Nanduri Yogananda... vs Sri Agastheswaraswamivaru

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 15 January, 1960

Coram: J.L. Kapur, K.C. Das Gupta, P.B. Gajendragadkar

The appeal concerned a decision of the Madras High Court that had modified the decree previously issued by the trial court. In the original suit, the parties who had been defendants in the trial court became the appellants before the Supreme Court, while the plaintiff was represented by the sole trustee appointed by the Hindu Religious Endowment Board. The case was titled Nanduri Yogananda … versus Sri Agastheswaraswamivaru and the hearing took place on 15 January 1960 before a bench comprising Justice J. L. Kapur, Justice K. C. Das Gupta and Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar.

The plaintiff, who acted on behalf of the deity through the appointed sole trustee, instituted the suit seeking recovery of a sum of Rs 3,480 that represented arrears of income from a property held in trust for the fiscal years 1942‑44. In addition, the plaintiff asked the court to order future payments calculated at a rate of one hundred sixty bags of paddy per year, which the plaintiff equated to a monetary value of Rs 1,680. The plaintiff contended that the disputed property was a specific endowment that had been made to finance the Kalyanotsavam ceremony of the deity, and alleged that the defendants‑trustees had failed to fulfill that purpose. Accordingly, the prayer prayed for a decree that would recover the expenses associated with the Kalyanotsavam and the charges for feeding the deity. The defendants counter‑claimed that the grant, described as an inam, was a personal concession intended solely for the purpose of driving the deity’s carriage on festival days, and therefore did not constitute a specific trust or an endowment for the idol’s benefit. In essence, they argued that the inam was burdened only with a service obligation to the god. The defendants also raised several additional pleas, including objections relating to jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata and claims of adverse possession. The trial court concluded that the grant did indeed constitute a specific endowment for the Kalyanotsavam, but held that the defendants were not required to apply the entire income of the lands to that purpose. Instead, the court fixed an annual sum of Rs 200 as a sufficient provision for performing the Kalyanotsavam service. All other pleas raised by the defendants were decided against them.

When the matter was before the High Court, the sole issue that was argued concerned the character of the grant. The High Court observed that a general trustee could not demand payment from a specific trustee unless there was proof that the amount had been spent for the intended purpose, and it found that such proof was lacking. Consequently, the prayer contained in the original plaint for monetary payment was not granted. The High Court further noted that the plaintiff had pleaded all material facts, that no new facts were available for allegation, and that both parties were fully aware of the true nature of their dispute, which had already been framed as the central issue. In view of these considerations, the High Court permitted the amendment of the plaint by inserting a new prayer for a declaratory order. The amendment sought a declaration that the properties listed in the schedule and the income derived therefrom constituted a specific endowment dedicated to the proper performance of the Kalyanotsavam services of the deity, including feeding charges and other incidental expenses. The amendment further posited that, on that basis, the appellants were liable to pay the entire income generated by the properties.

The Court observed that the petition sought a declaration of entitlement to the entire income and held that the evidence presented by both parties was complete. It further expressed the view that the request for a declaration was merely a formal remedy that directly arose from the allegations contained in the plaint. The Court noted that granting such a declaration would not alter the original cause of action nor would it necessitate the production of fresh evidence, and consequently it allowed the amendment of the plaint by adding the aforementioned prayer. In the present appeal, counsel for the appellant advanced three separate contentions: first, that the suit was not maintainable; second, that the amendment of the plaint should not have been permitted; and third, that the grant in question was a personal grant to the appellants which imposed a service obligation and therefore could not be characterised as a specific endowment. Regarding the first contention, the Court observed that no material had been placed before it to demonstrate how the suit might be non‑maintainable. Concerning the second contention, the Court held that the High Court had correctly exercised its discretion in allowing the amendment. It pointed out that the plaint contained all the necessary allegations, that the requisite pleas had been raised by the appellants, that an issue was framed on the disputed question, and that the parties were fully aware of the matters in controversy and had led the required evidence. In this assessment, the Court affirmed that the High Court was right to permit the amendment by adding the new prayer to the prayer clause. The Court then turned to the question of the nature of the grant. Both the High Court and the trial court, after examining the documentary and other evidence, had concluded that the grant constituted a specific endowment for the performance of Kalyanotsavam. The appellant challenged this finding and sought to overturn it. To address this challenge, the Court examined the inam documents, which the appellant identified as the primary documentary material. The Court reiterated that inam registers are regarded as evidence of the highest significance. The first document considered was a copy of the inam statement dated 1859‑60, prepared by N. Buchayya, who was the ancestor of the present appellants. Column 1 of this document listed the names of the inamdars and indicated that the present enjoyment was “towards the Kalyanotsavam” of the deity. Columns 4 and 5 provided the residence and the name of the original inamdars, while Column 5 also set out the particulars of the family of the then‑enjoyers, showing that the entry related to the deity’s Kalyanotsavam. Column 6 recorded the name of the grantor who conveyed the land to the grantee and stated that “with the income therefrom he has been performing Sri Swami Varu’s Kalyanotsavam from that time.” Columns 7 through 9 detailed the extent of the land involved. Column 11 contained particulars relating to the present enjoyment, again identifying the entry as Sri Swami Varu’s Kalyanotsavam. Finally, Column 12 indicated that the grant was revenue‑free, that the land was cultivated by Buchayya, and that the income derived from it amounted to Rs 11 per annum. The Court therefore concluded that the documentary evidence supported the characterization of the grant as a specific endowment for the Kalyanotsavam.

In the records, it was shown that the inam had been granted as a specific endowment intended exclusively for the Kalyanotsavam of the deity, and that the income derived from the land was to be expended on the services of the deity. The next document examined by the Court was a copy of the inam‑fair register dated 16 May 1860. The High Court observed that certain entries in that copy were unclear, and therefore it directed that the original register be obtained from the Collector’s office. Upon examination of the original, the Court discovered that some of the entries appearing in the copy were not present in the original register. For example, in Column 8 the words “driving the car” could not be located, and the remarks entered in Column 12 stating that “the purpose for which the inam was granted is not stated” were also absent from the original document. Column 2 of the register classifies the grant under the general heading of religious endowment. Column 8, which relates to the description of the inam, records the entry “For service in the pagoda … The service is performed.” Columns 9 through 11 pertain to the tenure of the grant, while Column 12 was already discussed earlier. Column 9 indicates that the land was free of tax. Column 13 names the original grantee as the ancestor of the present appellants. In Column 15 the entry reads: “In fasli 1223 Viresalingam 0‑8‑8 – In fasli 1236 Nanduri Vissanna Buchayya for service during the festival of the pagoda 0‑8‑0.” Column 21 contains the statement: “To be confirmed and continued so long as the service is performed. In fasli 1216 the inamdar is entered as village servant but it is ascertained and is entered in fasli 1256 that service is performed from a long time in the pagoda.” Column 22 records the word “confirmed” and supplies the title‑deed number, identified as T.D. 243. Considering these documents, the fact that neither the sanad nor the inam title deed had been produced, and certain admissions made by the predecessors of the appellants that they acted as dharmakartas of the Kalyanotsavam, the High Court concluded that the lands in dispute were endowed specifically for the Kalyanotsavam and for ancillary purposes, thereby forming a specific trust of which the appellants were the trustees. Counsel for the appellants argued that the wording in the inam register, indicating that the grant would continue only while the service was performed, suggested that the grant was made to the individuals themselves with the added obligation to spend the income on the designated service to the deity. The Court noted that a combined reading of the ancestor’s statement and the inam register demonstrates that the grant was indeed a specific endowment, that the lands were bestowed for the purpose of the Kalyanotsavam and related incidental purposes, and that they constituted a specific trust.

The Court observed that the trust created by the two documents was a specific trust, and that the lower courts had correctly identified this character. Even though the documents could be read to yield two possible inferences, the Court found no reason to disturb the conclusions of the lower courts, especially because the predecessors of the appellants had admitted facts that supported those conclusions. The Court further noted that the language of the documents did not necessarily indicate that the grant was made to an individual with a personal obligation to spend money on the service. In the present case, the inam register did not state that the grant was to be confirmed in favour of Buchayya and to continue only while the service was performed. The Court explained that similar language used in inam registers had been examined in earlier Madras High Court decisions, for example Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Thadikonda Koteswara Rao (A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 852), where a distinction was drawn between the phrases “to be confirmed so long as the service is performed” and “to be confirmed to the party so long as he continues the performance of the services”. The former was held not to create a personal grant, whereas the latter did. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court’s finding—that the grant was a specific endowment for the Kalyanotsavam of the deity, constituting a specific trust and not a personal grant with an added spending obligation—was correct and required no interference. The next issue for determination concerned the portion of the income from the inam lands that should be expended on the service to the deity. The lower courts disagreed on this point. The trial court had held that Rs. 200 of the income would be sufficient for the purpose, while the High Court, applying the Cy‑pres doctrine, held that the entire income should be devoted to the deity even though it exceeded the amount needed for the specific service. The Court noted a material fact emerging from the inam register: at the time the grant was made, the specific charitable payments exhausted the income of the property, leading to a reasonable inference that the intention was to devote the whole income to charity and that any later increase in the property’s value would accrue to the charity. The Court cited authorities supporting this inference, including Hindu Religious Endowments v. Thadikonda Koteswara Rao (A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 852), Tudor on Charities (5th Ed.) p. 164, and Laws of England Vol. 4, para. 624, p. 303. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the High Court was justified in directing that the entire income be given to the deity, thereby superseding the trial court’s limited allocation. The High Court had relied on the decision in N. Sankaranarayana Pillayan & Ors. v. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras ((1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 230), which held that when a grant is made to a deity and the earmarked income exceeds the amount needed for the specified services, the Cy‑pres doctrine applies to allocate the surplus.

The Court explained that when a gift is made for the benefit of a deity and the income from that gift is designated for particular religious services, any excess income that cannot be applied to those services must be dealt with under the Cy‑pres doctrine. In this case the original income from the inam was only eleven rupees, and the entire amount was historically spent on the performance of the deity’s service known as Kalyanotsavam. Considering that the grant was intended solely for that religious purpose, the High Court correctly applied the Cy‑pres principle to address the surplus. Accordingly, the Court held that the judgment delivered by the High Court was legally sound. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings. The final order affirmed the dismissal of the appeal.