Bhagwant Rao vs Vishwas Rao And Anr.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 12 January 1960

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, S.K. Das

The case Bhagwant Rao versus Vishwas Rao and Anr., decided on 12 January 1960 by the Supreme Court of India, was recorded by Justice S.K. Das with a bench that also included Justice A.K. Sarkar. The judgment began by noting that the matter before the Court was an appeal from a certificate issued by the High Court of Nagpur under clause (c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution, which declared the dispute fit for consideration by this Court. The appeal raised a substantial question concerning the authority of the State Government’s revenue officers to resume certain lands described as “patel ki huq inam” situated in the area formerly known as the ceded region of Berar. The plaintiff, identified as Bhagwantrao Shivaji Patel—referred to in the judgment by his short name Bhagwantrao—stood as the appellant. The defendant who had originally been numbered as Defendant No. 2 in the suit, Vishwasrao Patel, was now styled as Respondent No. 1. The Provincial Government of the Central Provinces and Berar, which had previously been Defendant No. 1, appeared in the appeal as Respondent No. 2, now identified as the State of Bombay. The lands that formed the subject of the suit had originally fallen within the jurisdiction of the Central Provinces and Berar, subsequently became part of Madhya Pradesh, and at the time of the appeal lay within the bounds of Bombay. The factual background was summarized as follows: the disputed lands comprised six survey numbers enumerated in paragraph one of the plaint and were located in the jagir village of Nawabag, belonging to the taluq of Ellichpur—now called Archalpur—within Berar. In Nawabag there existed four Patel families, each rotating the office of patel for ten‑year periods; these families bore the surnames Dongre, Rokade, Raut and Ingle. The case concerned the Rokade family. Shivajirao of that family had two sons, Amrit and Bhagwant, the latter being the present appellant. Vishwasrao, the present Respondent No. 1, was the son of Amrit. Shivajirao died in 1886 and his son Amrit died in 1920. A partition between the appellant and Respondent No. 1 occurred in 1923, after which the appellant claimed that the “patelki inam” lands were divided and that the lands now before the Court had been allotted to his share. While Shivajirao held the patel office during his lifetime, his son Amrit also performed the duties of patel, and subsequently Vishwasrao likewise served as patel. In 1935 the Government appointed a special officer to compile a record of rights for the jagir village of Nawabag. The officer submitted a report that prompted further enquiries, and the investigation concluded that the appellant was not entitled to hold the “patelki inam” lands, which were regarded as emoluments of the patel office belonging to a working patel of the Rokade family. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner ordered that the lands in the appellant’s possession should be resumed and regranted to the working patel, identified as Respondent No. 1, and the appellant appealed against that order.

The Deputy Commissioner ordered that the lands in question should be resumed and regranted to the working patel, identified as respondent No. 1. The appellant challenged this order by filing an appeal before the Commissioner of Berar, seeking reversal of the eviction. The Commissioner set aside the eviction order but directed that the present situation should be maintained until the Government issued its final orders. Subsequently, on 19 December 1941, the Financial Commissioner concluded that the individual actually performing the duties of patel was entitled to the full emoluments attached to that office. He also observed that revenue officials had consistently refused to acknowledge any claim to a share of the patelki emoluments by anyone other than the serving patel. Accordingly, the Financial Commissioner reversed the earlier order of the Commissioner and reinstated the original order of the Deputy Commissioner. In response, the appellant instituted a suit in 1942 asserting that the Government lacked jurisdiction to resume and regrant the lands to respondent No. 1 and that the revenue orders were void. The appellant also prayed that the court grant him possession of the disputed lands and award him mesne profits for the period of dispossession. By later amending the plaint, the appellant claimed that two specific plots, identified as 2/1A and 9/1A, had ceased to be patelki inam lands and had become private family property. Consequently, he argued that the Government possessed no legal authority to resume those two specific plots and therefore could not lawfully dispossess the family of them. He placed this claim on an alternative basis, which the Court indicated would be examined in due course. The trial judge dismissed the suit, but on appeal the learned Additional District Judge of Amraoti set aside that dismissal and decreed in favour of the appellant. A further appeal to the High Court of Nagpur resulted in the high court allowing the appellant’s appeal, overturning the decree of the Additional District Judge and restoring the trial judge’s dismissal. The Nagpur High Court held that (i) the lands were originally granted by the sovereign authority as remuneration for the patel’s services and were recognised as a service inam by the British Government, and (ii) the revenue authorities were empowered to resume and regrant the lands under the Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900 applicable in Berar and section 190 of the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928. Subsequently, the appellant obtained a certificate from the High Court and filed the present appeal in reliance upon that certificate.

In order to understand the arguments presented by the appellant, the Court found it necessary to set out additional historical background concerning the village of Nawabag and the patelki inam lands that formed the subject of the dispute. The original sanad documents that created the jagir of Nawabag and that established the patelki inam were not produced as evidence in the present proceedings. Nevertheless, the parties agreed that both the jagir and the accompanying inam rights dated back to a very early period, indicating a long‑standing historical foundation. Berar was transferred from the control of the Nizam of Hyderabad to the British administration in the year 1853, an event that later prompted the formulation of rules governing inam settlements. In 1859 the British Government issued the Inam Rules to regulate the settlement of jagir and inam claims, and Rule I of those regulations expressly provided, inter alia, that any land proved to have been held as an inam either under a fixed quit‑rent or rent‑free for a period of forty years prior to the cession would be recognized by the Government as an inam possessed under a valid title. These provisions formed the statutory backdrop against which the present dispute over the patelki inam lands was to be examined.

In the era preceding the cession, the British Government regarded any inam that had been held rent‑free for a period of forty years as an inam possessed under a valid title. Following the issuance of the Inam Rules, an investigation of inams was undertaken. A copy of an inam entry dated 31 August 1866, identified as Exhibit P‑1, indicated that the jagir of Nawabag had originally been granted by the Kings of Delhi to an individual named Shah Abdul Huq. This grant was later continued and confirmed by sanads issued by the Nizam of Hyderabad in the year 1757. The village of Nawabag encompassed a total area of approximately 1,846 bighas, of which around 262 bighas were held by patels in accordance with their “huq,” calculated at the rate of one bigha for each netan, a measurement equal to nine bighas. The Inam Commissioner recorded that the jagir had been in possession for more than one hundred years prior to the inam enquiry and, except for an area of two hundred bighas for which satisfactory proof was lacking, should be continued in perpetuity subject to a quit rent of rupees 87‑8‑0. An earlier document, Exhibit P‑9A, dated 24 October 1771, revealed a dispute between the jagirdars and the patels regarding the patels’ entitlement to one and a half bighas of “patelki inam” land for each netan. The jagirdars contested the patels’ claim, and the matter was ultimately referred to the Nazim Sahib of Ellichpur. The record contains a recital showing that the “patelki inam” lands of Nawabag were ancient grants: “The Nazim, after seeing from the previous records as to who was in enjoyment, granted the mukaddami inam of a bigha and half from year to year as desired by the mukaddaman. As per the old judicial usage, land is calculated at the rate of one and half bigha per netan and measured out from the lands of Nawabag and the aforesaid mukaddaman are held to be occupants of the said cultivated land.” It appeared that out of the 262 bighas of “patelki inam” lands in the village, the Rokade family possessed about eleven plots, roughly amounting to fifty acres. Sometime before 1904, some of the co‑sharer jagirdars of Nawabag alienated portions of the jagir lands to strangers, prompting the Government to commence resumption proceedings. Consequently, about half of the jagir village was resumed by the Government around 1904‑05. After a detailed enquiry, it was found that survey numbers 1 to 21 and 40 to 45 of the “patelki inam” lands lay within the resumed portion, whereas survey numbers 22 to 39 were included in the jagir portion. Survey numbers 2/1A and 9/1A, which were in the possession of the Rokade family, fell within the resumed portion and were therefore recorded as Khalsa and subjected to revenue assessment, while the remaining survey numbers—29/1, 34/3, 36/2 and 37/2—continued to be possessed by the Rokade family without any assessment. A further resumption proceeding occurred around 1917 when it was discovered that the jagirdars had once again alienated lands falling within the jagir portion.

In the later resumption, the lands that fell within the jagir portion were also taken back by the Government. This time the resumed lands were not declared Khalsa; instead, they were re‑granted to the jagirdars. Because of this re‑grant, the jagirdars assumed that they were entitled to occupy the “patelki inam” lands that belonged to the Rokade family. Their belief gave rise to additional revenue proceedings. One of the key documents that emerged during those proceedings was a letter dated 28 August 1922. That letter conveyed the Government’s sanction for two exclusions: first, the exclusion from resumption of twenty‑five acres and fifteen gunthas of land situated in the Khalsa portion of the village; second, the exclusion from the land that had been re‑granted to the jagirdar, comprising twenty‑four acres and thirty gunthas in the inam portion of Nawabag jagir village. The Government’s order further directed that the lands thus excluded would be recorded in the name of Amrit Shivaji Patel as his “patelki huq inam”. After this order, some other patel families attempted to obtain a release of the inam lands that had been resumed in their favour, but those attempts failed. The Government’s enquiry reported that, apart from Amritrao, no member of the old patelki families—except Deo Rao—was in possession of the old “patelki inam” lands. Because Deo Rao did not belong to the branch that held the right of officiation, his claim could not be entertained. Consequently, the 1922 Government order clarified that the “patelki inam” lands of Amritrao constituted a homogeneous, separate service grant that was not dependent on the resumption of the Nawabag jagir. The proceedings that took place between 1917 and 1922 were followed by further proceedings from 1935 to 1941, which culminated in a third resumption of the “patelki inam” lands and a re‑grant to Vishwasrao, as previously mentioned. Those later proceedings completed the historical record of the lands in dispute up to the moment when the appellant instituted his suit in 1942.

Beyond the alternative claim concerning survey numbers 2/1A and 9/1A and the claim of title by adverse possession—issues that will be examined later—the central question that the appellate court must decide concerns the true nature of these “patelki inam” lands. The question is whether the lands represent a grant of remuneration or emoluments for the patel’s office, as the High Court held, or whether the lands constitute a grant of land to the patelki family that is burdened with the obligation of service, meaning that as long as any family member performs the patelki service, the lands remain joint family property subject to partition among the members. The appellant’s counsel argued strongly that the High Court’s finding on this point was erroneous. The counsel articulated a four‑fold submission. Firstly, the counsel asserted that the rights possessed by the Rokade family were rights of ownership subject to the condition that a family member performed the patelki service, effectively characterising the grant as land burdened with service.

The appellant’s counsel advanced four principal submissions concerning the nature of the “patelki inam” lands. First, it was submitted that the rights in these lands were those of owners, but subject to the condition that a member of the family performed patelki service; in other words, the grant was a conveyance of land burdened with a service obligation. Second, the counsel contended that the grant originated from the jagirdar of the village Nawabag and not from the sovereign authority, and accordingly neither the Inam Rules nor the provisions of the Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900, were applicable. Third, even assuming that the aforementioned rules and statutory provisions did apply, the appellant maintained that he nonetheless retained hereditary rights in the lands. Fourth, it was argued that the Government orders dated 28 August 1922 did not create any new right nor did they extinguish any existing right in respect of the “patelki inam” lands, and that the Government therefore had no authority to resume the lands and regrant them to respondent No. 1. The Court found that the second submission could be disposed of with relative ease. It noted that the original sanads establishing either the jagir or the “patelki inam” had not been produced before the Court. The earliest document available was the kararnama dated 24 October 1771, which, as previously indicated, revealed a dispute between the jagirdars and the patels over the entitlement of one and a half bighas per netan as the patels’ “huq,” a claim that the jagirdars contended was not mentioned in the sanads granted to them.

The Court observed that the dispute was referred to the Nazim, the local representative of the then‑sovereign authority, whose decision was recorded as granting an inam of one and a half bighas from year to year for each netan, a practice allegedly supported by old judicial usage. In the Court’s view, the kararnama demonstrated two important points: firstly, that the original grant of the “patelki inam” of one and a half bighas per netan was a grant by the sovereign authority, subsequently confirmed by the Nazim in accordance with established judicial custom; secondly, that the grant was made on an annual basis in consideration of patelki services and was binding on the jagirdars who had agreed to its terms. An entry in the Inam Register dated 31 August 1866 (Exhibit P‑1) corroborated this interpretation by showing that 262 bighas were excluded from the jagir “as allowed to patel in lieu of his huq to one and a half bighas,” thereby distinguishing these lands from other petty inams granted by the jagirdars themselves. The appellant’s counsel also drew the Court’s attention to Rules I and II of the Inam Rules and to Rule XV, submitting that if the “patelki inam” were separate and independent of the jagir, which was classified as a class III inam, a distinct title deed in the form of an inam certificate would have been issued, classifying it as a case IV inam. The Court acknowledged the High Court’s observation that “patelki inams” were not separately recognized during the inam enquiry and that they had been treated as interests carved out of the lands granted to the jagirdars.

In the present case the records demonstrate that the patelki inam was not merely a subdivision of the jagir but existed as an independent interest. The first indication of this independence emerged shortly after the initial resumption proceedings against the jagirdars were conducted in the years 1904‑05. At that time the revenue administration began to examine the status of the patels. In 1906 the Sub‑divisional Officer of Ellichpur appointed a member of the Dongre family, known as Moti, to the office of patel. The following year, in 1907, the Deputy Commissioner appointed Amrit, the son of Shivaji, from the Rokade family to serve in rotation with Moti. A dispute arose in 1908 between the jagirdars and the patels, and the Sub‑divisional Officer issued an order setting out his findings. He observed that the jagirdar claimed to have appointed patels from the watan family, but the existing documents did not support this allegation. He referred to a petition dated 4‑1‑67 in which the jagirdar asked the revenue authorities to appoint a particular individual as patel, emphasizing that the appointments were made by the revenue officials, not by the jagirdar. The officer further explained that patels were village servants answerable solely to the Government and that the Patel family had enjoyed watandari rights for roughly one hundred and fifty years, leading him to conclude that the watan was independent of the jagir. The matter was appealed to Commissioner Sly, later Sir Frank Sly, who affirmed that the patelki constituted an independent watan and sanctioned the rotational arrangement between Moti and Amrit.

The independent character of the patelki inams continued to be recognized in subsequent resumption proceedings that took place between 1917 and 1922. By an order dated 28 August 1922 the Government expressly excluded the patelki inam lands from the resumption process affecting the jagir, holding that these lands were separate and independent of the jagir estate. In an earlier order dated 7 August 1918, the Financial Commissioner, Mr Walker, acknowledged that although the Patel did not possess an Inam Certificate, the resumption procedure triggered by the jagirdar’s actions should not disturb the arrangement concerning the Patels that had been recommended years earlier by His Exalted Highness the Nizam’s Government. Walker directed that the entire village, including both the khalsa portion and the re‑granted inam portion, be reopened for enquiry to ascertain the fields representing the original grant of 262 bighas to the Patel in lieu of his huq, and that the resumption orders be modified to exclude those fields. Consequently, the record provides overwhelming evidence that the patelki inams were distinct and independent of the Nawabag jagir, even though the parcels of land lay within the geographical boundaries of the jagir village. This leads to the more important question concerning the true character of the patelki inam lands in this matter.

The Court observed that there existed clear and indisputable evidence supporting the High Court’s determination regarding the nature of the “patelki inam” lands in the present dispute. It noted that the archival documents, specifically the kararnama dated 1771 and the inam entry of 1866, demonstrated that the grants were not ordinary transfers of land but were made to patelki families burdened with service obligations. Consequently, it would be perplexing if a disagreement over remuneration arose between the jagirdars and the patels, or if the payment of one and a half bighas per netan had to be fixed annually. In a 1908 revenue proceeding, Amrit Patel himself affirmed that the land had been given to his ancestors as compensation for the patelki huq and should not be subject to land revenue assessment. Moreover, the appellant’s plaint expressly claimed that the patels had been allotted certain lands within the jagir village in consideration of their duties as patels and for performing other responsibilities.

The Court further referred to the second resumption proceedings of 1917, wherein the Government initially resolved to resume the jagir and re‑grant it to Jagirdar Amerulla Khan. In the orders recorded as Exhibit ID‑18, it was stipulated that the jagirdars could permit the working patels to retain lands deemed reasonable by the Deputy Commissioner, free from revenue liability, as a substitute for mushahara, i.e., wages or emoluments. This wording indicated a common understanding that the “patelki inam” represented payment in kind for the office of patel. Subsequent inquiry revealed that Amrit Rao declared he held survey numbers 26, 27, 29, 34, 36 and 37 as remuneration for his patelki duties and expressed willingness to retain four acres and seventeen gunthas of survey number 27 for the same purpose. The Sub‑Divisional Officer, however, recommended that only the four acres and seventeen gunthas be allotted to Amrit Patel as his emoluments. An application filed on Amrit’s behalf, signed by his brother—the present appellant acting as his agent—contained significant statements. It argued that the Sub‑Divisional Officer had overlooked the long‑standing service of the applicant’s family, noting that during the early Berar administration, when land yielded little income, cash held greater value, prompting the Inamdars to convert cash payments into land grants. The application also highlighted that the 1866 inam enquiry and the sanad granted to the Inamdar of the Nawabag Jahagir had expressly deducted the land possessed by the applicant from the village’s total area, thereby reserving it as fair in‑kind remuneration for the patel’s work. These assertions, together with the earlier orders modified on the recommendation of Commissioner Standan, affirmed that the lands held as “patelki inam” should be excluded from resumption and allowed to be retained by the patel free of any cash‑based remuneration. The Court concluded that, notwithstanding the absence of the original sanads, the transactions and statements described were admissible evidence to demonstrate the character of the “patelki inam” lands.

In the record, the appellant and his brother Amrit explained that the “patelki inam” lands represented a form of remuneration for the duties of a patel. They specifically stated that the lands were granted in lieu of cash emoluments, citing the historical practice in 1866 when the area designated for the Patel was treated as fair compensation for his services. The Court observed that this interpretation was later accepted when the earlier orders were revised on the recommendation of Commissioner Standan, who advised that the lands held as “patelki inam” should be excluded from any resumption and that the patel should retain them without any further cash payment for his office. Accordingly, the Court noted that orders dated 28 August 1922 were issued on this basis. The Court further held that, although the original sanads creating the grant were not produced, the transactions and statements made by the parties were admissible to demonstrate how the parties themselves understood and dealt with the grant in the contested revenue proceedings between the jagirdars and the patels.

The appellant then submitted that evidence existed showing that some patels had alienated their “patelki inam” lands, yet each patel retained his allotted land despite the office being held in rotation. The Court rejected this contention, pointing to the appellant’s own statement in a revenue case of 1937‑38 (Ex.ID‑15) which confirmed that lands alienated by other patels were resumed and regranted to the jagirdar during the resumption proceedings of 1917‑18. After Amrit Rao succeeded in having his “patelki inam” lands excluded from resumption, the other patels also unsuccessfully sought similar releases, demonstrating that the Government never accepted that such lands could be freely alienated. The Court further noted that, although the patel office was rotatory as provided in Section 3 of the Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900, each patel continued to hold his inam land even when it was not his turn to act as patel. The Court concluded that this circumstance did not alter the nature of the grant, which the High Court had previously characterized, and that Section 3 of the 1900 law expressly allowed the Deputy Commissioner to direct rotational service when two or more patels were present in a village.

The Deputy Commissioner may direct that each patel hold office in turn by rotation for a term of not less than ten years. This direction does not mean that a patel ceases to be a patel when his turn ends; he continues to be a patel and to enjoy his emoluments. The Court now examines the position under the Inam Rules, 1859, the Berar Patels and Patwaris Law, 1900 and the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928. The appellant argues that even under the Inam Rules he is entitled to his share in the “patelki inam” lands, provided that a member of the family continues to work as patel. The appellant’s counsel has drawn attention to Rules V and VI and submits that because the patelki inam is a service inam it falls within the fourth class mentioned in Rule II and therefore is governed by Rule VI(2). Rule VI(2) provides: “Inams granted in lieu of lands or money stipends, commonly called huqs and ressums of offices, such as Deshmukh, Deshpandia, and others the service of which has either been dispensed with or otherwise discontinued, shall be disposed of according to clause 2 of Rule V, if they are hereditary in their terms, either by express declaration of Government or by recognized usage. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to apply to cash allowance known as ressums or lawazamas granted to Deshmukhs and Deshpandias in lieu of emoluments previously payable to them.”

Rule VI(2) refers to clause (2) of Rule V which reads: “If the present incumbent is a descendant of the original grantee, the inam will be continued to him hereditarily, subject to the following conditions: First – Successions limited to direct lineal heirs and undivided brothers. Second – The inam escheats to Government on failure of such heirs. Third – Future alienation of the inam is prohibited. Fourth – The right of adoption to an inam is not recognized.” The appellant contends that read together, Rule VI(2) and Rule V(2) give him a right to his share in the inam as an undivided brother of Amritrao, Patel. The Court does not accept this contention. Firstly, Rule VI(2) applies only to inams granted in lieu of lands or money stipends where the service has been dispensed with or otherwise discontinued, a situation that does not obtain in the present case. Secondly, clause (8) of Rule VI makes clear that when the inam attached to an office is wholly or partially enjoyed by family members who do not perform the service, only that portion of the alienated inam deemed necessary for the efficient performance of duties will be attached to the office‑holder. Rule XIV(2) further provides that service grants are not liable to be alienated by purchase or otherwise. Rule VIII explains the meaning of the term ‘inam’ and Rule II also bears on the question presently before the Court. Consequently, there is nothing in the aforementioned rules that permits the appellant to claim a share in the patelki inam lands merely by virtue of being a member of the patel’s family, irrespective of whether he performs the service.

The Court referred to a rule that governs the settlement of lands that are held as inam. The rule provides that settlement must be made with the head member of the family who actually holds the office or enjoys the inam, and that this head member alone is liable to the Government. The provision further states that the Government will never compel the present holder of an office to transfer any part of his regulated service grant to other relatives, because service grants cannot be divided by governmental order. In addition, Rule XXI(2) contains a clause indicating that, with respect to service grants, the determinations made by the Commissioner and the Resident concerning lands held free by village officers as remuneration for service are deemed final and not subject to further challenge. After examining these provisions, the Court observed that none of the rules create a legal basis for the appellant to assert a right to a share in the “patelki inam” lands merely because he belongs to the patel’s family. The Court stressed that the entitlement to a share does not arise from family connection, and it is irrelevant whether the appellant actually performs the service attached to the inam. Consequently, the appellant cannot claim a proprietary interest in the lands on the ground of his familial relationship alone.

The Court then turned to the Patels and Patwaris Law of 1900, which it found to be even more explicit on the matter. Section 9 of that statute declares that the emoluments attached to the office of a patel or patwari are to be enjoyed exclusively by the person presently holding the office. A substitute officer may receive the entire emoluments of the office unless the Deputy Commissioner orders otherwise, and where more than one patel is appointed in a village, the Deputy Commissioner is empowered to determine the proportionate share of the emoluments among them. Sections 10 and 11 further provide that the emoluments of the patel’s office are immune from attachment or sale, and that any assignment of those emoluments is void. Moreover, Section 20 bars the civil courts from hearing any suit that seeks a claim to any emolument pertaining to the patel’s office. These statutory provisions, the Court explained, demonstrate that the “patelki inam” lands are subject to the directives of the revenue authorities concerning service‑related matters, and that no member of the patel’s family is vested with a right to demand a portion of the emoluments. Finally, the Court highlighted Section 190 of the Berar Land Revenue Code, which empowers the Deputy Commissioner to resume alienated land that was originally granted on the condition of rendering specified services or incurring community‑benefiting expenditures. If the holder fails to fulfil those obligations, or if the land is transferred in a way that is likely to defeat the purpose of the original grant, the Deputy Commissioner may declare the land forfeited. This provision underscores the conditional nature of such grants and supports the conclusion that the appellant’s claim to the “patelki inam” lands lacks legal foundation.

The Court noted that Section 191(2) of the Berar Land Revenue Code provides that any land forfeited under that provision shall vest in the Crown for the purposes of the Province, free of all encumbrances, and shall be re‑granted on the original conditions stipulated by the law. Section 192 further declares, inter alia, that no civil court shall entertain any suit to obtain a decision on any matter which the revenue authorities are empowered to determine under the law. Among the matters listed in that section are any claims against the State relating to property or emoluments that belong to the office of any hereditary officer or servant. The Court observed that these statutory provisions expressly negate the claim advanced by the appellant. Turning to the authorities relied upon by counsel for the appellant, the Court considered several decisions cited by that counsel. Counsel had submitted that the High Court relied on the Privy Council decision in Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabhadrayya, 48 Ind App 244 (AIR 1922 PC 96), where the issue was whether service lands granted to a karnam, a village accountant in Madras State, could be partitioned by other members of the family. Counsel argued that the “patelki inam” lands in Berar occupy a different legal position from the karnam service lands in Madras and that there exist decisions holding that co‑sharers are entitled to a share in service grants in Berar. The first decision examined by the Court was Krishnarao v. Nilkantha, AIR 1922 Nag 52, a case involving a jagir that was held to fall under the third class; the original sanad made no mention of service. The Court explained that the decision was based on the ordinary rule that persons who are beneficially entitled to shares in an estate may claim a partition. It was further held that property constituting an ordinary inam village could be partitioned at the suit of a co‑sharer, except where the land was held on a saranjam or other impartible tenure, or where the grant expressly imposed a condition on its enjoyment. The Court concluded that this decision does not establish the proposition sought by the appellant, namely a right to a share in the emoluments of the patel’s office. The next authority considered was the Privy Council decision in Mir Subhan Ali v. Imami Begum, which held that the devolution and incidents of an inam estate in Berar were governed by the Inam Rules 1859, but only in matters not addressed in the sanad, certificate, or other document evidencing the special terms of the grant. The fundamental issue in that case was a question of construction: whether the beneficial interest in the inam granted to a common ancestor and continued by the British Government in 1866 passed under the terms of the grant made to all heirs according to Shia Mahomedan Law, or whether it devolved only on male descendants. The Court noted that the grant in that case was not a service grant, and consequently no question of a share in the emoluments of the patel’s office arose.

The Court examined whether the language of a grant required that the benefit pass to all heirs under Shia Mahomedan law or only to male descendants. It observed that the grant in question was not a service grant and therefore did not raise any issue of a right to share in the salaries or perquisites of the patel’s office. In the decision of Lakhamgouda Basavaprabhu Sardesai v. Baswantrao, the Privy Council explained the difference between a grant of an office that is paid for by the use of land and a grant of land that carries with it a service obligation. The Council held that when the grant creates an office remunerated by land, the land may be resumable on a first‑case basis, but where the grant merely conveys land burdened with service, the land is not resumable unless the grant’s terms or the circumstances of its creation expressly allow it. The Court then referred to Sahebrao Narayanrao v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao, where an inam certificate described a village as granted “for personal maintenance to the claimant, his descendants and co‑sharers.” From that description, the Court concluded that a co‑sharer was entitled to possess his proportionate share of the land. In Shrinivasrao v. Vinayakrao, the grant involved two villages given to the great‑grandfather of the parties, who were brothers, and to “his lineal heirs” or “his successors.” The issue was whether inheritance should follow primogeniture or whether the estate was impartible. The Court applied the ordinary principles of Hindu law, citing an earlier authority, and again emphasized that the grant was not a service grant; consequently, no question arose about a claim to a share in the emoluments of an office.

The Court then stated that it was unnecessary to cite additional decisions. It clarified that, to its knowledge, no authority had ever held that a member of the patel’s family was automatically entitled to a share of the emoluments attached to the patel’s office, nor that the Government lacked the power to resume “patelki inam” lands and regrant them to a new officer. Turning to the specific dispute over survey numbers 2/1A and 9/1A, the appellant asserted that these two plots ceased to be inam lands when they fell within the portion of the Jagir that was resumed. He claimed that Bannobi Begum and Mahmudi Begum, the jagirdars, had sold the plots and that he and his brother Amrit had filed suits, obtained decrees, and taken possession in execution of those decrees. The trial judge correctly observed that the decrees pertained to property other than the two plots in question. Moreover, it was undisputed that the entire “patelki inam” estate held by Amritrao Patel, including the portions that had been declared khalsa in 1904‑05, were excluded from resumption, and that Amrit’s “patelki inam” lands were treated as a single, homogeneous unit by the relevant orders.

The order that had been issued on August twenty‑eighth, 1922, was referred to by the Court in its reasoning. Consequently, the two parcels identified as survey numbers two slash one A and nine slash one A were placed on the same legal footing as the remaining patelki inam lands that had belonged to Amritrao. The Court observed that the contention raised by the appellant that he held title to the two plots by way of adverse possession could be dealt with succinctly. It held that once it is established that the lands had been granted as emoluments for the office of patel, the possibility of a competing title based on adverse possession against the Government disappeared. That conclusion applied even though the records of 1866 indicated that the lands had been shown as excluded from the jagir of Nawabag. Amritrao had performed the duties of patel until his death in the year one thousand nine hundred twenty, and the appellant had obtained possession of the disputed parcels through a partition proceeding in the year one thousand nine hundred twenty‑three. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the Government retained the authority to resume those lands in the year one thousand nine hundred forty‑one and to regrant them to respondent number one. Accordingly, the appellant could succeed only if he proved that he possessed a lawful share in the patelki inam lands and that the Government had no power to resume the same. The Court found that the appellant had failed to demonstrate either of those required elements. For those reasons, the Court concluded that the appeal was without merit. Consequently, the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that costs be awarded against the appellant. Thus, the final disposition was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.