Pandit M. S. M. Sharma vs Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petition No. 176 of 1959

Decision Date: 1 August 1960

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

In the case titled Pandit M. S. M. Sharma versus Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and others, the judgment was delivered on 1 August 1960 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and the bench comprised Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam, P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta and J. C. Shah. The petitioner was Pandit M. S. M. Sharma, who was the editor of the English daily newspaper Searchlight published from Patna, and the respondents were Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and others. The citation for this decision is 1960 AIR 1186 and it is referenced in several later reports, including R 1961 SC1457, R 1964 SC1013, R 1965 SC1553, and RF 1975 SC2299. The matters addressed involve the State Legislature, breach of privilege, the effect of a decision of a court if res judicata applies between the parties, and the constitutional provisions of Articles 194(3) and 19(1)(a). The headnote records that the petitioner was summoned before the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative Assembly to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for alleged breach of the Speaker’s and the Assembly’s privilege by publishing an inaccurate account of their proceedings. He filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking to quash that proceeding, raising the substantive question of whether the privilege conferred by Article 194(3) is subject to the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). By a majority the Court held against the petitioner. Subsequently the Assembly was prorogued on several occasions, the Committee of Privileges was reconstituted and a fresh notice was issued to the petitioner. Through the present petition the petitioner attempted to reopen the earlier decision, to raise the same controversy again and to contend that the majority decision was erroneous. The Court examined whether such a reopening was permissible.

The Court held that the general principles of res judicata applied, so that the earlier judgment could not be reopened and it bound both the petitioner and the Bihar Legislative Assembly; the later reconstitution of the Committee of Privileges could not affect that outcome. The decision relied upon the precedent set in Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, [1953] S.C.R. 154, confirming that a legislative body possesses the authority to control the publication of its proceedings and to punish any breach of privilege, and therefore any alleged non‑compliance with procedural rules could not be a ground for interference by the Court under Article 32. The Court also referred to Janardan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad, [1951] S.C.R. 344, to underline that prorogation of an assembly merely interrupts its business and does not dissolve it; the Assembly’s work may be revived by a fresh motion to continue or renew the proceedings. Consequently, the Court concluded that the petitioner could not relitigate the matter and that the earlier judgment remained authoritative.

It was therefore not correct to argue that, because the Assembly had been prorogued on several occasions after the alleged breach of privilege, the proceedings should be considered terminated. The judgment relates to an original jurisdiction petition, identified as Petition No. 176 of 1959, which was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The petition was presented on behalf of the petitioner by counsel comprising Basudeva Prasad, M K Ramamurthi, K N Keshwa and R Mahalingier. The respondents were represented by Lal Narain Sinha, B K P Sinha, L S Sinha and S P Varma. Appearances on behalf of the Attorney‑General of India were made by M C Setalvad, the Attorney‑General, C K Daphtary, the Solicitor‑General, and the advocates H J Umrigar and T M Sen. The judgment was dated 1 August 1960 and was delivered by Chief Justice Sinha.

In this petition, the petitioner raised virtually the same controversy that had been presented in Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958 and in Writ Petition No. 106 of 1959. The earlier petition, No. 122 of 1958, had been heard and decided by this Court on 12 December 1958. The subsequent petition, No. 106 of 1959, was heard on 10, 11 and 12 November 1959, but it did not culminate in a judgment because the petitioner’s counsel requested permission to withdraw the petition, a request which the Court granted, thereby allowing the withdrawal. In each of these proceedings the petitioner, a journalist by profession and serving as the editor of “The Searchlight,” an English‑language daily newspaper published from Patna in the State of Bihar, challenged the validity of the actions taken by the Committee of Privileges. The petitioner sought an injunction restraining the opposite party, namely the Chief Minister of Bihar who acted as Chairman of the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, together with the Secretary of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, from proceeding against him for having published in the 31 May 1957 issue of “The Searchlight” an account of the debate that had taken place in the Bihar Legislative Assembly on 30 May 1957.

The factual matrix of the case had been set out in full detail in the majority opinion delivered by Chief Justice S. R. Das in the case of M S M Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha. In the opening paragraph of that opinion, the Court enumerated the parties and highlighted an apparent anomaly. The Court then held, for the purposes of this case, that under Article 194(3) of the Constitution a State Legislature possesses the same powers, privileges and immunities that the House of Commons of the United Kingdom possessed at the moment the Constitution came into force. At that historical point, the House of Commons enjoyed the power or privilege of prohibiting the publication of even a true and faithful report of its proceedings, and, consequently, it also possessed the stronger privilege of prohibiting the publication of any inaccurate or distorted version of such debates or proceedings. Accordingly, the powers and privileges of a State House of Legislature, including those of its committees, are to be understood as identical to the corresponding powers that the House of Commons enjoyed at the commencement of the Constitution.

The Court explained that, unless and until a law is enacted by Parliament or by a State Legislature to modify them, the powers, privileges and immunities of a State Legislature, its members and its committees are identical to those possessed by the House of Commons at the moment the Constitution came into force. Accordingly, the Court observed that legislatures in India, like the historic House of Commons, would recognise the advantages of public scrutiny and would therefore refrain from invoking those powers, privileges and immunities except in exceptionally serious circumstances. In contrast, the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Subba Rao held that, at the relevant historical date, the House of Commons – and consequently Indian legislatures – did not enjoy a blanket privilege to suppress the publication of an accurate and faithful report of their proceedings, except in the case of secret sessions. He maintained that the privilege was limited to preventing the malicious publication of distorted, unfaithful or censored accounts. Justice Subba Rao further concluded that the petitioner possessed a fundamental right to publish a report of the Legislature’s proceedings. Relying on the majority view, the Court dismissed the petition without awarding costs. The Court also affirmed that the Bihar Legislative Assembly had the authority to initiate proceedings for an alleged breach of its privileges, and that it alone was empowered to decide whether any such breach had actually occurred.

Following the termination of Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958, the petitioner filed another application before the Court invoking Article 32 of the Constitution; this matter was recorded as Writ Petition No. 106 of 1959. On 5 January 1959 the petitioner received a notice stating that the Committee of Privileges of the Assembly would examine the alleged breach of privilege against him on 3 February 1959. The hearing, however, was repeatedly postponed, and by August 1959 the petitioner again approached the Court under Article 32. In his petition he argued that, as a citizen of India, he was entitled to the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which encompasses freedom of speech, expression, publication and circulation. He contended that the Bihar Legislature could not invoke any privilege that conflicted with this constitutional right. In other words, the petitioner asserted that the privilege granted to a State Legislature by Article 194(3) was subject to the fundamental freedom protected by Article 19(1)(a). Additionally, the petitioner alleged that the first respondent, the Chief Minister of Bihar, who was said to control the majority of the Assembly members and the Committee of Privileges, was acting in bad faith in pursuing the privilege proceedings against him.

In the petition, the petitioner argued that the proceedings initiated against him for an alleged breach of the privilege of the House were essentially a repetition of the issues that this Court had already resolved in its judgment dated 12 December 1958. The petitioner sought a decree that the actions of the Committee of Privileges, taken at its meeting on 10 August 1958, should be set aside, and that a writ of prohibition should be issued to prevent the respondents from continuing any action against him in connection with the publication of the Bihar Legislative Assembly proceedings of 30 May 1957.

Subsequent to the filing of the writ application, the Bihar Legislative Assembly reorganised its Committee of Privileges. On the very same day, a member of the Assembly moved a motion to revive and refer again the matter concerning the alleged breach of privilege by the petitioner. Several members opposed the moving of this motion, and the Speaker chose to defer a decision on the objection. At the request of some Assembly members, the Speaker then directed two questions to be put to the Advocate General of Bihar for his opinion on the floor of the House on 20 October 1959. The first question asked whether the Assembly could legitimately debate an issue that might be sub‑judice because of the writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution. The second question concerned whether a matter that had become dead due to multiple prorogations of the House could be legally revived and restored for consideration.

On 20 October 1959, the Advocate General appeared before the Assembly and delivered his opinion, the substance of which is not required for the present record. The writ petition numbered 106 of 1959 was subsequently heard in part, and the Court permitted the petition to be withdrawn, an order that was entered on 12 November 1959. Nonetheless, on 24 November 1959, the petitioner received a new notice from the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, designated as opposite party No. 3, which required the petitioner to show cause by 1 December 1959 why appropriate action should not be recommended against him for an alleged breach of the privilege of both the Speaker and the Assembly.

In response, the petitioner again invoked Article 32 of the Constitution, contending that the resolution adopted by the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative Assembly at its meeting on 23 November 1959 constituted an unlawful restriction of his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). He further asserted that the resolution represented an illegal and mala‑fide threat to his personal liberty, contravening Article 21 of the Constitution, and that the Committee of Privileges, identified as respondent No. 2, lacked any jurisdiction or authority to proceed against him as suggested by the notice. The petitioner set out these contentions as the grounds of his claim.

In the present writ petition, the petitioner argued that, as a citizen of India, he possessed the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression, a right that encompassed the freedom to obtain the earliest and most accurate information about contemporary events, including the proceedings of a legislature, and to publish that information. He maintained that no State legislature could claim a privilege that would curtail this constitutional right. Consequently, the petitioner contended that the majority judgment of this Court in Pt. M. S. M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha (1) was erroneous. In support of this claim, he asserted that the rule of construction applied by the Court in its earlier decision had been misapplied. He further submitted that even if a State legislature were vested with powers, privileges and immunities analogous to those of the House of Commons, such powers would be limited to those actually exercised at the commencement of the Constitution, and that the power to prevent publication of its proceedings was not among those privileges. The petitioner also invoked Article 21 of the Constitution, arguing that no citizen could be deprived of personal liberty except in accordance with a law established by procedure. Accordingly, he alleged that the alleged malafide act of respondents 1 and 2, by requiring him to show cause, amounted to a threat to his fundamental rights. Moreover, the petitioner claimed that after several prorogations the earlier proceedings for breach of privilege had become extinguished; therefore, the Assembly possessed no authority or jurisdiction to issue a fresh notice based on the motion of 23 November 1959 that revived the proceedings. The petitioners therefore submitted that the very same questions that were examined and decided in Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958 were being re‑raised, and that the previous decision of this Court had been founded on an incorrect appreciation of the legal position. In short, they insisted that the petitioner retained the fundamental right to publish the proceedings of the Bihar Legislature and that the Legislature lacked any power to restrict or control such publication. On the other side, the Government Advocate of Bihar, representing the opposite parties, contended that the present writ petition against the Chairman and the members of the Committee of Privileges—respondents 1 and 2—was barred by the principle of res judicata and therefore could not be entertained. He further argued that a writ could not be issued either against an individual member or against the Legislature as a whole for actions taken in the exercise of its privilege to prohibit or control the publication of its proceedings.

The respondent argued that the Assembly possessed the authority to control the publication of its proceedings. On behalf of the petitioner, counsel contended that respondent number two, the Committee of Privileges, had been reconstituted after the earlier decision of this Court and that, consequently, the doctrine of res judicata could not be invoked. In support of this argument, it was noted that in Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958 the Chief Minister of Bihar, Sri Krishna Sinha, had been sued as opposite party number one in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, while opposite party number two had been described simply as the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative Assembly without naming any individual members. In the present writ petition, opposite party number one remains the same person. Opposite party number two is described as the new Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, and a list of names is supplied, including Dr Sri Krishna Sinha, the Chief Minister, as Chairman. The question was raised whether the change in the personnel of opposite party number two makes any difference. The Court held that it does not. So long as the Assembly itself continues to exist, it may reconstitute its committees to meet the demands of its business, and the Committee of Privileges is merely one of the agencies through which the Assembly carries out its functions. Accordingly, it is the Assembly as a whole that is proceeding against the petitioner, invoking the powers, privileges and immunities recognized by this Court in its judgment in Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958. The Court further referred to the decision in Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, where it was observed that the principle underlying res judicata applies to a question that has been fully contested and decided, even if the tribunal that decided the first case lacked jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit or the subject‑matter of the two disputes was not identical. In that case, the rule of res judicata was applied to land‑acquisition litigation, and the Court employed the general principles of law concerning res judicata rather than the specific provisions of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The doctrine is intended to give finality to a decision reached after a complete hearing of the parties concerned. Therefore, despite the fact that opposite party number two was not named in exactly the same way, there is no doubt that the Committee of Privileges remains the same committee irrespective of the individuals who compose it at any particular time.

It was held that a Committee formed by the same Legislative Assembly continued to be the same Committee as long as it was constituted by that Assembly. The question that had been decided by this Court on a previous occasion concerned a matter of great importance affecting the entire Legislature of the State of Bihar. That decision was of general significance and did not rely on the particular composition of the Committee of Privileges at the time. Consequently, it could not be said that the earlier question had not been fully debated or that it had not been decided after proper deliberation. The fact that there had been a difference of opinion among the Judges, with one Judge expressing a view different from the others, merely indicated that the issue allowed for divergent views. The earlier judgment of this Court was binding on both the petitioner and the Legislative Assembly of Bihar. For the purpose of applying the general principles of res judicata, it was unnecessary to examine whether the prior decision was correct or erroneous. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the issues settled by the earlier decision could not be reopened in the present case and must continue to determine the rights and obligations of the parties, which were essentially the same as before. The Court found that the petitioner possessed no fundamental right that was being threatened by the actions of the opposite party, and therefore the petitioner’s claim of infringement could not succeed.

Having dealt with the primary issue, the Court turned to the subsidiary questions raised by the petitioner. The petitioner argued that the procedure adopted within the House of the Legislature was irregular and not strictly in accordance with law. The Court identified three possible responses to this contention. First, under the earlier decision of this Court, the petitioner did not possess the fundamental right he claimed, and therefore his grievance fell outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Second, the validity of the proceedings conducted inside a State Legislature could not be challenged merely on the ground that the procedural requirements prescribed by law had not been strictly observed; Article 212 of the Constitution provided a complete answer to this argument, emphasizing that courts could not intrude into matters that fell within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature, which has the authority to manage its own business. Third, the Court noted that it might be premature to examine procedural compliance because the Committee charged with investigating the matter had not yet concluded its proceedings. The Court further observed that once it had been established that the Legislature possessed the power to control the publication of its proceedings and to determine whether any breach of privilege had occurred, the Legislature was fully empowered to continue its business in accordance with its own rules. Even if the Legislature had not adhered strictly to the procedural law governing its business, such a lapse could not serve as a basis for judicial interference.

The Court observed that Article 32 of the Constitution distinguishes clearly between a complete lack of jurisdiction and a merely improper or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. It noted that the mere failure to comply with procedural rules cannot, by itself, justify the issuance of a writ under Article 32, citing the decision in Janardan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad. The petitioners also argued that the contempt proceedings concerned events that had occurred more than three years earlier, and therefore the matter was too stale to be pursued, referring to the principle set out in the 1951 S.C.R. report at page 344. The Court held that this question of staleness fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislature, which alone could determine whether the alleged contempt was recent enough to warrant serious consideration or whether any punitive measures were appropriate if the petitioner were found guilty. The Court expressly stated that it had no role in deciding such matters. It further recorded that the government advocate for Bihar informed the Court that the legislature's primary concern was the protection of its constitutional rights rather than the imposition of punishment on the petitioner, and consequently the Court found no further discussion on this point necessary.

The Court then turned to the petitioner’s contention that the Assembly lacked authority to initiate contempt proceedings against the petitioner in May 1957 because the Assembly had been prorogued on several occasions between 31 May 1957 and 23 November 1959. The Court rejected this argument, explaining that prorogation does not amount to dissolution of the Assembly; the body remains intact, with only its sessions temporarily suspended as dictated by public demands and the workload of its members. The Court referred to the passage quoted from the sixteenth edition of May’s Parliamentary Practice, page 279, which states that prorogation suspends all business until Parliament is summoned again, quashing pending proceedings except for specific cases such as impeachments by the Commons and appeals before the House of Lords, and requiring bills to be re‑introduced as if for the first time. The Court held that the cited observations do not support the petitioner’s extreme claim that the contempt proceedings are permanently extinguished. Rather, prorogation merely interrupts proceedings, which may be revived by a fresh motion to continue or renew them. Accordingly, the Court found it unnecessary to address the separate question of whether the dissolution of the House would completely nullify the contempt proceedings.

After reviewing the material that had been set out earlier in the judgment, the Court expressed that, in its considered opinion, the petition failed to demonstrate any sufficient basis upon which the Court could invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 32 of the Constitution. In other words, the submissions and evidence presented did not satisfy the threshold required for the Court to entertain the relief claimed under that constitutional provision. As a result of this conclusion, the Court ordered that the petition be dismissed in its entirety. The dismissal meant that the relief sought by the petitioner was not granted and that the proceedings would not continue any further. Moreover, the Court indicated that no award of costs would be made against either party, so that each side would bear its own expenses. The order therefore concluded with the formal statement that the petition was dismissed, thereby bringing the matter to an end.