M/S. Madan Mohan Damma Mal Ltd. And Anr vs The State Of West Bengal And Anr
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 1959
Decision Date: 24 November 1960
Coram: Raghubar Dayal, Syed Jaffer Imam, A.K. Sarkar
In the case titled M/S. Madan Mohan Damma Mal Ltd. and another versus The State of West Bengal and another, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 24 November 1960. The bench consisted of Justice Raghubar Dayal, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and Justice A K Sarkar. The petitioners were identified as M/S. Madan Mohan Damma Mal Ltd. together with an additional appellant, while the respondents were the State of West Bengal and an associated party. The decision appears in the 1961 volume of the All India Reporter at page 1013 and also in the 1961 Supreme Court Reports (Second Series) at page 664. The legal question arose under section 462 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 (West Bengal Act XXXIII of 1951), which creates a presumption that mustard oil stored for sale is intended for commercial distribution unless that presumption is successfully rebutted. According to the headnote, the first appellant sent a consignment of mustard oil in a tank wagon from Firozabad in Uttar Pradesh to its own premises in Calcutta, where it received the wagon from the railway authorities. A Food Inspector subsequently collected samples of the oil from the wagon; laboratory analysis disclosed that the oil was adulterated. Consequently, the appellants were prosecuted under section 462 for storing adulterated mustard oil for sale. The appellants argued that the statutory presumption was displaced because of certain arrangements between the Uttar Pradesh Oil Millers Association and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, and they also produced a letter addressed to the Association in which they requested that a sample be taken and tested so that the appellants could accept delivery only if the oil was found pure. The Court held that this letter did not sufficiently rebut the presumption that the oil was stored for sale. The letter failed to declare that the oil would not be sold, and it did not specify the course of action should the oil be found impure. Moreover, there was no agreement between the Association and the municipal corporation, which alone possessed the authority to act under the Act. The arrangement and the letter were therefore considered a device intended to make detection of the offence difficult, and the presumption remained unrebutted.
The matter proceeded in criminal appellate jurisdiction as Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 1959, filed by special leave against the order of the Calcutta High Court that affirmed the conviction of the appellants, Messrs. Madan Mohan Damma Mal Ltd. and Om Prokash Manglik, its manager, under section 462 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. The High Court had previously upheld a judgment and order dated 2 July 1957, which itself arose from the decision dated 16 January 1956 of the Second Court of the Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta, in case No. 208B of 1955. Counsel for the appellant comprised legal representatives C B Aggarwala, B B Tawakley and B P Maheshwari, while the respondents were represented by Nalin Chandra Bannerjee, Sunil K Basu and S N Mukherjee on behalf of P K Bose. The judgment was delivered on 24 November 1960 by Justice Raghubar Dayal. The Court opened its opinion by stating that this appeal, granted by special leave, challenged the High Court’s order confirming the conviction of the two appellants under the cited provision of the Calcutta Municipal Act, thereby setting the stage for a detailed examination of whether the statutory presumption had been properly rebutted and whether the procedural steps taken by the authorities were lawful.
The Court noted that the factual background of the present appeal began with the shipment of a consignment of mustard oil weighing approximately 499 maunds. The oil was manufactured at Firozabad and was sent by Messrs Madan Mohan Damma Mal Ltd., referred to in the proceedings as appellant No 1, to its own premises in Calcutta. The consignment was transported in tank wagon numbered 75612 and arrived at the Pathuriaghat siding in Calcutta at about 8.45 a.m. on 3 January 1955, having been dispatched from the place of manufacture on 25 December 1954.
Upon arrival, Dr Nityananda Bagui, who served as the Food Inspector for the Calcutta Corporation, proceeded to the siding accompanied by several police officers. Dr Bagui arranged with Om Prokash Manglik, identified in the case as appellant No 2 and found standing near the wagon, to purchase twelve ounces of the oil for a price of eight annas. Following this transaction, Dr Bagui extracted three separate samples of the mustard oil from the wagon and placed each sample in a distinct phial. The three phials were sealed in accordance with proper procedure. One of the sealed phials was handed over to appellant No 2, while the remaining two phials were retained by Dr Bagui. He immediately forwarded one of his retained phials to the Public Analyst for examination on the same day.
The Public Analyst, Ashit Ranjan Sen, received the phial on 3 January 1955 and conducted an analysis of the oil contained therein. Sen reported that he was unable to reach any definitive conclusion regarding the purity of the oil. Nevertheless, later that evening Dr Bagui seized the tank wagon, affixed the seal of the Calcutta Corporation to it, and placed the wagon under the custody of appellant No 2. The oil remaining in the sealed tank was subsequently permitted to be pumped out and transferred to the appellants’ godown on 6 January 1955. The lock of the godown was thereafter sealed with the Corporation’s seal to preserve the integrity of the contents.
On 4 January 1955, Mr Sen sent an initial report to the Corporation indicating that the oil appeared to be adulterated. He later prepared a more detailed analytical report, which was dispatched on 24 January 1955 and set out the specific findings of his examination. Upon receipt of this detailed report confirming adulteration, Dr Bagui filed a formal complaint against the appellants on 4 February 1955. The complaint alleged that the appellants were selling and keeping for sale mustard oil that, according to the analysis, had been adulterated with groundnut oil.
During the subsequent trial, the trial Court considered an application made on behalf of the appellants seeking the dispatch of the third sealed sample phial that was still in the possession of the Corporation’s Health Officer. The Court ordered that this third phial be sent to the Director of Health Services of the Government of West Bengal for independent analysis and a report. The analytical work on this sample was performed by Dulal Chandra Dey, who appeared as Court Witness No 1. Dey’s examination concluded that the oil in the third phial was also adulterated with groundnut oil. The analytical report, however, was transmitted to the Court on a document bearing the signature of Dr S K Chatterjee, Deputy Director of Health Services, Government of West Bengal, rather than the analyst himself.
The appellants further alleged that they had obtained an independent assessment of the oil in their possession by sending a sample to Om Prakash, an oil expert employed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Om Prakash issued a report dated 27 July 1955, in which he stated that the sample “conforms to Agmark Specification for Mustard Oil and is considered to be free from adulterants such as sesame, groundnut and linseed oil.” The Court observed, however, that this report had not been substantiated by any evidence presented before it.
The narrative concluded with a reference to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, indicating that further procedural steps involving the police were relevant to the matter, though the details of those steps were to be addressed in the subsequent portion of the judgment.
On 10 January 1955 the Enforcement Branch of Calcutta dispatched a sample of mustard oil to the Public Analyst of Food & Water at the West Bengal Public Health Laboratory. The analyst, Sri S. N. Mitra, designated D.W. 7, examined the sample and, relying on a saponification value of 173.3 and an iodine value of 105, reported that the oil approximated the standards applicable to genuine mustard oil. The Court noted, however, that this report did not demonstrate that the oil was pure mustard oil. In answer to a request for clarification from the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Sri Mitra explained his position in the following words: “But, unless conclusive evidence of the presence of a foreign oil, corroborated in some instances by the figures of the usual oil contents, is obtained, the sample is not and cannot be declared adulterated. In the present case the sample of mustard oil has already been examined exhaustively and has been certified as ‘approximating to standards’ but not as genuine. The legal implication of the expression is that the sample will have the benefit of doubt.” The Court observed that no satisfactory proof was placed on record establishing that the oil submitted to Sri Mitra was taken from the appellants’ tank‑wagon. Dr Bagui, who was examined as a witness, did not testify that the police had taken a sample, nor was he questioned on that point. Consequently, the Court found no reasonable basis for the police to have obtained a sample for the purpose of determining whether the mustard oil was pure. During cross‑examination on behalf of the appellants, it appeared that the prosecution alleged that Dr Bagui himself had taken four samples of the questioned mustard oil and that one of those samples had been forwarded to the Enforcement Branch. Dr Bagui repudiated this allegation, declaring that he had not taken four samples. His denial was fully supported by the testimony of Kalidas Ganguli, Sub‑Inspector of the Calcutta Enforcement Branch, who had accompanied Dr Bagui at the relevant time. Sub‑Inspector Ganguli affirmed that the Corporation Food Inspector had collected three samples, while the police had taken a fourth sample that was sealed with the Corporation’s seal. The Court expressed doubt that the police indeed seized a sample and affixed the Corporation seal as described by Sub‑Inspector Ganguli. The lower courts, having examined the evidence, concluded that the mustard oil in the appellants’ tank‑wagon was adulterated with groundnut oil, that the appellants possessed the adulterated oil, and that they had stored it for sale, relying on the presumption created by subsection (4) of section 462 of the Act, a presumption that the appellants had not successfully rebutted. Counsel for the appellants challenged the correctness of these findings. The Court then turned to the evidence concerning the analyses performed by chemists, including the testimony of Ashit Ranjan Sen, P.W. 2, the Public Analyst who had examined the first sample sent by Dr Bagui.
Dr. Bagui examined the sample of mustard oil on January 3‑4, 1955 and concluded that it was adulterated. His conclusion was based on two laboratory results: the B.R. Index measured at 40 °C was 60.4, and the Bellier test for groundnut oil was positive because the sample became turbid at 28 °C. Court Witness No. 1, Dulal Chand Dey, who personally analysed the sample that the Court had sent, also found the oil to be adulterated. His analysis showed a saponification value of 175.5, an iodine value of 106°, and the appearance of turbidity at 27 °C. In addition, he observed a small quantity of linseed oil in the sample. The correctness of Dey’s opinion on these data was acknowledged by Sri Mitra, Deputy Commissioner of the Enforcement Branch, who examined the same sample.
Given these expert findings, the Court held that the lower courts were correct in finding that the mustard oil present in the appellant’s tank‑wagon was adulterated. It was not established that the sample of mustard oil sent by the Deputy Commissioner to Sri Mitra originated from the tank‑wagon belonging to the appellants. Therefore, Sri Mitra’s opinion on the nature of that particular sample did not contradict the opinions of Sri Sen and Sri Dey, both of whom had concluded that the oil they examined was adulterated with groundnut oil.
The appellants also claimed that they were not in possession of the oil at the time Dr. Bagui took his sample, arguing that the presumption under subsection (4) of section 462 of the Act could not be raised against them for holding the oil for sale. The judgment of the High Court under appeal indicated that this claim was not contested at the hearing; the record showed that the appellants were indeed in possession of the mustard oil from which the sample was taken. On the basis of the evidence, the Court was of the opinion that the appellants possessed the oil.
The consignment of oil originated from the manufacturing firm, appellant No. 1, and was destined for the same firm’s premises in Calcutta. The manager of appellant No. 1, appellant No. 2, received delivery of the railway wagon on January 3, 1955. Although there was no direct documentary evidence proving that the delivery occurred before Dr. Bagui’s sampling, the surrounding circumstances led the Court to conclude that appellant No. 2 must have taken delivery prior to the sampling. The reasoning was that appellant No. 2 could not have opened the wagon for the purpose of taking oil samples unless he already had legal possession of the wagon from the railway authorities. The railway authorities would have ensured that no one tampered with the contents while the wagon remained under their control. Consequently, appellant No. 2 would have been required to pay the freight charges and formally receive the wagon before Dr. Bagui’s visit, thereby gaining control over the wagon and the oil it contained.
It was therefore concluded that the appellants possessed the oil in the tank wagon at the time Dr Bagui removed samples from it, and consequently they were in a position to extract the oil themselves or to allow another party to do so. The appellants’ principal argument was that the statutory presumption that the mustard oil stored in the wagon was intended for sale by them, which arises under sub‑section (4) of section 462 of the Act, could be displaced and that they had fully succeeded in doing so. To support that claim they relied upon certain alleged arrangements between the Uttar Pradesh Oil Millers Association and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Enforcement Branch, together with a letter addressed by the appellants to the Secretary of the Association dated 3 January 1955 (Exhibit R). The Court examined all the documents cited in support of the purported arrangement between the Association and the Deputy Commissioner, and found no provision therein that would lawfully prevent the appellants from marketing the oil even if it were later discovered to be adulterated. The record of the meeting of the Uttar Pradesh Oil Millers Association held on 9 June 1954, which was attended by the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner of the Enforcement Branch, disclosed that no such agreement was concluded. At that meeting the Deputy Commissioner suggested that every member of the Association should write to their respective mills requesting that any imported oil first be delivered to a designated point before further distribution, but this recommendation was not fully accepted; the members merely affirmed that they always imported pure mustard oil. The meeting did resolve that oil samples should be taken on the following morning, 10 June 1954. Subsequently, in November 1954, the Uttar Pradesh Oil Millers Association wrote to appellant No 1 informing him that, following the Deputy Commissioner’s direction, each application to draw a sample for testing must be accompanied by a certificate signed by the chemist, manager or proprietor of the mill affirming that the mustard oil in the tank wagon was pure and free from argemone, linseed or any other adulterant. Further reminders issued by the Deputy Commissioner in February 1955 and April 1955 urged the Association to advise its members that whenever they ordered mustard oil from outside Bengal, the railway receipts should be accompanied by a clear certificate of examination from the chemist of the supplying factory. These directives appear to have had little effect, as the oil consignment received by the appellants was not accompanied by any such certificate. The chemist of the appellants’ mill, Mahendra Kumar Gupta, deposed that he had taken a sample from the oil in the wagon and found it to be genuine mustard oil, free from any adulteration. However, there is no evidence that any certificate concerning the purity of the mustard oil was attached to the railway receipt or shown to Dr Bagui or the police officers who accompanied him at the time of sampling.
The certificate that was alleged to confirm the purity of the mustard oil sent was not shown to have been attached to the railway receipt, and it was also not demonstrated that the certificate had been presented to Dr Bagui or to the police officers who were accompanying him at the relevant time. On the morning of 3 January 1955, at precisely ten o’clock, a communication identified as Exhibit R was sent on behalf of appellant No 1 to the Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Oil Millers Association. The letter contained the following request: “Please arrange for a sample and have it tested through the proper authorities concerned, so that we may take delivery of the oil only if it is found pure on analysis.” The Court observed that such a statement does not effectively overcome the presumption that the oil consigned by appellant No 1 to itself at Calcutta was intended for storage and sale. The letter itself does not declare that the oil would be withheld from sale; it merely indicates that the parties would accept the delivery only after a purity test confirms that the oil is pure. The document does not specify what action would be taken if the analysis were to reveal impurity, and it makes no commitment to reject or destroy the oil in that circumstance. Moreover, the Association was not engaged in any arrangement with the Corporation, which alone possessed the authority to act against adulterated mustard oil, and the Enforcement Branch of the Police had no involvement in the matter. In this factual context, the purported arrangement with the Enforcement Branch and the subsequent letters of the same type as Exhibit R appear to have been a subtle scheme designed to create difficulty for the competent authorities charged with ensuring that mustard oil offered for sale is fit for consumption. It is evident from the facts that such an arrangement facilitated the appearance of an alleged fourth sample taken from the appellant’s tank wagon and resulted in an ambiguous report concerning its purity. Consequently, the Court concluded that Exhibit R, and the arrangement that led to its issuance, do not demonstrate that the mustard oil in the wagon, which would otherwise be presumed to have been stored for sale, was in fact not intended for sale. Accordingly, the Court held that the conviction of the appellants under section 462 of the Act was justified, and the appeal was dismissed.