Chairman of Bankura Municipality vs Lalji Raja and Sons

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 119

Decision Date: 23 March 1960

Coram: J.C. Shah, K.C. Das Gupta

The case was styled Chairman of the Bankura Municipality versus Lalji Raja and Sons and was decided on 23 March 1960 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice J C Shah, who sat together with Justice K C Das Gupta. The petitioner in the matter was the Chairman of the Bankura Municipality and the respondents were Lalji Raja and Sons. The decision was recorded under the citation 1960 AIR 871 and 1960 SCR (3) 358. The legal issue involved the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 (Bengal Act XV of 1932), particularly sections 430 and 431(2), concerning the seizure of unwholesome food and the authority to direct its destruction.

The respondents owned an oil‑seed pressing factory situated within the limits of the Bankura Municipality. They imported mustard seeds from various regions and held a licence for the sale of mustard seed. Following a report made by the Municipal Sanitary Inspector, the Sub‑Divisional Officer issued a search warrant directing the seizure of a large quantity of “rotten and decomposed” mustard seed from the respondents’ possession. The Chairman of the Municipality subsequently applied to the District Magistrate for action under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act. The proceedings that arose from the Chairman’s petition experienced a chequered course. Ultimately, the District Magistrate held that the mustard seed seized was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption on the date of seizure and, exercising the power conferred by section 431(2), directed that the seized seed be transferred to the Commissioners of the Municipality for disposal either as manure or as cattle feed. The High Court, hearing a revision, set aside the magistrate’s order on the ground that section 431 did not apply to a seizure made under a warrant issued pursuant to section 430. On special leave, the Municipality appealed this decision. The Supreme Court held that the powers contemplated in section 431(2) of the Bengal Municipal Act were expressly limited to articles seized under section 428, and that there was no language in section 431(2) supporting the view that those powers could also be exercised in respect of articles seized under a warrant issued under section 430. The Court therefore restored the magistrate’s authority to direct the disposal of the unwholesome mustard seed.

In this case the respondents, who owned the Gouranga Oil Mill located within Bankura Municipality in West Bengal, imported mustard seed from various regions for the purpose of oil extraction and possessed a licence to sell mustard seed. Following a request made by the Sanitary Inspector of the Bankura Municipality, the Sub‑Divisional Officer of Bankura issued a search warrant authorising the seizure of nine hundred bags of mustard seed described as “rotten and decomposed”. Of these bags, six hundred were located in the mill’s godown and three hundred were kept in the courtyard of the rice mill owned by Hanseswar Maji. During the execution of the warrant a large quantity of mustard seed that had been spread out for drying in the Gouranga Oil Mill was seized, and additional bags that were lying in the rice mill were also taken into custody.

After the inspection, the Sanitary Inspector prepared a report and the Chairman of the Municipality, relying on that report, applied to the District Magistrate of Bankura on 10 March 1950 for action under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, No. XV of 1932. The Chairman alleged that the seized mustard seed was in a highly decomposed condition, emitted an offensive odour, and therefore was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption.

The proceedings that arose from the Chairman’s petition underwent a series of contradictory orders. On 26 May 1950 the District Magistrate directed that the seized bags be restored to the respondents; that order was subsequently set aside by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in a revision proceeding. In April 1951 the District Magistrate issued another order directing that the contents of the bags be disposed of as “manure or fodder”; the Calcutta High Court again set aside that order and ordered a retrial of the matter. The Magistrate later conducted a fresh enquiry and, by an order dated 10 November 1954, held that the seizure had been lawful under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, that the mustard seed was indeed unwholesome and unfit for human consumption at the time of seizure, and, exercising the power conferred by section 431(2), directed that the material be handed over to the Commissioners of the Bankura Municipality for disposal either as manure or as cattle feed.

The Calcutta High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, promulgated an order on 24 August 1955 which set aside the Magistrate’s 1954 order. The High Court held that section 431 of the Bengal Municipal Act could not be invoked in a case where unwholesome food had been seized under a warrant issued under section 430. An appeal against that High Court order was filed with special leave. The sole issue for determination on appeal was whether food articles seized under a warrant issued by a Magistrate exercising powers under section 430 could be ordered to be destroyed under section 431(2) of the same Act.

In order to decide whether food seized under a magistrate’s authority pursuant to section 430 of the Bengal Municipal Act may be ordered to be destroyed under section 431(2) of that Act, the Court first examined the relevant statutory provisions. Section 421 of the Act makes it unlawful to sell or to store for sale any article of food that is unwholesome and intended for human consumption. Section 427, insofar as it is relevant, authorises the municipal commissioners and certain other officers to enter and inspect any premises where food articles are kept for the purpose of sale, preparation for sale, or where such food is brought for that purpose, and also to inspect the food found there. Clause (1) of section 428 empowers the commissioners and the officers designated in section 427 to seize any food article intended for human consumption when, during inspection, it appears to be unwholesome or unfit for human use. Section 429 provides that food seized under section 428 may be ordered destroyed if the owner or the person in possession gives written consent; if such consent is not obtained and the seized article is perishable, the seizing officer may present it before a magistrate, who may, upon finding the article unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human consumption, either condemn it or order its destruction. Section 430, insofar as it is material, states that a magistrate, satisfied on an application by the commissioners, the health officer, the sanitary inspector, or any other officer authorised by the commissioner, that there is reasonable cause to believe that unsound, unwholesome or unfit food is in the possession of a person for sale or offer within the municipality, may issue a warrant authorising entry onto the premises and the search for and seizure of such food articles. Section 431, by its first subsection, provides that any food article seized under section 428 which has not been destroyed by consent under subsection 1 of section 429, or any perishable article not dealt with under subsection 2 of that section, must be taken before a magistrate as soon as practicable after seizure. Sub‑section 2 of section 431 further provides that if the magistrate determines that the food is unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human consumption, he shall cause the same to be destroyed or to be otherwise disposed of by the

The Court explained that the municipal legislation permits municipal officers to enter and inspect premises where food articles are stored or prepared for sale, and that if the officers discover any article of food that is unwholesome or unfit for human consumption, they may seize the article and destroy it with the written consent of the owner or possessor; if such consent is not obtained and the article is perishable, the officers must obtain a Magistrate’s order for its destruction. The Court noted that section 428 is not the only provision that authorises seizure of unwholesome food; the municipal authorities may also approach a Magistrate for a warrant under section 430, and the warrant empowers them to seize any article of food that is unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human consumption. Once food articles are seized under subsection 1 of section 428 and are not disposed of under section 429, the law requires that they be taken before a Magistrate as soon as possible, and subsection 2 of section 431 authorises the Magistrate, upon finding that the articles are unsound, unwholesome or unfit, to order their destruction or other disposal. The Court clarified that the word “such” in subsection 2 of section 431 refers expressly to the articles described in subsection 1 of the same section, and that subsection 1 deals only with articles seized under section 428. Consequently, there is no express statutory provision that authorises the destruction or disposal of articles seized under a warrant issued pursuant to section 430. Counsel for the Municipality argued that the legislature intended all seized articles, whether seized on inspection under section 428 or under a warrant issued under section 430, to be dealt with under section 431, and therefore the High Court erred in holding that the Magistrate’s power to order destruction applied only to articles seized under section 428. The Court, however, held that the language of subsection 2 of section 431 clearly limits the Magistrate’s authority to order destruction to articles seized under section 428 and not disposed of under section 429, and it found it difficult to sustain the plea that the legislature, although not expressly, intended the same power to apply to articles seized under a warrant issued under section 430. Counsel further submitted that it could not have been the legislature’s intention to allow a Magistrate to order seizure of unwholesome food while denying him the power to order its destruction, even though he may order destruction of unwholesome articles seized by municipal officers; the Court, however, observed that the statutory language does not support that broader interpretation.

The Court observed that a person who stores unwholesome food articles may be prosecuted under section 421, and that during or after such prosecution the Magistrate, having taken charge of the complaint, may issue an order under the Code of Criminal Procedure to destroy the seized articles. Accordingly, the Court stated that it could not conclude that the lack of an explicit provision for disposal of articles seized under section 430 was unintentional; even assuming a gap in section 431, the Court held that it would be inappropriate to override the clear wording of the legislature by reading into subsection 2 of section 431 the authority to order destruction of articles seized pursuant to a warrant issued under section 430. The Court rejected the Municipality’s argument that the seizure was exercised under section 428 rather than section 430, finding that argument without merit. The report of the Chairman of the Municipality dated 10 March 1950 clearly indicated that the search warrant had been issued by the Sub‑Divisional Officer in accordance with his authority under section 430 of the Bengal Municipal Act. Any admission by the respondents that the seizure was made under section 428 in proceedings resisting the municipal order was deemed valueless. Section 428 does not envisage seizure of unwholesome food by a Magistrate, whereas section 430 expressly authorises a Magistrate to issue a warrant for such seizure. The powers in section 431(2) are expressly limited to articles seized under section 428, and nothing in that provision supports extending those powers to articles seized under a warrant issued under section 430. The Court concluded that the High Court was correct in its earlier finding. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.