Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs The Union Of India and Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1955

Decision Date: 5 December 1960

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

In this matter the Supreme Court considered the petition of Lt Col Khajoor Singh filed against the Union of India and another respondent. The petition was filed on 5 December 1960 and was heard by a bench comprising Bhuvneshwar P Sinha, J L Kapur, P B Gajendragadkar, K N Wanchoo, K C Das Gupta and J C Shah. The case is reported as 1961 AIR 532 and 1961 SCR (2) 828 and is cited in later authorities such as R 1962 SC1513 (4) D, D 1967 SC1244 (12) RF, R 1975 SC865 (30) R and R 1989 SC1933 (24). The petition invoked the fundamental right to enforce constitutional guarantees and sought a writ under Article 32(2A) of the Constitution, which is analogous to the power of a High Court to issue writs under Article 226. The relevant statutory provision examined was the power of the High Court to issue writs against the Government of India.

The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir had dismissed the petition on the basis of two precedents, Election Commission India v Saka Venkata Subba Rao [1953] SCR 1144 and K S Rashid and Son v The Income‑Tax Investigation Commission [1954] SCR 738, holding that the application was not maintainable because it fell outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The petitioner contended that he held the substantive rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Jammu and Kashmir forces and was entitled to remain in service until he turned fifty‑three on 20 November 1961. He argued that a letter dated 31 July 1954 issued by the Government of India retired him prematurely, without any charge or allegation, in violation of Article 16(1) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court’s reliance on the earlier decisions was correct and that the appeal must fail. The Court explained that the jurisdiction conferred on a High Court by Article 226 depends on the location of the authority that issues the order, not on the residence or location of the person affected by that order. Consequently, the place where the order has effect is irrelevant to jurisdiction. The Court clarified that a natural person is within the territorial jurisdiction if he resides there either permanently or temporarily; an authority other than the Government is within the territory if its office is located there; and a Government is within the territory if its seat from which it actually functions is situated there. The term “authority” in Article 226 is capable of including a Government, a meaning that must be read together with the clause “including in appropriate cases any Government.” This clause does not confer discretionary power on High Courts to issue writs against any Government; it merely indicates that where the authority against whom jurisdiction exists happens to be a Government or its subordinates, the Court may issue the writ. The Court approved the rulings in Election Commission India v Saka Venkata Subba Rao and K S Rashid and Son, overruled Maqbulunnissa v Union of India, and referred to Lloyds Bank Limited v The Lloyds Bank Indian Staff Association (Calcutta Branches). It also noted that proceedings under Article 226 are not suits covered by Article 300 of the Constitution.

The Court explained that the term “any Government” must be read together with the following clause “including in appropriate cases any Government.” When the clause is properly construed, it means that the term may embrace a Government in a situation that is suitable. The Court clarified that this clause is not linked to the act of issuing a writ or order and it is not intended to give High Courts discretion to issue a writ or direction against any Government. Rather, it simply indicates that in cases where the authority against which the High Court has jurisdiction happens to be a Government or its subordinates, the High Court may issue a writ directed at that Government. The Court cited the decisions in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] S.C.R. 1144 and K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income‑tax Investigation Commission, [1954] S.C.R. 738, and approved those rulings. It noted that the earlier case of Maqbulunnissa v. Union of India, I.L.R. (1953) 2 All. 289, had been overruled, and mentioned the case of Lloyds Bank Limited v. The Lloyds Bank Indian Staff Association (Calcutta Branches), I.L.R. [1954] 2 Cal. 1 as a reference. The Court emphasized that proceedings under Article 226 are not ordinary suits covered by Article 300 of the Constitution; they provide extraordinary remedies through a special procedure, and the concept of a cause of action cannot be introduced into such proceedings because the Constitution expressly requires that the person or authority concerned be situated within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. The decision in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129, was held to be inapplicable. While acknowledging that interpreting Article 226 in this way may cause inconvenience to persons living far from New Delhi, where the Union Government is physically located, the Court said that such inconvenience may be a reason for amending the Article but does not alter its plain language. The Court further warned that it should not, except where it is shown beyond all reasonable doubt that a previous ruling given after full deliberation and hearing was erroneous, revisit that ruling, especially on a constitutional question.

Per Subba Rao, J., the Court noted that the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in establishing the fundamental rights in Part III and empowering the High Courts by Article 226 was largely defeated if a person residing in a remote part of the country had to travel to New Delhi to obtain protection from the Punjab High Court whenever the Union Government infringed his fundamental right. The Court observed that the power conferred on the High Courts by Article 226 is of the widest amplitude; it enables the High Courts not only to issue writs but also to issue directions and orders. The words “any Government” in the Article embrace the Union Government, which has no fixed constitutional seat in a particular place and exercises its powers throughout the country. Consequently, the Union Government must be deemed, in law, to have functional existence throughout India and therefore to be situated within the territories of every State. As a result, when the Union Government infringes the legal right or interest of a person who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, that High Court possesses the authority under Article 226 to issue a writ against the Union Government. If the Government or its officers fail to obey the writ, even though they are physically outside the territorial limits, the High Court may proceed against them for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.

The Court explained that when a person lives within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, that High Court is empowered by Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ against the Union Government. If the Union Government or any of its officers disobey the order of the High Court, even though those officers may be physically located outside the High Court’s territory, the High Court may initiate contempt proceedings against them under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The Court noted that the decision in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] S.C.R. 1144, does not apply to the present situation. It also referred to the cases K….S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, [1954] S.C.R. 738 and Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, L.R. 70 I.A. 129, which were considered, and the decision in Maqbul‑Unnissa v. Union of India, I.L.R. (1953) 2 All. 289, which was approved. The judgments in Surajmal v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 958 M.P. 103 and Radheshyam Makhanlal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 353, were held not to be applicable. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the High Court possessed the authority to issue a writ to the Union Government under Article 32(2A) of the Constitution.

Justice Das Gupta added that it is neither correct nor appropriate to speak of a fixed “location” of any Government, and there is no satisfactory test for ascertaining the location of the Government of India. Because the Government exercises its functions throughout the entire territory of India, it is deemed to be present within the jurisdiction of every High Court. The expression “any Government” in Article 226 therefore indicates that a High Court may grant relief against the Union Government as well. Nevertheless, the Court clarified that the Union Government will not be required to face parallel applications for relief in every High Court for the same order. The phrase “in appropriate cases” in Article 226, when properly construed, means that only one High Court will have jurisdiction over a particular act or omission for which relief is claimed. The place where the act or omission occurred can be identified, and the High Court having jurisdiction over that place alone may grant the appropriate relief. The Court rejected the proposition that, under Article 226, the cause of action determines jurisdiction, and emphasized that neither Article 226 nor Article 32(2A) is based on that principle. The decision in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] S.C.R. 1144, was approved.

The judgment concerned a civil appeal numbered 37 of 1955, filed in the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction. The appeal challenged the judgment and order dated 7 December 1954 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 76 of 2011. Counsel for the appellant was Mr Vir Sen Sawhney. The respondents were represented by the Solicitor‑General of India, Mr C….K. Daphtary, and by senior counsel Mr B. R. L. Iyengar, Mr R. H. Dhebar and Mr T. M. Sen. An intervener was represented by Mr Sardar Bahadur. The order was pronounced on 5 December 1960. The judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Sinha, with Judges Kapur, Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Shah joining. Separate opinions were authored by Justice Subba Rao and Justice Das Gupta. The leading opinion was written by Chief Justice Sinha, who addressed the issues raised in the appeal and set out the Court’s conclusions regarding the jurisdiction of High Courts to issue writs against the Union Government under the constitutional provisions discussed.

The appeal challenged a judgment and order dated 7 December 1954 that had been issued in an application filed under article 32(2A) of the Constitution. The petitioner sought the issuance of a writ, directions or an order against two respondents: the Union of India, represented by the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi, who was termed respondent No 1, and the State of Jammu and Kashmir, represented by the Chief Secretary of the State, who was termed respondent No 2. The petition was based on several allegations and, for convenience, the petitioner is referred to as the appellant throughout the judgment. On 12 August 1954 the appellant was 45 years and 262 days old. He held a regular commission in the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces, which had been merged with the Defence Forces of the Union on 1 September 1949. At the time of the filing the appellant held the substantive rank of lieutenant‑colonel in the amalgamated forces and was entitled to remain in service until attaining the age of 53 years, an event that would occur on 20 November 1961. On 31 July 1954 the Government of India issued a letter retiring the appellant with effect from 12 August 1954. The retirement was not based on any allegation of inefficiency, indiscipline or any other irregularity on the part of the appellant. The appellant contended that the premature retirement was illegal, unwarranted, discriminatory and contrary to article 16(1) of the Constitution. The petition was opposed on several preliminary grounds, the first of which was that respondent No 1, being outside the territorial limits of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, could not be subject to a writ issued by that Court and therefore the petition was non‑maintainable. This preliminary objection was argued before a division bench consisting of the chief justice and another judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court. By its judgment dated 7 December 1954 the High Court upheld the preliminary objection, relying on its earlier decisions in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (1953) and K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income‑Tax Investigation Commission (1954). The High Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ against the first respondent and dismissed the petition, but it granted a certificate under article 132 of the Constitution, thereby giving rise to the present appeal. The matter was initially heard by a bench of five judges. During that hearing it became clear that the appellant not only sought to distinguish the two cited decisions but also questioned their correctness; consequently a larger bench was constituted to examine the validity of those decisions on which the High Court had relied.

It was noted that the High Court had refused to entertain the appellant’s petition on its merits. The appellant, through his counsel, contended at the first stage that the earlier decisions of this Court could be distinguished because those decisions had not, in substance, addressed whether the Government of India was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or to the jurisdiction of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court under Article 32(2A) of the Constitution. The appellant argued that, on a proper construction, those provisions should not obstruct the claim, since the Government of India has no fixed location and its authority extends throughout the Union territory. He further maintained that the correct test should be whether the cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the High Court’s jurisdiction and asserted that the High Court erred in holding that the term “authority” embraced a Government. In response to these contentions, the learned Solicitor‑General argued that a proper interpretation of the constitutional provisions required that the observations of Chief Justice Sastri in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (1) concerning “authority” applied equally to the Government, including the Union Government. He explained that the Government of India functions through its officers, and consequently the “location” contemplated in the statutes means the place where the impugned orders are ordinarily passed. He further distinguished the considerations in a suit, which focus on the cause of action, from those in a writ proceeding, where the writ must reach the specific officers concerned. The expression “in appropriate cases” was explained to mean that although the Union Government as a whole may not be situated within the territorial limits of a High Court, a writ may still be issued against it when an officer of the Union Government is acting within those limits and his order is the subject of the dispute. Accordingly, it was emphasized that a High Court cannot issue a writ against the Union in every circumstance; a writ of mandamus, for example, is directed against a particular named person or authority, and a writ of certiorari is directed against a specific record. Hence, the writ must be addressed to someone who is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court observed that the question presented here was of considerable importance and was not a matter of first impression. The issue had first been raised before this Court in 1952 and was decided by a Constitution Bench in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (1). In that case, a writ was sought from the Madras High Court to restrain the Election Commission from investigating the alleged disqualification of the respondent. A single judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras issued a writ of prohibition against the Election Commission, a statutory authority constituted by the President of India, with its office permanently located at New Delhi.

In the earlier proceedings, the Election Commission, an authority created by the President of India and permanently headquartered in New Delhi, was the subject of a writ petition before a learned single judge of the Madras High Court. The Commission raised a preliminary objection, contending that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to issue any writ against it because the Commission was not situated within the territorial limits over which the High Court exercised authority, and it also raised several other objections. The judge rejected this preliminary objection, proceeded to consider the merits of the case, and consequently issued a writ of prohibition directing the Commission not to continue with the enquiry it had initiated. The same judge also granted a certificate under Article 132 of the Constitution, holding that the matter involved a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. Following this, the Election Commission appealed to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court to have issued the writ in question.

This Court examined the appeal and rejected the Commission’s contention, which was based on the decision of the Privy Council in the Parlakimedi case (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1144, that the jurisdiction of a High Court to issue a writ could be likened to the jurisdiction of a court to pass a decree against persons outside its local limits, provided that the cause of action arose within those limits. The Court overruled that view, stating: “The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority ‘within the territories’ in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction.” The Constitution Bench further observed that the language of Article 226 is reasonably clear and imposes a two‑fold limitation: first, the power must be exercised throughout the territories over which the Court has jurisdiction; second, the person or authority against whom the writ is directed must be situated within those territories. In effect, a writ issued by a High Court cannot extend beyond the geographical area subject to its jurisdiction, and the entity affected by the writ must be amenable to the Court’s authority by virtue of its residence or location. The Court also noted a second relevant decision, K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income‑Tax Investigation Commission (2), which arose from an appeal against an order dated 10 August 1950 of the High Court of Judicature, Punjab at Simla. In that case, the Punjab High Court, acting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, had been urged to quash proceedings initiated against the appellants under the Taxation on Income (Investigation) Act, and the Commission similarly challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court on the ground that it was located in Delhi.

In this case the Court recorded that the petitioners had moved the High Court of Punjab seeking a writ of prohibition against the Income‑Tax Investigation Commission, contending that the Commission should be restrained from proceeding with investigations of cases that had been referred to it under the provisions of the Income‑Tax Investigation Commission Act (XXX of 1947). The petitioners relied on the judgments reported as (1) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129 and (2) [1954] S.C.R. 738 in support of their request for the writ. The writ petitions were opposed on behalf of the Commission on several grounds, chief among them being the argument that the Punjab High Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution because the Commission was situated in Delhi. The opposition also invoked a decision of the Privy Council in the Parliament case (1), asserting that the substantive issue was that the assessee persons against whom the investigations had been initiated were residents of Uttar Pradesh and that all assessment proceedings, including any reference to the High Court, would consequently lie within Uttar Pradesh. Accepting this line of reasoning, the Punjab High Court dismissed the petition, holding that it did not possess jurisdiction to grant the writ directed to the Commission. The assessees appealed to this Court, which, in its judgment, substantially adopted the reasoning articulated in its earlier decision in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (2). The Court observed that at the time the Punjab High Court rendered its decision, the precedent later cited by that earlier judgment had not yet been decided. Relying on its prior ruling, this Court concluded that the Punjab High Court had erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, and it dismissed the appeal on other grounds that were not material to the present controversy. Counsel for the appellant argued that the two earlier decisions of this Court were distinguishable because, in those cases, the Election Commission and the Income‑Tax Investigation Commission were statutory bodies located in Delhi, and the Court had held that the Punjab High Court was the appropriate High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction those bodies fell and therefore could be subject to its writ jurisdiction. The appellant further contended that the Union Government exercised its functions throughout the whole of India and could not be said to be confined to Delhi merely because the capital was situated there at the time. To support this contention, the appellant heavily relied on the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Maqbulunnissa v. Union of India (1), noting that the Allahabad High Court had held that the expression “any Government” in Article 226(1) of the Constitution clearly indicated that the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain a writ against the Union Government, notwithstanding the location of the government’s headquarters.

The Court held that it possessed jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain the petition not only against the State of Uttar Pradesh but also against the Union Government for the purpose of issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Government to refrain from giving effect to the order that required the petitioner to leave India. The reasoning for this holding was that, although the capital of the Government of India is situated in Delhi, the executive authority of that Government extends throughout the whole territory of the country, and therefore the appropriate test for determining jurisdiction is the place of residence of the petitioners and the impact of the impugned order upon them. After concluding that the High Court was properly seized of the petition, the Court dismissed the petition on other grounds that do not bear upon the issues being considered here. The Allahabad High Court distinguished a decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 17 January 1951 in the unreported case of The Lloyds Bank Limited v The Lloyds Bank Indian Staff Association (Calcutta Branches). In that earlier case, Chief Justice Harries, speaking for the Court, observed that Article 226, by departing from English practice, permits prerogative writs to be issued even against a Government, but that such Government must be situated within the territorial limits of the Court that seeks to exercise its power under the article. He further observed that the Government of India could not be said to be located in the State of West Bengal and therefore writs under Article 226 could not be issued against that Government by the Calcutta High Court. The Allahabad High Court set aside that observation on the ground that “the effects of the orders of the Union Government were not operative within the jurisdiction of the Court.” That judgment later appeared before this Court in Civil Appeal No 42 of 1952, which was dismissed by this Court on 20 April 1952 on grounds unrelated to the jurisdictional question. It is noteworthy that when the Allahabad High Court rendered its decision, heavily relied upon by the appellant, the two earlier decisions of this Court had not yet been delivered; the Allahabad Court might not have arrived at the same conclusion had those decisions been available. Consequently, two principal questions arise: first, whether the Government of India can be said to have a fixed location, namely New Delhi, despite its authority extending over every State and its officers functioning throughout the nation; and second, whether the concept of a cause of action can be introduced as a basis for exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Before addressing these two principal questions, the Court proceeds to consider certain subsidiary matters raised by the appellant.

In order to clear the issues raised on behalf of the appellant, the Court first addressed two subsidiary matters. The appellant contended that the term “authority” used in Article 226 does not include the Government. The Court was not persuaded by this argument. While interpreting the word “authority”, it was necessary to consider the clause that follows it in the provision. Article 226 states that a High Court may issue a writ to “any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government”, within the territory of the Court. The wording “including in appropriate cases any Government” clearly attaches to the word “authority”. On a plain and reasonable construction, this means that the word “authority” may, in appropriate situations, refer to a Government. The suggestion that this clause merely gives High Courts a discretionary power to decide whether a writ may be issued against a Government is untenable. Linking the clause to the act of issuing a writ or order and implying that the Court must first determine the appropriateness of proceeding against a Government is not supported by the rules of grammar. The Court therefore held without hesitation that the clause modifies “authority” and that its effect is to allow the jurisdiction conferred on a High Court to issue a writ or other appropriate order against a Government in certain cases. “Appropriate cases” in this context are those in which orders made by a Government or its subordinates are challenged; consequently, when such orders are contested, the High Court may issue a writ against the Government. Thus, under Article 226, the High Court is empowered to issue writs or orders to any person, any authority, and, in appropriate cases, to any Government for the enforcement of rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose.

Having resolved these subsidiary points, the Court turned to the two principal questions raised by the appeal. The first question concerned whether the Government of India can be said to be located at a single place, namely New Delhi. The appellant argued that the Government of India is all‑pervasive and operates throughout the entire territory of the country, and therefore every High Court should be presumed to have jurisdiction to issue a writ against it because the Government is deemed to be situated within the territorial jurisdiction of all State High Courts. The Court found this reasoning to confuse the concept of a Government’s location with the concept of its functioning. A Government may indeed function across an entire State or the whole of India, but it is not physically located everywhere. The Court noted that while the Constitution does not expressly declare New Delhi as the seat of the Government, it is a well‑known fact that the seat of the Government of India is in New Delhi and that the Government, as a distinct entity, is located there. The existence or absence of a constitutional provision does not alter this factual situation. The Court therefore needed to determine whether the words of Article 226 require the person or authority to which a writ is directed to be resident in, or located within, the territory of the High Court that issues the writ. For a natural person, residence within the territory, whether permanent or temporary, is clearly necessary. The same principle must be applied to determine the locus of a Government for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of a High Court.

The Court observed that the Constitution did not expressly declare that the seat of the Government of India was New Delhi, yet this omission did not imply that the Government lacked a seat. It was acknowledged as common knowledge that the Government’s seat was in New Delhi and that the Government, as an entity, was situated there; the lack of a constitutional provision could not alter this factual situation. Consequently, the Court turned to the question of whether the wording of Article 226 required the person or authority to whom a writ was addressed to be resident in, or physically located within, the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court issuing the writ. Article 226 provides that “every High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority within those territories…”. The Court reasoned that, for a natural person, the only way to be “within those territories” was to reside there, whether permanently or temporarily. For an authority, the requirement was that its office be situated within the territory. The Court then examined whether the same provision could be interpreted to cover a situation in which an authority, whose office lay outside the territory, issued an order that nonetheless affected persons residing within the territory. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 did not hinge upon the residence or location of the applicant seeking relief; instead, it depended solely on the location of the person or authority against whom the writ was sought. Accordingly, the residence or location of the person affected by the order was irrelevant to the determination of jurisdiction. The Court illustrated this principle by remarking that if a person living in Bombay was aggrieved by an order issued by an authority located in Calcutta, the appropriate forum for relief was the Calcutta High Court, not the Bombay High Court, even though the order’s impact was felt in Bombay. The Court stressed that it would be erroneous to insert into Article 226 the concept of the place where the order had effect as a basis for deciding jurisdiction, because such an insertion would generate confusion and overlapping jurisdictions. To underscore the point, the Court offered a hypothetical scenario wherein an order from an authority in Calcutta affected six brothers residing in Bombay, Madras, Allahabad, Jabalpur, Jodhpur and Chandigarh. The Court declared that it would be untenable to allow all six High Courts to claim jurisdiction over the matter, as doing so would conflict with the clear language of Article 226, which ties jurisdiction to the location of the authority issuing the order, not to the locations where the order’s consequences are felt.

The Court observed that the order issued by an authority situated in Calcutta had repercussions for individuals residing in the jurisdictions of the Madras, Allahabad, Jabalpur, Jodhpur and Chandigarh High Courts, thereby affecting persons in six different states. It then posed the question whether Article 226 of the Constitution could be interpreted to give each of those six High Courts the power to grant relief in respect of that same order. The Court answered this question in the negative, emphasizing that accepting such a view would inevitably lead to confusion and a clash of jurisdictions. By examining the language of Article 226, the Court concluded that the jurisdiction conferred by the provision on a High Court is determined solely by the location or residence of the person or authority that issues the order, and not by the place where the order is intended to have effect. The Court acknowledged that the Constitution must be interpreted in a manner that enables its smooth operation, but warned that introducing a “place of effect” test into Article 226 would defeat the purpose of the article and create overlapping jurisdictional claims among the various High Courts, as illustrated by the Calcutta example.

Consequently, the Court held that the mere effect of an order, irrespective of who issues it, bears no relevance to identifying the High Court that may entertain a petition under Article 226. The Court further explained that the functioning of a Government essentially consists of giving effect to its orders; therefore, the concept of “government functioning” should not be read into the phrase “any person or authority within those territories” in Article 226. Introducing such a concept would generate the same jurisdictional conflicts that would arise if the “place of effect” were considered. The Court therefore concluded that the words of Article 226 refer exclusively to the location or residence of the person or authority, not to the place where the Government may be operating.

Accordingly, the Court set out the scope of the territorial test. For a natural person, being “within those territories” means that the person resides in the territory, either permanently or temporarily. For a non‑governmental authority, the test is satisfied when the authority’s office is situated in the territory. For a Government, the test is met only when the seat of that Government lies within the territory. Although a Constitution may sometimes specify the seat of a Government and at other times leave it unstated, the Court observed that a Government invariably functions from a definite seat. Thus, Article 226 requires a factual connection of residence or location, and the existence of a governmental seat, whether expressly mentioned or not, determines the High Court that has jurisdiction over orders issued by that Government.

In this case the Court observed that if a government possesses a definite seat from which it exercises its functions, even when that seat is not named in the Constitution, the High Court whose territorial jurisdiction includes that seat will have authority under Article 226 to entertain writ applications relating to the government’s orders. Accordingly, the Court accepted the view expressed in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and in K.S. Rashid and Son v. The Income‑tax Investigation Commission. That view holds that the power of a High Court to issue writs under Article 226 is subject to a two‑fold limitation. First, the power may be exercised only throughout the territories over which the Court has jurisdiction; consequently a writ cannot extend beyond those territorial limits. Second, the person or authority against whom the writ is directed must be “within those territories,” meaning that the person or authority must be amenable to the Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of residence or location within the Court’s territorial reach. The Court then turned to the question of whether the notion of a cause of action could be imported into Article 226 so that the appropriate High Court would be the one whose jurisdiction encompassed the place where the cause of action arose. The Court noticed reliance on the Privy Council decision in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi. In that decision the Privy Council held that, although the impugned order was issued by a Board of Revenue situated in Madras, a High Court outside the city of Madras lacked jurisdiction to grant a writ quashing that order, except in limited exceptional circumstances which did not apply. The Court recognized that this Privy Council ruling seemingly introduced the place of the cause of action as a factor in determining High Court jurisdiction for writs. However, the Court explained that the ruling was rooted in the historical development of writ jurisdiction of the three Presidency High Courts, successors to the Supreme Courts, and that clause 8 of the Charter of 1800 conferred on the Supreme Court of Madras a jurisdiction comparable to that of the King’s Bench Division for territories then, or later, under the Government of Madras. Therefore, the Court cautioned against attaching excessive significance to that decision. The Court further noted that the issue of introducing the cause‑of‑action concept into Article 226 had also been examined in Saka Venkata Subba Rao’s case.

In the earlier case of Subba Rao, the Court rejected the proposition that the rule whereby a cause of action determines jurisdiction in suits could be extended to writs issued under Article 226. The Court explained that this rule is rooted in statutory enactments and cannot be applied to the writ jurisdiction created by Article 226, which makes no reference to a cause of action or to the location where such cause arises. Instead, Article 226 insists that the writ may be issued only against a person or authority that is present within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The provision does not mention the accrual of a cause of action, nor does it link the High Court’s jurisdiction to the place where a cause of action accrues, as illustrated by the cited authorities (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129 and [1953] S.C.R. 1144. The Court emphasized that proceedings under Article 226 are not ordinary suits; they constitute extraordinary remedies, follow a special procedure, and confer upon the High Court the power to correct the actions of persons and authorities. Such powers must be exercised within the limits set by the Constitution, one of which, as already noted, requires that the subject of the writ be situated within the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction. The Court then asked whether this constitutional limitation could be ignored by allowing a writ to be issued against a person or authority located outside the High Court’s territory merely because a cause of action arose within that territory. It held that to do so would contravene the explicit language of Article 226 and would eliminate the express limitation contained therein. Likewise, the Court declined to read Article 300, which provides for suits by and against the Government of India, as extending to writ proceedings under Article 226. It observed that Article 300, analogous to section 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935, deals exclusively with suits and related proceedings, and makes no reference to the extraordinary remedial jurisdiction of Article 226. Consequently, the Court concluded that the concept of a cause of action cannot be introduced into Article 226, because doing so would remove the explicit requirement that the person or authority against whom a writ is directed must reside or be located within the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction. The Court acknowledged that this interpretation might cause inconvenience to individuals residing far from New Delhi who are aggrieved by an order of the Government of India, and that such inconvenience could be a ground for seeking a constitutional amendment to Article 226. However, the Court held that the argument of inconvenience does not outweigh the clear language of Article 226, and that the limitation based on territorial presence must remain intact.

The Court observed that inserting the notion of a “place of cause of action” into Article 226 would eliminate the two expressly stated limitations on the High Court’s jurisdiction contained in that provision. After a careful examination of the language of Article 226 and of the two earlier decisions of this Court that were cited, the Court expressed the view that, in the absence of clear and compelling reasons, the interpretation set out in those cases should not be abandoned. Moreover, any departure from an earlier judgment of this Court should occur only when there is a substantial consensus that the prior decisions are manifestly erroneous. The Court emphasized that it should not reverse a previous ruling—particularly on a constitutional question—unless it is shown beyond all reasonable doubt that the earlier decision, rendered after full hearing and thorough deliberation, was wrong. In the present reconsideration, the Court affirmed that there is no room to introduce concepts such as the location where the impugned order takes effect, the functioning of a Government apart from the physical location of the office concerned, or even the place where the cause of action arises, within the meaning of Article 226. The language of the article, the Court held, is sufficiently plain to lead to the same conclusion reached in the two earlier cases. Consequently, if any inconvenience arises from this interpretation, the appropriate remedy is a constitutional amendment, not a strained reading of the article that the language does not support. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Justice Subbarao, after reviewing the judgment prepared by the Chief Justice, expressed regret that he could not agree with that reasoning. He noted that he would not have differed from the Chief Justice’s opinion except for the concern that accepting the respondents’ contention would effectively deprive the majority of citizens of the cheap, speedy and effective remedy that Article 226 provides against illegal actions of the Union Government. He stated that where the relevant constitutional provisions are clear and unambiguous, the contention must prevail, even if the effect is harmful to the public interest. However, where the words of the article admit two or more readings—one that fulfills the intention of the Constituent Assembly and another that defeats it—the former must be adopted. Justice Subbarao further cautioned that constitutional provisions are not “mathematical formulae which have their essence in mere form”. Because the Constitution is an organic statute, its provisions must be interpreted broadly and not in a pedantic manner, but without doing violence to the

In this case the Court observed that the factual background had already been completely recorded in the judgment of the Chief Justice, and therefore it was unnecessary to reiterate those facts. The Court therefore limited its discussion to the point of law that had been raised and to its own opinion on that point. The issue before the Court was whether the appellant, a citizen of India who resides in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, could invoke his fundamental right under article 32(2A) of the Constitution by filing an appropriate writ petition in the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir when his right is infringed by an order of the Union Government. The Court noted that the Constitution of India had been made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 (Order No 48 dated 14 May 1954) with certain exceptions and modifications. By that Order clause (3) of article 32 was deleted and a new clause (2A) was inserted after clause (2). The Court said that the question therefore required a true construction of the inserted clause (2A), which reads: “Without prejudice to the powers conferred by clauses (1) and (2), the High Court shall have power throughout the territories in rotation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government within these territories, directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.” The Court pointed out that the operative part of this clause is on the same subject as article 226 of the Constitution, the only difference being that the words “for any other purpose” that appear in article 226 are omitted in clause (2A). The Court explained that although the power of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir is limited to the extent mentioned, in all other respects it is as extensive as the power of other High Courts under article 226. The Court described the object of the amendment as self‑evident, namely to enable the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens of India residing in that part of the country. The learned Solicitor‑General argued that this Court has earlier construed the analogous provisions of article 226 and held that the writs under that article do not extend beyond the territories over which a High Court exercises jurisdiction, and that a High Court may not issue a writ unless the person or authority against whom the writ is sought is physically present or located within that Court’s territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Solicitor‑General submitted that, on the same line of reasoning, the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir could not issue a writ that would extend beyond the territory of the State against the Union Government acting through its officers in New Delhi. The learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, contended that neither article 32(2A) nor article 226 should be interpreted in such a limited way, and that, on a liberal and expansive construction of the constitutional provisions, the High Court should be capable of issuing a writ against any Government, including the Union Government, whenever that Government exercises functions within the territory of a State and infringes the right of a person in that State.

In construing the constitutional provisions, the Court held that a High Court may issue a writ against any Government, including the Union Government, when that Government exercises functions within the territory of a State and thereby infringes the right of a person situated in that State. Before interpreting clause (2A) of Article 32, the Court found it helpful to give a brief account of the history of Article 226, because such a background illuminates the legislative intention that is expressed in Article 32(2A). In the period before independence, the High Courts that were not located in the presidency towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras possessed no authority to issue prerogative writs. Even the presidency High Courts possessed only a very limited power to grant writs, and that power was confined to the scope of their original jurisdiction; the Governments were expressly omitted from the reach of those writs. The framers of the Constitution, aware of centuries of subjection, of the important role played by the High Court of England in safeguarding citizens against executive overreach, and of the effective and impartial function performed by the pre‑independence Indian High Courts within their narrow jurisdictions, deliberately chose to prevent any future autocratic tendencies. Consequently, they enshrined fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution and granted High Courts the authority to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, and, where appropriate, to any Government, for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose. In effect, any Indian citizen may approach the appropriate High Court to protect his or her rights against any person, authority or Government if a fundamental right or any other right has been violated by that entity. The Court observed that accepting the respondents’ contention would oblige a citizen, whose right has been infringed by the Union Government in a remote part of the country, to travel to New Delhi and file a writ petition in the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court. For example, a resident of Kanyakumari, the southernmost point of India, who is unlawfully detained or deprived of property by an order of the Union Government, would be forced to appear before the Punjab High Court in New Delhi to obtain relief – a result that would defeat the purpose of fundamental rights. Such an interpretation of Article 226 would imply that the Constitution’s framers intended to grant a right while simultaneously denying the practical remedy to enforce that right against the Union Government, a purpose that could not have been intended by the Constituent Assembly.

The Assembly, by interpreting the provision in the manner described, would produce an anomalous result whereby a right that was intended to be cherished by the citizens would become merely an illusion. In such a circumstance the right that the Constitution purports to confer would be rendered empty, thereby nullifying the purpose for which the framers of the Constitution introduced it.

The jurisdictional scope of Article 226 in relation to the power of the High Courts has previously been examined in two decisions of this Court, namely Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao (1) and K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income‑tax Investigation Commission (2). The present bench, composed of seven judges, was constituted so that the matter could be approached with a fresh perspective unburdened by earlier precedents. Accordingly, the bench proposed to consider the provisions of Article 32(2A) without being constrained by the curbs imposed in the earlier decisions. The core of Article 32(2A) is captured in the following phrases: “throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises its jurisdiction”, “any Government”, “within those territories”, and “directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, etc.” The expression “throughout the territories, etc.” defines the territorial limits within which a High Court may issue directions or writs.

A High Court exercises jurisdiction throughout the State in which it is situated, and the writs it issues operate only within that State and do not extend beyond its territorial boundaries. The principal purpose of these powers is to keep authorities and tribunals within the bounds of their lawful authority and to prevent them from infringing the fundamental or other rights of citizens. When an aggrieved person approaches the Court, the High Court may issue any of the writs, orders, or directions against the offending authority in respect of an act that has been done or omitted. Implicit in this limitation is the requirement that the impugned act must affect a person or property that falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1144. (2) [1954] S.C.R. 738.

The question of territorial jurisdiction in a different context was considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (1). In that case the Board of Revenue, situated in the Presidency town of Madras under section 172 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, increased the rents payable by ryots in three villages, including Parlakimedi village, which lay in the district of Ganjam in the Northern Circars. The issue was whether the Madras High Court possessed the authority to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the Board’s order, given that the parties to the dispute were not subject to the original jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. The Judicial Committee held that the Madras High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ that would run beyond the territorial limits of that High Court. When it was argued that the Board of Revenue was located in Madras and therefore the High Court could intervene, the Committee rejected that contention, observing at page 164 that the Board “has always had its offices in the Presidency Town, and in the present case the Collective Board, which made the order complained of, issued this order in the town. On the other hand, the parties are not subject to the original jurisdiction of the High Court…”. The Committee emphasized that jurisdiction must be regarded as a matter of substance and that the Supreme Court could not claim jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the settlement of rents in Ganjam between parties not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction simply because the revenue officer who initially dealt with the matter was situated in Madras.

The Court observed that the Board of Revenue had always maintained its offices in the Presidency Town, and that in the present case the Collective Board, which issued the order that was challenged, had made that order while situated in that town. The Court further noted that, despite the Board’s location, the parties to the dispute did not fall within the original jurisdiction of the High Court, and that the estate of Parlakimedi lay in the northern part of the province. Accordingly, the Court held that the question of jurisdiction must be examined as a matter of substance rather than merely on the basis of the Board’s physical presence. The Court stated that it would not have been within the competence of the Supreme Court to assert jurisdiction over the present matter by issuing a writ of certiorari directed at the Board of Revenue solely because the Board was located in the town. The Court explained that adopting such a view would effectively grant the Supreme Court jurisdiction to intervene in the settlement of rents for ryot‑holdings in Ganjam where the parties were not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction, a power the Court did not possess over the Revenue Officer who had originally dealt with the case.

This decision, in clear terms, emphasized the substantive nature of jurisdiction and held that mere physical presence of an authority within the territorial limits of a High Court does not empower that Court to issue writs against the authority for orders affecting parties residing outside its territorial jurisdiction. The Court explained that a High Court’s authority to grant an appropriate writ depends upon the simultaneous existence of two conditions: first, that the cause of action has arisen within the territory over which the Court has jurisdiction; and second, that the authority against which the writ is sought is itself situated “within” that territory. The Court acknowledged a possible criticism of this rule, noting that it could raise the question of which High Court could provide relief when the cause of action accrues in the jurisdiction of one High Court but the authority concerned is located within another. The Court observed that certain statutory authorities possess all‑India jurisdiction yet are conveniently located in a particular State, and that, when exercising powers granted by statutes, such authorities may issue orders affecting rights of parties residing in different States. The Court expressed a prima‑facie view that, insofar as the orders of those authorities operate within a specific territory, they should be considered “within” that territory, allowing the High Court that exercises jurisdiction throughout the territory to issue a suitable writ against the authority. This interpretation, the Court explained, avoids the anomaly of one High Court issuing a writ against an authority located within its own territorial jurisdiction for a cause of action that accrued in another State where it lacks jurisdiction. The Court added that this precise issue does not arise in the present case, which primarily concerns the Union Government. Finally, the Court turned to Article 226 of the Constitution, noting that its language is expressed in wide and comprehensive terms. While there is no difficulty regarding the words “person or authority,” the phrase “including any Government” generates divergent opinions. The Court indicated that if the framers had intended to limit the High Court’s power to issue writs only against State Governments, they could have used the expression “or the Government of the State.” Instead, they deliberately employed the words “any Government,” which at first glance appear ambiguous but upon deeper scrutiny reveal that “any” inevitably implies the existence of more than one Government functioning within a State.

The Court observed that if the Constitution’s framers had intended to limit the High Court’s power of issuing writs solely to the government of a State, they could have expressed that limitation by using the phrase “or the Government of the State.” Instead, they deliberately employed the broader expression “any Government.” Although this wording may appear expansive at first glance, a careful analysis shows that “any Government” cannot be interpreted as referring exclusively to State governments. The term “any” inherently suggests the existence of more than one government operating within a State. Under the Constitution, two distinct governments function in each State: the Union Government and the State Government. Article 1 declares India to be a Union of States, and the territory of India includes, inter alia, the territories of the States. Part XI creates a single class of citizens—citizens of India—who, regardless of the State in which they reside, are citizens of India and not citizens of that particular State alone. Both the three departments of the Union and the organs of the State operate within the State’s territory; Parliament and the State Legislature each enact laws applicable to the matters assigned to them respectively. The executive powers of the Union extend to the State in respect of matters on which Parliament may legislate, while the State executive exercises authority over matters within the State Legislature’s competence, as set out in Articles 73 and 162. The judiciary, organized as a hierarchy from the lowest courts up to the Supreme Court, exercises jurisdiction over causes of action arising within the State. Consequently, the division between Union and State governments is not based on geography but on subject‑matter jurisdiction, yet both governments function inside the same State boundaries. With this backdrop, it becomes clear that “any Government” must encompass the Union Government, because two State governments cannot simultaneously administer the same State, even though, for convenience or temporary arrangements, the offices of one State may be situated in another State. The Court then addressed why the Constitution confers the power to issue writs against any Government only in appropriate cases. Historically, before the Constitution, High Courts possessed no authority to issue writs against Provincial governments. The Constitution, for the first time, granted High Courts the power to issue writs not only against State governments but also against the Union Government. Because the Union Government’s influence extends beyond the particular State, the Constitution prudently imposes a limitation that writs may be issued only in appropriate circumstances. The High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs against the Union Government is therefore confined to causes of action falling within its territorial jurisdiction; it cannot entertain writ petitions that arise from causes beyond the territory over which the High Court has authority. The Court noted that there may also be

The Court examined a situation in which the secretariat of a particular State Government had been placed temporarily in a different State. Even in such a circumstance, the Court held that the High Court of the State in which the secretariat was temporarily situated could not entertain writ proceedings against the Government of the State to which the secretariat belonged. The reason advanced was that it would be inappropriate for that Court to issue such writs because the cause of action that gave rise to the petition arose within the original State, not within the State where the secretariat happened to be located at that moment. Having explained this point, the Court expressed confidence that the expression “any Government” appearing in the constitutional provision must necessarily be understood to include the Government of the Union.

The argument that followed focused on the phrase “within those territories”. Some counsel contended that the Union Government could not be said to be “within” a State because its headquarters are situated in Delhi. The Court observed, however, that the constitutional article does not employ the terms “headquarters”, “resident” or “location”. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word “within” is “inside of, not out of or beyond”. Moreover, the meaning of a word is coloured by the context in which it is used. A person, for example, may be described as being within a territory if he lives there permanently; he may also be considered within a territory when he temporarily enters it or passes through it. Likewise, an authority may be said to be within a territory if its office is situated there, or if it exercises its powers there and can issue orders binding persons with respect to property situated there. In the same vein, a Government may be regarded as being within a State if it possesses a legal situs in that State, and it may also be said to be within a State if it administers that State, even though, for administrative convenience, some of its executive officers reside outside the territorial limits. The Court emphasized that the interpretation of “within” should be given a meaning that facilitates the working of the Constitution rather than hinders it.

Consequently, the Court posed the question: can the Union Government be said to be within a particular State? It clarified that, for the purpose of the present discussion, the term “Union Government” refers to the executive branch of the Government of India. To answer the query concerning its location, the Court turned to the constitutional definition of the Union. Part V of the Constitution, titled “The Union”, deals with three separate subjects: the executive, the Parliament and the Union judiciary. Article 53 vests the executive power of the Union in the President, who may exercise that power either directly or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution. Article 74 establishes a Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, to aid and advise the President in the performance of his functions. Article 77 provides that all executive actions of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President; sub‑section (3) of that article authorises the President to make rules for the convenient conduct of Government business and for the allocation of such business among the Ministers. Finally, Article 73 states that, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend to the …

The Court explained that the Union Government’s authority extends only to matters for which Parliament has the power to enact legislation and to the exercise of any rights, authority, or jurisdiction that the Government of India may possess by virtue of any treaty or agreement. It observed that the Constitution does not designate a specific seat for the Union Government nor does it assign a fixed residence for the President. In concise terms, the Court stated that the Union Government consists of the President exercising his functions on the advice of the Council of Ministers, either directly or through subordinate officers, as prescribed by the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Government, insofar as it is relevant to the issue before the Court, is limited to those subjects over which Parliament may legislate. The Court then raised the question of where the “situs” or legal location of such a Government might be found. It noted that no statutory provision fixes a situs. For administrative convenience, the officials of the Union Government may be stationed at a single location or may be dispersed across various places; the President might reside in one city, the Prime Minister in another, the Ministers in a third, and the officers who assist the President in yet another. The Court illustrated this by asking what would occur if the Secretariat remained in New Delhi while the President spent several months of the year in Hyderabad, or conversely, what would happen if the President stayed in New Delhi but the whole or part of the Secretariat or some Ministers were located in Hyderabad. It concluded that, in the absence of any statutory situs, the test of residence or location could not be applied. Accordingly, the Court pronounced that the Union Government does not have a fixed legal abode. Rather, it is present throughout the territories over which it exercises its constitutional jurisdiction and, within those territories, it can issue effective and binding orders in the fields assigned to it by the Constitution. The Court described the constitutional “situs” of the Union Government as the entire territory of the Union, which is “within” the territories of India and therefore lies within every State. Turning to another aspect, the Court referred to Article 300 of the Constitution, which permits the Government of India to sue or be sued in the name of the Union of India. It explained that the term “sued” is employed in a broad sense and should not be confined by the Constitution to mean only the filing of a civil suit. Citing Webster’s definition, the Court said that “sued” means to seek justice or a right through legal process, and in general it includes any action brought before a court. The Court observed that the prevailing practice in the various High Courts and the Supreme Court aligns with this broad interpretation, as writs against the Government of India are invariably filed in the name of the Union of India. Because the Union of India is a juristic person, the Court held that it is impossible to ascribe a specific residence to it within the Union; its existence coincides with the boundaries of the Union territories. This reasoning, the Court explained, underlies Order XXVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which dispenses with the requirement to state a place of residence for the Union of India in pleadings.

The Court explained that in any suit brought by or against the Government, the pleading does not have to include the detailed name, description, and residence of the plaintiff or defendant; it is sufficient to insert the proper name as prescribed in Section 79 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 79, which parallels Article 300 of the Constitution, provides that in a suit involving the Government the authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant shall be (a) the Union of India when the suit is against the Central Government, and (b) the State when the suit is against a State Government. Because the Union of India does not possess a statutory residence, Order XXVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure exempts the requirement of stating a place of residence in either the plaint or the written statement. Consequently, a suit against the Union Government must be filed in a court that has jurisdiction to entertain such a suit, subject to the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 of the Code. By the same reasoning, the Court held that the Union of India likewise lacks a legal situs in any specific location, and therefore a writ petition may be presented against it in any High Court whose jurisdiction encompasses the place where the cause of action arises. The Court noted that the extent of a High Court’s power to issue a writ is implicit in the nature of each principal writ. It then described the nature of the core writs: habeas corpus is a prerogative process intended to secure an individual’s liberty by providing an immediate remedy for unlawful or unjust detention, whether in prison or private custody; mandamus is a command directed to any person, corporation, or inferior tribunal, ordering the performance of a specific act that falls within the incumbent’s public duty; prohibition is an order directed to an inferior tribunal prohibiting it from continuing proceedings that are pending before it; quo warranto is an information filed against a person who has claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, seeking to inquire into the authority on which the claim is based; and certiorari is an order directed to an authority requiring that the record of proceedings in a particular matter be transmitted to the High Court for consideration, as explained in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume II, third edition. The Court then addressed the question of how the liberty of a subject could be secured, how a command could be issued, how an inquiry could be prohibited, how the qualifications of a person to hold office could be challenged, and how the records of a proceeding could be sent to the High Court if the authority or person involved were situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.

In this case the Court examined a series of questions that had been raised concerning the reach of a writ issued by a High Court when the officer or authority against whom the writ was directed was physically located outside the territorial limits of that Court. The questions included how liberty could be secured for a subject, how an order could be issued, how an inquiry could be prohibited, how the credentials of a person to hold an office could be examined, and how the records of a proceeding could be directed to be transmitted to the High Court when the relevant authority or person resided beyond the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. The questions also sought to determine the manner in which an order of the High Court could be enforced against such an authority or person if they chose to disobey it. An additional argument advanced that, because officers of the Government of India were based in Delhi, a writ that would become “brutum fulmen” could not be issued by a High Court whose jurisdiction lay elsewhere.

The Court found that these queries were grounded in a misapprehension of the constitutional provisions that empower the High Court to issue writs against the Union Government. The Court clarified that the Constitution confers a power on a High Court to issue writs against the Union Government irrespective of whether the government is “within the State” for the purposes of the writ. The presence of an individual officer of the Government outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court did not defeat that power. The Court explained that if the Union Government were bound by an order of the High Court, the service of notice on a particular officer or the enforcement of the order against that officer fell within the realm of procedural law. The appropriate procedural rules could be framed by the High Court itself or could be provided by legislation enacted by Parliament.

The Court further observed that any failure by the Union Government to comply with a High Court order would constitute contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Even if the contemnor were an officer of the Government residing outside the territorial limits of the High Court, section 5 of that Act gave the High Court ample authority to reach such an officer and punish the contempt. The Court rejected the analogy drawn from English law, noting that England is a comparatively small country with a single Government whose jurisdiction extends throughout the nation via the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court. The problem of an officer residing outside the jurisdiction of a particular High Court could not arise in England, and the procedural regime there, although once technical, had been later simplified by statute.

The Court emphasized that the framers of the Indian Constitution deliberately used the phrase “in the nature of” to indicate that they were not importing the entire English procedural framework for writs. The Constitution required a procedural system suited to the federal structure of India, and the English procedural law could not simply be transplanted wholesale. Consequently, the Court asserted that a reasonable construction of the constitutional words was necessary, without being unduly constrained by the historical background of English writs, so as to fulfil the intention of the Constitution‑makers. Finally, the Court noted that Article 226 was not limited to the traditional prerogative writs that had been prevalent in England, thereby confirming the broader scope of the High Court’s power to issue writs against the Union Government.

The provision of the Constitution authorised the appropriate High Court not only to issue writs but also to pass suitable directions or orders. There was no logical basis for the High Court to be unable, in a proper case, to give an appropriate direction to, or to make a proper order against, the Union Government. The Court regarded such directions or orders as being free from the procedural technicalities that normally accompanied the writs mentioned in the provision. The Court then referred to the authorities that had been cited by counsel. The first authority mentioned was the decision of this Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao. In that matter the Governor of Madras had referred to the Election Commission, whose permanent offices were situated in New Delhi, the question of whether the respondent was disqualified and whether he could be permitted to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly. The respondent consequently filed an application before the Madras High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ that would restrain the Election Commission from enquiring into his alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly. The Supreme Court held that the power of a High Court to issue writs under Article 226 was subject to a two‑fold limitation: first, a writ could not extend beyond the territorial limits within which the High Court exercised jurisdiction; second, the person or authority against whom the writ was directed had to be amenable to the jurisdiction of that High Court, either by residence or by location within the same territorial jurisdiction. The Court explained that the first limb required the subject matter of the writ to lie within the geographical area over which the High Court could exercise authority, while the second limb ensured that the Court could effectively enforce any direction against a party that was physically present or had its seat within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Applying those principles, the Court dismissed the writ petition because the Election Commission was located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

The Court next observed a clear distinction between the earlier case and the present petition. In the earlier case the respondent was not the Union of India but an authority that could have its location outside the Madras State, and consequently the two limitations were not satisfied. In the present matter both conditions were fulfilled: the writ did not run beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court because the Union Government was deemed to be “within” the said territory, and the Union Government, being situated within the State, was also amenable to the jurisdiction of that High Court. The Court then turned to the authority relied upon by the learned Solicitor General, namely the decision of this Court in K. S. Rashid & Son v. Income‑Tax Investigation Commission. In that case the Income‑Tax Investigation Commission, whose office was in Delhi, was investigating the petitioners under section 5 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act 1947, although the petitioners were assessees from Uttar Pradesh and their original assessments had been made by the Income‑Tax authorities of that State. It was contended that the Punjab High Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 226 against the Commission. Restating the same two‑fold limitation, the Supreme Court held that the Commission was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court because its office was located within the territorial jurisdiction of that court, and therefore the Punjab High Court possessed the authority to issue the writ. By reaffirming the two‑fold test, the Court underscored that the Union Government, like a statutory authority situated within the State, could be subject to a direction or order issued by the High Court under Article 226.

The Court observed that the decision in K. S. Rashid & Son v. Income‑Tax Investigation Commission, reported in [1954] S.C.R. 738, involved a statutory authority situated in Delhi and therefore did not apply to the Union Government. The question of whether the principles governing the Government of India would also apply to statutory authorities located in one State but exercising jurisdiction in another did not arise for consideration in the present case; nevertheless, the Court noted that, on a preliminary view, there was no reason to think that the principles should not be applicable. Turning to the decisions of the High Courts, the Court referred to the clear statement of the relevant principles in Maqbul‑Un‑Nissa v. Union of India, reported in I.L.R. [1953] 2 AR 289. In that case the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court directly addressed the issue now before us. The importance of that decision lay in the fact that the learned judges examined the problem without being constrained by the later decision of this Court in Saka Venkata Rao’s case, reported in [1953] S.C.R. 1144. After considering the applicable constitutional articles, Justice Sapru, speaking for the Full Bench, remarked at pages 293‑294 that the analogy between a government and a corporation or joint‑stock company having its domicile where its head office is situated is misleading. He warned that to hold that the jurisdiction of this Court does not extend to the Union Government because its capital is Delhi, thereby deeming the Union Government beyond the jurisdiction of all State High Courts except the Punjab High Court, would be erroneous. The learned judge further explained at page 294 that the jurisdiction of a High Court to intervene under Article 226 depends not on the location of the government’s headquarters or capital but on whether the effect of the act done by the government, whether Union or State, falls within the territorial limits of that Court. Referring to the words “any Government” in Article 226, the judge observed at page 292 that the framers of the Constitution intended that more than one government could function within the same territory. The Court fully agreed with those observations, finding that they correctly construed Article 226 and gave effect to the Constitution‑makers’ intention. After the decision in Saka Venkata Rao’s case, the Madhya Pradesh High Court considered a similar issue in Surajmal v. State of M. P., reported in (2). In that case the Central Government had rejected a mining‑lease application and communicated the order to an applicant residing in Madhya Pradesh; the High Court held that a writ could not be issued to bind the Central Government for the reasons set out in that judgment.

In the earlier case, the High Court had refused to bind the Central Government on the basis of four reasons. First, it held that the Central Government could not be regarded as permanently situated or normally conducting its business within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Second, it observed that the record of the matter decided by the Central Government was not in the possession of the High Court and could not be obtained from any legal custodian within the State. Third, it stated that the order issued by the State Government must be deemed to have merged into the order of the Central Government. Fourth, it concluded that the State Government’s order could not be disturbed unless the Central Government’s order could be produced before the High Court and set aside. The present discussion limits itself to the first and second of those grounds. The learned Chief Justice, speaking for the Full Bench, applied the principle laid down by this Court in Saka Venkata Rao’s case to the Union Government. On the basis of the reasons already mentioned, the author expressed the view that the decision in Saka Venkata Rao’s case was not applicable to the Union Government. The second ground, according to the author, effectively elevated procedural requirements above the substantive law.

The author acknowledged that a writ of certiorari ordinarily requires the production of records, but argued that once it is accepted that the Union Government falls within the State for the purposes of Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no reason why the High Court could not, by exercise of its constitutional power, direct the Union Government to produce the records wherever its officers may have kept them. This second ground is essentially a corollary of the first, namely the contention that the Union Government is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Bombay High Court, in Radheshyam Makhanlal v. Union of India (1), had held that a writ could not be issued against the Union Government whose office lay outside the territorial limits of the High Court. Shah, J., applying the principle of Saka Venkata Rao’s case (2) to the Union Government, affirmed that because the Union Government’s office was not located in the State of Bombay, the Bombay High Court could not issue a writ against it. By contrast, S. T. Desai, J., did not go as far; he concluded on a narrower basis that even if such a writ were issued, it could not be enforced. The author had already indicated that both of these grounds were untenable. He asserted that the Union Government operates within the State of Bombay to the extent that it exercises its powers there, and that the High Court possesses a constitutional authority to issue writs to the Union Government. Consequently, the enforceability of such writs does not depend on the physical residence of the Union Government’s officers. The discussion was then summed up in a series of propositions, the first of which stated that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is of the widest amplitude.

The Court observed that the jurisdiction conferred on a High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution was not limited to the issuance of writs such as habeas corpus. Instead, the Court stated that a High Court possessed the authority to grant directions or orders against any individual or authority, and, where appropriate, against any Government. The Court noted that the Constitution’s framers deliberately used the expression “any Government” in ordinary terms, which necessarily encompassed the Union Government. Accordingly, the Court explained that a High Court could issue a writ that extended throughout the territories over which it exercised jurisdiction, and that such writ could be directed to a person, authority, or Government situated within those territories. The Court further observed that the Union Government did not have a fixed constitutional situs, yet it exercised its executive powers in relation to matters legislated by Parliament, and those powers were exercisable throughout the whole of India. Consequently, the Court held that, in law, the Union Government must be regarded as having a functional existence across the entire country.

The Court went on to state that when the Union Government, by exercising its powers, issued an order that infringed upon the legal right or interest of a person residing in the area of a particular High Court’s jurisdiction, that High Court could issue a writ to the Union Government because, for legal purposes, the Union Government was deemed to be “within” that State as well. The Court affirmed that issuing such a writ did not take the High Court beyond its territorial limits, since the order was directed against the Government acting within the State. The Court emphasized that the physical location of the officer who issued the order was irrelevant; the Union Government itself would be required to produce records or comply with the order. The Court further declared that orders issued by the High Court could be enforced against the Union Government, which was subject to the Court’s jurisdiction and could be held in contempt if it disobeyed those orders. Even if the officers responsible for the order resided outside the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, the Court could still reach them under the Contempt of Courts Act if they chose to ignore valid orders. The Court noted that any difficulties in communicating the orders related merely to procedural rules, and that appropriate rules could be made to ensure communication with the Central Government or its officers. For these reasons, the Court held that Article 32(2A) of the Constitution empowered the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir to issue a writ to the Union Government when its actions infringed the fundamental rights of parties within that State. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, and directed the High Court to dispose of the matter in accordance with law, with the appellant to receive his costs.

The Justice observed that he had reviewed the judgments prepared by the Chief Justice and Justice Subba Rao, and that he concurred with the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the appeal must be dismissed. Although his reasoning arrived at the same result by a slightly different analytical route, he intended to set out briefly the basis for his agreement. He stated that the factual background had already been fully detailed in the Chief Justice’s judgment, and therefore it was unnecessary to repeat those facts. He summarized that the appellant had moved the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 32(2A) of the Constitution, seeking an appropriate writ, order or directions to restrain both the Union of India and the State of Jammu‑Kashmir from enforcing a directive contained in a Government of India letter dated 31 July 1954, which ordered the appellant’s premature compulsory retirement effective from 12 August 1954. The respondents raised a preliminary objection, contending that the Government of India was not a government situated within the territorial limits over which the Jammu and Kashmir High Court exercised jurisdiction, and consequently the petition was not maintainable. The High Court accepted this objection as valid and dismissed the petition. The sole issue before this appeal, the Justice noted, was whether, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court possessed jurisdiction to issue a writ directed to the Government of India under Article 32(2A). He quoted the full text of Article 32(2A), which provides that, without prejudice to the powers conferred by clauses (1) and (2), the High Court shall have power throughout the territories within which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, and, in appropriate cases, to any Government within those territories, directions, orders or writs—including habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari—for the enforcement of any right conferred by Part III of the Constitution. He observed that, while the phrase “the High Court” in this provision refers exclusively to the High Court of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Article 226 applies to all other High Courts. He further noted that the power under Article 32(2A) is limited to the enforcement of rights guaranteed by Part III, whereas Article 226 empowers High Courts to enforce not only those rights but also any other legal right or duty. Despite these differences in scope and reference, he concluded that the operative language of the two provisions is essentially identical. Accordingly, the High Court is empowered to grant relief by issuing appropriate writs or orders to (1) any person, (2) any authority other than a Government, and (3) any Government, subject to the condition precedent that the person or authority is situated within the territories over which the Court exercises jurisdiction.

The judgment explained that a person, a government, or an authority other than a government could be subject to a writ only if it was “within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction.” A special limitation was introduced by the phrase “in appropriate cases” that preceded the words “any Government.” Before considering the effect of those words, the Court needed to determine when a government could be said to be within the jurisdiction of a particular High Court. The Union of India, as the first respondent, argued that for a government to be within a High Court’s jurisdiction it had to be physically situated within the territorial limits of that Court. The argument was that, just as “any person” must be present within a specified territory to be within that territory, an authority other than a government must have an office located there, and therefore the same requirement of location should apply to governments. This line of reasoning appeared attractive and initially plausible. However, upon closer scrutiny the Court found that the argument oversimplified the issue by assuming that a government possessed a fixed location in the same manner as an individual or a non‑governmental authority. The Court noted that a government is essentially the executive organ of a State. Under Article 53 of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union was vested in the President, and under the corresponding provisions, the executive power of each State was vested in its Governor, to be exercised by them. The Court then asked whether it followed that the Government of India was located at the President’s place of residence, and similarly whether each State government was located at the Governor’s residence. It observed that while the Constitution expressly provided the seat of the Supreme Court in Article 130 and the principal seat of each State High Court in Article 231, it did not prescribe any principal seat for the President of India or for the Governors of the States. The presence of the President’s official residence at Rashtrapati Bhawan and the Governors’ residences at Rai Bhavan did not constitute a constitutional declaration of a “location” for the respective governments. Consequently, the Court concluded that the notion of locating a government solely on the basis of the residence of its head was unfounded, and that the earlier argument that a government must be physically situated within a High Court’s territorial jurisdiction could not be sustained.

In this case the Court observed that the President of India resides at Rashtrapati Bhawan in Delhi and the Governors of the States have official residences known as Rai Bhavan at various places in the States. The Court said that this fact might lead one to think that the Constitution provides a specific place of residence for the President or the Governors, but the Constitution actually contains no such provision. Nothing in the Constitution prevents the President from having more than one permanent place of residence within the Union. The Court therefore considered a hypothetical situation in which the President were to have permanent residences in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras in addition to the residence in Delhi. It asked whether, in such a circumstance, the Government of India could be said to be located in Delhi when the President is in Delhi, in Calcutta when he is in Calcutta, in Bombay when he is in Bombay and in Madras when he is in Madras. The Court noted that this illustration, though it may appear fantastic at first sight, is not improbable, pointing out that during British rule the Viceroy had a permanent residence at Simla for part of the year and another at Calcutta for the other part, and after 1911 had permanent residences at Delhi and Simla. Consequently, if the location of a government were determined by the residence of its head, it would be impossible to speak of any particular place as the seat of the Government of India throughout the year.

The Court further explained that this difficulty would not affect the question of a State Government being within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of that State, because any Governor’s residence must necessarily lie within the territory of the State. However, linking the Government of India to the President’s residence would make the position wholly uncertain as to which High Court’s territorial jurisdiction the Government of India falls within. For part of the year the Government might be within the jurisdiction of one High Court and for another part within another High Court, which the Court described as wholly unreasonable. Having found the test of the President’s residence to be illusory, the Court suggested an alternative approach: to locate the Government of India, or of a State, at the place where the offices of the ministries are situated. It observed that under Article 77 the President allocates the business of the Government of India among the Ministers, and under Article 166 the Governor allocates the business of a State among its Ministers, except for matters in which the Governor is required to act in his discretion. The Court noted that if all Ministers of the Union or of a State were required to perform their functions at a single place, that place could be said to be the location of the respective Government, but the Constitution does not impose such a requirement.

The Constitution states that the business of a State government is allocated by the Governor among the Ministers, except for matters in which the Governor must act at his own discretion. Accordingly, if one were to say that all the Ministers of the Union government must perform the functions assigned to them at a single location, it might appear reasonable to conclude that the Government of India is situated at that location. Likewise, if all the Ministers of a State were required to carry out their duties at one particular place, one could argue that the State government is located there. However, the Constitution contains no provision that obliges every Minister of a State to work from a single place, nor does it require the Union Ministers to operate from a single location within the country. In practice, circumstances—whether during emergencies or even in ordinary times—may compel some Ministers to discharge their responsibilities from locations different from those of their colleagues. For instance, the rehabilitation of refugees from Pakistan falls under a specific Ministry of Rehabilitation for Refugees, and the Minister heading that Ministry habitually conducts a substantial portion of his work in Calcutta, West Bengal, where many of the Ministry’s offices are situated. Similar situations can arise in other Ministries. Special demands may require portions of the Ministry of Commerce’s work to be carried out in cities such as Bombay, Calcutta or Madras instead of Delhi, causing the Commerce Minister to transact business at those sites. If the public interest dictates that the bulk of the Ministry of Defence’s activities be performed away from Delhi for security or other reasons, the Defence Minister would necessarily operate from that alternative location. Consequently, while it may be possible at any given moment to identify the headquarters of an individual Ministry, it is not appropriate to conclude that the entire Government of India is located at the same place.

Therefore, the Court found that it is neither correct nor suitable to speak of a single “location” of a Government. No satisfactory test exists for determining the location of the Government of India. In the earlier decision of Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, the Court held that before a writ under Article 226 could be issued against an authority, that authority must be situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. That case, however, dealt with an authority, not with a Government, and did not address the question of a Government’s location. Subsequent judgments, such as K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income‑Tax Investigation Commission, also do not bind the present Court on this issue. It is therefore reasonable to hold that the requirement for a Government to be within the jurisdiction of a High Court is satisfied merely by the Government’s functioning throughout the territory of India. Since the Government of India operates across the whole country, it must be regarded as being within the territorial jurisdiction of every High Court, including the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir.

It was observed that, before a writ under article 226 may be issued to an authority, the authority must be situated within the territory that falls under the jurisdiction of the concerned High Court. The earlier decision in Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao dealt only with the jurisdiction of an authority such as an Election Commission and did not address the question of whether a Government itself could be said to have a location. Consequently, that decision and the later decision in K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income‑tax Investigation Commission do not obligate us to hold that a Government possesses a location in the same manner as an authority like the Election Commission or the Income‑tax Investigation Commission. Accordingly, it appears reasonable to hold that the only requirement for satisfying the condition that a Government be “within the territories” of a High Court is that the Government must be functioning within those territories. The Government of India carries out its functions throughout the whole of the Indian territory. Hence, the conclusion follows that the Government of India is present within the territorial jurisdiction of every High Court, including the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir. The expression “any Government” therefore adds another reason for thinking that the Government of India falls within the jurisdiction of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court, the phrase “any Government” meaning, in this context, every Government.

If the location test were strictly applied, the only Government located within the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be the Government of Jammu and Kashmir itself. This would render the power of the High Court to grant relief against “any Government” meaningless, because it would exclude the Government of India. The words “any Government” were inserted by the Constitution‑makers to ensure that the High Court also possesses the authority to grant relief against the Government of India. The respondent contended that allowing such a construction would create an intolerable situation that the Constitution‑makers could not have intended. The argument was that, because the Government of India would be within the jurisdiction of every High Court, it would be subject to writs and orders from each High Court, and a litigant could choose the most convenient High Court to seek relief. This could lead to the Government of India facing multiple applications concerning the same order in several High Courts across the country. Even if such an outcome were inconvenient for the Government, the Court would not shrink from an appropriate interpretation of the constitutional language merely to assist the Government. A proper reading of the words “in appropriate cases” indicates that for every act or omission for which relief may be claimed, only one High Court will have the authority to exercise jurisdiction. The limitation introduced by the phrase “in appropriate cases” does not apply to writs issued against persons or authorities other than the Government, and there is no basis for suggesting that the Constitution‑makers intended a different standard of review for the Government compared with other authorities. Consequently, the proper construction allows a single High Court to entertain a writ against the Government of India for a particular act or omission, avoiding the prospect of multiple, conflicting proceedings.

In this case, the Court explained that when a petition seeks relief for an act or omission, only a single High Court that has jurisdiction over the location of that act or omission may entertain the petition. The Court first observed that the limitation expressed by the phrase “in appropriate cases” was not intended to apply differently to writs issued against private persons or authorities other than the Government. Some submissions suggested that the phrase meant that a High Court, when issuing writs against the Government, must exercise greater caution and could not issue writs as freely as it could against non‑governmental parties, implying a special standard for government respondents. The Court rejected that suggestion without hesitation, stating that it was implausible that the Constitution‑makers intended to set a separate benchmark for cases involving the Government as compared with cases involving other authorities. The Court noted that whenever relief is claimed under Article 226, the High Court must exercise its discretion to determine whether to grant relief, and that discretion inherently requires the Court to grant relief only in proper cases and to refuse it where it is not warranted. The Court then addressed the purpose of the words “in appropriate cases.” It reasoned that the drafters were aware of the practical difficulties that would arise if every High Court in the country were allowed to issue writs against the Central Government merely because the Government operated throughout the nation. To avoid such inconvenience, the drafters limited jurisdiction to the High Court whose territorial jurisdiction covered the place where the contested act was performed, or, in cases of an alleged omission, the place where the act should have been performed. The Court explained that in any petition under Article 226 it is possible to identify the location of the act complained of, or the location where the omission was required. Once that location is identified, only the High Court that has authority over that territory may entertain the petition and grant relief. The Court considered this to be the logical effect of the phrase “in appropriate cases.” The appellant, relying on the Privy Council decision in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129, argued that jurisdiction under Article 226 arises merely because a part of the cause of action arose within the territory of the Court. The Court noted that the question of whether a cause of action determines jurisdiction for relief under Article 226, as it does in ordinary suits, had previously been examined by this Court in Saka

In the matter of Venkata Subba Rao’s Case (1), the Court answered the question in the negative. The Court then referred to the Privy Council decision in Parlakimedi’s Case (2) and observed that that decision did not involve the construction of a statutory provision that was similar in scope, purpose, or wording to Article 226 of the Constitution; consequently, the Privy Council judgment offered little assistance for interpreting Article 226. While delivering the judgment of the Court, Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri explained that the rule whereby a cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on a statutory enactment and therefore cannot be applied to writs that may be issued under Article 226. Article 226 makes no reference to any cause of action or to the place where it arises; instead, it requires the presence of the person or authority “within the territories” over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. The Court held that this earlier decision was binding and expressed confidence in its correctness, noting that the earlier case had involved a question of jurisdiction concerning an authority other than the Government.

The Court found no reason to accept that a cause of action could confer jurisdiction against a Government entity while it could not do so against other persons or authorities. It was therefore clear that the Constitution, under Article 226 or Article 32(2A), had not incorporated a principle that bases jurisdiction on the existence of a cause of action. Although it might initially appear that permitting the High Court whose jurisdiction covers the place where the action or omission occurred would effectively acknowledge the accrual of a cause of action as the basis for jurisdiction, the Court clarified that this is not the case. Rather, the High Court obtains jurisdiction because the Constitution uses the words “in appropriate cases,” which point to the territorial connection of the act or omission, not to a cause of action. Earlier High Court decisions on the same point, which were cited in the majority judgment and in the judgment of Justice Subba Rao, were not reiterated, as doing so would not serve a useful purpose. The Court consequently concluded that, although the Government of India is located within the territorial reach of every High Court in the country, the only High Court that may issue a writ, order, or direction under Article 226 or Article 32(2A) against the Government is the one whose territorial jurisdiction includes the place where the act or omission giving rise to the relief occurred. In the present case, the act complained of was performed in Delhi, a location within the territorial jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court; consequently, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court could not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 in this matter.

Referring to the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court considered the merits of the appeal that had been before it. After hearing the submissions, the judge stated that, in the result, he concurred with the opinion expressed by the Lord Chief Justice that the appeal ought to be dismissed and that the costs of the proceedings should be awarded to the opposing party. The Court then recorded that, in line with the view adopted by the majority of the judges hearing the matter, the appeal was to be dismissed with costs. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court ordered the dismissal of the appeal and directed that the costs be borne by the appellant. The final order of the Court therefore read that the appeal was dismissed, with the costs of the litigation awarded against the party who had brought the appeal.