Narain Das vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 14 September 1960

Coram: Raghubar Dayal

In the matter titled Narain Das versus The State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 14 September 1960. The petitioner was Narain Das and the respondent was the State of Uttar Pradesh. The case concerned an appeal arising under section 476‑B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, read with sections 195 and 476 of the same Code. The issue was whether an appeal against the order of a single judge of the Allahabad High Court, who had exercised civil jurisdiction and refused to file a criminal complaint, could be taken directly to the Supreme Court. The headnote of the judgment recorded that during the pendency of a civil writ petition in the Allahabad High Court, the petitioner moved an application under section 476 of the Code to compel the filing of a complaint under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code against a respondent named Phanish Tripathi. The single judge rejected that application, and the petitioner thereafter filed an appeal under section 476‑B before the Supreme Court. The Court held that such an appeal did not lie to the Supreme Court but was cognizable by the Appellate Bench of the High Court. The Court explained that decrees of a single judge of the High Court exercising civil jurisdiction were ordinarily appealable to the High Court under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court read with clause 13 of the Uttar Pradesh High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. Consequently, the court constituted by the single judge was a court subordinate to the Appellate Bench of the High Court within the meaning of section 195(3) of the Code. The Court distinguished the earlier decision in M. S. Sheriff v. The State of Madras, [1954] S.C.R. 1144.

The factual backdrop was that Narain Das had filed a civil writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. In the course of that proceeding he submitted an application under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to make a complaint under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code against Phanish Tripathi, alleging that a statement in an affidavit filed by Tripathi on 14 May 1959 was false. The learned judge examining the application concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated that any portion of Tripathi’s affidavit was false and accordingly dismissed the application. Narain Das then filed a memorandum of appeal under section 476‑B of the Code challenging the dismissal. The registry forwarded the memorandum along with a report to determine whether the appeal was competent to be heard by the Supreme Court. The Court noted that section 476 of the Code is situated in Chapter XXXV, titled ‘Proceedings in case of certain offences affecting the administration of justice’. Section 476 empowers any civil, revenue or criminal court, when it believes an inquiry into an offence referred to in section 195(1)(b) or (c) is expedient in the interests of justice, to make a complaint after conducting such inquiry before a magistrate with appropriate jurisdiction. The Court therefore examined the scope of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by section 476‑B and concluded that the appeal must be directed to the higher bench of the same High Court rather than to the Supreme Court.

Section 476 of the Code authorises a civil, revenue or criminal court, when it is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to investigate any offence mentioned in section 195(1)(b) or (c) that appears to have been committed in or in connection with a proceeding before it, to make a complaint before a magistrate of the appropriate class after conducting such inquiry as it deems necessary. Consequently, where an offence under section 195(1)(b) or (c) is alleged to have been committed during or in relation to a proceeding in a civil court, the inquiry contemplated by section 476 and the consequent action of the civil court are directed at that very proceeding. Any person who is aggrieved by an order issued by a court under section 476 may, under section 476B, appeal to the court that is subordinate to the court that made the order, in accordance with the meaning attributed to “subordinate” in section 195(3). Section 195(3) provides that, for the purposes of the section, a court shall be deemed subordinate to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appeal‑able decrees or sentences of the former court, or, in the case of a civil court whose decrees are not ordinarily appealable, to the principal court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within the local limits of the jurisdiction wherein the civil court is situated. The decree of a single judge of the High Court exercising civil jurisdiction is ordinarily appealable to the High Court itself under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court read with clause 13 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. Although a decision rendered by a single judge of the High Court is as much a decision of the High Court as a decision of an appellate bench hearing appeals against that judge’s decrees, the court constituted by the single judge is nevertheless subordinate to the appellate bench of the High Court by virtue of the artificial judicial subordination created by section 195(3), which deems a court to be subordinate to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from its appeal‑able decrees. In the situation of a civil court that passes appeal‑able decrees, that court is deemed subordinate to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from those decrees. Conversely, in the case of a civil court whose decrees are not ordinarily appealable, that court is deemed subordinate to the principal court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within the local limits of the jurisdiction where the former court is situated, even though ordinarily such a court would not be subordinate to that principal court. Counsel for Narain Das argued that the order of the single judge issued under section 476 did not constitute a decree and therefore the provisions of section 195(3) should not apply. The Court considered this submission in the context of the statutory scheme governing appeals under section 476B.

In this case, the Court observed that it was unnecessary to decide whether the order issued by the learned single Judge under section 476 was appealable under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The Court noted that a right of appeal against such an order was provided by section 476B of the Code, and that the appropriate forum for that appeal was also prescribed by section 476B read together with section 195(3). Accordingly, the only relevant question was to determine the court to which appeals against appealable decrees of the single Judge ordinarily lay. The Court explained that, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court, appeals from the decisions of a single Judge fall to the High Court, and therefore the present appeal was properly within the jurisdiction of the High Court.

The counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in M S Sheriff v The State of Madras (1) [1954] S.C.R. 1144, arguing that an appeal under section 476B lay to this Court from the order of a single Judge of a High Court who had refused to register a complaint under section 476. The Court distinguished that precedent, explaining that the earlier case dealt with an appeal from an order of a Division Bench of a High Court, not from a single Judge. The Court further clarified that no appeal lies to this Court against the decision of a Division Bench of a High Court; consequently, an appeal under section 476B from a Division Bench order must lie to this Court. The Court observed that the fact an appeal may lie to this Court from the order of a single Judge when the High Court certifies, under Article 132 of the Constitution, that the matter involves a substantial question of law, did not support the appellant’s claim that the present appeal was competent before this Court. The Court held that it could not be said that an appeal ordinarily lies to this Court from the judgment of a single Judge, because such an appeal would arise only when a certificate under Article 132 is issued. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the present appeal did not lie to this Court but to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, directed that the memorandum of appeal be returned for presentation to the proper court, and declared the appeal incompetent.