequently, the Court found no reason to interfere with the High Court’s order rejecting the appellant’s petition for a writ. Because the High Court had already examined the application and found it wanting, the appellate Court saw no justification for revisiting the merits. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and no order as to costs was made, meaning that each party would bear its own expenses. During the hearing, counsel for the company, on behalf of the company, stated that, in addition to the Rs 1,000 already agreed as part of the settlement, the company would also pay a further ex‑gratia sum of Rs 500 (Rupees five hundred) only, without prejudice. The Court expressed confidence that the company would honour this additional statement. The appeal was dismissed.