R. Muthammal (Died) and Parameswari... vs Sri Subramaniaswami...

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1955

Decision Date: 14 January 1960

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar

In the case styled R. Muthammal (Deceased) and Parameswari Thayammal versus Sri Subramaniaswami Devasthanam, Tiruchendur, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment on 14 January 1960. The judgment was authored by Justice Hidayatullah, who was joined by Justices S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar. The citation of the decision is 1960 AIR 601 and 1960 SCR (2) 729. The matter concerned the application of Hindu law to the exclusion from inheritance of a person who was a lunatic, and whether the lunacy must be congenital to operate as a bar to succession.

The headnote of the judgment recorded that a Hindu individual was found to be a lunatic at the time succession opened. It was contended that Hindu texts required lunacy to be congenital in order to exclude a person from inheritance. The Court held that, under Hindu law, lunacy—distinct from idiocy—need not be congenital to disqualify a person from inheriting, provided that the lunacy existed when the succession commenced. The Court approved the rulings in Muthusami v. Meenammal (1920) I.L.R. Mad. 464; Wooma Parshad Roy v. Grish Chunker Prochundo (1884) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 639; and Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash (1883) I.L.R. 5 All. 509 (F.B.). It disapproved the decisions in Murarji Gokuldas v. Parvatibai (1876) I.L.R. 1 Bom. 177 and Sanku v. Puttamma (1891) I.L.R. 14 Mad. 289.

The civil appeal, numbered 200 of 1955, was filed in the Supreme Court under its civil appellate jurisdiction. The appeal challenged a judgment and decree dated 20 January 1943 of the Madras High Court (A. S. No. 392 of 1943), which itself arose from a judgment and decree dated 30 March 1943 of the Sub‑Judge at Tuticorin (O. S. No. 34 of 1939). Counsel for the appellant were two advocates, while counsel for the respondent were three advocates; for clarity the parties are referred to as counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondent.

The appeal was lodged after the High Court of Madras had granted leave to appeal against its own decree dated 20 January 1947, which had substantially altered the decree of the Sub‑Judge, Tuticorin, dated 30 March 1943. Prior to the filing of an application for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee, the first defendant, Ramasami Pillai, died. His widow, R. Muthammal, who was the fourth defendant in the original suit, filed the application for leave. Shortly thereafter, R. Muthammal also died, and her position in the proceedings was taken by her daughter, Parameswari Thayammal, the fifth defendant. In addition to these three defendants, other members of Ramasami Pillai’s family were joined as defendants. The suit had been instituted by Sri Subramaniaswami Devasthanam, Tiruchendur, hereafter referred to as the Devasthanam, which was the sole respondent contesting the case before this Court.

Background facts revealed that one Poosa Pichai Pillai had five sons and three daughters. Among his children, Meenakshisundaram Pillai died on 21 May 1919. Before his death he executed a registered will on 20 May 1919 and a registered codicil on 21 May 1919. By these instruments he bequeathed his entire property to his only son, M. Picha Pillai, on the condition that if M. Picha Pillai died without issue the property would devolve upon the Devasthanam.

In this case, the court recorded that the Sri Subramaniaswami Devasthanam’s predecessor, M. Picha Pillai, died unmarried on 10 December 1927. After his death three parties laid claim to his estate. The first claimant was the Devasthanam itself, which asserted title based on the gift provision that had been made to it. The other claimants were the heirs of M. Picha Pillai, who contended that the gift to the Devasthanam was void. In addition, the brother and sister of Meenakshisundaram’s wife—namely Arunachala Irungol Pillai and N.S. Muthammal, who is identified as the third defendant—claimed the estate under a purported will of M. Picha Pillai. The persons described as the heirs of M. Picha Pillai were listed as defendants numbered 7, 8, 10, 13 and 14, together with the father of defendant 9 and the first defendant. All of these claimants denied the Devasthanam’s claim and argued that the will and the codicil executed by Meenakshisundaram’s predecessor gave M. Picha Pillai an absolute ownership, thereby rendering the gift to the Devasthanam invalid. The Devasthanam therefore instituted suit O.S. No. 57 of 1932 seeking a declaration of its title and possession of the properties covered by the will, along with other reliefs. While the suit was pending, certain heirs of M. Picha Pillai and the present defendants numbered 15 and 16—who were two of the three sons of Arunachala Irungol Pillai—assigned their respective interests in favour of the Devasthanam. Consequently, the trial court passed a decree granting the Devasthanam the interests of those assignors, but it dismissed the claim with respect to the interests of N.S. Muthammal (the third defendant) and Pothiadia Irungol Pillai (the second defendant), who had not entered into the compromise. It is noteworthy that, according to Exhibit D‑22, a registered agreement dated 20 May 1928 showed that the heirs had already agreed to allocate one‑eighth share each to Arunachala Irungol Pillai and N.S. Muthammal in the properties of M. Picha Pillai. Under that compromise the Devasthanam obtained five‑sixths of the estate, while the remaining one‑sixth was divided between Pothiadia Irungol Pillai, who received one‑twenty‑fourth, and N.S. Muthammal, who received one‑eighth. Dissatisfied with the dismissal of the one‑sixth share, the Devasthanam appealed to the High Court, but the appeal was unsuccessful. The Devasthanam then appealed to the Judicial Committee, which also dismissed the appeal. The judgment of the Privy Council in that appeal is reported in Sri Subramaniaswami Temple v. Ramasamia Pillai. Without awaiting the final outcome of the Judicial Committee appeal concerning the one‑sixth share, the Devasthanam instituted the present suit. In that suit it joined both sets of claimants and prayed for a declaration of title, ejectment, possession by partition of the disputed properties, and mesne profits. The properties in dispute were listed in several schedules annexed to the plaint; however, the court indicated that it would refer to those schedules only when necessary for the judgment. One of the primary contentions advanced by the plaintiff, the Devasthanam, was that the first defendant, Ramasami Pillai, was not entitled to any share of the estate as an heir of M. Picha Pillai because he was a lunatic at the time succession opened. On behalf of Ramasami Pillai, who contested the suit through his

In the present appeal the first defendant, Ramasami Pillai, contested the suit through his wife and guardian, R Muthammal, and it was submitted that he was not a lunatic as defined by the expression buddhi swadeenam illadavar, but only a person of weak intellect, described as buddhi deechanya matra, and therefore his status should not bar him from inheritance. This matter formed the principal argument of the appeal because the two courts below had reached opposite conclusions on it. The Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin held that Ramasami Pillai’s plea was correct and proved, whereas the High Court concluded that the mental defect in Ramasami Pillai amounted to lunacy and consequently disqualified him from any share. Connected with this issue, the second contention raised by Ramasami Pillai was that he was entitled to a one‑ninth share of the property by virtue of an alleged agreement set out in an affidavit annexed as Exhibit D‑7, which was purportedly made by Doraiappa Pillai on 1 April 1931; the details of that contention will be explained later. The third contention, which was also raised before the High Court, concerned the properties described in the plaint schedule 4‑A. Ramasami Pillai asserted that those properties had been the subject of a decree dated 19 September 1927 in favour of M Picha Pillai in Original Suit No 35 of 1924, a decree that had not been executed for twelve years. Accordingly, he claimed that the decree was barred under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the Devasthanam therefore could not claim possession of those properties in the present suit. The Court began by addressing the question of whether Ramasami Pillai was excluded from inheritance because of his mental condition as of 10 December 1927. The appellant’s argument was two‑fold: first, whether Ramasami Pillai was a lunatic under Hindu law texts, and second, whether the lunacy needed to be proved as congenital in order to disqualify him from succeeding to his father’s estate. These two questions were considered separately. Because the lower courts had disagreed on the existence of lunacy, the Court examined the evidence afresh and heard the appellant’s submissions. It was concluded that the High Court’s view was correct in all the circumstances. The appellant argued that the evidence should be examined both before and after the date of 10 December 1927, including the conduct of the father, relatives and other claimants. It was contended that Ramasami Pillai had been attending school, although no material was produced to show that he had benefited from education. The appellant placed considerable reliance on two documents, Exhibits D‑1 and D‑2, executed by his father, Perumal Pillai, in January and April 1924. By the first document Perumal Pillai released his claim to certain properties in favour of his four sons, specifically mentioning Ramasami Pillai.

The documents executed by the father, Perumal Pillai, did not refer to his son’s lunacy nor did they name any guardian for the son. In the first document, dated January 1924, the father relinquished his claim over certain properties in favour of his four sons and specifically mentioned Ramasami Pillai, yet omitted any reference to his mental state. The second instrument, a will dated April 1924, allocated equal shares of the father’s assets to all his sons, including Ramasami Pillai, and similarly made no note of any mental incapacity. It was argued that, being a Sub‑Registrar, Perumal Pillai would have understood the significance of such a fact and would have been aware of the legal principle that a lunatic could not inherit. The omission of any mention of Ramasami Pillai’s condition in these two documents, however, was deemed irrelevant to the matter before the Court for two reasons. Firstly, the suit alleged that Ramasami Pillai was of sound mind up to the year 1924 and that any deterioration in his mental health occurred only after that year. Secondly, the father’s failure to record his son’s condition might have been motivated by affection, whereby a father could view the rights of a mentally defective child differently from the strict legal position. The appellants further contended that the remaining heirs had recognized Ramasami Pillai’s entitlement in April 1928 by agreeing to grant him a one‑ninth share, as previously noted. The Court observed that such an agreement did not automatically confirm a legal right, because the compromise, which was itself disputed, could have been driven by charitable motives rather than an acknowledgment that Ramasami Pillai’s claim was legally enforceable. The record, on the other hand, contained extensive evidence of Ramasami Pillai’s mental incapacity. From June 1924 until his death, numerous suits were instituted by various family members—including his wife, cousins, uncle and aunt—wherein Ramasami Pillai was consistently described as a lunatic requiring the appointment of a next friend or a guardian‑ad‑litem. In a solitary case where he appeared as the second defendant, counsel entered an appearance on his behalf asserting his sanity and insisting that he should appear personally. The Court appointed the Head Clerk of the Court as his guardian, directing the clerk to report on Ramasami Pillai’s condition, and also ordered him to appear in person so that the Court could form its own opinion by questioning him directly. The Head Clerk visited Ramasami Pillai and submitted a report (Exhibit P‑8) describing his observations. The report noted that when questioned, Ramasami Pillai failed to state his own name, remained silent and appeared wooden. Although relatives fed him because they thought he was hungry, he still gave no answers to the questions posed in the presence of his wife and others. Consequently, the Head Clerk reported that Ramasami Pillai presented himself as a gloomy, sickly individual with a vacant stare and that he was unable to answer even simple queries, thereby indicating a state of insanity.

In this case, the Court recorded that the Head Clerk’s report, which described Ramasami Pillai as appearing “gloomy and sickly” with a vacant look and unable even to answer a simple question about his own name, had been presented before the Subordinate Judge while the vakil who had filed the vakalatnama was in attendance. On 20 September 1924 the Subordinate Judge entered an order, identified as G S No 35 of 1924 (Ex P‑9), noting that the vakil for Ramasami Pillai did not object to the report and that Ramasami Pillai was therefore to be treated as a lunatic. The Court further observed that Ramasami Pillai himself did not appear before the Judge.

The appellant argued that the fact that Ramasami Pillai required a guardian or next friend in many other litigations merely demonstrated his incapacity to manage his own affairs, and did not, by itself, prove insanity within the meaning of Hindu law texts. According to that argument, the presence of a guardian was a procedural necessity for the conduct of suits, not definitive proof of lunacy. The Court, however, rejected this submission. It held that the long and continuous pattern of behaviour exhibited by Ramasami Pillai’s relatives, together with the earlier Head Clerk’s observation, clearly indicated that Ramasami Pillai was indeed a lunatic, not merely a person with a slight mental derangement. The Court emphasized that the earlier report, made in a case predating the present proceedings, unequivocally showed that Ramasami Pillai was regarded and found to be a lunatic for all practical purposes. Consequently, the distinction the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin sought to draw was not supported by the evidence, and the Court found that the evidence firmly established Ramasami Pillai’s lunacy.

Further, the Court noted that an exhibit dated 20 May 1928 (Ex D‑22) showed Ramasami Pillai was not treated as a claimant in that proceeding, and his relatives did not overlook his possible claims in order to obtain an additional share of the property by excluding him. The Court explained that if Ramasami Pillai had been competent, at least one of his relatives would have felt compelled to assert his claim on his behalf. In light of the preponderance of probabilities favouring the High Court’s decision, the Court concluded that the appellant had failed to establish any meaningful distinction between a lunatic and a person of weak intellect based on the evidence presented.

The Court then turned to a point of law raised by the appellant. It observed that, before the Subordinate Judge, Ramasami Pillai had not contested the proposition that, as a matter of law, insanity must be congenital in order to disqualify a person from inheritance. Counsel for the appellant argued that raising this issue was futile because the Madras High Court, in Muthusami v. Meenammal (1920) I.L.R. Mad. 464, had held that insanity need not be congenital to create a disability; it was sufficient that the person was insane at the time succession opened. The Court indicated that this legal position was the one under consideration.

In the earlier proceedings, the High Court had ruled against Ramasami Pillai, a decision that is now being challenged in this appeal. The appellant contended that the textual provisions of Manu, specifically chapter nine verse two hundred and one, enumerate several disabilities that justify exclusion from inheritance, such as blindness, muteness, idiocy and lameness, and that each of these conditions must be present from birth. The appellant argued that the passage of the same text should be read to mean that insanity, like the other enumerated disabilities, also has to be congenital in order to bar a person from inheritance. While it is true that the term “Unmatha” (insanity) is positioned between the expressions “Jatyandhabadhirau” and “Jadamukascha,” judicial precedent has consistently held that the requirement of congenital origin does not extend to madness. The argument drew support from Dr Sarvadhikari’s commentary in the second edition of Principles of Hindu Law Inheritance, page 846, where he applied rules of grammar to the passage but expressed doubt, on medical grounds, that madness could ever be congenital. However, other scholarly translations by Setlur, Gharpure and Dr Ghose do not endorse this interpretation.

In the earlier case of Muthusami v. Meenammal (1920) I.L.R. Mad. 464, the court observed that the word “Unmatha” was not qualified by the term “Jati.” Justice Seshagiri Ayyar, applying Mimamsa principles, noted that an adjective qualifying one clause should not, by implication, qualify a different clause. Counsel for the appellant at that time agreed with this reasoning but nevertheless relied on Dr Sarvadhikari’s view, which the court did not accept. The appellant further cited Colebrooke’s Digest, volume 11 page 432, whose translation is based on the commentary of Jagannatha Tarkapanchanana. Jagannatha made no distinction among the various disabilities and maintained that madness, like blindness or muteness, must be present from birth. Although Jagannatha was regarded as a highly learned pandit of Bengal, his translation has not achieved universal acceptance and is not corroborated by the original texts or by commentaries on the Mitakshara. Dr Ghose, in Hindu Law, volume 1 page 224, also expressed skepticism about this view. Moreover, the classical texts of Narada (XIII, verses 21‑22), Yajnavalkya (XI, verses 140‑141) and others do not indicate that the defect of madness must be congenital. Saraswati Vilasa (page 148) emphasizes congenital disability in the context of blindness and deafness, while Smriti Chandrika, chapter V, verse 4, mentions persons born blind and deaf separately from madmen and idiots. Courts have consistently ruled that idiocy must be congenital, and this principle has been uniformly applied in case law, except for the obiter observation in Murarji Gokuldas v. Parvatibai (1) and the dissenting opinion in Sanku v. Puttamma (2). Consequently, the present appeal does not succeed in overturning the established legal position, and Ramasami Pillai is not entitled to succeed to the estate of M. Picha Pillai.

In contrast to the earlier authorities, the Court observed that the decisions in Wooma Pershad Roy v. Grish Chunder Prochundo (3), Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash (4) and several other cases unmistakably adopted the opposite view, holding that the condition of madness need not be congenital. The Court further noted that, on two occasions before the Privy Council, the judges proceeded on the assumption that insanity could arise after birth. The Court also remarked that when the Legislature enacted the Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act XII of 1928, it deliberately chose not to make the amendment retrospective, thereby affirming the correctness of the traditional judicial interpretation of the original Hindu law texts. In light of this perspective, the Court concluded that there was no justification for disturbing the established legal position and it found no indication that any alternative view was viable. Consequently, the Court rejected the contention that Ramasami Pillai was entitled to succeed to the estate of M. Picha Pillai.

The Court then turned to the second contention raised by the appellant, namely that even if the foregoing finding were correct, Ramasami Pillai should nevertheless receive a one‑ninth share based on a purported family arrangement evidenced by Exhibit D‑7 dated 1 April 1931. The document in question was an affidavit sworn by Doriappa Pillai, identified as Defendant 8, in a suit for possession (Original Suit No. 25 of 1930) that he had filed to enforce his claimed one‑eighth share, the claim being supported by Exhibit D‑22. In that suit Ramasami Pillai appeared as the second defendant, and Exhibit P‑5 contained the written statement filed on his behalf, in which he denied that his alleged insanity had excluded him from inheritance. The suit was withdrawn on 2 April 1931 with the permission of the Court, the court also granting liberty to institute a fresh suit, as recorded in Exhibit D‑6. The affidavit submitted by Doriappa Pillai set out the following statements:

1. (1876) I.L.R. 1 Bom. 177. 2. (1801) I.L.R. 14 Mad. 289. 3. (1884) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 639. 4. (1883) I.L.R. 5 All. 509 (F.B.). 5. “Excepting Defendant 9, myself and almost all the Defendants agree to give Defendant 2 an equal share with others and thus come to some amicable arrangement between us.” 6. “In view of the ninth Defendant’s contentions in the suit and in view of the fact that I have not prayed in this suit for a declaration of my title to the suit properties as against him, I am advised that I should withdraw the present suit for partition with liberty to institute a fresh suit as I may be advised.” 7. “It is therefore just and necessary that I may be permitted to withdraw this suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit properly framed.”

The Subordinate Judge, relying on this affidavit and the evidence of Defendant W 2, held that the alleged family arrangement had been duly proved and that Defendant 10, who was present in Court when the statement was made, did not object to it. However, the High Court correctly observed that the affidavit did not demonstrate that the compromise had become a final fact, and it also declined to accept the wording attributed to Defendant W 2. The Court therefore concluded that the appellant had not successfully established the existence of a binding family arrangement, and it deemed it unnecessary to examine the oral evidence further.

The court noted that the documentary evidence of D.W. 2 was incomplete and that the claimants, who were alleged to have allotted a share to Ramasami Pillai, had not been examined at all. The High Court also observed that no application had been made for the transfer of the pattas. Considering these circumstances, which the court found to be correct, the appellant could not be said to have successfully proved the existence of the alleged family arrangement, and consequently the court held that it was unnecessary to probe the oral evidence in the matter. The court then turned to the question of whether Ramasami Pillai was entitled to a share in the lands described in Schedule 4‑A. It recalled that M. Picha Pillai had instituted Original Suit No. 35 of 1924 against his cousins seeking possession of those lands, and that the suit had been decreed on 19 September 1927. On 30 October 1927, P. Picha Pillai (identified as Defendant 7) together with Serindia Pillai dispatched a notice, exhibited as Exhibit P‑3, informing M. Picha Pillai that he could take possession of the properties covered by the decree. That notice was refused and returned to the senders. M. Picha Pillai died shortly thereafter on 10 December 1927. It was contended that, following his death, the properties remained in the possession of the judgment‑debtors and that, because the decree had not been executed, the suit filed on 18 October 1939 was barred with respect to those properties, preventing the Devasthanam from obtaining possession. Both the subordinate courts agreed that M. Picha Pillai must have obtained possession by a means other than execution of the decree, noting that even D.W. 2, who was not favorably disposed toward the Devasthanam, admitted that M. Picha Pillai was in possession of all the suit properties at the time of his death. The courts also pointed out that for the years Fasli 1338 and 1339 the tenth defendant had paid the land taxes, a circumstance that would not have occurred if the heirs of M. Picha Pillai were not enjoying the lands. The courts further held that the fact that the patta remained in the names of the original judgment‑debtors did not prove any adverse claim, because mutations sometimes lag behind actual changes in possession. In view of the unanimous findings of the lower courts and the supporting evidence, the appellate court saw no reason to interfere. No issue concerning mesne profits had been raised and no other point was argued. Accordingly, the court concluded that the appeal lacked merit, dismissed it with costs, and entered an order of dismissal.