Dalip Singh vs The State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 235 of 1958

Decision Date: 28 July 1960

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah

In the matter titled Dalip Singh versus The State of Punjab, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 28 July 1960. The opinion was authored by Justice K.C. Das Gupta, who sat on the bench together with Justices P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, and J.C. Shah. The petitioner was Dalip Singh and the respondent was the State of Punjab. The case is reported in the All India Reporter at page 1305 of the 1960 volume, and it has been subsequently cited in several later decisions, including reports from 1964, 1967, 1970, 1971, 1976, and 1989. The statutory provision that formed the backdrop of the dispute was the rule concerning compulsory retirement of a State Service officer, as contained in Rule 278 of the Patiala State Regulations of 1931, together with the relevant constitutional provision, Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, which protects a civil servant from removal or dismissal except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

The appellant, who had been serving as Inspector General of Police in the former Patiala and East Punjab States Union, was retired by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu through an order dated 18 August 1950. The order, issued in the name of His Highness the Rajpramukh, stated that the appellant was being retired from service for administrative reasons, effective from that date, and that he was on leave at the time. No formal charges had been framed against him, and it was only at the appellant’s own insistence that certain allegations were communicated to him. Rule 278 of the Patiala State Regulations, which was then applicable, provided that any person desiring a pension had to submit an application, and that the State reserved the right to retire any employee on pension for political or other reasons. The primary question before the Court was whether this compulsory retirement amounted to removal or dismissal within the meaning of Article 311(2). The trial court decided in favour of the appellant, but the High Court reversed that decision. The Supreme Court examined two tests it had previously laid down for determining whether a compulsory retirement constituted removal or dismissal: first, whether the retirement was imposed as a punishment, based on a charge or imputation against the officer; and second, whether the officer was stripped of any benefit already earned, as would occur in a dismissal. Relying on the earlier judgments in Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and State of Bombay v. Subhagchand Doshi, the Court held that the order against the appellant was not made on any charge of misconduct or inefficiency. Although the government might have considered such factors, the order did not contain any explicit imputation or charge, and the appellant retained the pension benefits to which he was entitled. Consequently, the Court concluded that the compulsory retirement did not amount to dismissal or removal under Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

It was observed that the statutory rule under which the officer was retired contemplated the granting of a pension, and the officer in question indeed received the full pension to which he was entitled. The Court held that it would be erroneous to conclude that, merely because the rule did not prescribe a specific age at which compulsory retirement could be effected, every order of compulsory retirement issued pursuant to that rule must automatically be characterized as a dismissal or removal for the purposes of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. This principle was explained in the earlier authority of State of Bombay v. Subhagchand Doshi, [1958] S.C.R. 571.

The matter before the Civil Appellate Court was Civil Appeal No. 235 of 1958, an appeal from the judgment and decree dated 18 October 1956 rendered by the former PEPSU High Court in Regular First Appeal No. 11 of 1954. That decision itself arose from the judgment and decree dated 21 November 1953 of the Additional District Judge, Patiala. Counsel for the appellant comprised Gopal Singh and K. B. Krishnaswamy, while N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta appeared for the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 28 July 1960 by Justice Das Gupta.

According to the facts established, the appellant, Dalip Singh, entered the service of the Patiala State in 1916. He rose through the ranks and was appointed Inspector General of Police of that State in June 1946. Following the creation of the State of PEPSU, he was integrated into the new police service and was confirmed in the same rank of Inspector General of Police. While occupying that post, he went on leave on 18 October 1949, a leave that continued until 17 August 1950.

On 18 August 1950, the Rajpramukh of the State issued an order stating: “His Highness the Rajpramukh is pleased to retire from service Sardar Dalip Singh, Inspector General of Police, PEPSU (on leave) for administrative reasons with effect from the 18th August, 1950.” A copy of this order was dispatched to the appellant. The very next day, 19 August 1950, the appellant addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary of the State in which he asserted that the forced retirement would cause him a substantial loss, estimated at about Rs. 50,000, representing the pay and allowances he would have earned during the intervening period, and that his pension would also be adversely affected. He further contended that the government’s action amounted to his removal from service and demanded that the government disclose the specific grounds that justified such a decision.

Subsequently, on 30 March 1951, the government furnished the appellant with the charges it alleged against him, explaining that these charges formed the basis for retiring him on administrative grounds. After serving a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant instituted a suit before the District Judge, Patiala, against the State of PEPSU. In his plaint, the appellant sought a declaration that the orders dated 16 August 1950 and 18 August 1950, which purportedly removed him from the post of Inspector General of Police, PEPSU, were unconstitutional, illegal, void, ultra vires and inoperative. He further prayed that the Court recognize that he remained in the service of the State as Inspector General of Police and that he was entitled to the arrears of his pay and allowances.

In the suit, the plaintiff sought a decree that he should receive his arrears of pay and allowances from 18 August 1950, that he should continue to draw his salary and allowances until he reached the age of superannuation, and that the State should pay him Rs 26,699‑130 together with full costs of the suit and future interest. The plaintiff’s principal argument was that the order dated 18 August 1950, which retired him, amounted to his removal from service within the meaning of article 311(2) of the Constitution; because the procedural safeguards required by that article had not been observed, the termination of his service was void and inoperative. The State, on the other hand, contended that the plaintiff had been retired, not removed, and that therefore article 311 was inapplicable. The trial court held that compulsory retirement was equivalent to removal under article 311, that the statutory requirements of that article had not been complied with, and consequently declared the August 1950 order unconstitutional, illegal, void, ultra vires and inoperative. The court further affirmed that the plaintiff remained in service as Inspector General of Police, was entitled to arrears from 18 August 1950, could continue to receive his salary until retirement, and ordered the State to pay the specified sum. On appeal, the Pepsu High Court disagreed, holding that compulsory retirement did not constitute removal within article 311 and consequently set aside the trial court’s decree and dismissed the suit. Before the present Court, the plaintiff reiterated that the retirement order was indeed removal under article 311. Counsel for the plaintiff also submitted that rule 278 of the Patiala State Regulations, on the basis of which the retirement order had been made, was no longer operative because the regulations had been revised after the integration of Patiala into the Pepsu State Services. It was argued that the revised rules contained no provision similar to rule 278, which read: “For all classes of pensions the person who desires to obtain the pension is required to submit his application before any pension is granted to him. The State reserves to itself the right to retire any of its employees on pension on political or on other reasons.”

The counsel for the respondent attempted to convince the Court that the provision granting the State the authority to retire any employee on pension for political or other reasons was absent from the revised rules. However, the counsel was unable to demonstrate that any amendment to Rule 278 had been made before 18 August 1950. The record shows that revised rules concerning travelling allowance were issued in 1946 as Volume II of the new rules, and that rules relating to pay and allowances were issued in 1947 as Volume I. Subsequently, in 1952 the first volume of the PEPSU Service Regulations dealing with pay and leave was published, and in the same year the third volume of the PEPSU State Regulations, which contained the pension rules, was released. The preface to this third volume states that the Revised Edition of the Patiala State Regulations covering pay, allowances, leave, pension and travelling allowance was originally published in 1931. The travelling allowance rules were later revised and re‑issued as Patiala Service Regulations, Volume II, in 1946, while the pay, allowances and leave rules were extracted from the 1931 edition and printed as Patiala Services Regulations, Volume I, in 1947. The pension rules, however, remained in the 1931 Revised Edition and were updated only by correction slips. When the Patiala and East Punjab States Union was formed on 20 August 1948, these rules were extended to the entire Union by Ordinance No 1 of 2005. Because the original publication had run out of copies, government offices experienced difficulty locating the rules, prompting a decision to revise and re‑print the publication for universal availability. This explanation makes clear that up to the 1952 publication of Volume III of the PEPSU Service Regulations, the pension rules from the 1931 Patiala State Regulations continued to apply to PEPSU. Consequently, on 18 August 1950 it is reasonable to conclude that Rule 278 in its full terms remained in force and was applicable to PEPSU. Moreover, the 1952 edition still retained the Government’s reservation of the “right to retire any of its employees on pension on political or on other reasons” (see Chapter V, Rule 10). Therefore, the respondent’s claim that Rule 278 did not apply to the appellant on 18 August 1950 lacks any factual basis. This leads to the principal issue of the case: whether the appellant’s compulsory retirement under Rule 278 of the Patiala State Regulations constitutes a removal from service within the meaning of the Constitution.

In this case the Court examined whether compulsory retirement under Rule 278 of the Patiala State Regulations constituted a removal from service within the meaning of article 311 of the Constitution. The Court first referred to its earlier decision in Shyamlal v. State of U.P. and the Union of India (1), which established two criteria for determining whether a compulsory retirement amounts to a removal or dismissal that would trigger the protection of article 311. The first criterion required a finding that the action was a punishment; for this to be so, the Court held, a specific charge or imputation against the officer must be made a condition of exercising the power to retire. The second criterion examined whether the officer, by being compulsorily retired, lost a benefit already earned, as would be the case in a dismissal or removal. In Shyamlal’s case a charge‑sheet had indeed been drawn up and an enquiry held, but the eventual order of compulsory retirement was not based on the enquiry’s result. The Court observed that the enquiry served only to assist the Government in deciding whether it was in the public interest to dispense with the officer’s services, and therefore the imputation in the charge‑sheet was not a condition precedent to exercising the retirement power.

The Court then applied these same tests in State of Bombay v. Subhagchand Doshi (2). It held that the compulsory retirement provision under rule 165.A of the Saurashtra Civil Service Rules, which was invoked in that case, did not violate article 311(2). The judgment explained that while misconduct and inefficiency are relevant factors in both dismissal and retirement, a distinction exists: in retirement they merely provide background for the decision, and no duty to hold a formal enquiry exists beyond satisfying the authority taking action; in dismissal or removal, however, such factors form the very basis of the order, and the enquiry must be formal and must comply with the rules of natural justice and the requirements of article 311(2). The Court quoted the passage, “while misconduct and inefficiency are factors that enter into the account where the order is one of dismissal or removal or of retirement, there is this difference that while in the case of retirement they merely furnish the background and the enquiry, if held—and there is no duty to hold an enquiry—is only for the satisfaction of the authorities who have to take action, in the case of dismissal or removal, they form the very basis on which the order is made and the enquiry thereon must be formal, and must satisfy the rules of natural justice and the requirements of article 311(2).”

Applying this analysis to the present facts, the Court noted that the order issued by the Rajpramukh did not allege any charge of misconduct or inefficiency. The order simply stated that the compulsory retirement was for “administrative reasons.” Only after the appellant requested the grounds for his retirement were certain charges communicated to him. Consequently, there was no basis to say that the retirement order contained any imputation or charge against the officer. The Court further observed that even if the Government had considered misconduct or inefficiency in reaching its decision, such consideration did not amount to an imputation or charge. Turning to the second test, the Court found that the officer had been granted a full pension, indicating that he had not lost a benefit he had earned. Rule 278 itself provides for retirement on pension; had the rule permitted retirement without pension, a different conclusion might have been reached. Because the officer received a full pension, the retirement could not be characterized as punitive. The Court therefore concluded that the compulsory retirement under Rule 278 did not amount to a removal within the meaning of article 311.

In this matter, the Court observed that the fact that the Government considered various factors before concluding whether any action should be taken under Rule 278 does not constitute an imputation or charge against the officer. The Court then applied the second test, which asks whether the officer has been deprived of a benefit that he had earned. On that basis, the Court found that the officer had been allowed to receive the full pension to which he was entitled, and therefore he had not lost any earned benefit. The Court noted that Rule 278 itself provides for retirement with pension, and that if the rule had mandated retirement without pension, the retirement might have been characterized as punitive. However, because the rule permits only pensionable retirement and the officer in the present case received the full pension, the Court concluded that the retirement order was not punitive in nature. Turning to the authority cited in Doshi’s Case, the Court referred to an observation on page 579 that, at first glance, appears to suggest that compulsory retirement which does not amount to dismissal or removal can occur only under a rule that fixes an age for such retirement. The Court clarified that this was not the intended meaning of the earlier decision. It explained that in the first instance of Doshi’s Case there existed a rule that set the compulsory retirement age at fifty‑five, together with an additional rule that allowed compulsory retirement after an officer had either reached the age of fifty or completed twenty‑five years of service. The Court emphasized that the observation was made in that specific context, and that the case did not involve a rule providing for compulsory retirement at any age regardless of length of service. Consequently, the Court held that it would be improper to read the observations in Doshi’s Case as establishing a principle that retirement under the rule presently before the Court must automatically be treated as dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the view of the High Court that the order of compulsory retirement issued against the appellant did not constitute removal from service that would invoke the protections of Article 311 of the Constitution, and that the suit filed by the appellant was properly dismissed. The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs, and the judgment concluded with the dismissal of the appeal.