P.C. Joshi And Another vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1960

Decision Date: 25 October, 1960

Coram: J.C. Shah, S.K. Das

In this case the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 25 October 1960. The judgment was authored by Justice J.C. Shah, who was joined by Justice S.K. Das on the bench. The petitioners were P.C. Joshi and another individual, while the respondent was the State of Uttar Pradesh. The case was reported in 1961 AIR 387 and also in the 1961 Supreme Court Reports (Second Series) at page 63. The matter concerned the criminal trial provisions relating to the defamation of a public servant with respect to a public function. Specifically it examined whether a complaint filed before a Sessions Judge by a public prosecutor needed to be signed by the public servant whose reputation was alleged to be harmed, as required by sections 198 and 198‑B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (the 5th edition).

The headnote of the judgment recorded that the Public Prosecutor of Kanpur had filed a complaint in the Kanpur Court of Session charging the appellants with publishing a news item that was false and defamatory of the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. The complaint satisfied the requirements of section 198‑B of the Code. The appellants argued that the complaint also had to satisfy section 198, contending that the absence of the Chief Minister’s signature rendered the complaint legally ineffective and that the Sessions Judge therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. The Court held that the signature of the Chief Minister was not a necessary condition for a complaint filed under section 198‑B. The Court explained that the phrase “notwithstanding anything contained in this Code” in sub‑section (1) of section 198‑B expressly excludes the operation of other procedural provisions of the Code, including section 198, concerning the initiation and trial of a defamation offence. Furthermore, sub‑section (13) of section 198‑B clarifies that the provisions of that section are in addition to, and not in derogation of, section 198, thereby preserving the right of the person defamed to file a separate complaint under section 198. Consequently, the two sections furnish alternative remedies, and the compensation provisions in section 198‑B concerning false, frivolous or vexatious accusations do not alter this conclusion. The Court also observed that normally it is the public servant who moves the Government to initiate proceedings, and under sub‑section (5) of section 198‑B that servant is required to be examined as a witness to support the prosecution; hence it cannot be said that he has no interest in lodging a complaint under section 198‑B. The Court disapproved the earlier rulings in C.B.L. Bhatnagar v. The State, AIR 1958 Bombay 196 and R. Sankar v. The State, I.L.R. (1959) Kerala 195.

The judgment proceeded under the criminal appellate jurisdiction for Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1960, which was a special leave appeal from the Allahabad High Court’s order dated 28 April 1960 in Criminal Revision No. 1865 of 1959. The counsel for the appellants consisted of senior advocates, while the respondent was represented by its own legal team. The Court delivered its judgment on 25 October 1960, with Justice Shah presiding. At the commencement of the judgment the Court noted that Appellant No. 1 was the editor and Appellant No. 2 was the printer and publisher of the “New Age”, an English weekly news sheet published in Delhi.

The parties were identified as the printer and publisher of “New Age”, an English weekly news‑sheet that was circulated in Delhi. On 15 May 1959, the Public Prosecutor of Kanpur instituted a complaint in the Kanpur Court of Session against the two appellants. The complaint alleged that the appellants had printed a news item in the issue of “New Age” dated 16 November 1958, and that they had done so while knowing, or having good reason to believe, that the material was false and defamatory of the Chief Minister of the State of Uttar Pradesh, with the intention of damaging his reputation in the general public and among his acquaintances in particular. Accompanying the complaint was an order signed by the Home Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, which sanctioned, under section 198B(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the filing of a complaint by the Public Prosecutor for an offence punishable under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to the same news item published on 16 November 1958 under the heading “Explosive situation in Kanpur”. The learned Sessions Judge took cognizance of the complaint, proceeded to examine six prosecution witnesses, and thereafter framed a charge of defamation against the appellants on the ground that they had published the article titled “Explosive situation in Kanpur” with the intention of harming, or with the knowledge that they were likely to harm, the reputation of the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. The appellants subsequently filed an application before the Allahabad High Court, seeking to set aside the charge framed by the Court of Session. In their submissions, they contended that there was no evidence that the Home Secretary had actually considered the factual circumstances before granting sanction for prosecution; they further argued that, irrespective of any sanction, the article did not constitute defamation of the Chief Minister with respect to his official conduct as a public officer, and that the complaint, having not been signed by the Chief Minister himself—the aggrieved party—was beyond the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. The High Court rejected each of the appellants’ contentions. Consequently, the appellants appealed to this Court, invoking special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the observations made by the High Court regarding whether the publication in the 16 November 1958 issue of “New Age,” bearing the caption “Explosive situation in Kanpur,” was defamatory of the Chief Minister in respect of his discharge of official duties were made merely for the purpose of deciding the revision application and did not constitute a final determination on the defamatory nature of the article. The Court further indicated that the ultimate decision on the question of defamation would be left to the trial judge when the case is finally tried.

The Court examined the material before it to determine whether the newspaper item was defamatory of the Chief Minister with respect to his performance of public duties. The contention that the Home Secretary had issued the sanction for the complaint without giving any thought to the matter was rejected as unsupported. The witness, Siddiqi, who served as an assistant in the Home Department of the Uttar Pradesh Government, testified that he had received the sanction‑related documents from the Superintendent of the Rome Department. These documents included the “notings” and the copy of the offending newspaper issue. Siddiqi took these “notings” and the accompanying papers to the Deputy Secretary, who added his own note. Subsequently, Siddiqi forwarded the same bundle to M. G. Kaul, the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary examined the “notings,” the Deputy Secretary’s annotation, and the article itself, and after reviewing all the material, he approved the draft sanction.

It was not contested that the Home Secretary possessed the authority to sanction a complaint alleging defamation of a minister of the Uttar Pradesh Government. The evidence demonstrated that the Home Secretary had indeed considered all relevant facts before granting the sanction. The Court noted that the mere existence of a document that lists the names of the persons to be prosecuted, cites the statutory provisions alleged to be violated, and bears the signature of an officer authorized to grant the sanction does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction on a court to try the offence, where such sanction is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. Where the charge‑related facts are not evident on the face of the sanction, it must be shown that those facts were presented to the competent authority and that the authority exercised thought before issuing the sanction. In the present case, the charge‑related facts were printed on the sanction, and the evidence confirmed that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority, considered by that authority, and consequently sanctioned.

Section 198B, which addresses a particular class of defamation offences against high dignitaries of the State, ministers, and public servants concerning their conduct in public functions, was inserted into the Code by Act XVI of 1955. Before the insertion of Section 198B, the sole prerequisite for a court to entertain a defamation complaint was provided by Section 198, which required a complaint from the aggrieved person before the court could take cognizance. Section 198B introduced several additional prerequisites for the trial of offences falling within its scope. The key provisions of Section 198B are found in sub‑sections (1), (3) and (4), with sub‑section (1) setting out the basic condition for a Court of Session to take cognizance of such offences upon a written complaint made by the Public Prosecutor.

The provision stated that, notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, when any offence falling under Chapter Twenty‑One of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) other than defamation by spoken words was alleged to have been committed against the President, the Vice‑President, the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, a Minister, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State, in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions, a Court of Session could take cognizance of such offence without the accused being committed to it for trial, provided that a complaint in writing was made by the Public Prosecutor. The provision further required that no complaint under sub‑section (1) could be made by the Public Prosecutor unless it was preceded by the prior sanction of a specified authority. In the case of the President, Vice‑President or Governor of a State, the sanction had to be obtained from any Secretary to the Government authorized to give such sanction. In the case of a Minister of the Central Government or of a State Government, the sanction had to be obtained from the Secretary to the Council of Ministers, if any, or from any Secretary to the Government authorized for that purpose. In the case of any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, the sanction had to be obtained from the Government concerned. Furthermore, the provision mandated that a Court of Session could not take cognizance of an offence under sub‑section (1) unless the written complaint was filed within six months of the date on which the offence was alleged to have been committed. Thus, the special procedure applied only when six conditions were satisfied: the defamation was not by spoken words; the alleged offender was one of the persons listed; the alleged defamation related to the conduct of the person in the discharge of his public functions; a written complaint was made by the Public Prosecutor; the complaint was made with the prior sanction of the authority specified in sub‑section (3); and the complaint was filed within six months of the alleged offence. Section 198 required that a defamation complaint could be initiated only by the aggrieved person, prescribed no limitation period, and could be entertained only by a First Class Magistrate. By contrast, Section 198‑B transferred jurisdiction to a Court of Session without committal, imposed the six‑month time limit, and required a written complaint by the Public Prosecutor with prior sanction.

In this matter, the Court observed that the larger public interest had led to a departure from the usual rule that a defamation complaint must be presented before a magistrate. Accordingly, the accusation was to be entertained not by a magistrate but by the Court of Session, and this could be done without a committal proceeding, provided the complaint was filed within six months of the date of the alleged offence. The complaint had to be in writing, lodged by the Public Prosecutor, and it had to carry the prior sanction of the authorities specified in the statute. The Court further noted that the non‑obstante clause contained in sub‑section (1) of Section 198‑B, which states “notwithstanding anything contained in this Code,” expressly excludes the operation of various provisions of the Code that relate to the initiation and trial of a defamation offence, and that Section 198 is prima facie one of those excluded provisions. The appellants, however, contended that sub‑section (13) of Section 198‑B makes the provisions of Section 198 applicable to a complaint for defamation of persons listed in sub‑section (1) of Section 198‑B, and that it provides that no court can take cognizance of a defamation offence except on a complaint made by the aggrieved person. They further argued that because the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, who was alleged to be the aggrieved party, had not signed the complaint, the Court of Session at Kanpur lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter. Sub‑section (13) states that “the provisions of this section shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, those of Section 198.” The Court held that this language was enacted expressly to reaffirm, ex abundanti cautela, that the right of a person whose reputation has been harmed by a defamatory statement to proceed under Section 198 is not taken away by the enactment of Section 198‑B. The phrases “in addition to” and “not in derogation of” were interpreted to mean that Section 198‑B is an additional provision and is not intended to deprive a person, even if he belongs to the specially listed classes and the defamatory statement concerns his conduct in public office, of the right to file a complaint under Section 198. The term “derogation” was explained as taking away, lessening, or impairing authority, position, or dignity, and the context of sub‑section (13) demonstrated that the remedies provided by Section 198 remain intact. Consequently, the Court concluded that Section 198‑B does not diminish the aggrieved person’s right to approach a magistrate under Section 198 for a defamation offence, even when the person falls within the specified categories and the defamation relates to his official functions. The Court warned that if sub‑section (13) were read to mean that Section 198‑B merely supplements Section 198, the non‑obstante clause at the beginning of sub‑section (1) would become meaningless, and, absent a compelling contextual reason, the Court would not adopt such an interpretation. The judgment further noted an inherent indication in Sections 198 and 198‑B supporting the view that Section 198‑B was intended to provide an alternative remedy rather than merely a supplementary one.

The Court observed that section 198B was not meant to be an addition to the remedy provided in section 198, but rather to offer a separate avenue of redress for defamation of the persons described in that provision. It explained that the term “complaint,” as defined in section 4, clause (h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, signifies an allegation, either oral or written, presented to a Magistrate with the purpose of invoking the Magistrate’s power under the Code to act against a person, known or unknown, who is alleged to have committed an offence. The Court stressed that every complaint of an offence must be made to a Magistrate who is competent to take cognizance of that offence and not to a Court of Session. A Court of Session, unless expressly provided otherwise, does not have the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint; it can only try a criminal case that has been committed to it. Consequently, the usage of the word “complaint” in section 198 is intended in the sense given by section 4(h).

Turning to the arguments advanced by the appellants, the Court noted that accepting those arguments would generate considerable confusion in the operation of the Code. If, in addition to the complaint filed by the Public Prosecutor under section 198B, the aggrieved person were also required to lodge a separate complaint, two distinct courts would become involved in addressing the same alleged defamation. The complaint filed by the Public Prosecutor under section 198B would necessarily be before a Court of Session, whereas the complaint under section 198 would have to be before a Magistrate, because only a Magistrate has the power to take cognizance of a defamation offence under that provision. The Court further explained that, after the Magistrate receives the complaint under section 198, the matter might have to be committed to a Court of Session, and only after the Public Prosecutor’s complaint is lodged could the case proceed. The Legislature, the Court held, could not have intended that for the same offence there should be two parallel complaints—one in a Court of Session and another in a Magistrate’s court—either both to be tried separately or to be consolidated after a committal order.

The appellants also relied on sub‑sections (6) to (11) of section 198B, which provide for the award of compensation to a person accused if the court is satisfied that the accusation is false and either frivolous or vexatious. They contended that Parliament could not have intended that a person who is not the complainant and who is not directly involved in the proceedings should nevertheless be compelled, if ordered by the court, to pay such compensation. However, the Court pointed out that sub‑section (5) of the same section stipulates that a person against whom the offence is alleged shall, unless the court records a reason to the contrary, be examined as a witness for the prosecution. This provision indicates that the determination of whether a complaint is false, frivolous or vexatious must be made in the context of the person who is the subject of the alleged offence, and not by imposing liability on an unrelated third party.

The Court observed that compensation could be awarded only when the individual alleging defamation actively supported the complaint, and therefore it could not be said that section 198B authorized compensation against a person who had no concern with the complaint. Section 198B was explained as legislation that created a mechanism for protecting the reputation of high dignitaries, ministers and public servants when they faced defamatory attacks. The provision contemplated two distinct categories of persons for whom defamation proceedings could be instituted: first, high dignitaries such as the President, the Vice‑President, the Governors and the Raj pramukhs; and second, ministers and other public servants. The Court noted that it was not contested that a rule permitting the State to launch a prosecution, at State expense, for defamation of members of the first class—given their prominent status in public life—was principally designed to serve the public interest. Consequently, it would be entirely appropriate for the question of awarding compensation to arise even if the defamation complaint were later found to be false, frivolous or vexatious. The Court further held that, in a democratic system, maintaining the purity of public conduct and administration required that allegations of improper behaviour against persons of the second class be investigated whenever such allegations related to the discharge of their public functions. It was also deemed to be in the public interest that a person seeking vindication of his character should not normally be required to bear the cost of a potentially expensive and protracted proceeding, nor should he, for obvious reasons, control the proceeding. The Court explained that, in cases where a private individual was defamed, the State did not have a primary role; the aggrieved party could, if he chose, initiate proceedings to obtain relief. By contrast, when defamatory accusations concerned ministers or public servants in the performance of their official duties, the State’s interest was as vital as that of the individual defamed. Accordingly, the Legislature had empowered the State to prosecute offenders in appropriate cases. To prevent abuse of this procedure, the provision allowed for the examination of the defamed person and the award of compensation against him if the complaint was found to be false, frivolous or vexatious. The Court observed that, normally, a minister or public servant who felt his conduct in office had been attacked would approach the Government under which he served to seek proceedings that vindicated his character. Although the formal complainant in cases under section 198B was the Public Prosecutor, when the defamed person was a minister or public servant, the complaint could effectively be regarded as filed at the instance of that minister or servant. The Court pointed out that such a person necessarily had to support the accusation with evidence, and his conduct was therefore subject to judicial scrutiny. In this context, the Court concluded that it would be difficult to hold that a person who had either initiated the complaint or was required to back it with evidence had no concern with the lodging of the complaint.

In this case, the Court observed that a person who is instrumental in initiating a complaint, or who must support the complaint with evidence, has a connection with the lodging of the complaint. The Court further explained that compensation would be awarded only when the Court is satisfied that the allegation made by the purportedly aggrieved person is false and either frivolous or vexatious. The Court examined the language of Section 198B and held that the provision does not require that, before taking cognizance of a complaint, the complaint be signed by any individual other than the Public Prosecutor. Accordingly, the provision envisions a written complaint filed solely by the Public Prosecutor and by no other person. The Court stated that inserting the words “and also by the person aggrieved” into sub‑section (1) would be an unwarranted addition, assuming the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants were accepted. Since the Legislature deliberately omitted any requirement that the Public Prosecutor’s complaint also bear the signature of the aggrieved person, the Court found no justification to read such a requirement into the statute in the absence of compelling reasons. The Court referred to observations made by a former judge in C. B. L. Bhatnagar v. The State (1), where it was suggested that subsection (13) of Section 198B mandates that a complaint under that section must also satisfy the provisions of Section 198, implying that the complaint must be made both by the aggrieved person and by the Public Prosecutor. The Court also noted a similar view expressed in R. Sanker v. The State (2), which held that a complaint by the aggrieved person is not dispensed with even in cases falling under Section 198B. The Court concluded that these observations do not correctly interpret subsection (13) of Section 198B in this statutory context. Consequently, the Court held that the appeal fails and therefore ordered that the appeal be dismissed in its entirety. Accordingly, the appellate remedy was denied, and the appeal was dismissed with no further relief granted to the parties. (1) A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 196. (2) 1.L.R. (1959) Kerala 195-