Purushottam Umedbhai and Co vs M/S. Manilal And Sons (In Connected Appeals)

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 178 and 179 of 1960

Decision Date: 07 October 1960

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, A.K. Sarkar, Raghubar Dayal

In the connected appeals titled Purushottam Umedbhai and Co. versus M/S. Manilal and Sons, the judgment was delivered on 7 October 1960 by a bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, Justice A. K. Sarkar and Justice Raghubar Dayal. The petitioner was Purushottam Umedbhai and Co., and the respondent was M/S. Manilal and Sons, a firm carrying on business in Singapore. The respondent initiated a suit in the name of its firm against the appellants alleging breach of contract. The plaint was signed and verified on behalf of the firm by an individual identified only as “D,” who acted under a power of attorney executed by a single partner of the firm. Approximately six years after the suit was filed, the respondent applied to amend the plaint. The amendment sought to strike out the name of the firm, contending that the description of the plaintiff was a misdescription, and to substitute the names of five individual partners of the firm so that the dispute could be framed against the proper parties.

The amendment application was dismissed on the ground that the original plaint was not a valid plaint at law. The court held that the defect was not merely a case of misnomer, misdescription, or a non‑existent firm or person; rather, the suit was a nullity because the Code of Civil Procedure does not permit a suit to be instituted in the name of a firm. Consequently, the appropriate remedy for such a fundamental procedural flaw was not to amend the plaint in contravention of Order I Rule 10 of the Code, but to seek the court’s permission to withdraw the suit and to be at liberty to file a fresh suit under Order 23 Rule 1 on the basis of formal defect, and that such step must be taken before the limitation period expires.

On appeal, the High Court concluded that where the Code of Civil Procedure disallows a suit in the name of a firm, describing the plaintiff by the firm name should be treated as a description of the individual partners collectively. This situation therefore amounts to a misdescription that can be corrected, and it does not constitute a description of a non‑existent person. The High Court also rejected the contention that the power of attorney in favour of “D” was insufficient.

The Court dismissed the argument that the power of attorney granted to D was inadequate. It held that the terms “firm” or “firm name” used in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act merely provide a concise description of all the partners taken together. Consequently, when a suit is instituted in the name of a firm, it is in effect a suit brought by every partner of that firm, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that some partners did not authorize the proceeding. The Court explained that Order XXX rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure are enabling provisions allowing multiple firms, which operate as partners, to sue or be sued in the collective name of the firm. These rules do not bar the partners from suing or being sued in their individual capacities, nor do they prevent partners who conduct business within India from appearing in court under their own names even if they also conduct business abroad. Because a partnership does not possess a separate legal personality, the privilege of suing in the name of the firm is confined to those partners who are carrying on business in India; it does not extend to partners whose business activities are solely outside India. In such circumstances, those partners must sue in their personal names. If, however, partners whose business is conducted abroad mistakenly file a plaint in the name of their firm, they are misdescribing themselves, as the suit is still instituted by the individual partners who are collectively identified as a firm. The Court clarified that a plaint filed in an Indian court under the name of a firm that operates abroad is not automatically void; rather, it is a plaint brought by all the partners with an inaccurate description of their identities for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court said that, under section 153 of the Code, a civil court may permit amendment of the plaint so that the plaintiffs are correctly described, thereby aiding the court in resolving the real dispute between the parties. The Court noted that neither rule 10(i) nor rule 10(2) of Order I applies to such a case, because from the outset the suit was by the partners of the firm and no addition or substitution of parties was necessary; the partners were already collectively described by the firm’s name. Further, the Court held that it is not essential for every partner to sign the power of attorney. A partner acts as an agent of the firm, and there is no prohibition against a partner executing a power of attorney in favour of an individual who is authorised to commence litigation on the firm’s behalf. The Court cited precedents including Vyankatesh Oil Mill Co. v. Velamahomed, A.I.R. 1928 Bom. 191 (disapproved), Amulakchand Mewaram v. Babulal Kanalal, A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 304, Sadler v. Whiteman, [1910] 1 K.B. 868, and Mura Mohideen.

In this judgment the Court noted that the authorities in V.O.A. Mohomed, A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 294 and Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmal Shriyam, (1892) I.L.R. 17 Bom. 413 had been discussed, and that Hajee Sattar Hajee Peer Mohomad v. Khusiram Benarsilal, I.L.R. [1952] 1 Cal. 153 had been referred to for guidance. The matter before the Court comprised two civil appeals, numbered 178 and 179 of 1960, filed by special leave against a judgment and decree dated 18 December 1958 issued by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. Those appeals challenged the High Court’s order dated 18 December 1958, which had set aside an earlier order of Justice P. B. Mukherjea dated 8 February 1957. Justice Mukherjea’s order had rejected a petition for amendment of the plaint filed by the respondent in Suit No. 1452 of 1951, a suit originally instituted under the High Court’s ordinary original civil jurisdiction.

The original plaint in Suit No. 1452 of 1951 was presented in the name of the firm Manilal & Sons, a commercial partnership carrying on business at No. 11A, Malacca Street, Singapore. The partnership consisted of five individuals identified as the partners: (1) Manubhai Maganbhai Amin, (2) Pravinbhai Dahyabhai Patel, (3) Gangabhai Iswarbhai Patel, (4) Bachubhai Manibhai Amin and (5) Dahyabhai Trikambhai. The defendant in the suit was the firm Purushottam Umedbhai & Co., which at the time of the suit was a partnership registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and conducted its business from No. 55 Canning Street, Calcutta. In July 1949 the parties entered into a contract whereby the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff, subject to specified conditions, 950 bales of heavy CEE’s gunny bags, cost, insurance and freight to Singapore, to be shipped from Calcutta in August 1949. In the same period, a second agreement was made for the sale of 600 bales of similar gunny bags, cost, insurance and freight to Hong Kong, also to be shipped from Calcutta in August 1949.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to perform its contractual obligations, causing the plaintiff loss. Consequently, the plaintiff claimed monetary compensation of Rs 2,73,864 together with expenses of Rs 7,850, making a total claim of Rs 2,81,714. The breach was said to have occurred in October and November 1949. The suit was instituted on 2 April 1951, and the defendant filed its written statement around 21 May 1951. Several years later, on 31 January 1957, the plaintiff filed a petition seeking to amend the plaint. The amendment sought to strike out the name of the firm Manilal & Sons as plaintiff and to substitute the names of the five individual partners in place of the firm name, together with any consequential amendments required in the body of the plaint.

The amendment that was filed aimed to replace the name of the firm with the names of the five individuals who were partners of the firm, so that those partners could be entered in the plaint as plaintiffs. The petitioner also requested that the necessary consequential changes be made throughout the body of the plaint. According to the petition for amendment, on 29 January 1957 the plaintiff’s solicitors received a letter from the defendant’s attorney stating that, because the firm Manilal & Sons was carrying on business in Singapore, the defendant would object that the suit, as presently framed, was null and void and therefore not maintainable. At that stage the suit was pending before the court of P. B. Mukherjea, J., and it appeared for the first time on the peremptory list on 3 January 1957. The petitioner was advised that the description of the plaintiff as the firm was a bona‑fide misdescription and that the correct course was to bring the names of the individual partners of Manilal & Sons onto the record so that the controversy could be properly before the appropriate parties. Acting on that advice, the petitioner filed the petition for amendment. When a chamber summons was issued, Judge Mukherjea heard the application and rejected it. He held that the original plaint was not a plaint in law and therefore amounted to a mere nullity of process. In his view, when such a mistake occurs the proper remedy is not to amend the plaint under Order I, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but rather to seek the court’s permission to withdraw the suit and to be at liberty to file a fresh suit under Order XXIII, rule 1 of the Code on the ground of a formal defect, and that such a step must be taken before the limitation period expires. He further expressed the opinion that the situation was not one of a simple misnomer or misdescription, nor was it a case of a non‑existent firm or person, but rather a case of a legal bar; consequently, a plaint that purports to name a plaintiff who is not a legally recognised person must be treated as a nullity. Judge Mukherjea was also dissatisfied with the explanation offered for seeking the amendment six years after the suit had been instituted. On appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court examined several decisions of Indian High Courts and English courts and concluded that describing a plaintiff by a firm name where the Code of Civil Procedure does not allow a suit to be brought in the name of the firm should be treated as a description of the individual partners of the business. Such a description, the Bench held, constitutes a misdescription that can be corrected by amendment and should not be regarded as a description of a non‑existent person. The High Court also rejected the defendant’s contention that the power of attorney in favour of Dunderdale was insufficient, a contention that had been based on the allegation that the authority did not empower Dunderdale to act on behalf of the firm, let alone the individual members of the firm.

The Court noted that the Power of Attorney did not authorize Dunderdale to act on behalf of the firm Manilal & Sons, let alone to represent the individual members of that firm. Accordingly, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the amendment that had been prayed for and sanctioned the substitution of the names of the individual partners of Manilal & Sons in place of the firm name as plaintiffs. The Bench permitted the individual partners either to sign the plaint themselves or to do so through attorneys duly appointed by them. This amendment was conditioned upon the payment of all costs incurred by the appellant before the Court up to the date of the judgment. In the same order, the Division Bench set aside the decree of P. B. Mukherjea, J., which had dismissed the suit, and allowed the appeal against that decree. The present appeal, designated as Appeal No. 179 of 1960, was filed by special leave against the order of the Division Bench. On behalf of the appellants, several points were urged. First, it was contended that the plaint as originally filed was a nullity, rendering the suit incompetent; adding the partners of the firm to the record was alleged to amount to the addition of new parties, and if the limitation period had expired at the time those partners were added, the entire suit would be time‑barred. Second, even assuming the plaint was not a nullity, the appellants argued that neither Order 1, Rule 10 nor Order VI, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code applied to the present case. Third, reliance was placed on Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, asserting that a suit instituted by only one partner or a single promisee was defective from the outset; since no suit had been filed by all partners within the limitation period, any amendment permitting such a suit would effectively create a new suit, which would be barred by limitation if the amendment were allowed after the prescribed period. Fourth, the appellants submitted that permitting the amendment would constitute the addition or substitution of new plaintiffs, and that, for those new plaintiffs, the suit would be deemed to have been instituted at the time they were made parties, invoking Section 22(1) of the Indian Limitation Act; consequently, the suit would be time‑barred as to those new plaintiffs. Fifth, it was argued that the circumstances indicated that, in the eyes of the law, no suit existed because the plaint had not been verified or signed as required, and therefore no proceeding existed before the Court in which an amendment could be sought. Sixth, even if the plaint were not a nullity, it had been signed and verified on behalf of Manilal & Sons by Dunderdale under a Power of Attorney executed by only one partner, which did not demonstrate that all partners intended to sue. The Court therefore had to consider these contentions in determining whether the amendment should be allowed.

The Court observed that a Power of Attorney granted to Dunderdale by a single partner of Manilal & Sons could not be treated as a document authorising Dunderdale to act on behalf of the entire firm. The judgment placed considerable reliance on the earlier decision of Blackwell, J., in Vyankatesh Oil Mill Co. v. N. V. Velamahomed, where the learned judge held that a suit filed by an entity lacking legal existence under Indian law could not be maintained, because there was no procedural mechanism permitting such an entity to sue in India. Consequently, the amendment sought in the present case could not be characterised merely as a correction of a misdescription; rather, it had to be regarded as an application for substitution of the individual persons who comprised an entity that the law did not recognise. That view was not adopted by Beaumont, C. J., in Amulakchand Mewaram v. Babulal Kanalal Taliwala. Beaumont, C. J. expressed difficulty in following both the reasoning and the conclusions of the earlier judge, noting that the case involved a suit brought in the name of a firm carrying on business outside British India, which, according to Order 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, would not be justified. He remarked that the earlier order granting leave to amend appeared inconsistent with the finding that the plaintiff firm was a non‑existent entity, and he questioned whether Order 30 could determine the factual issue of whether a suit filed in the name of such a firm represented a mere misdescription of existing persons or a suit by a non‑existent entity. The Calcutta High Court, in Hajee Sattar Hajee Peer Mahomad v. Khusiram Benarsilal, rejected Blackwell, J.’s perspective and referred to the observation of Farwell, L. J., in Sadler v. Whiteman, which explained that under English law a firm possesses no separate legal existence; partners act as principals and agents for each other within the partnership business, and the firm name is merely a convenient label, not a legal entity, though Order XLVIII‑A may allow its use for suing and being sued. Similarly, the Madras High Court, in Mura Mohideen v. V. O. A. Mohomed, dissented from Blackwell, J.’s opinion, stating that it could not agree with the view that a foreign firm, because it is not a legal entity, could not itself file a suit under the Civil Procedure Code.

In this case, the Court observed that a suit filed under the Civil Procedure Code itself determines whether the inclusion of the members of a firm amounts to the addition of a new party. The view expressed by Blackwell, J. had apparently been followed in two reported decisions, namely Neogi Ghose and Co. v. Nehal Singh, AIR 1931 Cal. 770, and L. N. Chettiar Firm v. M.P.R.M. Firm, AIR 1935 Rang. 240. However, the Court stated that it could not agree with the reasoning of those decisions, noting that neither of them provided any further justification to support Blackwell, J.’s position.

The Madras High Court, after consideration, concluded that when a party is named imperfectly or incorrectly in a plaint, the correction of that error does not constitute the addition or substitution of a party. Instead, such correction merely clarifies what was previously obscured by the mistake. The Court explained that the issue in such a situation is one of the party’s intention, and if the Court can discover the person or persons whom the plaintiff intended to sue or be sued, a mere misdescription may be corrected provided the mistake was made in good faith, referring to Order 0.1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This amendment does not involve the addition of a party that would attract section 22(1) of the Limitation Act. Suits filed by or on behalf of deceased persons, the Court noted, belong to a different category, and the principle of correcting a misdescription by amendment does not automatically apply to them. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the fact that the law does not recognise a firm as a legal entity does not prevent the firm’s name from indicating or designating the individuals who compose the firm.

To summarise, the Court likened the situation to a case where an individual, who is known by an alias or abbreviated name, initially describes himself using that name and later seeks to have it rectified to the name by which he is generally known. The Court held that correcting the name does not add a new plaintiff so as to trigger section 22(1) of the Limitation Act. A trade name, whether of an individual or a group of persons carrying on a partnership, functions in reality as an alias for the person or the group. The Court also observed that before the introduction of Order XXX in the Code of Civil Procedure, suits were often instituted in the name of a firm, particularly in the Mofussil courts, and were generally not objected to. This practice was presumably based on the assumption that the suit concerned either all the partners of the firm as plaintiffs or all the partners as defendants. The Court indicated that if an objection were raised that a suit in the name of a firm was not maintainable because the firm had no legal entity, the courts would then need to decide whether the suit had been instituted by non‑existent persons, which would affect its maintainability.

In this case the Court observed that if a firm lacks a separate legal existence, the court must determine whether the suit was instituted by persons who do not exist, because a suit brought by such non‑existent persons would be incapable of continuation. The Court illustrated the point by referring to the earlier decision of Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmal Shriram, reported as (1), which arose before Order XXX was introduced into the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case the plaintiff had instituted the suit in the name of the firm Kondanmal Sagarmal, and the suit was presented by the firm’s manager, Sagarmal Shriram. The defendants objected that another partner, Malamchand, who was also a member of the firm, ought to be joined as a plaintiff. Consequently, Malamchand was added to the plaintiff’s side on 27 January 1888. The defendants further contended that the suit was barred by section 22 of the Limitation Act. The Bombay High Court held that the objection raised was one of misdescription rather than non‑joinder, because the action had been commenced in the name of the firm by its authorised manager.

The Court explained that the introduction of Order XXX into the Code of Civil Procedure in 1892, as reported in (1) (1892) I.L.R. i7 Bom. 413, eliminated the possibility of raising such an objection. Order XXX permits two or more persons who are conducting the business of a partnership to sue or be sued in the name of the firm, provided that the firm is carrying on business within India. This provision is therefore an enabling rule that allows the partners who constitute a firm to sue or be sued collectively in the firm’s name. However, the Court stressed that the same privilege does not extend to firms that conduct business outside India. The existence of Order XXX does not transform a plaint filed in the name of a firm doing business abroad into a suit that is not, in substance, a suit by the individual partners.

To support this analysis, the Court referred to section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, which defines a partnership as “the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all.” The section further explains that persons who have entered into partnership are called “partners” individually and “a firm” collectively, and that the name under which the business is carried on is the “firm name.” From this definition it follows that the terms “firm” or “firm name” are merely a collective description of all the partners. Consequently, when a suit is filed in the name of a firm, it remains a suit instituted by all the partners of that firm unless evidence shows that some partners did not authorize the proceeding. The Court clarified that a firm is not a legal entity in the same sense as a corporation or a company formed under the Companies Act, but it is nonetheless an existing concern in which business is conducted by a group of persons in partnership. Therefore, a suit filed in the name of the firm is, in reality, a suit by all the partners of the firm.

In this case the Court observed that filing a suit in the name of a firm is in reality a suit brought by all the partners of that firm. The Court explained that if 0. XXX had not been introduced into the Code and a suit had been filed in the name of a firm, the suit would not be characterized as a suit filed by a nonexistent person. It would still represent a suit by the partners of the firm, the only defect being that the parties were described collectively as a firm. To remedy that defect, the Court said that a court may permit an amendment by striking out the name of the firm and replacing it with the names of the persons who actually form the partnership. Such an amendment is described as a case of misdescription rather than a case of a suit filed by a non‑existent entity. Even if the provisions of 0. 1, r. 10 and 0. VI, r. 17 did not strictly apply, the amendment could still be allowed under s. 153 of the Civil Procedure Code because it does not amount to adding parties or substituting parties.

The High Court, as noted by the present Court, had referred to a number of decisions that support the view that in the present matter the plaintiff described in the plaint as the firm of Manilal and Sons was a mere misdescription capable of amendment and not a case where a plaint had been filed by a non‑existent person, which would render it a nullity. The Court then quoted the relevant provisions of 0. XXX, C.P.C. Order XXX, r. 1, which states: “(1) Any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and any party to a suit may in such case apply to the Court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, partners in such firm, to be furnished and verified in such manner as the Court may direct. (2) Where persons sue or are sued as partners in the name of their firm under sub‑rule (1), it shall, in the case of any pleading or other document required by or under this Code to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant, suffice if such pleading or other document is signed, verified or certified by any one of such persons.” This rule enables any party to a suit filed in the name of a firm doing business in India to apply to the court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were partners at the time the cause of action accrued, with the statement to be furnished and verified as directed by the court.

The Court further noted that Order XXX, r. 2 states: “(1) Where a suit is instituted by partners in the name of”.

Order XXX, rule 2, sets out three sub‑rules that apply when a suit is filed by partners in the name of their firm. The first sub‑rule requires that, upon a written demand made by any defendant or the defendant’s representative, the plaintiffs or their pleader must immediately disclose in writing the names and the residential addresses of every person who constitutes the firm for whose benefit the suit has been instituted. The second sub‑rule provides that if the plaintiffs or their pleader do not obey the written demand required by the first sub‑rule, the court may, upon an application made for that purpose, suspend all proceedings in the suit and may impose such conditions for the suspension as it deems appropriate. The third sub‑rule states that when the required disclosure of the partners’ names and residences is made in the manner prescribed by the first sub‑rule, the suit will continue as if the partners themselves had been named as plaintiffs in the plaint; all the legal consequences of such a naming will attach, although the proceedings will nevertheless continue to be conducted in the name of the firm.

The effect of these provisions is that rule 1 of Order XXX operates as a general rule, while rule 2 is limited specifically to suits instituted by partners in the name of their firm. The wording of rule 2 makes it clear that even though the suit is formally presented in the firm’s name, a mandatory disclosure of the partners’ identities and residences must be made when any defendant requests it in writing. Consequently, when the partners are identified under the first sub‑rule, the court treats the action as if the individual partners were the named plaintiffs, even though the case continues to be styled as a suit by the firm. This interpretation shows that the provisions of rule 2, together with rule 1, function as enabling provisions that allow multiple individuals who are partners to sue or be sued collectively under the firm’s name. The structure of rule 2 would not have been drafted in this way if the intention were to regard the suit merely as an action by the firm without recognizing the partners as the true litigants.

In this case the Court observed that a suit filed in the name of a firm is, in reality, a suit brought by the individual partners who constitute the firm. The rules identified as O. XXX are described as enabling provisions; they do not forbid partners from being sued or from suing in their personal capacities. Likewise, those rules do not bar partners who conduct business outside India from suing in India under their own names. The appellant did not dispute this principle. However, because a firm does not possess legal personality, the right to sue in the name of the firm is limited to those partners who carry on business within India. The privilege does not extend to partners whose business activities are situated abroad; such partners must therefore institute proceedings in their individual names. If, mistakenly, partners who operate outside India file a plaint in the name of their firm, they are incorrectly describing themselves, since the suit is actually brought by the partners who are collectively identified as a firm. Consequently, a plaint filed in an Indian court on behalf of a firm that conducts business outside India is not automatically void; rather, it represents a suit by all the partners but contains an inaccurate description of the plaintiffs for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a situation the civil court is empowered, either under section 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure or possibly under O. VI, rule 17, to allow amendment of the plaint so that the plaintiffs are correctly described, thereby enabling the court to resolve the true dispute between the parties. The Court further noted that Order I, rule 10(1) was inapplicable because the suit was not instituted in the name of an incorrect person, nor was there any uncertainty about the identity of the proper plaintiff. Similarly, Order I, rule 10(2) did not apply because there was no issue of an improperly joined party that needed to be struck out, nor was there a need to add a party whose presence was essential for the complete adjudication of the matter. From the commencement of the suit, it had been effectively a suit by the partners of the firm, and no request to add or substitute any individual arose; the partners had been collectively described as a firm bearing a specific name. Among those partners, Manubhai Maganbhai Amin, who acted as the Manager of the firm Manilal & Sons, had executed a power of attorney in favour of four persons.

In this case the Court considered a Power of Attorney that had been executed by Manubhai Maganbhai Amin, who was the manager of the partnership firm Manilal & Sons. The instrument named four persons as agents, one of whom was Dunderdale. By virtue of that Power Amin authorised any of the four named persons to institute a suit for the recovery of monies owed to the firm by the appellant, Purushottam Umedbhai & Co. The Power also empowered those agents to appear and to represent the firm in any court or jurisdiction, whether civil, criminal, insolvency, original, appellate or otherwise, and before any official in any suit, proceeding or matter. It further authorised them to draft, sign, verify, present and file a plaint. In the proceedings before this Court Dunderdale signed and verified the plaint that gave rise to the present dispute. Upon examining the Power of Attorney the Court found no doubt that it expressly authorised Dunderdale to file the plaint on behalf of Manilal & Sons and to verify it. It was contended before the Court that the Power might have been a personal instrument of Manubhai Maganbhai Amin and not one vested in the partnership. The Court rejected that submission, observing that although the Power bore only the signature of Amin and not the signatures of all the partners, the law did not require the signatures of every partner. Under clause B.18 of the Companies Act a partner is an agent of the firm for the purposes of the firm’s business, and Amin, being both a partner and the manager, therefore possessed the authority to act on behalf of the partnership. The Court further noted that section 19(2) of the Act lists certain matters that a partner’s implied authority cannot cover in the absence of a contrary trade usage or custom, but none of those prohibited matters includes the execution of a Power of Attorney authorising a suit on behalf of the firm. Consequently the Court held that the plaint was not defective at the time of filing merely because the Power of Attorney was not signed by every partner. The High Court had pointed out that on the record there now existed Powers of Attorney signed by all the partners of the firm. Accordingly the Division Bench of the High Court was correct in concluding that the plaint was not a nullity. The suit had been instituted by all the partners of the firm, which was described as Manilal & Sons, carrying on business at No. 11A Malacca Street, Singapore, and the learned judges properly permitted the amendment of the plaint on the terms set out in their order. As a result, the High Court was justified in setting aside the decree of P. B. Mukherjea, J., which had dismissed the suit, and therefore the appeals were dismissed.

After reviewing the submissions and the record, the Court held that the two appeals did not establish any basis for relief and therefore were bound to fail. The Court therefore directed that both appeals be dismissed in their entirety. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that, although the appeals had been properly presented, the arguments raised did not persuade the Court to overturn the earlier decision, and consequently there was no justification for granting any relief. The Court also considered the surrounding circumstances and determined that no party should be ordered to bear costs in connection with these appeals. As a result, the final order was that the appeals be dismissed without the imposition of costs on either side.