Pramatha Nath Mukherjee vs The State Of West Bengal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 116 of 1958

Decision Date: 11 March 1960

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

In this case the petition was titled Pramatha Nath Mukherjee versus The State of West Bengal and the judgment was delivered on 11 March 1960 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising Justice K.C. Das Gupta and Justice J.C. Shah. The petitioner was identified as Pramatha Nath Mukherjee and the respondent as the State of West Bengal. The official citation of the decision is 1960 AIR 810 and 1960 SCR (3) 245. The matter concerned provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, specifically sections 251A(2) and 190(1)(b), and the question of whether an accused who is discharged under the provisions applicable to offences triable as warrant cases may nevertheless be tried for another offence disclosed in the police report that is triable as a summons case.

The criminal proceeding began in the court of a magistrate at Calcutta where a police report alleged that the appellant had voluntarily caused hurt to the Bailiff of the Calcutta Corporation and to another person, thereby attracting a charge under section 332 of the Indian Penal Code. After a hearing of both parties, the magistrate expressed the view that the evidence did not sustain a conviction under section 332, but observed that a prima facie case existed under section 323 of the same code. Accordingly, the magistrate framed a charge against the appellant under section 323. The appellant entered a plea of not guilty and contended that, pursuant to section 251A(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, he should have been acquitted of the offence and that the trial for the alleged offence under section 323 could not lawfully proceed. The magistrate rejected this contention and proceeded to convict the appellant. The central issue presented for determination was whether, after an order of discharge under section 251A(2) in respect of an offence triable as a warrant case, the magistrate may still try the accused for another offence arising from the same police report that is triable as a summons case. The Court held that an order of discharge exercised under sub‑section (2) of section 251A operates only with respect to offences triable under Chapter XXI of the Code, which deals with warrant cases, and does not extend to offences triable under Chapter XX, which are summons cases. Consequently, the magistrate’s discharge of the appellant in relation to the charge under section 332 did not affect the pending trial for the lesser offence under section 323, as there was no indication that the magistrate intended to discharge the appellant from all charges. Since section 323 is triable under Chapter XX, the magistrate correctly applied the procedural provisions of that chapter. Moreover, when a magistrate takes cognizance under section 190(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the magistrate is deemed to have taken cognizance of all offences that are constituted by the facts reported by the police officer, and not merely a selected subset of those offences.

The appeal was filed under the criminal appellate jurisdiction as Criminal Appeal No 116 of 1958. It challenged the judgment and order dated 28 February 1957 delivered by the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No 1158 of 1956, which itself arose from the judgment and order dated 26 June 1956 of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, in G R Case No 284 of 1956. Counsel for the appellant was a representative of the appellant, while counsel for the respondent represented the State. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Das Gupta and pronounced on 1 March 1960.

The central issue in the appeal concerned whether a Magistrate, after issuing an order of discharge under section 251A(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of a charge that is triable as a warrant case, may continue to try the accused for a different offence disclosed in the police report that is triable as a summons case. The proceedings against the appellant originated from a police report that alleged commission of an offence punishable under section 332 of the Indian Penal Code. The alleged conduct involved voluntarily causing hurt by means of a piece of wood to the complainant, Sisir Kumar Bose, Bailiff of Calcutta Corporation, and to Chandra Sekhar Bhattacharjee, an employee of Calcutta Corporation, with the intent to prevent or deter them from performing their duties as public servants. After ensuring that the documents referred to in section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been served on the accused, the Magistrate examined those documents and, after hearing counsel for both sides, concluded that the charge under section 332 IPC could not be sustained. However, the Magistrate found that the material was sufficient to establish a prima facie case under section 323 IPC. Consequently, he framed a charge against the accused under section 323 IPC, examined the accused, and recorded a plea of not guilty. The Magistrate then ordered that the case be posted for the examination of prosecution witnesses.

At the subsequent hearing, the accused’s counsel submitted that, pursuant to the provisions of section 251(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused should have been acquitted entirely and that no trial could proceed with respect to the offence under section 323 IPC. The Magistrate rejected this submission, holding that the trial for the offence under section 323 IPC should proceed under Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial continued in accordance with that procedure, and ultimately the accused was convicted of the offence under section 323 IPC. The conviction was accompanied by a fine of fifty rupees, and the judgment provided that, in default of payment of the fine, the accused would be liable to rigorous imprisonment for one month. The appellant later sought revision of this order under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the High Court dismissed the application. The learned judge of the High Court expressed the view that if, on the material before him, the Magistrate finds that a summons‑case offence has been committed by the accused, the Magistrate has both the right and the duty to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The term “discharge” as used in subsection (2) was therefore understood to refer only to the specific offence on which the charge‑sheet had been filed, without precluding further proceedings for other offences disclosed in the police report.

The Court observed that the term “discharge” used in sub‑section (2) of section 251A of the Criminal Procedure Code must be interpreted as referring only to a discharge with respect to the particular offence for which the accused had been charge‑sheeted. The Court clarified that such a discharge did not necessarily preclude the magistrate from proceeding against the accused for any other offence, for example a summons‑case offence, under Chapter XX of the Code, even though the discharge was made under section 251A(2). The appeal before the Court had been filed on the basis of a certificate that the High Court had issued under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. For the purpose of the discussion, the Court reproduced the relevant statutory provisions. Section 251 stated: “In the trial of warrant‑cases by Magistrates, the Magistrates shall – (a) in any case instituted on a police‑report, follow the procedure specified in section 251A; and (b) in any other case, follow the procedure specified in the other provisions of this Chapter.” Section 251A read: “(1) ………………………………. (2) If, upon consideration of all the documents referred to in section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge him. (3) If, upon such documents being considered, such examination, if any, being made and the prosecution and the accused being given an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try, and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.” The Court explained that, in deciding whether to act under sub‑section (2) or sub‑section (3) of section 251A, the magistrate had to form an opinion on whether there existed any ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence triable under Chapter XXI. When the magistrate’s opinion was that such a ground existed, he was required to proceed with trial; when the magistrate concluded that no such ground existed, his duty was to discharge the accused. The Court identified the real issue as whether a discharge order made by the magistrate under the powers conferred by sub‑section (2) of section 251A applied to all the offences that the facts in the police report could potentially disclose. The Court answered this question in the negative. It held that when the magistrate issued an order under section 251A(2), he did so after considering whether the charge articulated in the police report for offences triable under Chapter XXI was groundless; the discharge therefore related only to those offences covered by the charge‑sheet that fell within Chapter XXI, and did not automatically extend to any other offences that might also be present in the report.

The discharge order pertained only to those charges in the charge‑sheet that were triable under Chapter XXI, because the magistrate found those particular offences groundless. Frequently, the factual allegations in a charge‑sheet give rise to one or more warrant offences falling under Chapter XXI together with one or more additional offences that are triable under Chapter XX. Because the discharge order applied solely to the Chapter XXI offences, it did not alter the fact that the charge‑sheet also contained allegations of offences triable under Chapter XX. Counsel for the appellant argued that the magistrate was therefore unable to proceed with trial of the Chapter XX offences, contending that cognizance of those offences had not been taken. He further maintained that only after a fresh complaint specifically addressing the Chapter XX offences could the magistrate acquire cognizance and then conduct trial in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The court observed that this argument ignored the rule that when a magistrate takes cognizance under section 190(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, he must take cognizance of every offence disclosed by the police report. The court illustrated the principle by stating that if the police report described facts sufficient for an offence under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, the magistrate could take cognizance of that offence. If the same report also disclosed facts constituting an offence under section 426, the magistrate was likewise authorised to take cognizance of the offence under section 426. In the present case, the police report narrated facts establishing an offence punishable under section 332 of the Indian Penal Code, which inevitably also amounted to a lesser offence under section 323. When the magistrate took cognizance under section 190(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code of the offence under section 332, he necessarily also took cognizance of the minor offence under section 323. Accordingly, even after the magistrate discharged the accused with respect to the section 332 offence, the proceeding against the section 323 offence remained open because no order indicated its dismissal. Since the section 323 offence fell within Chapter XX of the Criminal Procedure Code, the magistrate correctly applied the procedural regime applicable to Chapter XX offences. The court consequently dismissed the appeal, holding that the magistrate had acted within his jurisdiction by proceeding against the Section 323 offence under the appropriate Chapter XX procedure.