Bhagwantrao vs Vishwasrao And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 208 of 1955

Decision Date: 12 January, 1960

Coram: S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar

In the case titled Bhagwantrao versus Vishwasrao and Another, the judgment was delivered on 12 January 1960 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice S.K. Das, who was joined on the bench by Justice A.K. Sarkar. The parties were recorded as petitioner Bhagwantrao and respondents Vishwasrao and another individual. The citation for this decision is reported as 1960 AIR 642 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reports as 1960 SCR (2) 710. The matter concerned the statutory provisions relating to Grant, Resumption and the true nature and character of Patelki huq inam under the Inam Rules of 1859, the Patel and Patwaris Law of 1900, and section 190 of the Berar Land Revenue Code of 1928.

The central question that the Court had to resolve was whether the revenue authorities of the State Government possessed the power to resume lands that were identified as “patelki huq inam” and situated in the jagir village of Nawabag, which lay within the ceded territory of Berar. Those lands had originally been granted by the then sovereign authority as remuneration or emoluments for services to be rendered by the patel. The grant was described as being of ancient origin and had been recognized by the British Government as a “service inam.” In Nawabag village there were four patel families, known by the surnames Dongre, Rokade, Raut and Ingle, whose members held the patel’s office in a rotating ten‑year cycle. A partition within the Rokade family resulted in the division of the patelki inam lands, and the portion that formed the subject of the suit was allotted to the share of the appellant, who had never actually occupied the patel’s office.

During the preparation of the record of rights for the jagir village, an enquiry concluded that the appellant was not entitled to continue holding the patelki inam lands, because those lands were granted as emoluments to the patel who was actively performing the duties of the office. The Financial Commissioner subsequently affirmed that the person who was the working patel was entitled to receive the full emoluments of his office. Accordingly, the Commissioner confirmed the order that the lands in the appellant’s possession should be resumed by the government and re‑granted to the sitting patel, identified as respondent No. 1.

Two principal issues arose concerning the true nature of the patelki huq inam. First, the Court examined whether the grant constituted remuneration or emoluments for the patel’s office, thereby allowing the government to resume the land; second, the Court considered whether the grant was a parcel of land given to the patelki family, burdened with service, such that the land remained a joint‑family property subject to partition among family members as long as any member performed the service. The Court held that, in the present case, the patelki inam originated as a grant by the sovereign authority intended as remuneration for patelki service. The grant was therefore distinct from and independent of the jagir of Nawabag, despite the land’s physical location within the jagir village. In its true character the patelki inam constituted land given in lieu of wages for the office of patel; consequently it could not be freely alienated and the government retained the authority to resume the land.

The Court held that when the office of patel was assigned by rotation among several individuals, the termination of a particular turn did not extinguish the person’s status as a patel, nor did it deprive him of the emoluments attached to that office. The Court further observed that the Inam Rules of 1859 did not provide any basis for a family member of a patel to claim, as a matter of right, a share in the lands that constituted the patel‑ki‑huq‑inam merely by virtue of his kinship, irrespective of whether he performed the required service. Accordingly, a member of the patel’s family could not be presumed to be entitled to a portion of the emoluments of the patel’s office. The State retained the full authority to resume the patrimonial inam lands and to regrant them to the person actually occupying the patel’s office, in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Patel and Patwaris Law of 1900 and Section 1900 of the Berar Land Revenue Code of 1928. Moreover, since the lands in question were granted as remuneration for the performance of the patel’s duties, the Court concluded that the doctrine of adverse possession could not be invoked by the Government to challenge its title over those lands under the facts of the present case. The Court referred to several earlier authorities to support its reasoning, including Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabhadrayya (1921) L.R. I.A. 224, Krishnarao v. Nilkantha and Others A.I.R. (1922) Nag. 52, Mir Subhan Ali v. Imami Begum (1925) 21 Nag. L. Reports 117, Lakhamgouda Basavaprabhu Sardesai v. Baswantrao and Others A.I.R. (1931) P.C. 157, Jaiwantrao and Another v. Sahebyao (1933) 29 Nag. L. Reports 210, and Raje Shrinivasrao v. Raje Vinayakrao I.L.R. [1949] Nag. 1.

The appeal before this Court arose from a certificate granted by the High Court of Nagpur under clause (c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution, indicating that the matter was fit for adjudication by the Supreme Court. The case centered on significant questions concerning the right of the State government’s revenue authorities to resume certain lands known as “patel‑ki‑huq‑inam” situated in the former ceded area of Berar. The appellant, Bhagwantrao Shivaji Patel (referred to simply as Bhagwantrao), was before the Court, while Vishwasrao Patel, who had been the defendant No. 2 in the original suit, appeared as respondent No. 1. The earlier proceedings involved a judgment and decree dated November 27, 1951, of the former Nagpur High Court in Second Appeal No. 169 of 1947, which itself arose from a judgment and decree dated February 3, 1947, of the First Additional District Judge, Amraoti, in Civil Appeal No. 85‑A of 1946, against a judgment and decree dated December 20, 1945, of the Civil Judge First Class, Ellichpur, in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1943. Counsel for the appellant were W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi; counsel for respondent No. 1 were H. J. Umrigar and Sardar Bahadur; and counsel for respondent No. 2 were R. Ganapathy Iyer, M. P. Nathwani and R. H. Dhebar. The judgment was delivered on January 12, 1960, by Justice S. K. Das.

The State of Bombay appeared as respondent No. 2, having previously been the Provincial Government of the Central Provinces and Berar, which had been defendant No. 1. The six survey numbers that form the subject of the suit were originally situated within the Central Provinces and Berar, later became part of Madhya Pradesh, and at the time of the appeal lay in the State of Bombay. These lands lay in the jagir village of Nawabag, which at that time belonged to the Ellichpur taluq of Berar and is now known as Archalpur. The village contained four Patel families—Dongre, Rokade, Raut and Ingle—who each held the office of Patel on a rotational ten‑year basis. The dispute concerned the Rokade family. Shivajirao Rokade had two sons, Amrit and Bhagwant; Bhagwant, who is styled as the appellant, is the plaintiff before this Court. Vishwasrao, who is styled as respondent No. 1, is the son of Amrit. Shivajirao died in 1886 and his son Amrit died in 1920. In 1923 a partition was effected between the appellant and respondent No. 1. The appellant asserted that the partition resulted in the division of the “patelki inam” lands and that the lands now the subject of the suit were allotted to his share. While Shivajirao had acted as Patel, his son Amrit had also performed the duties of Patel, and subsequently Vishwasrao had likewise exercised the Patel office.

In 1935 the Government appointed a special officer to compile a record of rights for the jagir village of Nawabag. The officer submitted a report, and subsequent enquiries concluded that the appellant was not entitled to the “patelki inam” lands, which were regarded as emoluments belonging to the serving Patel of the Rokade family. The Deputy Commissioner therefore ordered that the lands presently possessed by the appellant be resumed and re‑granted to the working Patel, namely respondent No. 1. The appellant appealed this order. The Commissioner of Berar set aside the eviction order but kept the status‑quo pending final Government orders. On 19 December 1941 the Financial Commissioner ruled that the person actually performing the Patel duties was entitled to receive the full emoluments of the office, that revenue officers consistently refused to acknowledge any claim to a share of those emoluments, and consequently set aside the Commissioner’s order while restoring the Deputy Commissioner’s decree. Following this decision, the appellant instituted a suit in 1942 asserting that the Government lacked jurisdiction to resume and re‑grant the lands to respondent No. 1 and that the revenue orders were void. He sought possession of the land and mesne profits. By a later amendment he claimed that at least two of the plots, identified as 211A and 9/1A, had ceased to be “patelki inam” lands and had become private family property, so that the Government possessed no authority to resume them; this alternative claim was to be considered later.

In this case, it was established that at least two of the plots, identified as 211A and 9/1A, had ceased to be “patelki inam” lands and had become the private property of the family. Consequently, the Court observed that, under any interpretation, the Government possessed no authority to resume those two plots. The appellant’s claim concerning those plots was presented on an alternative basis, and the Court indicated that it would examine that claim in due course. The trial Judge had dismissed the suit, but on the appellant’s appeal the learned Additional District Judge of Amraoti reversed the decision and decreed in favour of the appellant. A further appeal was lodged before the High Court of Nagpur, which allowed the appellant’s appeal, set aside the decree of the Additional District Judge, and restored the trial Judge’s dismissal. The High Court’s substantive findings were twofold: first, that the lands in dispute had been granted by the then‑sovereign authority as remuneration or emoluments for the services of the patel, and that the grant had been recognised by the British Government as a service inam; second, that the revenue authorities were empowered to resume and regrant the lands pursuant to the provisions of the Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900, as applicable in Berar, and section 190 of the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928. After that judgment, the appellant obtained a certificate from the High Court, and the present appeal was filed on the basis of that certificate. To understand the arguments raised by the appellant, the Court found it necessary to recount further historical facts concerning the jagir village of Nawabag and the “patelki inam” lands contained therein. Although the original sanads establishing the jagir of Nawabag or the “patelki inam” were not produced, it was not contested that they were of very ancient origin. Berar had been ceded by the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1853, and the Inam Rules for settling jagir and inam claims were issued in 1859. Rule 1 of those rules provided, inter alia, that land shown to have been held as inams—either under a fixed quit rent or rent‑free for at least forty years before the cession—should be treated by the British Government as an inam possessed under a valid title. Following the promulgation of the Inam Rules, an inams investigation was undertaken. Exhibit P‑1, a copy of an inam entry dated 31 August 1866, demonstrated that the jagir of Nawabag had originally been granted by the Kings of Delhi to one Shah Abdul Huq and was later continued and confirmed by sanads issued by the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1757. The village covered approximately 1,846 bighas, of which about 262 bighas were held by patels in lieu of their “huq,” allocated at a ratio of one bigha per netan (a measurement of nine bighas). The Inam Commissioner noted that the jagir had been in existence for more than one hundred years prior to the inam enquiry and should be…

In the records the jagir was noted as having been continued in perpetuity, except for an area of two hundred bighas for which satisfactory proof of title could not be produced, and the continuation was subject to a quit‑rent of Rs 87‑8‑0. An earlier document, Exhibit P‑9A dated 24 October 1771, disclosed a dispute between the jagirdars and the patels concerning the patels’ entitlement to one bigha of “patelki inam” land for each netan. The jagirdars contested the patels’ claim and the matter was ultimately referred to the Nazim Sahib of Ellichpur. The Nazim, after reviewing the earlier records to determine who was in possession, granted the mukaddami a yearly inam of one and a half bighas as requested by the mukaddaman. According to the old judicial usage, land was to be measured at the rate of one and a half bighas per netan from the lands of Nawabag, and the mukaddaman were therefore held to be occupants of the cultivated area. Of the total of roughly 262 bighas of “patelki inam” lands in the village, the Rokade family possessed about eleven plots, amounting to approximately fifty acres. Some time before 1904 certain co‑sharer‑jagirdars of Nawabag alienated portions of the jagir lands to strangers. This alienation prompted Government resumption proceedings, and about half of the jagir village was resumed by the Government in the years 1904‑05. A detailed enquiry showed that survey numbers 1 to 21 and 40 to 45 of the “patelki inam” lands fell within the resumed portion, whereas survey numbers 22 to 39 remained within the jagir portion. Consequently, the Rokade‑held survey numbers 2/IA and 9/IA, which lay in the resumed area, were recorded as Khalsa and were assessed for revenue, while the remaining surveyed parcels—29/1, 34/3, 36/2 and 37/2—continued to be possessed by the Rokade family without any assessment. Around 1917 another resumption proceeding disclosed that the jagirdars had also alienated lands within the jagir portion. In that instance the resumed lands were not declared Khalsa but were re‑granted to the jagirdars. Believing that this re‑grant extended to the “patelki inam” lands of the Rokade family, the jagirdars attempted to take possession, leading to further revenue proceedings. A crucial document in the case is a letter dated 28 August 1922, which conveys Government sanction to exclude from resumption twenty‑five acres and fifteen gunthas of land situated in the Khalsa portion of the village, and to exclude from the land re‑granted to the jagirdar twenty‑four acres and thirty gunthas in the inam portion of Nawabag jagir village. The Government order further stipulated that the excluded lands would be entered in the name of Amrit Shivaji Patel as his “patelki huq inam”.

The record showed that the lands were entered in the name of Amrit Shivaji Patel as his “patelki huq inam”. Some other patel families attempted to obtain a release of the inam lands that had been resumed, but those attempts failed. The Government reported that an inquiry had found that, aside from Amrit Rao, no member of the old patelki families—except Deo Rao—was in possession of the original “patelki inam” lands. Because Deo Rao did not belong to the branch that held the right of officiation, his claim was rejected. Consequently, the Government order of 1922 clarified that the “patelki inam” lands of Amrit Rao constituted a homogeneous, separate service grant and were not contingent upon the resumption of the Nawabag jagir. The proceedings that took place between 1917 and 1922 were followed by further proceedings from 1935 to 1941, which resulted in a third resumption of the “patelki inam” lands and a regrant to Vishwas Rao, as earlier referenced. These events traced the history of the disputed lands up to the filing of the appellant’s suit in 1942. Apart from alternative claims concerning survey numbers 2/IA and 9/IA and a claim of title by adverse possession—issues that would be examined later—the principal issue for determination in the appeal concerned the true character of the “patelki inam” lands. Specifically, the question was whether the lands represented a grant of remuneration or emoluments for the patel’s office, as the High Court had held, or whether they were a grant of land to the patelki family subject to service, such that the lands remained joint family property, liable to partition among family members, as long as a family member performed the patelki service. On behalf of the appellant, counsel argued vigorously that the High Court’s conclusion on this point was erroneous. In support of this position, the appellant’s counsel advanced a four‑fold submission. First, it was contended that the Rokade family possessed ownership‑type rights over the lands, conditioned only by the requirement that a family member render patelki service; in other words, the grant was a land grant burdened with service. Second, the counsel asserted that the grant originated from the jagirdar of the village Nawabag rather than from the sovereign authority, and therefore neither the Inam Rules nor the provisions of the Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900, applied. Third, even assuming that the aforementioned Rules and statutory provisions were relevant, the appellant maintained that his hereditary rights in the lands persisted. Fourth, it was submitted that the Government orders dated 28 August 1922 did not create any new rights nor did they extinguish any existing rights concerning the “patelki inam” lands, and that the Government lacked authority to resume the lands and regrant them to respondent No 1. The second submission, concerning the source of the grant and the inapplicability of the Inam Rules and the 1900 law, was ready for further consideration.

The matter was disposed of without much difficulty. The Court noted that the original sanads that created the jagir or the so‑called “patelki inam” had not been produced before the Tribunal. The earliest document that could be examined was the kararnama dated 24 October 1771. That kararnama, as previously explained, recorded a dispute between the jagirdars and the village patels. The patels claimed a right to one bigha per netan as their “huq”, while the jagirdars contended that no such “huq” was mentioned in the sanads granted to them. The parties brought the controversy before the Nazim, who acted as the local representative of the sovereign authority at that time. The Nazim’s decision, as recorded, was that he granted an inam of one and a half bighas per netan year after year, and he said that this grant was supported by established judicial usage. The Court observed that the kararnama therefore demonstrated two points. First, the grant of the “patelki inam” of one and a half bighas per netan originated as a grant made by the sovereign authority and was subsequently confirmed by the Nazim in accordance with long‑standing judicial practice. Second, the grant was intended to be a yearly allocation in consideration of the performance of patelki services and it bound the jagirdars who accepted it. The entry in the Inam Register dated 31 August 1866 (Exhibit P‑1) corroborated this understanding; it recorded that 262 bighas were excluded from the jagir and were allowed to the patel in lieu of his “huq” to one and a half bighas, distinguishing these lands from other small inams that the jagirdars themselves had permitted.

On behalf of the appellant, the Court was drawn to Rules 1 and 11 of the Inam Rules together with Rule XV. It was submitted that if the “patelki inam” were a separate and independent interest from the class III jagir, a distinct title deed in the form of an inam certificate should have been issued for the “patelki inam” as a class IV inam. The High Court had observed that the “patelki inams” were not separately recognised during the inam enquiry and had been treated as interests carved out of the lands granted to the jagirdars. Nevertheless, the record contained clear evidence that the “patelki inam” in the present case was independent of the jagir. Immediately after the first resumption proceedings against the jagirdars in 1904‑05, the status of the patels came under review by the revenue authorities. In 1906, a member of the Dongre family named Moti was appointed patel by the Sub‑divisional Officer of Ellichpur. The following year, in 1907, Amrit, the son of Shivaji, was appointed patel in the Rokade family to serve in rotation with Moti, an appointment made by the Deputy Commissioner. In 1908 another dispute arose between the jagirdars and the patels. The Sub‑divisional Officer who adjudicated that dispute recorded the jagirdar’s contention, stating: “The Jagirdar says …”.

In the proceedings, it was observed that the jagirdar claimed his family had appointed the village patels from the watan families, but the documents that existed did not support that claim. A petition dated 4‑1‑67 was filed by the jagirdar, in which he asked the revenue authority of that time to appoint a particular individual as patel. The record showed that, during that period, the revenue authorities—not the jagirdar—were the ones who appointed the patel. The patels were described as village servants whose duties and accountability were owed solely to the Government, not to the jagirdar. The Patel family was noted to have possessed watandari rights for at least one hundred and fifty years. On the basis of these facts, the observation was made that the watan appeared to be independent of the jagir. The dispute was taken up before Commissioner Sly, who later became Sir Frank Sly. He ruled that the patelki estate constituted a watan that was independent of the jagir, and he endorsed the proposal for a rotational system of appointment between Moti and Amrit. The patelki inams were consequently treated on the same footing during the resumption proceedings that took place between 1917 and 1922. By an order dated 28 August 1922, the Government excluded the patelki inam lands from the resumption actions that related to the jagir, on the ground that those lands were separate from and independent of the jagir. Earlier, on 7 August 1918, the then Financial Commissioner, Mr. Walker, issued an order (Exhibit ID‑11) stating that, although the patel did not hold an inam certificate, he concurred with the Commissioner that the inam‑resumption process triggered by the jagirdar’s actions should not disturb the arrangement that had been made for the patels at the suggestion of His Exalted Highness the Nizam’s Government many years earlier. To implement this view, Mr. Walker explained that it would be necessary to reopen the enquiry concerning the entire village—both the khalsa portion and the re‑granted inam portion—to determine which fields in each part represented the original grant of two hundred and sixty‑two bighas to the patel in lieu of his huq. Once that area was identified, the resumption orders would have to be altered so as to exclude those fields. The cumulative record therefore provided overwhelming evidence that the patelki inams were distinct from and independent of the Nawabag jagir, even though the lands were situated within the jagir village. The Court then considered the more fundamental question concerning the true nature of the patelki inam lands in this case. It was concluded that there existed clear and unimpeachable evidence supporting the High Court’s finding, including reference to the kararnama of 1771 and the inam entry of 1866. If those grants had been made merely as land assignments to patelki families burdened with service, it would be difficult to understand why a dispute over remuneration between jagirdars and patels arose, or why the remuneration of one and a half bighas per netan had to be fixed annually. In a revenue case from 1908, Amrit Patel himself had declared that the land had been granted to his ancestors in lieu of patelki huq and therefore should not be subject to land‑revenue assessment. Even so, the evidence consistently indicated the independent character of the patelki inams.

The appellant contended in his plaint that the Patels had been allotted certain parcels of land taken from the jagir village in recognition of their service as patels and for the performance of other duties. An additional document of importance relates to the second resumption proceedings of 1917, when the Government resolved to resume the jagir and to re‑grant it to the then Jagirdar Amerulla Khan. The orders issued in that case, recorded as Exhibit ID‑18, expressly stipulated that the Jagirdars could, at the discretion of the Deputy Commissioner, permit the working patels to retain such lands deemed reasonable, free of revenue liability and as a substitute for mushahara, that is, emoluments or wages. It was widely understood at that time that the so‑called “patelki inam” represented compensation in kind for the office of patel.

Subsequent to those orders an inquiry was conducted, during which Amrit Rao declared that he was in possession of survey numbers 26, 27, 29, 34, 36 and 37 as remuneration for his patelki duties. He further expressed willingness to retain only 4 acres and 17 gunthas of survey number 27 in satisfaction of his emoluments. On the basis of this statement the Sub‑Divisional Officer recommended that Amrit Patel be allotted merely the 4 acres and 17 gunthas as his entitlement. Thereafter an application was filed on behalf of Amrit, signed by his brother—who is the present appellant—acting as his agent. The application contained the following material observations: “The learned S.D.O. has again lost sight of the fact that the family of the applicant has been doing the work of the Patel from a very long time, that in the early days of the Berar Administration when land had no value and did not fetch the income it is doing now, the applicant and his predecessors worked to what they would get from the land. Cash had more value then than land and hence the Inamdars thought it is advisable to commute money payment into land grant. That the learned Sub‑Divisional Officer has lost sight of the fact that in the inam enquiry and the sanad granted to the Inamdar of the Nawabag Jahagir in 1866, the land in the possession of the applicant has been deducted from the area of the village and it is only the rest of the area that is made over to the Inamdar, vide Co. 5 of the sanad viz. area of grant. This shows that in 1866 the area reserved for the Patel was considered as a fair remuneration in kind to the Patel for his work.” These statements plainly indicate that the appellant and his brother Amrit understood the “patelki inam” lands to have been given as compensation in lieu of wages or other emoluments.

The Court observed that this interpretation ultimately prevailed, leading to the modification of the earlier orders on the recommendation of Commissioner Standan. The Commissioner advised that the lands held by a patel as “patelki inam” should be excluded from resumption and that the patel should be permitted to retain those lands free of any revenue liability.

In the matter before the Court, it was observed that no cash payment was made for the remuneration of the patel’s office. Consequently, orders dated 28 August 1922 were issued, an earlier reference to which had already been made. In the absence of the original sanads that created the grant, the transactions and statements contained in those orders were admitted as evidence to demonstrate how the parties themselves had understood and dealt with the grant during contested revenue proceedings between the jagirdars and the patels. The appellant’s counsel submitted that the record contained proof that some patels had alienated their “patelki inam” lands, yet each patel continued to retain his own “patelki inam” lands despite the office being held in rotation. It was argued that these circumstances militated against the view that the grant was merely a grant of office with emoluments in the form of inam lands. The Court could not accept that contention. The appellant’s own statement in a revenue case of 1937‑38 (exhibit ID‑15) showed that lands alienated by other patels were resumed and regranted to the jagirdar in the resumption proceedings of 1917‑18. After Amritrao succeeded in having his “patelki inam” lands excluded from resumption, the other patels also attempted, without success, to have their lands released – a circumstance previously noted. This indicated that the Government never accepted the position that “patelki inam” lands could be freely alienated; on the contrary, the evidence showed that the Government had resumed such lands on more than one occasion. Regarding the second circumstance, it is true that the office was rotatory, as provided in section 3 of the Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900, but each patel retained his inam land even when it was not his turn to serve. The Court did not consider this circumstance sufficient to alter the High Court’s finding on the nature of the grant. Section 3 of the Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900 states that when a village has two or more patels and the Deputy Commissioner, in his opinion, can have the duties efficiently performed by a single patel, he may direct that each patel hold office in turn by rotation for a period not less than ten years. This provision does not terminate a patel’s status after his turn ends; he continues to be a patel and retains his emoluments. The Court now proceeds to examine the position under the Inam Rules, 1859, the Berar Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900 and the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928. The appellant argues that even under the Inam Rules he is entitled to his share of the “patelki inam” lands so long as a member of his family serves as patel. Counsel for the appellant drew the Court’s attention to Rules V and VI, submitting that, being a service inam, the “patelki inam” falls within the fourth class mentioned in Rule 11 and is therefore governed by Rule VI(2).

The Court explained that the inam in question would fall under the fourth class mentioned in Rule 11 and consequently would be governed by Rule VI(2), which provided: “Inams granted in lieu of lands or money stipends, commonly called huqs and ressums of offices, such as Deshmukh, Deshpandia, and others the service of which has either been dispensed with or otherwise discontinued, shall be disposed of according to clause of Rule V, if they are hereditary in their terms, either by express declaration of Government or by recognized usage. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to apply to cash allowance known as ressums or lawazamas granted to Deshmukhs and Deshpandias in lieu of emoluments previously payable to them.” Rule VI(2) referred to clause (2) of Rule V, which read: “If the present incumbent is a descendant of the original grantee, the inam will be continued to him hereditarily, subject to the following conditions – First – Successions limited to direct lineal heirs and undivided brothers. Second – The inam escheats to Government on failure of such heirs. Third – Future alienation of the inam is prohibited. Fourth – The right of adoption to an inam is not recognized.” The appellant contended that, read together, Rule VI(2) and Rule V(2) entitled him, as an undivided brother of Amrit Rao, Patel, to a share in the inam. The Court rejected this contention. Firstly, Rule VI(2) applied only to inams granted in lieu of lands or money stipends whose service had been dispensed with or otherwise discontinued, a condition that did not obtain in the present case. Secondly, clause (8) of Rule VI made clear that when the inam attached to an office was wholly or partially enjoyed by family members who did not perform the service, the portion necessary for the efficient performance of the duties would be attached to the office holder, and Rule XIV(2) stated that service grants could not be alienated by purchase or otherwise. Rule VIII defined the term “inam,” and Rule 11 further clarified the issue by stating, for the purposes of this case: “The settlement will be made with the head member of the family holding the office or enjoying the inam and who will be held alone responsible to Government, and in no case will the Government interfere to compel the actual incumbent of an office to make over any portion of his regulated service grant to other branches of the family, as service grants cannot be divided according to the orders of Government.” Rule XXI(2) added that, inter alia, decisions of the Commissioner and the Resident concerning lands held free by village officers as remuneration for service were final. From these provisions, the Court found that there was no basis in the rules for the appellant to claim a share in the “patelki inam” lands merely by virtue of being a member of the patel’s family, irrespective of whether he performed the required service.

The Court observed that the appellant could not rely on a right to a share in the “patelki inam” lands merely by virtue of being a member of the patel’s family, regardless of whether he performed any service. The Court turned to the provisions of the Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900, which it found to be even clearer on the matter. Section 9 of that statute provided that the emoluments attached to the office of the patel or patwari were to be enjoyed exclusively by the person who actually held the office at the time. The provision further stated that even a substitute would receive the whole of the emoluments of the office unless the Deputy Commissioner directed otherwise. Moreover, where two or more patels existed in a village, the Deputy Commissioner was empowered to determine the proportions in which they would share the emoluments of the office. Sections 10 and 11 reinforced this scheme by declaring that the emoluments of the patel’s office were not liable to attachment or sale and that any assignment of those emoluments was void. Section 20 barred the jurisdiction of the civil courts from entertaining any claim by any person to any emolument of the patel’s office. From these statutes, the Court concluded that the “patelki inam” lands were subject to orders issued by the revenue authorities concerning the matters mentioned in the statutes, and that no member of the patel’s family could claim a share in the emoluments arising from those lands.

The Court then examined the power to resume lands that had been granted on the condition that the holder would render specified services. This power was expressly mentioned in Section 190 of the Berar Land Revenue Code. The Court quoted the relevant portion of the provision, which provided that if alienated land had been granted on the condition that the holder render certain services or incur expenditure for the benefit of the community, and the holder failed to do so to the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner, or if the holder transferred the land in a manner that, in the Commissioner’s opinion, would defeat the purpose of the grant, the Deputy Commissioner could declare the land forfeited. The provision further stipulated that forfeited land would vest in the Crown for the province free of all encumbrances and would be re‑granted on the original conditions of the law. Section 192 of the same code was also cited. That provision barred any civil court from entertaining a suit seeking a decision on any matter that the revenue authorities were empowered to determine, and specifically listed among those matters any claim against the State relating to property or emoluments attached to the office of any hereditary officer or servant. The Court held that these provisions likewise negated the appellant’s claim. Having established the statutory framework, the Court indicated that it would now turn to the judicial decisions that the appellant’s counsel sought to rely upon. The Court noted that the counsel for the appellant had submitted that the High Court had relied on a particular decision, and that this observation would be considered in the further analysis.

In this matter, the Court examined the decision of the Privy Council in Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabadrayya (1). In that case the issue was whether lands granted as karnam service lands to a karnam, who served as a village accountant in Madras State, could be partitioned by other members of the family. The Privy Council observed that the “patelki inam” lands in Berar were situated on a different legal footing from the karnam service lands of Madras, and noted that certain decisions held that co‑sharers were entitled to a share in service grants in Berar. The first authority that the appellant sought to rely upon was Krishnarao v. Nilkantha and Others (2), reported in (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 244. That case involved a jagir and was classified as a third‑class grant. The Court in that decision reiterated the ordinary rule that persons who are beneficially entitled to shares in an estate may seek partition, and further held that a village consisting of an ordinary inam was subject to partition at the suit of a co‑sharer except where the land was held on a saranjam or other impartible tenure or where the grant itself imposed a condition on its enjoyment. The present Court does not consider that decision to support the appellant’s claim that he possesses a share in the emoluments of the patel’s office. The next judgment cited by counsel was the Privy Council decision in Mir Subhan Ali v. Imami Begum (3). That ruling stated that the devolution and incidentals of an inam estate in Berar were governed by the Inam Rules, 1859, but only to the extent that the matter was not covered by the sanad, certificate, or any other document that set out the special terms of the particular grant. The core question in that case was one of construction: whether the beneficial interest in the inam granted to a common ancestor and continued by the British Government in 1866 passed, under the terms of the grant, to all heirs of the grantees according to Shia Mahomedan law, or whether the interest descended only on male descendants. That case did not involve a service grant, and consequently no issue of a share in the patel’s emoluments arose. The Privy Council in Lakhamgouda Basavaprabhu Sardesai v. Baswantrao and Others (4) distinguished between a grant of an office that is remunerated by the use of land and a grant of land that carries a service burden. The Council observed that in the former situation the land would be prima facie resumable, whereas in the latter situation resumability would depend on the specific terms of the grant or the circumstances of its making. The Court also noted the citation (1) A.I.R. (1922) Nag. 52, (2) (1925) 21 Nag. L.R. 117, and (3) A.I.R. (1931) P.C. 157. Finally, the Court referred to the case of Jaiwantrao and Another v. Sahebrao (1), where the inam certificate issued to the head of the senior branch of a family

In the matter of Deshmukh watandars, the grant was described as being for personal maintenance to the claimant, his descendants and co‑sharers. The Court therefore held that a co‑sharer was entitled to possession of the portion allocated to him as shown in the inam statement. In the later case of Raje Shrinivasrao v. Raje Vinayakrao(2) two villages had been granted to the great‑grandfather of the appellant and the respondent, who were brothers, with the language “his lineal heirs” or “his successors”. The question before the Court was whether succession should follow primogeniture or whether the estate was impartible. The Court applied the ordinary principles of Hindu law and referred to the earlier decision in Mir Subhan Ali v. Imami Begam(3). The Court observed again that the grant was not a service grant and therefore no question arose as to any claim to a share in the emoluments of an office. The Court indicated that it was unnecessary to cite many decisions and simply noted that no authority had been brought to its notice which held that a member of the patel’s family is by right entitled to a share in the emoluments of the patel’s office, nor that the Government lacks the power to resume “patelki inam” lands and re‑grant them to another officer.

The next issue before the Court concerned the special claim relating to survey numbers 2/IA and 9/IA. The appellant contended that those two plots had ceased to be inam lands when they fell within the portion of the jagir that was resumed; they had subsequently been sold by the jagirdars Bannobi Begum and Mahmudi Begum. The appellant and his brother Amrit brought suit and obtained decrees for those plots, and on execution of the decrees they took possession. The learned trial judge correctly observed that the decrees in question pertained to property other than plots 2/IA and 9/IA. It is not disputed that the entire “patelki inam” lands in the possession of Amritrao Patel, including the portions that were declared khalsa in 1904‑05, were excluded from resumption, as recorded in (1) (1933) 29 Nag. L.R. 210, (2) I.L.R. (1949) Nag. 1 and (3) (1925) 21 Nag. L.R. 117, and that Amrit’s “patelki inam” lands were treated as a single homogeneous unit by the orders dated 28 August 1922. Consequently, the two plots 2/IA and 9/IA stand on the same footing as the other “patelki inam” lands of Amritrao. The Court held that a claim of title by adverse possession is easily dismissed. Once it is established that the lands were granted as emoluments for the patel’s office, no right of adverse possession can arise against the Government, even though the lands were shown as excluded from the jagir of Nawabag in 1866. Amrit served as patel until his death in 1920; although the appellant obtained possession through partition in 1923, the Government was fully within its authority to resume the lands in 1941 and re‑grant them to respondent No. 1.

In this case, the appellant could succeed only by establishing two points: first, that he possessed a legal right to a share in the lands that were classified as “patelki inam”; and second, that the Government did not have a lawful authority to resume those lands. The burden of proof rested with the appellant, and he was required to produce evidence or legal justification showing that his claim to a portion of the “patelki inam” lands was valid and that the resumption power of the State could not be exercised over those lands. The Court found that the appellant failed to meet this evidentiary burden. No satisfactory proof was presented that he had any entitlement to a share, nor was any argument accepted that the Government’s power to resume the property was lacking. For the reasons already set out in the judgment, the Court concluded that the appeal was devoid of merit. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. The order also confirmed that the appellant was to bear the entire costs of the suit as a result of his failure to establish a viable claim. No additional relief was granted to either side. The dismissal of the appeal therefore closed the matter.