Bhagat Singh vs The State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 1 July, 1960

Coram: J.C. Shah, K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In this matter the appellant, Bhagat Singh, challenged a dismissal that had been ordered by the Punjab Police. He had entered the service of the Punjab Police in 1931 as a foot‑constable. By early 1944 he was acting in the capacity of an Assistant Sub‑Inspector and was actually assigned the duties of a Police Censor. While performing the duties of Police Censor he was alleged to have intercepted certain letters in an unlawful manner, to have caused copies and photographs of those letters to be made, and thereafter to have used those copies and photographs to threaten the owners for personal gain. As a result of those allegations he was demoted on 14 January 1944 to his substantive rank of head constable. A few days later, on 21 January 1944, the Superintendent of Police initiated a departmental enquiry into the conduct of the appellant and ultimately dismissed him from the service. The appellant contested that dismissal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, but his appeal was rejected. He then sought a revision of that decision before the Inspector General of Police, and that revision was also dismissed. After those administrative remedies failed, the appellant submitted several representations and memorials to the Government of Punjab, none of which obtained any relief. Consequently, in February 1949 he instituted a suit in a civil court seeking redress for his dismissal.

The original plaint set out a narrative of the appellant’s service history and then asserted, in a broad and unspecific manner, that the misconduct charge had been fabricated out of personal enmity and that the departmental enquiry conducted by the Superintendent of Police had been arbitrary and contrary to the applicable rules and regulations. Apart from that general averment, the plaint identified a single concrete grievance: that the Superintendent of Police had dismissed the appellant without recording any defence evidence and without providing him an opportunity to present such defence. The appellant later amended the plaint to include an additional grievance, namely that his appointment had been made by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and that, therefore, only the Deputy Inspector General possessed the authority to dismiss him, not the Superintendent of Police. The amendment also pointed out further irregularities in the departmental enquiry. Specifically, it contended that the appellant had been denied permission to engage counsel, that he had not been allowed a full opportunity to cross‑examine the prosecution witnesses, and that the enquiry officer had failed to invite him to make a response to the charges and had not permitted him to file a written statement setting out his version of the alleged incriminating circumstances. The Punjab Government, appearing on behalf of the State, opposed the suit and maintained that the enquiry had been conducted in strict compliance with the relevant regulations and was therefore not arbitrary.

The Government contended that the departmental enquiry had not been arbitrary. It also rejected the allegation that the appellant had been denied any opportunity to present defence evidence, to cross‑examine the prosecution witnesses, or to make his own statement in answer to the charge. While it conceded that the appellant had been refused permission to engage counsel, the Government finally asserted that, taken as a whole, the enquiry did not suffer any defect sufficient to render it invalid or to warrant interference by the courts.

Three general issues were framed by the trial court. The first issue concerned whether the appellant’s dismissal was void, illegal, inoperative, and wrongful, and what the legal effect of such a dismissal would be. The second issue examined whether the civil courts possessed jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to consider the validity of the departmental enquiry. The third issue sought to determine whether a suit for a declaration was maintainable and competent, and on what basis.

It was noted with regret that the specific points raised by the appellant, whatever their nature, had not been formulated as distinct issues for decision. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that the appellant’s case was governed by section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The court reinforced this conclusion by referring to the Police Regulations, which it held provided safeguards equivalent to those contained in section 240(3).

Accordingly, the trial court held that because the requirements of section 240(3) had not been complied with, the dismissal was both void and illegal. On the remaining two issues relating to the jurisdiction of the civil courts, the trial court decided in favour of the appellant.

The Punjab Government appealed this decision to the District Judge. The District Judge concurred with the trial court’s finding that section 240(3) applied to the appellant’s case. He also referred to an amendment in the Police Regulations which stipulated that, before any order of dismissal or reduction in rank could be made, the officer concerned must be produced before the officer empowered to impose the punishment, be informed of the charges proved against him, and be given an opportunity to show cause why such an order should not be passed. The District Judge noted that this amendment had been introduced in September 1946, long after the appellant’s dismissal, and therefore would not ordinarily apply to his case. Nevertheless, the Judge overruled the Government’s contention, holding that the rule was merely declaratory of the law and served only to remove any ambiguity that might have arisen from section 243 of the Government of India Act. Consequently, the District Judge dismissed the Government’s appeal.

A second appeal was filed by the Punjab Government before the High Court. The High Court held that section 240(3) did not apply to the appellant’s situation and that section 243 of the Government of India Act was the governing provision. Accordingly, the High Court further concluded that the appellant was not entitled to the protection afforded by section 240(3).

The High Court observed that the amendment to the Police Regulations, which introduced the substance of section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, was effected after the appellant had already been dismissed; consequently, the appellant could not rely on that amendment. Regarding the departmental enquiry, the High Court held that although minor procedural defects might have existed, the enquiry was substantially in conformity with the Regulations and the principles of natural justice, and therefore could not be declared invalid. The Court noted that there was no serious breach of the Regulations: the witnesses who appeared were cross‑examined by the appellant, and the appellant was also required to present his defence within forty‑eight hours. The appellant chose not to file his defence and instead sought a postponement, which was refused, after which the Superintendent of Police proceeded to dismiss him.

Counsel for the appellant challenged the High Court’s conclusions on three grounds. First, counsel argued that section 240(3) of the Government of India Act applied to police officers of subordinate rank and that nothing in section 243 removed the protection afforded by section 240(3). Second, counsel contended that even if only the Police Regulations were applicable, there had been a violation of those regulations sufficient to vitiate the enquiry proceedings. Third, counsel maintained that the Superintendent of Police could not conduct a departmental enquiry on the basis that a criminal offence had been committed, relying on sections 29 and 35 of the Police Act, No. V of 1861.

Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act appears in Chapter II of Part X, which deals with “Civil Services.” That chapter begins with section 240, and sub‑section (3) provides that no member of a civil service or any holder of a civil post in India shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. Section 243, however, reads: “Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this chapter, the conditions of service of the subordinate ranks of the various police forces in India shall be such as may be determined by or under the Act relating to those forces respectively.”

It was evident that section 243 was a special provision concerning the subordinate ranks of police forces in India, and the appellant unquestionably belonged to those subordinate ranks. Accordingly, under section 243 the conditions of service of the subordinate ranks were to be governed by the respective police Acts, and section 240(3) could not apply to them. The non obstante clause in section 243 made clear that, for subordinate police ranks, section 243 governed and the earlier provisions, including section 240(3), were excluded. The Court therefore expressed the opinion that in view of

The Court observed that because the appellant was a member of the subordinate ranks of the police forces, the special provision in section 243 applied to him and consequently section 240(3) could not be invoked. The Court referred to the Privile Council decision in North‑West Frontier Province v Suraj Narain Anand ([1948] F.C.R. 103), which held that the non‑obstante clause in section 243 barred the operation of section 240(2) for subordinate police ranks and that the conditions of service included the power of dismissal. Although that case concerned section 240(2), the Court ruled that the same reasoning extended to section 240(3). The learned District Judge had already pointed out that the substance of section 240(3) was incorporated into the Police Regulations in September 1946, which was long after the appellant’s dismissal, and therefore could not apply to him. As a result, the appellant was not entitled to the second notice contemplated in section 240(3), a principle explained in I M Lall’s case by the Privile Council (see High Commissioner for India & High Commissioner for Pakistan v I M Lall (1948) F.C.R. 44). The Court further noted that no such notice was required under the Police Regulations that were in force at the time of the dismissal. The Court affirmed that the view taken by the High Court in these circumstances was correct.

Regarding the alleged breach of rule 16.24 of the Police Regulations, the Court identified three specific allegations raised by the appellant: that he was not given an opportunity to defend himself, that he was denied the chance to cross‑examine the prosecution witnesses, and that he was prevented from explaining the circumstances against him and from filing a written statement. The Court found that the appellant had indeed been given a chance to present his defence, but he chose not to make use of it. It also observed, consistent with the findings of the High Court, that the appellant had cross‑examined the witnesses at length and that there was no evidence he was denied the opportunity to explain the circumstances against him. Consequently, the Court agreed with the High Court that there was no serious violation of the Regulations warranting judicial interference. The Court then turned to sections 29 and 35 of the Police Act. Section 29 prescribes penalties for neglect of duty and other misconduct by police officers and specifies the punishment that a magistrate may impose upon conviction. Section 35 delineates the jurisdiction of a First Class Magistrate to try charges against police officers of rank above constable under the Police Act. Neither section excludes the possibility of a departmental enquiry; they merely state that when an offence punishable under the Police Act is committed by a police officer above the rank of constable, the case must be tried before a First Class Magistrate.

In this case, the Court observed that when a police officer holds a rank above that of a constable, criminal trial procedures apply. The Court further held that such an officer must be tried before a First Class Magistrate as prescribed by law. The requirement that a First Class Magistrate preside over the trial, however, does not imply that a departmental inquiry cannot be initiated concerning the same matter. The Court explained that the possibility of prosecuting a police officer under the Police Act does not bar the department from conducting its own internal investigation. The argument that statutory provisions expressly prohibit any departmental enquiry when criminal prosecution is permissible was found to be without merit. Accordingly, the Court rejected that contention and held that it carries no legal force or effect in the present proceedings. Having dismissed the argument, the Court concluded that the appeal filed by the appellant fails and therefore must be dismissed. The Court further noted that, given the specific circumstances of the case, it would not make any order regarding the award of costs to either party. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without any direction on costs being issued by the Court, leaving the cost issue unresolved. The final order recorded by the Court simply states that the appeal is dismissed, confirming the earlier conclusion.