R.P. Kapur And Others vs Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 59 of 1960

Decision Date: 28 October 1960

Coram: S.K. Das, M. Hidayatullah, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

The case was titled R.P. Kapur and others versus Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon and others and was decided on 28 October 1960 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice S.K. Das and was delivered by a five‑judge bench comprising Justices S.K. Das, M. Hidayatullah, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioners were R.P. Kapur and other persons identified as “others,” while the respondents were Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon together with other respondents. The official citation of the decision appears as 1961 AIR 1117 and 1961 SCR (2) 143, and it is also referenced in later reports such as 1980 SC 326 (12). The matter concerned the criminal‑procedure provisions governing the investigation of offences, specifically the authority of a Deputy Superintendent of Police to conduct an investigation under the direction of an Inspector‑General of Police. The petitioners alleged that the respondents had acted in violation of sections 154, 156 and 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and they challenged the procedural steps on the ground that the chief minister had not filed an affidavit concerning the allegations made against him. The constitutional provision invoked by the petitioners was article 14, which guarantees equality before the law, and the statutory provisions relied upon included sections 154, 156, 157 and 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

The factual backdrop described by the Court was that a complainant sent a complaint against the first petitioner to the Chief Minister, who then transmitted the complaint to the Additional Inspector‑General of Police. The Additional Inspector‑General, in turn, directed a Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Criminal Investigation Department to “register a case and investigate personally,” and the Deputy Superintendent subsequently prepared a First Information Report. In addition to this primary case, three other cases had been instituted against the petitioners or some of them, and those matters were being investigated by other officers of the Criminal Investigation Department. The petitioners contended that the respondents had contravened the procedural safeguards embodied in sections 154, 156 and 157 of the Code, that an atypical investigative procedure had been employed, and that the petitioners had been singled out for distinctive treatment in breach of article 14 of the Constitution. The Court examined these contentions and held that the investigative procedure adopted was fully authorized by section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which empowers the Inspector‑General to deal with a complaint and to assign its investigation to a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Even if the justification provided by the Inspector‑General—that the case was of a technical nature—was not entirely correct, the Court found that the Inspector‑General was nevertheless within his discretion to refer the investigation to the Deputy Superintendent, particularly in view of the petitioners’ status. The Court further concluded that the procedures followed in the three additional cases were not illegal and that there was no evidence of unequal treatment that would trigger the protective ambit of article 14. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on earlier authorities including H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi, King Emperor v. Nilkantha, Pulin Bihari Ghosh v. The King and Textile Traders Syndicate Ltd. v. State of U.P. Finally, the Court noted that because the petitioners had made allegations against the Chief Minister, the Chief Minister was obligated to file an affidavit setting out, as far as he remembered, the true position of the matter.

The matter before the Court was recorded as Petition No. 59 of 1960. It was presented under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The petitioners were represented by counsel consisting of A. S. R. Chari, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra. The respondents, namely the State of Punjab, Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon who was the Chief Minister, and certain officials, were represented by the Advocate‑General of Punjab, S. M. Sikri, together with the Additional Advocate‑General H. S. Doabia, the Deputy Advocate‑General M. S. Punnu and counsel D. Gupta. The judgment was handed down on 28 October 1660 by Justice S. K. Das.

This application was a writ petition. The three individuals who filed the petition were: (1) R. P. Kapur, who at the relevant time was a Commissioner in the State of Punjab; (2) Sheila Kapur, his wife; and (3) Kaushalya Devi, his mother‑in‑law. They invoked Article 32 of the Constitution seeking the enforcement of the rights guaranteed to them under Articles 14 and 21. The petitioners alleged that these rights had been infringed upon by the respondents, who included the State of Punjab, the Chief Minister Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon, and various police, administrative and magisterial officers who were either conducting or were otherwise connected with investigations or inquiries into several criminal cases that had been instituted against the petitioners. The Court indicated that later portions of the judgment would refer to particular officials and describe the roles they played or were alleged to have played in those criminal matters.

The petitioners presented a concise summary of their grievance. They claimed that the first petitioner, R. P. Kapur, had unfortunately attracted the displeasure of the Chief Minister. According to the petition, the Chief Minister was irritated with petitioner 1 because he had not expressed a willingness to testify for the prosecution in a matter identified as the Karnal Murder Case, subsequently referred to as the Grewal case. In that case, D. S. Grewal, who was then the Superintendent of Police in Karnal, together with other police officials and additional persons, faced serious criminal allegations. The Supreme Court had transferred the case to a Special Judge in Delhi, and that Judge began the trial during May or June of 1959. At that time, petitioner 1 was serving as the Commissioner of Ambala. He alleged that the Chief Minister informed him that the prosecution intended to call the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police as witnesses, and that it would be appropriate for petitioner 1 also to appear as a prosecution witness. When confronted with this suggestion, petitioner 1 gave a hesitant reply, indicating that his testimony might or might not be beneficial to the prosecution.

The petition further alleged an additional cause for the Chief Minister’s displeasure with petitioner 1. It concerned certain orders that petitioner 1 had issued while acting as Commissioner of the Patiala Division in a revenue matter known as the Sangrur case. The petition promised to elaborate on the details of that case later, but stated that it was sufficient at this stage to note that the orders in the Sangrur case were a source of animosity from the Chief Minister towards petitioner 1.

In the petition it is alleged that while acting as Commissioner, petitioner no. 1 issued orders disposing of property valued at approximately nine lakh rupees, and that those orders were detrimental to Surinder Kairon, who is the son of the Chief Minister. The petition further claims that because petitioner no. 1 incurred the displeasure of the Chief Minister for the two reasons previously mentioned, the investigating authorities adopted a special procedure in the prosecution of the criminal cases filed against the petitioners, and that, through the Central Investigation Department police, new cases were initiated with the purpose of harassing and persecuting the petitioners. The petition quotes itself as stating that “a special procedure or rather a technique has been devised for circumventing the mandatory provisions of the law (meaning the Code of Criminal Procedure) as regards the petitioners, two of whom are ladies and who are being dragged about unnecessarily because they happen to be related to petitioner no. 1.” It is further asserted that there has been a deliberate departure from normal legal process in the institution and investigation of criminal cases against the petitioners, a departure said to arise from “an evil eye and unequal hand,” which the petitioners contend amounts to a denial of the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. The petition describes the alleged special procedure as consisting of several steps, namely: (1) personal entertainment of a criminal complaint by the Chief Minister; (2) institution of complaints by the Central Investigation Department police; (3) registration of first information reports after such complaints; (4) investigations conducted prior to the filing of complaints; (5) investigation by specially selected CID officials, who may not be of high rank and who lack investigative powers, as suggested by learned counsel for the petitioners; and (6) the formation of a special CID squad tasked with “unearthing something” against the petitioners. The petition identified four criminal cases as illustrative of this alleged unlawful special procedure, and a supplementary petition filed on 9 June 1960 referred to additional cases. After the Court informed counsel for the petitioners that the supplementary petition could not be considered because the respondent had not been given an opportunity to meet it, the supplementary petition was withdrawn, and therefore the Court will not comment on the cases mentioned therein. The four cases set out in the original petition are: (1) FIR no. 304 of 1958, lodged by M. L. Sethi, hereinafter referred to as Sethi’s case; (2) FIR no. 39 of 1959, instituted on the complaint of M. L. Dhingra, hereinafter called Dhingra’s case; (3) FIR no. 135 of 1959, instituted on the complaint of the Civil Supply Officer, Karnal, the accused in that case being the State Orphanage Advisory Board of which petitioner no. 1 was Vice‑President at the relevant time and Kartar Singh, farm manager of Kaushalya Devi, called the Orphanage case; and (4) FIR no. 26 of 1960, instituted on the complaint of Daryao Sing, DSP, CID, Karnal, one of the respondent police officials, in which three accused persons, including petitioner no. 1, are charged, hereinafter referred to as the Ayurvedic Fund case.

In the matters under consideration, the third case, known as the Orphanage case, involved the Advisory Board on which petitioner no 1 served as Vice‑President at the relevant time, together with Kartar Singh, who was the farm manager of Kaushalya Devi. The fourth case, referred to for brevity as the Ayurvedic Fund case, arose from FIR no 26 of 1960 that was lodged on the complaint of Daryao Sing, the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the C.I.D. in Karnal, who was one of the respondent police officials; this FIR named three accused persons, one of whom was petitioner no 1. The Court stated at the outset that it would not pass any judgment on the merits of any of these four cases, because the merits would only be examined if and when the cases are tried before a criminal court. Consequently, nothing in this judgment should be interpreted as influencing the substantive outcomes of those cases. The petition presented two principal questions: first, whether the institution and investigation of the four cases had been carried out by a special procedure that is not provided for by law; and second, whether the petitioners had been singled out for unequal treatment in the administration of criminal law in the State. The two questions were linked, for the Court observed that the adoption of a special, unlawful procedure against the petitioners would itself constitute a denial of equal protection under the law. Counsel for the petitioners, however, argued the second question independently of the first, contending that even if the procedure employed against the petitioners was legally permissible, it nonetheless represented a departure from normal practice and was executed with “an evil eye and unequal hand” to harass and persecute the petitioners. The Court indicated that both questions would be examined in the context of the procedures applied in the four referenced cases. It was necessary to note that the petition had been contested by the respondents. The Chief Minister had not filed any affidavit in response to the allegations leveled against him, although affidavits in reply were submitted by the Chief Secretary and the Home Secretary of the Punjab Government, along with affidavits from certain respondent officials; the Court said it would address those affidavits in greater detail later and would also comment on the Chief Minister’s failure to file an affidavit. The respondents strongly denied both allegations raised by the petitioners: that a special procedure not sanctioned by law had been adopted, and that the procedure was motivated by “an evil eye and unequal hand” to persecute and harass the petitioners. They maintained that the procedure followed was lawful and justified, and that the involvement of C.I.D. officials in investigating the cases against the petitioners was warranted by the special nature of those cases. The respondents further contested the correctness of the petitioners’ allegations.

The petitioners alleged that petitioner No 1 had fallen into the displeasure of the Chief Minister for the two reasons set out in the petition. The respondents, however, contended that no breach of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 21 had occurred and that there was no basis for any interference by this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. According to the respondents, in the matters identified as Setbi’s case and Dhingra’s case, the petitioners had approached the High Court seeking a quashing of the proceedings, but their applications had been dismissed. In the case referred to as Sethi’s case, an appeal to this Court against the High Court’s order had also been unsuccessful. The respondents further pointed out that petitioner No 1 had previously filed a petition in the High Court alleging contempt of court against the Chief Minister on matters similar to those now raised, and that this petition had been dismissed in limine; the learned Advocate‑General of Punjab had then explained the High Court’s order with respect to some of the allegations. Having set out the respective positions of the parties, the Court indicated that it would now examine in detail the procedure adopted in the four cases instituted against the petitioners. Before undertaking that analysis, the Court noted that a brief discussion of Grewal’s case and the Sangrur case was necessary, as these matters were cited to explain why petitioner No 1 had apparently incurred the Chief Minister’s displeasure. It was alleged that in Grewal’s case petitioner No 1 had been called to give evidence for the prosecution but had replied in a manner described as dubious, thereby displeasing the Chief Minister. It should be observed, however, that the trial in Grewal’s case did not commence until May‑June 1959, whereas the complaint in Sethi’s case had been lodged in December 1958 and the complaint in Dhingra’s case in February 1959; consequently, those two complaints could not have arisen as a consequence of any refusal to testify in Grewal’s case. On 28 May 1959 petitioner No 1 wrote to the Chief Secretary concerning the complaints in Sethi’s and Dhingra’s cases, but made no allegation against the Chief Minister, merely requesting an opportunity to explain his position. A second letter was sent on 9 June 1959 to the Chief Secretary about the same complaints, again without any accusation directed at the Chief Minister. Subsequently, on 29 June 1959 petitioner No 1 filed two separate petitions in the Punjab High Court seeking the quashing of the proceedings in Sethi’s case and in Dhingra’s case; those petitions alleged that powerful influences were acting against him in order to harm him and to bar him officially, and that the two cases were the result of such influences, yet they contained no reference to Grewal’s case or any demand that he give evidence therein. It was for the first time on 20 July 1959,

When the petition for contempt proceedings was presented, it contained a specific allegation against the Chief Minister in paragraphs thirty‑five to thirty‑seven of the petition, which are reproduced as annexure 1 to the present petition. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the allegation was not prima facie established. The court observed that petitioner No 1 had been unable to advance his case further, even though the Chief Minister had not filed an affidavit, an issue that the court indicated it would address later. The petition also referred to the Sangrur matter, and the High Court likewise rejected petitioner No 1’s allegation in that case. The Sangrur episode concerned the estate of the late Sardar Mukan Singh of Sangrur, who left two widows, Sardarni Pritam Kuar and Sardarni Pavitar Kaur. Sardarni Pavitar Kaur had three daughters, one of whom was married to Surinder Singh Kairon, the son of the Chief Minister. The estate was placed under the administration of the Court of Wards, that is, the Financial Commissioner of Punjab. On June nineteenth 1958 the Court of Wards resolved to release the estate after partitioning the immovable property between the two widows. A question subsequently arose as to whether the property should be divided into five equal shares – two for the widows and three for the daughters – or only into two shares for the widows. Sometime before May sixth 1959 the decision was taken to adopt the two‑share partition, and a detailed mode of partition was thereafter agreed upon by the parties, a fact confirmed by a note of petitioner No 1 dated May sixth 1959. After that agreement no further dispute remained concerning the Sangrur estate.

Petitioner No 1 also claimed that he had been arrested on July eighteenth 1959 because he had dictated an adverse order a few days earlier, an order that had been typed but not yet signed. The court found that this claim did not appear prima facie correct, especially when considered together with the question of whether petitioner No 1 was merely acting as a conduit between the Deputy Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner, the latter being the only authority competent to pass final orders in the matter. Consequently, the court concluded that the petitioners had failed to establish the allegation that R P Kapur, one of the petitioners, had incurred the displeasure of the Chief Minister as a result of the events in the Grewal case and the Sangrur case. The court noted that any other administrative or non‑administrative reasons for possible displeasure on the part of the Chief Minister were irrelevant to the present proceedings. Although the affidavits filed before the court made reference to the past record of R P Kapur, the court deemed it unnecessary to examine that record, first because it bore no relevance to the matters before the court, and second because it would be unfair to rely on confidential material that was not part of the public record.

In this matter the Court turned its focus to four criminal actions that were still pending against the petitioners, either against all of them collectively or against certain individuals among them. The petitioners framed two precise points for the Court’s consideration. The first point questioned whether the process of instituting and investigating these criminal matters involved a special procedure that was not recognised by any law. The second point sought to determine whether the petitioners had been singled out for a disparate or unequal application of the legal provisions that govern the institution and investigation of criminal cases within the State. After evaluating the entire set of proceedings, the Court concluded that the first two matters—identified as Sethi’s case and Dhingra’s case—required a more extensive discussion. Consequently, the Court decided to scrutinise the factual background, the sequence of procedural steps, and the allegations raised in these two cases before moving on to the remaining criminal actions, thereby addressing the petitioners’ concerns about possible unlawful procedures or discriminatory treatment.

Regarding Sethi’s case, the Court noted that the matter originated from a complaint that, according to the petitioners, had been sent directly to the Chief Minister. The complaint contained four principal allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation. It claimed that R. P. Kapur had misrepresented to the complainant, Sethi, that a specific parcel of land sold to Sethi had been purchased by Kapur at the rate of ten rupees per square yard; that Kapur had deliberately concealed from Sethi the existence of pending proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector in Delhi and the acquisition of the land under section 17 of the relevant Act; and that Kapur had made false statements concerning the housing scheme applicable to the area where the land was situated. Although the complaint was dated 10 December 1958, it appears that it was forwarded to the Additional Inspector General of Police on 23 December 1958. The Additional Inspector General then issued an order directing the registration of a case and personal investigation, an order addressed to Sardar Hardayal Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., Amritsar. Sardar Hardayal Singh subsequently prepared a First Information Report. The original complaint filed by Sethi was not produced before the Court; instead, a carbon copy of the complaint, together with the Additional Inspector General’s order, was presented. The petitioners alleged that the original complaint had been sent to the Chief Minister, who had issued certain orders, and that the failure to produce the original was intended to conceal those orders from the Court. The Court observed that the Chief Minister had not filed any affidavit concerning these allegations, while an affidavit was filed by the Home Secretary, A.N., who was not in a position to comment on the Chief Minister’s actions. Accordingly, the Court proceeded on the basis that, for Sethi’s case, the complaint appears to have been addressed to the Chief Minister, who then transmitted it to the Additional Inspector General of Police, and that the Additional Inspector General subsequently sent it to Deputy Superintendent Sardar Hardayal Singh for registration and investigation.

In the matter heard at Amritsar, the Court was asked to determine whether the procedure applied to the petitioners represented a method unknown to law or amounted to unequal treatment that would engage the guarantee of equality before the law contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. The counsel for the petitioners referred to the provisions of Part V, Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and argued that certain statutory requirements had been ignored in the present case. According to his submission, Section 154 of the Code requires that every piece of information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence must be presented to an officer in charge of a police station. He further contended that Section 156 empowers any officer in charge of a police station, without obtaining an order from a magistrate, to investigate any cognizable case that a court having jurisdiction over the local area would be competent to inquire into or to try, as provided in Chapter XV concerning the place of inquiry or trial. The counsel also highlighted Section 157, which obliges the officer in charge of a police station to immediately forward a report of the first information to a magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence, and to either proceed personally or to delegate a subordinate officer of a rank prescribed by a general or special order of the State Government to go to the spot, investigate the facts and circumstances, and, if necessary, take steps for the discovery and arrest of the offender. He maintained that the petitioners had been subjected to a special procedure that was not sanctioned by law, or at the very least, to a mode of treatment that differed from that accorded to other individuals against whom information about a cognizable offence had been lodged.

The Court could not agree with these contentions. It observed first that Section 154 does not prescribe that the information of a cognizable offence may be given only to an officer in charge of a police station. The provision merely mandates that whenever information relating to a cognizable offence is given orally to such an officer, the officer must reduce the information to writing, either personally or under his direction, read the written record back to the informant, obtain the informant’s signature, and enter the substance of the information in a book to be kept by the officer in the form prescribed by the State Government. The Court then turned to Section 156, which confers upon an officer in charge of a police station the authority to investigate without a magistrate’s order any cognizable case that a court with jurisdiction in the local area could inquire into or try. The Court also noted the subsidiary clause (2) of Section 156, which provides that the proceedings of a police officer in any such case shall not at any stage be questioned on the ground that the officer lacked the power to investigate under that section. Consequently, the Court concluded that the procedural steps alleged by the petitioners did not contravene the statutory scheme laid down in Sections 154, 156 and 157, and therefore the claim of a “special procedure unknown to law” or of unequal treatment could not be sustained.

The Court observed that the argument presented by the respondent relied on the proposition that the case under consideration was one which the police officer, acting under section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was not authorised to investigate. A controversy was raised before the Court concerning the interpretation of the expression “any such case” that appears in sub‑section (2) of section 156. Since the Court’s decision was not founded upon sub‑section (2) of section 156, the Court deemed it unnecessary to embark upon an extensive analysis of the precise scope and effect of that provision. The Court then turned to section 157, which prescribes the procedure that a police officer in charge of a police station must follow when an information concerning a cognizable offence is received. In addition, the Court highlighted another provision of the Code that was highly relevant to the matter, namely section 551, which states: “Police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station.” The Court noted that the Additional Inspector General of Police to whom the complainant’s information had been sent was undeniably a police officer of superior rank to a police‑station officer, and that Sardar Hardayal Singh, who held the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Investigation Department (C.I.D.) in Amritsar, was likewise a superior officer. Consequently, both of these officers were empowered to exercise, throughout the jurisdictional area to which they were appointed, the same powers that a police‑station officer could exercise within the confines of his own station. The Court accepted without dispute that the jurisdictional area of the Additional Inspector General of Police covered the entire State. Regarding the jurisdictional reach of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., the respondent State contended that although the officer was posted at Amritsar, his jurisdiction extended over the whole State.

The advocate general for the respondent State drew the Court’s attention to Police Rule 21.28 contained in the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Volume III, which were issued by and under the authority of the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by sections 7 and 12 of the Police Act (V of 1861). That rule provides that the Criminal Investigation Department does not possess a separate jurisdiction; instead, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.D., may decide either to assume direct control of any particular investigation or to delegate one or more of his officers to work directly under the supervision of the Superintendent of Police of the concerned district. The Court also noted Police Rule 21.32, which lists certain categories of cases in which the assistance of the Criminal Investigation Department may be solicited. Further, Police Rule 25.14 was cited, which authorises the Criminal Investigation Department to obtain expert technical assistance, and permits the department to seek such assistance whenever it is required. In the

The affidavit filed by Sardar Hardayal Singh declared that he was assigned the investigation of Sethi’s case on the ground that the case involved technical questions and that, as a gazetted officer attached to the Criminal Investigation Department, his jurisdiction extended over the entire State, a circumstance supported by memorandum no 9581‑H‑51/7912 dated 26 October 1951. That memorandum indicated that the Deputy Inspector General of the CID and all gazetted officers of the CID possessed authority throughout Punjab State. The same point was reiterated in the affidavit of Shamshere Singh, who held the position of Additional Inspector General of Police. Counsel for the petitioners contested these statements, asserting that Sethi’s case did not raise any technical issues and therefore the reasons given in the affidavits of Shamshere Singh and Sardar Hardayal Singh were inaccurate. The Court, however, held that the matter before it was not to decide whether the assignment of the investigation to Sardar Hardayal Singh was justified on technical grounds. Rather, the issue was whether the transfer of the investigation to Sardar Hardayal Singh involved a special procedure that was unknown to law, or whether the law governing investigations was applied with malice or partiality. The Court observed that even if a police officer believed the case should be investigated by the CID for reasons that the Court did not find persuasive, such a belief alone could not render the procedure illegal. Consequently, the Court could not agree with the petitioners’ counsel that either of the two contentions was established in the present case.

The Court concluded that the Inspector General of Police, CID, possessed the authority to address Sethi’s complaint and also the further power to direct its investigation to Sardar Hardayal Singh, who, being senior in rank to a police‑station officer, could lawfully exercise the powers of an officer in charge of a police station with respect to the same matter. Hence, the Court found no basis to describe the adopted procedure as foreign to law. It was also not satisfied that the procedure was driven by any wrongful motive, although the explanations offered by Shamshere Singh and Sardar Hardayal Singh—that the case was of a technical nature and therefore required CID assistance—were not wholly convincing. Even if the case lacked a technical character, the Additional Inspector General of Police retained the discretion to transfer the investigation to a Deputy Superintendent of Police given the status of the petitioners. In paragraph 31 of his affidavit, A. N. Kashyap, the Home Secretary, asserted that the Inspector General of Police, upon receiving Sethi’s complaint, ordered the registration of the case on his own initiative without any instruction from the Chief Minister. The Court noted that this statement had been vigorously challenged. In the absence of an affidavit from the Chief Minister and the original complaint, the Court chose to proceed on the basis that the Additional Inspector General of Police had obtained the complaint from the Chief Minister and subsequently issued the necessary orders, and even on that basis it could not be said that any legal procedure had been violated or that the petitioners had suffered unfair discrimination.

Even if the court proceeded on the premise that the Additional Inspector General of Police had received the complaint from the Chief Minister and had subsequently issued the necessary orders, the court was still unable to conclude that any legal procedure had been breached or that the petitioners had suffered unfair discrimination. The petitioners’ counsel had cited certain remarks made by this Court in H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi, which appeared on page 1160 of the law reports. Those remarks emphasized that it was highly important for an accused person that the evidence gathered during an investigation be collected under the authority of a competent and authorised investigating officer. The cited observations originated from a case that dealt with the question of whether the provisions of section 5(4) and the proviso to section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947) and the corresponding section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendment) Act, 1952 (Act LIX of 1952) were mandatory. The earlier Court had held those provisions to be mandatory and had declared that an investigation conducted in contravention of them was illegal. It had further held that an illegality occurring during investigation did not affect the trial‑court’s jurisdiction, but that if a breach of mandatory investigative provisions was brought to the Court’s attention early in the trial, the Court must examine the nature and extent of the breach and, if necessary, order a fresh investigation. The present court found that the observations and the decision in that earlier case did not assist the petitioners, because it had already concluded that no mandatory investigative provisions had been violated in Sethi’s case and that the investigative procedure followed was lawful.

The court’s attention was also drawn to King Emperor v. Nilkantha, where, on a certificate of the Advocate‑General, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court considered whether an Inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department was a legally competent authority to investigate facts within the meaning of section 157 of the Evidence Act. The majority of the judges answered affirmatively, while Justice Abdur Rahim and Justice Sundara Ayyar dissented. During the arguments, the bench also examined whether CID Inspectors were appointed to any local area as defined by section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Some judges held that the entire Presidency constituted their local area, while others disagreed. Based on the material before it, the court held without hesitation that the Deputy Superintendent of Police who had been entrusted with the investigation of Sethi’s case possessed the necessary authority to conduct that investigation.

The Court observed that the Deputy Superintendent of Police who was entrusted with investigating the Sethi matter possessed the necessary authority to conduct that investigation. It held that the decision in Pulin Bihari Ghosh v. The King, which had been relied upon by the petitioners, was not applicable to the present case because that earlier case concerned proceedings under section 202 and investigation under rule 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it was decided that those two processes could not operate simultaneously. Moreover, the earlier ruling stated that a direction issued under rule 156(3) could be given only to an officer in charge of a police station. The Court noted that no question in that case involved the exercise of powers under section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore the precedent did not support the petitioners’ claim. In contrast, the Court found the decision in Textile Traders Syndicate Ltd. v. State of U.P. to be more pertinent. That decision had held that an Inspector of Police belonging to the Criminal Investigation Department was senior in rank to the officer in charge of a police station and, by virtue of section 551, could exercise the powers of such an officer throughout the whole State. Turning to the facts of Dhingra’s case, the Court recounted that a complaint dated 27 February 1959 had been forwarded to the Chief Minister together with a covering letter stating that “R. P. Kapur had already started tampering with the evidence and therefore request that orders be passed that the Police should take in hand investigation immediately and collect all material evidence.” The Chief Minister’s response directed the Inspector General of Police, noting his illness, to have the Additional Inspector General take immediate action to obtain the papers from the relevant Government departments and from Sri Dhingra, and to provide a prima facie report. The Additional Inspector General endorsed this instruction, ordering that an officer be deputed to contact Sri Dhingra and obtain the necessary records, that immediate action be taken to take over records from various departments, and that a case be registered, adding that the Chief Secretary had been informed and agreed. The Deputy Inspector General of the CID then directed that the case should be registered and investigated by Bir Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, under his supervision, and that immediate steps be taken to secure the salient records of Sri Dhingra. This directive was addressed to Ujager Singh, Superintendent of Police, CID. Following these instructions, the case was formally registered by Sardar Sampuran Singh, Inspector of Police, Police Station Chandigarh, and the investigation was placed under the charge of Sardar Bir Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, CID. The Court concluded that the legal position governing the institution and investigation of Dhingra’s case was the same as that applicable to the Sethi case, namely that the appropriate legal sanction was section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the reasons previously given for upholding the procedure in the Sethi matter likewise applied to Dhingra’s case.

The Court observed that the legal basis for instituting and investigating the case against Dhingra was the same provision that had governed the investigation of Sethi, namely section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioners argued that the Chief Minister’s personal involvement in Dhingra’s case was now openly visible and that, in 1959, a complaint was lodged concerning offences allegedly committed about five years earlier, in 1954. The petitioners highlighted that the Chief Minister, without any prior inquiry, directed a “prima facie report” and that the same Criminal Investigation Department machinery was promptly activated, just as it had been in Sethi’s matter, at a time when the Sethi case remained a lingering threat over the petitioners. Further, the petitioners contended that the order to seize documents was unlawful because the Chief Minister lacked statutory authority to issue such a direction. The Court held that these contentions did not meet the threshold required to succeed in the writ petition. Specifically, the petitioners failed to demonstrate that an illegal procedure, unknown to law, had been employed in instituting or investigating Dhingra’s case, nor did they establish that they had been singled out for unfair or discriminatory treatment. The Court noted that the reasons for the Chief Minister’s endorsement of the complaint and the decision to refer the matter to the Additional Inspector General or the CID, rather than to the officer in charge of the relevant police station, were matters within the Chief Minister’s special knowledge, which he chose not to disclose. Affidavits from Shamshere Singh and Sardar Bir Singh indicated that the actions were taken under section 551 and on the basis that the case was technical, respectively. While the Court found these explanations unconvincing, it recognized that the police officers might have honestly believed that the CID was the appropriate investigating agency. The Court expressly declined to opine on the merits of Dhingra’s case and reiterated that the petitioners had not established either an illegal procedure or a case of discriminatory treatment.

The Court then turned to the remaining two matters, identified as the Orphanage case and the Ayurvedic Fund case. The Orphanage case originated from a complaint filed by the Civil Supply Officer of Karnal, whereas the Ayurvedic Fund case arose from a statement made by Daryao Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, CID, Karnal. In the Orphanage matter, the respondents included the Orphanage Advisory Board, of which R. P. Kapur served as Vice‑President at the relevant time, and Kartar Singh, who was the farm manager of Kaushalya Devi. The case concerned alleged violations of certain Control Orders in connection with a brick‑kiln operation. The Ayurvedic Fund case implicated R. P. Kapur and several other individuals who were not petitioners before this Court and alleged criminal breach of trust and related offenses concerning funds held by the accused. The Court clarified that it was not tasked with adjudicating the merits of either case, and therefore did not elaborate on the specific allegations. Regarding the Orphanage case, no specific illegality in its institution had been brought to the Court’s attention, apart from allegations of high‑handedness in the seizure of the orphanage’s records despite protest from its General Manager, and accusations directed at Choudhuri Ram Singh, then Deputy Inspector General of the Ambala Range. The Court held that, irrespective of the truth of these allegations, they did not demonstrate any illegality sufficient to warrant the quashing of the investigation. Consequently, the Court found no basis to interfere with the ongoing investigative processes in either the Orphanage or the Ayurvedic Fund matters.

The Court observed that the second proceeding, described as the Ayurvedic Fund case, was instituted against R. P. Kapur and several other individuals who did not appear as petitioners before this Court. The complaint alleged a criminal breach of trust concerning certain funds that were said to be in the possession of the accused persons. Because the present writ petition did not require a determination on the merits of that case, the Court considered it unnecessary to elaborate further on the specific allegations contained in the Ayurvedic Fund proceedings. Similarly, with respect to the Orphanage case, the Court noted that no concrete illegality concerning the initiation of that suit had been brought to its attention. The only matters raised consisted of allegations that the records of the Orphanage had been seized in a manner described as high‑handed, despite protest from the General Manager of the Orphanage, and that certain accusations had been made against Choudhuri Ram Singh, who at the relevant time held the position of Deputy Inspector General for the Ambala Range. The Court held that, irrespective of the veracity of those allegations, they did not demonstrate any procedural impropriety sufficient to justify the quashing of the investigation.

Turning to the affidavit of Daryao Sing, the Court reproduced his statements which claimed that an audit report revealed irregularities involving Orphanage funds, including payments made to Kartar Sing, identified as an employee of petitioner No. 1 and as the attorney of Shrimati Kaushalya Devi. The affidavit further alleged that there were instances of excess and double payments, procurement of timber and wood without the issuance of quotations, and the diversion of Orphanage funds to the Madhuban Co‑operative Society. It also asserted that cement, iron and steel, which were under official control, had been used in the construction of a private building belonging to Shri Kapur and his family, the value of such materials being reported as up to Rs 20,000. The Court expressly refrained from commenting on the truth or falsity of these contentions. It concluded that the institution of the Orphanage and Ayurvedic Fund cases was not illegal, nor was the conduct of the investigations tainted by discrimination. While recognizing that officers of the Criminal Investigation Department had been tasked with investigating the matters—something the Court could not assess as justified or unjustified—it affirmed that such delegation did not, per se, render the investigations unlawful, given that the officers were empowered to act under section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court noted that Daryao Singh, who had served as an Inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department at Karnal, was promoted to Deputy Superintendent of Police, CID, in December 1959, and likewise possessed the authority conferred by section 551. Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to relief, dismissed the writ petition, and ordered that no costs be awarded. Before concluding, the Court indicated that it would make further observations concerning serious allegations made against the Chief Minister, who was a respondent in the proceedings and had received notice of those allegations.

In the matter before the Court, serious allegations had been made against the Chief Minister, who was a respondent and had received notice of those allegations. According to the complaint filed by Sri M. L. Sethi, the Chief Minister had issued certain orders in connection with the original complaint, and those orders had been forwarded to the Additional Inspector General of Police together with the original document. The Court, however, could not examine the original complaint because it was not made available on the ground that it could not be traced. In the affidavit submitted by the Additional Inspector General of Police, it was stated that upon receiving the complaint from Sri M. L. Sethi, he ordered an investigation of the case without any prior order or direction from the Chief Minister. The affidavit did not specify whether the complaint had been received directly from Sethi or had been transmitted through the Chief Minister.

In a separate case involving Dhingra, the Chief Minister had issued an order that could be interpreted in two ways: either as an instruction to prepare a prima facie report, or simply as a direction that a report should be prepared if a prima facie case was established. The Court noted that it was unclear why the Chief Minister had ordered the seizure of documents before any prima facie report had been prepared, especially in respect of an alleged offence said to have occurred five years earlier. The Court observed that only the Chief Minister was in a position to clarify these points, and that the allegations against him created a duty for him to file an affidavit setting out, as far as he could remember, the true circumstances.

The Court recognised that a Chief Minister might not be able to recall the exact details of every document that passed through his hands, given the volume of paperwork involved in the daily administration of government. Nevertheless, the Court held that if the Chief Minister was unable to remember, he could simply state that fact, and if he did remember, he could have readily refuted the allegations. The Court emphasized that the matter was not one that could be left to Secretaries or other officers, who could only speak from the records and were not in a position to explain why the Chief Minister had issued the particular orders. The petitioners expressed a grievance that they had not received a fair deal, but the Court found no legal justification for that grievance. While acknowledging that both executive and judicial administration require not only that justice be done but also that it appears to be done, the Court concluded that an affidavit from the Chief Minister would have removed much of the doubt that had arisen in the absence of such a statement. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.