Kalindi and Others vs Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co., Ltd

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 101 of 1960

Decision Date: 25 March 1960

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In the matter titled Kalindi & Others versus Tata Locomotive & Engineering Co., Ltd., the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the 25th day of March, 1960. The opinion was authored by Justice K.C. Das Gupta, who was joined on the bench by Justices P.B. Gajendragadkar and K.N. Wanchoo. The case was recorded under the citation 1960 AIR 914 and also reported in the Supreme Court Reporter at volume 3, page 407. The parties before the Court were identified as petitioner Kalindi & Others and respondent Tata Locomotive & Engineering Co., Ltd. The judgment pertained to an industrial dispute concerning whether a workman, who faced an enquiry conducted by management into alleged misconduct, possessed a statutory right to be represented at that enquiry by a representative of his trade union. The headnote of the judgment summarised the Court’s view that, although an employer may, at his discretion, permit union representation, there is no inherent entitlement for a workman to be so represented, particularly where the enquiry involves straightforward factual determinations about misconduct. The Court further observed that, in domestic tribunals, it is customary for the individual accused of misconduct to present his own case, and that natural justice does not, in such circumstances, compel the presence of a union representative.

The appeal arose from Civil Appeal No. 101 of 1960, which was filed by special leave against an award dated the 2nd of March, 1959, issued by the Labour Court of the Chotanagpur Division in Ranchi. The award related to miscellaneous cases numbered 73, 76, 77, 79‑82, 84‑90 of the year 1958. Counsel appearing for the appellants, who were fourteen workmen employed by M/s. Tata Locomotive & Engineering Co., Ltd., Jamshedpur, were N.C. Chatterjee, A.K. Dutt and B.P. Maheshwari. Representing the respondent were Sohrab D. Vimadalal, S.N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. Vohra. The factual backdrop involved the dismissal of the fourteen workmen pursuant to orders issued by the company’s management following an enquiry into alleged misconduct. At the time of those dismissals, industrial disputes involving the workmen and the company were pending before the Industrial Tribunal of Bihar. Consequently, the company filed applications purportedly under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act seeking approval of the dismissals, while the workmen filed counter‑applications under section 33A contesting the dismissals. The company’s applications under section 33 were eventually rendered ineffective, and the workmen’s applications under section 33A were considered and disposed of by the Labour Court, resulting in the rejection of the appellants’ claims. After obtaining special leave, the dismissed workmen appealed the Labour Court’s decision, contending that the enquiry which formed the basis of their dismissals was invalid because they had been denied the assistance of a representative from the Jamshedpur Union. They argued that fair procedure required such representation to facilitate examination and cross‑examination of witnesses and to ensure proper record‑keeping, asserting that without union assistance they were deprived of a fair opportunity to present their case before the Enquiry Officer.

The Labour Court had examined and disposed of the applications filed under section 33A concerning the fourteen workmen, and it dismissed each of those applications. Following that dismissal, the fourteen appellants obtained special leave to appeal the Labour Court’s order before the Supreme Court. The appellants consistently argued that the enquiry which formed the basis of their dismissal was neither proper nor valid because they were denied representation by a member of the Jamshedpur Union to which they belonged. They maintained that fairness required the workman at such an enquiry to receive reasonable assistance for examining and cross‑examining witnesses and for ensuring that an accurate record of the proceedings was made. The appellants further contended that a union representative was the most suitable person to provide such assistance, and that without this assistance the workman could not obtain a fair opportunity to present his case before the Enquiry Officer. On 5 June 1953, the workmen collectively requested permission to be represented at the enquiry by a delegate of the Jamshedpur Mazdoor Union, but management refused the request. Instead, management informed the workmen that, if they wished, they could be represented by a fellow employee from their own department during the enquiry. The central issue before the Court therefore became whether the management’s refusal to allow union representation invalidated the enquiry. The Court observed that, unlike courts of law where skilled advocates conduct examinations, an industrial enquiry is not a judicial trial and does not demand specialist legal representation. It noted that the purpose of such enquiries is to determine, through simple factual questions, whether the workman committed the alleged misconduct. The Court reasoned that a person of ordinary intelligence and familiarity with industrial conditions can normally question witnesses effectively and extract the truth. It added that, in many cases, the accused workman himself is best placed to cross‑examine hostile witnesses and to present supporting testimony. The Court further observed that domestic tribunals customarily allow the accused to conduct his own case without any appointed representative. It pointed out that the Government has issued procedural rules for such enquiries, and those rules contain no provision granting a right to union representation.

In the matter before the Court, it was observed that the procedural rules governing domestic tribunals did not contain any provision allowing a person who was the subject of an enquiry to be represented by another individual. The usual practice in such tribunals was that the accused workman presented his own case. Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that principles of natural justice required mandatory representation by a Union official in enquiries arising from a charge‑sheet of misconduct against a workman. The Court also noted that if an enquiry was not conducted fairly, the affected workman retained the right to challenge its validity through an industrial dispute. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a workman facing an enquiry initiated by management did not possess a legal right to be represented by a Union representative, although an employer, at its discretion, could permit such assistance.

Representing the appellants, counsel argued that the dismissal orders were unlawful because they were based on a finding of guilt for misconduct that was not mentioned in the charge‑sheet. The appellants—Charan Singh, Parmanand and K. Ganguli—had each been charged in the charge‑sheet with four distinct acts of misconduct: (i) participating in an illegal strike; (ii) leaving the appointed place of duty; (iii) inciting other employees to strike work; and (iv) threatening and intimidating other workers. The Enquiry Officer found each of them guilty of the first three charges. However, the Officer recorded no finding on the fourth charge and instead concluded that the workmen were guilty of a different misconduct not listed in the charge‑sheet, namely “behaving in a riotous and disorderly manner by shouting slogans on the shop floor.” The appellants contended that, because it was impossible to determine how this additional finding influenced the manager’s decision, the dismissal orders should be set aside.

The Court examined the records and found that there were three separate cases in which the manager had dismissed employees on the basis of guilt for only the offences stated in the charge‑sheet, namely participating in an illegal strike, leaving the appointed place of duty, and inciting other employees to strike work. There was no indication that the manager treated the present appellants differently from those cases. The Court therefore reasoned that, even if the finding of “behaving in a riotous and disorderly manner by shouting slogans on the shop floor” were omitted, the manager would still have arrived at the decision to dismiss, because each appellant had already been found guilty of at least one charge that was expressly mentioned in the charge‑sheet. The inclusion of the additional misconduct in the dismissal order did not, in the Court’s view, affect the validity of the order. Thus, the dismissal orders against Charan Singh, Parmanand and K. Ganguli were upheld as lawful.

In this case the charge‑sheet specified four distinct acts of misconduct: first, participation in an illegal strike; second, leaving the appointed place of duty without permission; third, inciting other employees to strike work; and fourth, threatening and intimidating other workers. The order of dismissal recorded that the employee had been found guilty of “entering the works when not on duty and inciting other employees to strike work” and consequently dismissed from service. The argument advanced by the employee was that the phrase “entering the works when not on duty” did not appear in the charge‑sheet and that its inclusion in the dismissal order rendered the order invalid. The Court observed, however, that “entering the works when not on duty” is not defined as a misconduct under the company’s standing orders. The wording in the dismissal order was intended merely to describe the circumstances in which the misconduct of inciting other employees to strike work was committed, rather than to constitute an additional charge. The Court noted that the erroneous reference to “entering the works when not on duty” does not demonstrate that the punishing authority relied upon that fact in determining the punishment. The only misconduct that weighted with the authority was the act of inciting other employees to strike work, and this was the sole ground for dismissal. Consequently, the contention that the mention of “entering the works when not on duty” as a separate act of misconduct vitiated the dismissal order was rejected.

The employee’s counsel further argued that the dismissal order cited misconduct of “deliberately preventing the man in charge of the compressor in the repair shop from carrying out his duty,” which was alleged to be absent from the charge‑sheet. The Court clarified that this argument stemmed from a misreading of the charge‑sheet. The charge‑sheet, in fact, alleged four acts, namely participation in an illegal strike; inciting other employees in other sections of the Auto Division to strike work; leaving the appointed place of duty without permission; and threatening and intimidating other workers in the repair shop. After addressing the first three charges, the dismissal order went on to state that the employee was also found guilty of the fourth charge, i.e., threatening and intimidating the workers. The charge‑sheet provided particulars for the fourth charge, describing how the employee, by threatening and intimidating others in the repair shop, stopped them from working and physically restrained the compressor man, thereby preventing him from performing his duties. The Court therefore concluded that the act of “deliberately preventing the man in charge of the compressor” was indeed covered by the fourth charge, albeit expressed in slightly different words, and that the dismissal order correctly reflected the misconduct charged.

In the dismissal order the company stated that the employee had “in the Repair Shop and deliberately prevented the man in charge of the Compressor in the Repair Shop from carrying out his duty.” The appellant argued that the charge‑sheet did not contain any reference to such an act of deliberately preventing the Compressor man from performing his work. That contention is plainly mistaken. After listing the four alleged acts of misconduct, the charge‑sheet supplied particulars for each charge. Regarding the fourth charge, described as “threatening and intimidating the other workers in the Repair Shop,” the charge‑sheet specifically recorded: “By threatening and intimidating others in the repair shop you stopped them from working and also you took the Compressor man by his hand and got the Compressor stopped.” Thus, the language in the dismissal order that he was guilty of deliberately preventing the man in charge of the Compressor from performing his duty is, in fact, derived from the charge‑sheet, although the wording is slightly different. Consequently, there is no merit in the claim that the dismissal was based on a mis‑described misconduct not found in the charge‑sheet. The four acts of misconduct set out in the charge‑sheet against Gurbux Singh were: (1) participation in an illegal strike; (2) leaving his appointed place of duty; (3) inciting other employees to strike work; and (4) threatening and intimidating other workers. The Enquiry Officer’s report concluded that he was guilty of the same four acts, namely: (1) participation in an illegal strike; (2) leaving his place of duty without permission; (3) inciting other employees to strike work; and (4) threatening and intimidating Mr Charan Singh to stop work. The managing officer’s order on these findings read: “I have gone through the findings of the Enquiry Officer as well as the proceedings of the Inquiry. Though Mr Gurubux Singh created a scene on 11 June 1958 and left the place of inquiry, he was given another opportunity and the enquiry was held at a later date. Having examined the evidence recorded against him during the enquiry, I agree with the findings of the C.P.O. The charges being of a very serious nature, I order that he be dismissed from the services of the company with effect from the date of the charge‑sheet.” The formal dismissal order, drawn up on the basis of those findings and served on the employee, stated that he was found guilty of the first three charges and, additionally, of threatening and intimidating Mr Chakravarty, a chargeman, who was compelled to stop work on 21 May 1958. On his behalf it was contended that although the Enquiry Officer’s report mentions “threatening and intimidating Charan Singh,” the General Manager mistakenly thought the report referred to Mr Chakravarty. No finding in the Enquiry Officer’s report actually identified Mr Chakravarty as the person intimidated.

In this matter the Court observed that the enquiry officer had found that Gurubux Singh had threatened and intimidated the Chargeman, Mr Chakravarty. The report, however, contained a clerical mistake in its concluding paragraph where the finding on the fourth charge was recorded as “threatening and intimidating Charan Singh to stop work”. Charan Singh was one of the striking workers and there was no allegation in the record that he had been intimidated. The Court pointed out that the remainder of the report clearly identified the fourth charge as intimidation of Mr Chakravarty and that this allegation had been proved on the basis of witness statements. Consequently, the reference to Charan Singh was an accidental substitution of the wrong name in the final sentence of the report. The Court held that the General Manager, having examined the evidence and the enquiry officer’s findings, could not have been misled by this typographical error because the substantive conclusion throughout the report was that Mr Chakravarty had been the victim of intimidation. Moreover, the charge concerned the act of threatening and intimidating another worker; the identity of the worker, whether Charan Singh or Mr Chakravarty, was not material to the existence of the misconduct. The body of the report demonstrated that the only person who had been threatened was Mr Chakravarty, and the enquiry officer had expressly recorded that this finding was proved. It was therefore reasonable to conclude that the General Manager relied on the correct finding and not on the erroneous name that appeared in the concluding clause. The Court therefore rejected the contention that the dismissal was based on a finding that Charan Singh had been threatened and intimidated. The appellant, through counsel, further argued that the Manager had acted on a mistaken belief that Gurubux Singh was guilty of all four misconducts listed in the charge‑sheet, whereas the enquiry officer had proved only three of them. The four misconducts alleged in the charge‑sheet were: (1) participation in an illegal strike; (2) leaving his place of duty without permission; (3) inciting employees in the Paint Shop, Propeller Shaft Section, Rear Axle Section and Press Section of the Auto Division to stop work; and (4) behaving in a riotous and disorderly manner and threatening and intimidating another coworker. The formal order of dismissal, however, recorded that Gurubux Singh had been found guilty of the first three offences only—participation in an illegal strike, unauthorized absence from his post, and incitement of employees in the specified sections to stop work. The fourth allegation of threatening and intimidating another coworker was expressly held not to have been proved beyond doubt. The Court therefore found no merit in the appellant’s claim that the dismissal was based on an unproved fourth charge and held that the dismissal order was consistent with the findings of the enquiry officer.

In the formal dismissal order the document listed as one of the acts of misconduct the allegation that the employee had threatened and intimidated another employee named Mr. T. S. N. Rao, identified by service number 6610/60205/1, and had prevented that employee from performing his duties, and then concluded that the employee was therefore dismissed from the service of the Company......... The Enquiry Officer’s report set out his conclusions, stating that, based on the testimony of witnesses, it was conclusively proved that Mr. Dhanda had (1) participated in an illegal strike; (2) left his place of duty without permission; and (3) incited other employees to stop work. The report added that the charge of threatening and intimidating had not been proved beyond doubt. When the formal order of dismissal is examined, it appears that although the charge of threatening and intimidating other employees was not proved, the order still mentioned that charge among the misconduct findings on which dismissal was based. If this were the only basis, the order would contain a serious defect. However, the General Manager recorded his order on the formal report, stating: “I have gone through the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the proceedings of the enquiry. Even though the charge of threatening and intimidating other workers has not been proved against Mr. Dhanda the other charges are also of a serious nature. In the circumstances, order that he be dismissed from the service of the company with effect from the date of the charge‑sheet.” This statement was dated 3 July 1958 and the formal order bears the same date. Reading both statements together makes it clear that the General Manager, while issuing the dismissal, relied on the conclusion that the threatening and intimidating charge was not proved and that the dismissal was based on the other serious charges. The inclusion of the fourth charge in the list of misconduct in the formal order is therefore a clerical mistake. The Court held that this clerical error does not affect the validity of the dismissal order because the Manager did not base his decision on the unproved charge. Consequently, the Court rejected the separate contentions of seven appellants that the tribunals below had failed to consider certain infirmities in the order. The appeal was dismissed, and no order as to costs was made.