NANDURI YOGANANDALAKSHMINARASIMACHARI AND ORS. vs. SRI AGASTHESWARASWAMI VARU

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1956

Decision Date: 15 January, 1960

Coram: J.L. Kapur, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta

The case was titled Nanduri Yoganandalakshminarasimachari and others versus Sri Agastheswaraswami Varu of Kolakalur and was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 15 January 1960. The judgment was authored by Justice J. L. Kapur, who sat with Justices P. B. Gajendragadkar and K. C. Das Gupta. The petitioners were Nanduri Yoganandalakshminarasimachari and several co‑plaintiffs, and the respondent was Sri Agastheswaraswami Varu. The official citation of the decision is 1960 AIR 622 and 1960 SCR (2) 768, and it has been referenced in later reports, including RF 1978 SC 1329 (28).

The dispute arose out of a claim concerning a property that was held as a trust for the performance of the Kalyanotsavam ceremony of a deity. The sole trustee of the deity sought a decree to recover arrears of income from the property, asserting that the property had been granted as a specified endowment intended to finance the Kalyanotsavam and related expenses such as feeding charges. The petitioners, who were the trustees of the property, were alleged to have defaulted on the trust’s purpose. The petition, however, did not contain a formal prayer for a declaration that the property and its income formed a specific endowment for the said religious services.

In defence, the respondents argued that the grant of the property was a personal inam burdened with the service of the deity and that it did not constitute a specific trust or a designated endowment for the idol’s benefit. The Madras High Court allowed the respondents to amend the plaint by inserting a formal prayer that the property and its income were a specific endowment for the Kalyanotsavam, and consequently held that the petitioners were liable to pay the entire income to the deity.

On appeal, the petitioners contended, inter alia, that the grant was a personal inam only, not a specific trust, and that the High Court should not have permitted the amendment of the plaint. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the grant and observed that inam registers are critical evidence, especially where original title deeds are not produced. When documents permit two possible inferences, the Court refrained from overturning the lower courts’ view. The Court held that the grant in question was indeed a specific endowment for the Kalyanotsavam, making it a specific trust rather than a personal grant with an incidental service obligation. The Court further reasoned that when, at the time of a grant, the specified charitable payments exhaust the income of the property, it is reasonable to infer that the intention was to devote the whole income to charity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed that the property constituted a specific charitable endowment and that the amendment of the plaint was proper because the added prayer was a necessary formal relief flowing from the original allegation.

The Court explained that when a charitable trust receives a donation, any future increase in the value of the property belongs to the charitable purpose, and therefore the court may apply the doctrine of cy‑pres to direct the use of such increased value. The Court further held that if a plaint contains necessary allegations, the required pleas have been raised, and the issues have been framed on the question, and if the parties are fully aware of the points in dispute and have produced the necessary evidence, the trial court may correctly permit an amendment that adds a prayer to the prayer clause. Such an addition is regarded as a formal remedy that naturally follows from the original allegation in the plaint.

This appeal arose from Civil Appeal No 147 of 1956, which challenged the judgment and decree dated 7 August 1952 pronounced by the Madras High Court in Appeal S No 809 of 1947. The High Court’s judgment itself stemmed from a decree dated 31 October 1947 issued by the Sub‑Judge of Tenali in Original Suit No 64 of 1944. The appellants were represented by counsel K. R. Chaudri, T. S. Venkataraman and K. B. Sharma, while the respondent was represented by counsel N. Subramanyam and T. Satyanarayana. The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered on 15 January 1960 by Justice Kapur.

The substantive dispute involved a suit brought on behalf of a deity, represented by the sole trustee appointed by the Hindu Religious Endowment Board. The plaintiff sought recovery of Rs 3,480 as arrears of income from the trust property for the years 1942‑44, and also prayed for a future payment equal to 160 bags of paddy per year, which the Court quantified as Rs 1,680. The plaintiff contended that the disputed property was a specific endowment intended for the Kalyanotsavam of the deity, and that the trustees, who were the defendants in the trial court, had defaulted on the purpose of the trust. Accordingly, the prayer sought a decree directing payment of the expenses incurred for Kalyanotsavam and associated feeding charges.

The defence argued that the inam was a personal grant intended only for driving the deity’s car on festival days, and that it did not constitute a specific trust or an endowment for the idol’s benefit. In other words, the defence described the grant as one burdened with service to the god rather than a charitable trust. Additional pleas were raised concerning jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata, and adverse possession. The trial court held that the grant was indeed a specific endowment for the Kalyanotsavam, but it was not obliged to require the appellants to expend the entire income of the lands on that purpose. Consequently, the trial court decreed that a sum of Rs 200 per year would be sufficient to meet the service of Kalyanotsavam. The other pleas pleaded by the defence were decided against the appellants. On appeal, the High Court focused solely on the nature of the grant, and, as the Court observed, the parties had fully understood the real nature of the dispute and the issues had already been framed on that point.

It was held that a general trustee could not compel a specific trustee to pay any money unless it was shown that the money had been spent for the purpose of the trust, and there was no proof that such expenditure had occurred. Consequently, the prayer contained in the original plaint was not granted. The High Court further expressed that all material facts had already been pleaded, no new facts were available for allegation, and the parties were fully aware of the true nature of the dispute, having even framed issues on the very question in controversy. On that basis, the High Court permitted amendment of the plaint by adding a prayer for a declaration that the properties listed in the schedule and the income derived therefrom constituted a specific endowment intended for the proper performance of the deity’s Kalyanotsavam, the feeding charges, and other incidental expenses, thereby making the appellants liable to pay the entire income. The Court also observed that both parties had presented all the evidence that was available, and that the sought declaration was merely a formal relief flowing directly from the allegations in the plaint. This amendment did not alter the cause of action nor did it require a fresh trial, and therefore the petition for amendment was allowed as set out. In the present appeal, counsel for the appellant raised three points: first, that the suit was not maintainable; second, that the amendment should not have been permitted; and third, that the grant was a personal grant to the appellants burdened with a service obligation and not a specific endowment. Regarding the first contention, the Court found no material showing how the suit could be deemed non‑maintainable. Concerning the amendment, the Court agreed with the High Court that all necessary allegations had been made in the plaint, the requisite pleas had been raised, an issue had been framed on the question, and the parties were fully cognizant of the contested points, with the necessary evidence duly led. Accordingly, the amendment adding the prayer in the prayer clause was rightly allowed. Turning to the nature of the grant, the documentary and other evidence had been interpreted by the lower courts as establishing a specific endowment for Kalyanotsavam, a finding that the appellant contested. To address this, the Court considered the inam documents, which formed the principal documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant. Inam registers have traditionally been regarded as evidence of utmost importance. The first document examined dated 1859‑60 was a copy of the inam statement made by N. Buchayya, the ancestor of the present appellants, and Column 1 of this document displayed the names of the

The register lists the inamdars and the enjoyers as “N. Buchayya the present enjoyment is towards the Kalyanotsavam of the deity.” Columns four and five identify the residence and the name of the original inamdars. Column five further provides the details of the family of the enjoyers at that time and records that the entry relates to the deity’s Kalyanotsavam. In column six the grantor who transferred the land to the grantee is named, and the entry states that “with the income therefrom he has been performing Sri Swami Varu’s Kalyanotsavam from that time.” Columns seven through nine describe the extent of the land involved. Column eleven sets out particulars concerning the present enjoyment and records the entry as Sri Swami Varu’s Kalyanotsavam. Column twelve indicates that the grant was revenue‑free and that the land was cultivated by Buchayya, whose annual income from the land was recorded as eleven rupees. Collectively, these entries demonstrate that the inam was granted as a specific endowment for the Kalyanotsavam of the deity and that the income was intended to be spent on the deity’s services. The next document examined is a copy of the inam‑fair register dated 16 May 1860. Because the High Court observed that certain entries in that copy were unclear, it obtained the original register from the Collector’s office and discovered that some entries appearing in the copy were absent from the original. In column eight, the words “driving the car” could not be found, and the remarks in column twelve that “the purpose for which the inam was granted is not stated” were also missing from the original register. Column two of this register classifies the inam under the general heading of religious endowment. Column eight, which describes the inam, contains the entry “For service in the pagoda – the service is performed.” Columns nine through eleven relate to the tenure of the land, with column nine confirming that the land was free of tax. Column thirteen identifies the original grantee as an ancestor of the appellants. Column fifteen records the entry: “In fasli 1223 Viresalingam 0‑8‑8 – In fasli 1236 Nanduri Vissanna Buchayya for service during the festival of the pagoda 0‑8‑O.” Column twenty‑one includes the statement “To be confirmed and continued so long as the service is performed.” It further notes that in fasli 1216 the inamdar was listed as a village servant, but that by fasli 1256 (or a similar year) it was ascertained that the service had been performed for a long time in the pagoda. Column twenty‑two simply states “confirmed” and provides the title‑deed number as T.D. 243. From these documentary records, together with the fact that neither the original sanad nor the inam title deed was produced, and considering certain admissions made by the predecessors of the appellants that they had acted as dharmakartas of the Kalyanotsavam and had performed that service, the court derived its conclusions regarding the nature of the grant.

The High Court concluded that the inam lands which were the subject of the dispute had been endowed specifically for the Kalyanotsavam festival and for other purposes incidental to that festival, and that the endowment created a distinct trust of which the appellants acted as trustees. Counsel for the appellants argued that the wording in the inam register stating that the grant would continue as long as the service was performed indicated that the grant was made not to the deity but to the appellants individually, together with an obligation to spend income on the particular service to the deity. A combined reading of the two relevant documents – the statement of the ancestor of the appellants and the entry in the inam register – demonstrated that the grant was a specific endowment, that the lands were dedicated for the purpose of Kalyanotsavam and for ancillary purposes, and that the arrangement constituted a specific trust. The lower courts accepted this description of the trust, and even though two alternative inferences might be drawn from the documents, there was no justification for disturbing the view of those courts, especially because the predecessors of the appellants had made admissions that supported the lower courts’ interpretation. Moreover, the words in question did not necessarily imply that the grant was made to an individual with an added duty to fund the service. In the present matter, the inam register does not state that the grant was to be confirmed in favour of Buchayya and to continue only while the service was performed.

The language employed in inam registers has been examined by several decisions of the Madras High Court, for example in Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Thadikonda Koteswara Rao (1), where the Court distinguished between the phrases “to be, confirmed so long as the service is performed” and “to be confirmed to the party so long as he continues the performance of the services”. The latter expression was held to create a personal grant, whereas the former did not. Accordingly, the present Court is of the opinion that the High Court’s finding – that the grant was a specific endowment for the deity’s Kalyanotsavam, thereby creating a specific trust and not a personal grant with an added spending obligation (1 A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 852) – should be upheld. The subsequent issue for determination concerns the portion of the income from the inam lands that must be applied to the service of the deity. The lower courts differed on this point: the trial court held that a sum of Rs. 200 from the income would be sufficient, while the High Court applied the cy‑pres doctrine and sentenced the entire income to the deity, even though it exceeded the amount required for the specific service. One fact that emerges from the inam register is that when

The Court observed that when the grant was made, the specific charitable payments completely exhausted the income of the property. From this circumstance, the Court inferred that the donor intended to devote the entire income to charitable purposes and that any later increase in the property’s value would likewise benefit the charity. The Court cited the authority Hindu Religious Endowments v. Thadikonda Kotesuwararao (1) together with the commentary Tudor on Charities (5th Ed.) p. 164 and the passage in Laws of England Vol. 4, paragraph 624, p. 303, to support this inference. Accordingly, the High Court was justified in holding that the whole of the income should be directed to the deity, thereby overturning the trial court’s order that only a portion of the income be applied for that purpose. The High Court applied the Cy‑pres doctrine, relying upon the decision in N. Sankaranarayana Pillayan and Ors. v. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras (2). The earlier decision stated that when a grant is made to a deity and the income is earmarked for the specific services for which the endowment was created, any surplus that cannot be spent on those services must be dealt with. The appropriate method for dealing with such a surplus is the application of the Cy‑pres doctrine. The Court noted that originally the income from the inam lands amounted to only Rs. 11, and that the entire amount was expended on the deity’s service known as Kalyanotsavam. Considering the nature of the grant, the Court concluded that the High Court had correctly applied the Cy‑pres doctrine in this case. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the judgment of the High Court was appropriate and ordered the dismissal of the appeal, with costs awarded to the respondent. The order read “Appeal dismissed.” The citations accompanying the judgment are (1) A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 852 and (2) (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 230.