A. S. T. Arunachalam Pillai vs M/S. Southern Roadways (Private) Ltd

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 262 of 1958

Decision Date: 29 April 1960

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, J.C. Shah, Subba Rao

In this appeal the Supreme Court of India considered a petition filed by A. S. T. Arunachalam Pillai against M/S. Southern Roadways (Private) Ltd. The judgment was delivered on 29 April 1960 and the bench consisted of Justices Syed Jaffer Imam, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, A. K. Sarkar and J. C. Shah. The case is reported in 1960 AIR 1191 and also appears in the citator reference R 1963 SC 64 (7). The matter concerned the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) as amended by the Madras Act, 20 of 1948, specifically sections 44A and 64A dealing with stage‑carriage permits and the power to vary them.

The central question was whether the Regional Transport Officer, acting under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as modified by the Madras State Legislature, possessed the authority to vary the terms of a stage‑carriage permit issued under that Act. The appellant, who held such a permit, applied on 19 July 1954 to the Regional Transport Officer for a variation of the route specified in his permit. After hearing objections, the Regional Transport Officer rejected the application. The appellant then sought revision of that order under section 64A of the Act by approaching the State Government. The State Government, after hearing objections, set aside the Regional Transport Officer’s order and granted the variation of the permit as the appellant had requested. The respondent challenged this order before the Madras High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. A single judge, following a decision of a Division Bench of the same court, held that the Regional Transport Officer lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s application and that, consequently, the State Government could not, in revision, grant the variation. The judge therefore set aside the order of the Madras Government.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justices Sinha, Imam, Sarkar and Shah, held that section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, introduced by the Madras Legislature, although expressed in broad language, does not give the State Government any original jurisdiction nor authorise it to pass, in revision, an order that the authority whose order is being revised was itself powerless to pass. While the State Government may set aside an order of a subordinate officer passed without jurisdiction under Chapter IV of the Act, it cannot substitute its own order directing a variation of a stage‑carriage permit granted to a particular person. Sections 43 and 48 of the Act make clear that the State Government possesses no such authority, and the phrase “as it thinks fit” in section 64A must be interpreted within the limits of the Act’s provisions. The phrase “any officer subordinate to him” used in section 44A of the Act was also considered in this context.

The provisions amended by the Madras State Legislature were described as having a wide import and therefore could not be given a restricted meaning. They were required to include any officer who was subordinate to the Transport Commissioner in any sense. The Regional Transport Officer, who was undeniably administratively subordinate to the Transport Commissioner by virtue of the Madras Government notification dated 14 February 1953, was duly authorised at the time the application was made. Consequently, the Regional Transport Officer possessed jurisdiction to vary the conditions of the permit that had been issued to the appellant. Section 44A of the Motor Vehicles Act did not depend for its operation on any rules that might have been framed under section 133A of the Act, which was merely an enabling provision. Because of this, there was no doubt that the State Government retained power under section 64A of the Act to vary the terms of the permit, even though the Regional Transport Officer had refused to do so.

The Court approved the decision in B. Veeraswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 Andhra Pradesh 413, and disapproved the decision in T. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar v. P. S. Palani Pillai, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 599. In a separate judgment, Justice Subba Rao observed that section 44A of the Act did not empower the State Government to appoint officers subordinate to the Transport Commissioner; rather, it enabled the Government to confer statutory powers on officers who were already subordinate to the Commissioner. The State Government had not made any rules under section 133A that would render the Regional Transport Officer subordinate to the Commissioner. Therefore, neither the statute nor any rules made thereunder rendered the Regional Transport Officer subordinate within the meaning of section 44A. Even if the Government had treated the Regional Transport Officer as a subordinate for administrative purposes, and even if the word ‘may’ in section 133A conferred a discretionary authority to frame rules, it was incorrect to claim that the Government could achieve administratively what it could only do by rule‑making. If the Government truly intended to make the Regional Transport Officer subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner, the only method available was to frame a rule under section 133A(3) of the Act. The judgment of the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 262 of 1958, arising from the Madras High Court’s order dated 17 July 1957 in Writ Appeal No. 110 of 1956, and ultimately from the High Court’s order dated 3 September 1956 in Writ Petition No. 2/1956, was delivered by Chief Justice Sinha, along with Justices Imam, Sarkar and Shah. Justice Imam delivered the main judgment, while Justice Subba Rao delivered a separate judgment. Justice Imam noted that the appeal proceeded on a certificate granted by the Madras High Court, as it considered the matter involved a substantial question of law concerning the validity of delegating to the Regional Transport Officer the power to vary the conditions of a permit.

In this case the Court observed that the dispute raised a significant question of law concerning whether the Regional Transport Officer could validly be delegated the authority to vary the conditions of a transport permit. The appellant, identified as the proprietor of Sri Vinayagar Transports located in Woriyur, Tiruchirapalli, possessed a permit authorising his bus to operate on the route running from Tiruchirapalli Mainguard Gate to Tiruchirapalli Railway Station via Palakarai and Round Tana. On 19 July 1954 the appellant submitted an application to the Regional Transport Officer of Tiruchirapalli seeking a modification of the route so that his bus could travel from Mainguard Gate to Golden Rock, passing through Palakarai, Round Tana, Tiruchirapalli Railway Station, and then return to Round Tana before proceeding to Golden Rock again. The Regional Transport Officer issued a notice of the proposed variation and invited objections from interested parties. Both the appellant’s request and the objections raised were heard on 15 July 1955, after which the Regional Transport Officer rejected the variation sought by the appellant. Consequently the appellant filed a revision petition before the Government of Madras invoking section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, a provision that had been inserted into the Act by the Madras State Legislature. After considering objections to the revision petition, the Madras Government, by an order dated 28 December 1955, set aside the Regional Transport Officer’s decision and directed that the variation in the appellant’s permit be granted as he had requested. In response to that governmental order, the respondent, Southern Roadways (Private) Ltd., instituted a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Madras High Court on 2 January 1956, seeking a writ of certiorari to annul the Government’s order. When the petition was listed before Justice Rajagopalan, the respondent raised an additional plea that was not part of the original Article 226 petition, asserting that the Regional Transport Officer lacked jurisdiction to approve the variation and, consequently, the Government of Madras also lacked jurisdiction to grant such variation on revision of the officer’s order. This additional plea was premised on a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955, decided after the filing of the petition, which held that the Regional Transport Officer did not have the authority to consider applications for variation of permit conditions. Justice Rajagopalan, relying on the reasoning in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955, concluded that because the Regional Transport Officer was without jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s variation request, the Government of Madras likewise could not exercise jurisdiction to grant the variation in the revision proceeding. Accordingly, Justice Rajagopalan set aside the Government’s order dated 28 December 1955, without addressing the remaining contentions raised by the respondent in its Article 226 petition.

The appellant filed an appeal under Article 226 challenging the order of Rajagopalan, J. In that appeal the correctness of the decision rendered in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 was questioned, but the appellant did not press that issue because a later judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 56 and 57 of 1956, decided on 12 April 1957, had become controlling. Consequently, the argument in the present proceedings was based on the premise that the Regional Transport Officer of Tiruchirapalli lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s application for variation of the permit. On behalf of the appellant, the High Court was told that the respondents had earlier submitted to the jurisdiction of that officer and therefore could not now invoke a discretionary writ of certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The next contention advanced was that, even if the Regional Transport Officer indeed had no jurisdiction to entertain the variation request, the order issued by the Government of Madras, which the appellant sought to set aside, could not be characterised as ultra vires because the Government unquestionably possessed authority to pass the order under section 64A of the Act. The High Court rejected both of these contentions and affirmed the decision of Rajagopalan, J. Nevertheless, the High Court granted a certificate indicating that the matter was fit for appeal to this Court. The principal question before this Court is whether the Regional Transport Officer had the power to vary the conditions of a permit to ply a stage carriage. To answer that question, it is necessary to examine certain provisions of the Act as amended by the Legislature of the State of Madras, especially section 44A. Before addressing that issue, the two other questions that the High Court decided against the appellant must first be considered. In the present opinion, although the respondent had earlier submitted to the officer’s jurisdiction and had not raised, in his petition under Article 226 before the High Court, the objection that the officer lacked jurisdiction to vary permit conditions, the High Court rightly permitted the respondent to raise that jurisdictional point. It was only after the High Court’s decision in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 that the Court formally held that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to make any such variation. Once that legal position was declared, it cannot be reasonably said that the High Court erred in allowing the respondent to rely on it, even though the objection had not been expressly raised in the Article 226 petition. This outcome was justified because the decision in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 was not available at the time the petition was filed.

In this case, the Court observed that the question went to the root of the matter because it concerned whether the Regional Transport Officer possessed jurisdiction to vary the conditions of a permit. Since a Division Bench of the High Court had already decided on that issue, the Court held that the High Court could not justifiably deny the respondent permission to rely on that decision in support of its petition which challenged the validity of the order issued by the Government of Madras under section 64A of the Act. The appellant’s counsel had strongly argued before this Court that a proper construction of section 64A gave the Government of Madras ample authority to make an order directing the variation sought in the conditions of the appellant’s permit, even though the Regional Transport Officer lacked jurisdiction to do so. Section 64A, the Court explained, empowered the Government of Madras to pass such orders as it thought fit with respect to any order passed or any proceeding taken under Chapter IV of the Act by any authority or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself that the order or proceeding was legal, regular or proper, when the Government had called for the records of the case. In the Court’s opinion, section 64A conferred a power of revision on the State Government over orders made under Chapter IV by subordinate authorities or officers. That power was not an original jurisdiction, which the Court noted was vested elsewhere. Although the language “may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit” was wide, the Court said it did not mean that the State Government could, by revisional authority, pass an order that the original authority itself was unable to pass. The Court further observed that the State Government could certainly set aside an order made by a subordinate authority that lacked jurisdiction under Chapter IV, but it could not replace that order with its own order directing a variation in the conditions of the appellant’s permit. The Court found it significant that section 43, which dealt with the State Government’s power to control road transport, did not mention any power to vary the conditions of a permit, although the section enumerated all the powers it possessed, including the power to vary a notification issued under the section. Had the Act intended to give the State Government the power to vary the conditions of a stage‑carriage permit granted to a particular person, the provision would have expressly provided for such a power in section 43. The authority authorised to vary the conditions of a permit was, the Court noted, set out in section 48A, which clearly did not designate the State Government. Consequently, under the Act, no such authority was vested in the State Government, and the words “as it thinks fit” in section 64A must be interpreted within the limits of the Act’s provisions.

The Court examined whether the Regional Transport Officer possessed the authority to vary the conditions of the appellant’s permit and therefore had to interpret section 44A of the Act. Before undertaking that interpretation, it was necessary to refer to various provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, as well as to certain material facts. Section 42 prohibits the owner of a transport vehicle from using or permitting its use except in accordance with the conditions of a permit that has been granted or counter‑signed by a Regional or Provincial Transport Authority. Section 43, previously discussed, relates to the power of the State Government to control road transport. Section 43A empowers the State Government to issue orders and directions of a general character concerning any matter relating to road transport, which must be complied with by the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority. Section 44 authorises the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities; the former is to discharge the functions specified in subsection (3), while the latter is to exercise such powers as may be specified in the notification concerning each Regional Transport Authority. Section 44A, incorporated by the Madras Amending Act, provides that the State Government may appoint a State Transport Commissioner and, notwithstanding any other provision in the Act, may by notification in the Fort St George Gazette authorise that Commissioner or any subordinate officer to exercise and discharge, in place of any other authority prescribed by the Act, such powers and functions as may be specified in the notification. Section 45 directs that applications for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region where the vehicle is proposed to be used. Section 46 enumerates the matters that must be stated in a permit application. Section 47 sets out the procedure that a Regional Transport Authority must follow when considering applications for stage‑carriage permits. Section 48 empowers a Regional Transport Authority to limit the number of stage‑carriage permits that may be granted in the region, in any specified area, or on any specified route within the region, and to impose conditions on such permits; one such condition, found in clause (d)(ii‑a), requires that stage‑carriage vehicles be used only on specified routes or within a specified area. Finally, section 48A provides for alteration of the conditions attached to a permit and states that any conditions attached to a stage‑carriage permit pursuant to clause (d) of section 48 may be varied, cancelled or added to, subject to the powers conferred by the Act.

In the provision quoted, the statute authorized the State Transport Authority to vary, cancel or add conditions to a stage‑carriage permit at any time, provided that such power could not be exercised to the prejudice of the permit holder without giving the holder not less than three months’ notice. Section 133A(1) empowered the State Government, for the purpose of implementing the Act, to establish a Motor Vehicles Department and to appoint officers to that Department as it deemed fit. Sub‑section (3) further permitted the State Government to make rules regulating the discharge of functions by these officers, including prescribing their uniforms, the authorities to which they would be subordinate, their duties, the powers that could be exercised by them (including police powers under the Act), and the conditions governing the exercise of such powers. In the present case, no such rules had been framed.

The Court observed that, based on the language of the statute, it was the State Transport Authority—​and not any other body—that was authorized under section 48A to vary the conditions of a stage‑carriage permit. Section 44A, however, enabled the State Government to appoint a State Transport Commissioner and to, notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, by notification authorize the State Transport Commissioner or any officer subordinate to him to discharge, in place of any other authority prescribed by the Act, the powers and functions specified in that notification. Consequently, although section 48A vested the power of variation in the State Transport Authority, section 44A allowed the State Government to delegate that power to the State Transport Commissioner, and even to an officer subordinate to the Commissioner, in lieu of the Authority.

The key issue for determination was the construction of the phrase “any officer subordinate to him.” In interpreting these words, the Court noted that the provisions of section 133A had to be kept in mind. The respondent contended that sections 133A and 44A should be read together, arguing that subsection (3) required any subordination within the Motor Vehicles Department to be prescribed by rules. Since no rules had been made, the respondent argued that the Regional Transport Officer could not be said to be subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner.

The Court referred to the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in T. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar v. P. S. Palani Pillai, where the question of whether a Regional Transport Officer was subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner for the purposes of the Act was examined. The High Court had considered three views: administrative subordination, functional subordination, and statutory subordination. The Full Bench ultimately endorsed the statutory subordination view, holding that this interpretation was most consistent with established rules of statutory construction and did not require the insertion of extraneous words into the provision.

In the earlier case the Division Bench of the Madras High Court had advanced three possible interpretations of the term “subordinate” that appears in section 44A. The first interpretation, which the Division Bench preferred, held that “subordinate” signified administrative subordination. The second interpretation was advanced by the Advocate‑General of Madras, who contended that the word meant functional subordination. The third interpretation was presented by counsel for Mr Nambiar, who argued that “subordinate” should be understood as statutory subordination. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court accepted the third view and articulated its reasoning in the following passage: “Of the three views placed before us we are inclined to prefer the third. It appears to us to be the most rational and the most free from objections. It is in accord with all well‑established rules of interpretation of statutes. It does not require, as the theory of functional subordination seems to require, the introduction of new words into the section. It has the merit of being more flexible of powers not merely at the State level but at the regional level also. It ensures that there will be no transfer or delegation of powers except to officers whose subordination has been determined by rules properly framed under the Act. It also ought to avoid the anomaly that has now occurred of a person in the position of a Secretary of a body being empowered to vary the condition of a permit granted by that body. We therefore adopt this view.” The Court, in rejecting the Advocate‑General’s position, observed that the statute contained no qualifying language modifying the word “subordinate” in section 44A. Subsequently, the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in B. Veeraswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reached a different conclusion. That Court held that a Regional Transport Officer was an officer subordinate to the Transport Commissioner for the purposes of section 44A. Emphasising the word “any,” the Andhra Pradesh Court observed that the term excluded any limitation or qualification and possessed a wide‑ranging generality. Accordingly, the expression “any officer subordinate” was interpreted to include not only officers whose subordination was expressly prescribed by statute but also all officers who were eligible to be subordinate under properly framed rules, thereby bringing the Regional Transport Officer within its scope. After reviewing the reasons given by both Full Benches, the present Court finds itself largely aligned with the Andhra Pradesh view and will set out the reasons for that alignment. The record, however, contains no material showing the date on which the Madras Government appointed a State Transport Commissioner, nor any notification in the Fort St. George Gazette indicating the specific powers that the Commissioner or an officer subordinate to him was authorized to exercise.

In this case the Court observed that the authority in question had been given power to exercise and discharge functions in lieu of any other authority that might be prescribed by or under the Act. The Court then referred to the Madras Road Traffic Code of 1940, which records that on 21 May 1947 the Governor of Madras constituted a Provincial Transport Authority for the Province, now the State, of Madras; a Regional Transport Authority for the district and city of Madras; and a separate Regional Transport Authority for each of the other districts within the Province, now the State, of Madras. The same Code also incorporated the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules of 1940, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, which became effective on 1 April 1940. Under Rule 3(c) of those Rules, the expression “Central Road Traffic Board” or “Central Board” was defined to mean the Provincial Transport Authority that had been constituted for the State of Madras under sub‑section (1) of section 44 of the Act. The Court noted that this definition could only have been inserted after the Provincial Transport Authority was created in 1947. The definition was subsequently amended on 2 December 1955, when the words “Central Road Traffic Board” or “Central Board” were replaced by the words “State Transport Authority”. On the same day a further amendment was made to the Rules by inserting clause (m) into Rule 3, which defined “Transport Department” to mean the Motor Vehicles Department established under section 133A of the Act. The Court then turned to Notification No. G. 0. MS. 527 issued by the Government of Madras on 14 February 1953. That notification explained that before the Madras High Court’s decision in Writ Petition No. 806 of 1951, the Regional Transport Authorities regularly varied, whenever necessary, all conditions of permits. However, the High Court held that the Regional Transport Authorities could not vary the existing conditions of a stage‑carriage permit imposed under section 48(d) of the Act and that only the State Transport Authority possessed the power to vary those conditions under section 48A of the Act. The Court recorded that the High Court’s ruling had caused considerable administrative inconvenience because every application for a variation of permit conditions now had to be addressed to the State Transport Authority, resulting in delays and hardship for transport operators. The notification further mentioned that the Government of India was contemplating an amendment to section 48 of the Act to empower Regional Transport Authorities to vary all permit conditions, but that legislative action would require time. Pending that amendment, the Government of Madras decided to temporarily empower Regional Transport Officers to vary those conditions that were previously within the jurisdiction of the State Transport Authority. Finally, the notification stated that, by virtue of the powers conferred by section 44A of the Act, the Governor of Madras authorized both the Regional Transport Officers and the Secretary of the Road Traffic Board, Madras, to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the State Transport Authority under the relevant provisions.

In this case the Court explained that the powers given by sections 48A, 51A and 56A of the Motor Vehicles Act were affected by a later notification issued on 20 October 1955 by the Government of Madras. That notification reorganised the Motor Transport Department in accordance with the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1944 (Act XXXIX of 1944). Under the terms of the notification a Member of the Board of Revenue was to be appointed as Transport Commissioner pursuant to section 44A of the Act and the existing post of Transport Commissioner was to be abolished. An officer of the Transport Department was to be appointed as State Transport Authority and would also serve as Assistant Transport Commissioner. The post previously known as Secretary, Central Road Traffic Board was redesignated as Secretary, State Transport Authority. Collectors of the districts in the mofussil and the Commissioner of Police in the City of Madras were to be appointed as Regional Transport Authorities under section 44 of the Act. The Regional Transport Officers in the mofussil and the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Traffic & Licensing) in Madras City were to act as Secretaries to the Regional Transport Authorities. Furthermore, an officer of the rank of District Judge was to be designated as the appellate authority prescribed by section 64(1) of the Act, as amended, to hear appeals against orders of the Regional Transport Authorities, and this officer would be called the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Clause (2) of the notification provided that the Member of the Board of Revenue appointed as Transport Commissioner would become the Head of the Transport Department, bearing overall responsibility for the administration of the Act, and that the Government would empower him under section 44A to exercise the powers then exercised by the State Transport Authority under sub‑sections 3(a), (c) and (4) of section 44. In performing those functions the Transport Commissioner would acquire administrative control over the organisation that was then working under the former Transport Commissioner. Clause (4)(ii) transferred the authority to alter the conditions of stage‑carriage permits, contract‑carriage permits and public‑carrier permits—powers previously exercised by Regional Transport Officers under sections 48A, 51A and 56A—to the Regional Transport Authorities. Clause 5(1) stipulated that the Regional Transport Officer would act as Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority and, in that capacity, would assist the Authority in carrying out the functions described in clause (4). The Court, however, noted that when the appellant applied on 19 July 1954 to the Regional Transport Authority for a variation of his permit, the earlier Notification No. G.O. MS 527 dated 14 February 1953 was still in force. That earlier notification authorised Regional Transport Officers to perform the functions of the State Transport Authority under sections 48A, 51A and 56A of the Act. The respondent’s statement of case, in paragraph 6, asserted that the powers conferred under section 44(1) were being exercised in accordance with the earlier statutory framework.

In this case, the Court explained that under the Act the Government of Madras had created both Provincial and Regional Transport Authorities. In addition, the Government had established a Motor Transport Department that was headed by a Transport Commissioner. The officers serving in the lower grades of that Department were Regional Transport Officers, and those officers performed the function of Secretaries to the respective Regional Transport Authorities, which were collectively referred to as the Road Traffic Board. The Court noted that, although a Regional Transport Officer was placed under the Transport Commissioner for administrative purposes, that relationship could not be described as a subordination within the meaning of section 44A of the Act. The Court further observed that the State Government was empowered by section 133A to set up a Motor Vehicles Department and to appoint officers to it, but merely appointing officers did not automatically confer upon them the statutory powers and duties required to be carried out under the Act and the Rules made thereunder. Section 133A contemplated the preparation of rules that would govern how officers of the Department discharged their functions, specify to which authorities such officers were to be subordinate, and define the duties that they were to perform. The Court found no evidence that any statutory duties or powers had been vested in the Transport Commissioner, nor was there any rule indicating that a Regional Transport Officer was a subordinate of the Transport Commissioner for the purposes of the Rules. Accordingly, the statement of the case correctly pointed out that section 44A required a functional subordination rather than a mere administrative one. Reference to the Madras Financial Code, volume 11, Appendix 1, showed that the Transport Commissioner was listed as the Head of a Department. The half‑yearly list of gazetted officers in the Transport Department, as corrected up to 31 July 1955, identified the Transport Commissioner also as the Chairman of the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, with the Secretary of the Central Road Traffic Board, the Assistant Secretary, and the Regional Transport Officers shown as his subordinates. From these documents the Court concluded that the Regional Transport Officers were indeed officers subordinate to the Transport Commissioner, a point that the respondent itself admitted for administrative purposes. Section 44A, the Court observed, merely referred to an officer who was subordinate to the Transport Commissioner and to whom the Government of Madras might, by notification, confer authority in place of any other authority prescribed by the Act to exercise the powers and functions of that authority. Nevertheless, it was argued that, until rules were framed under section 133A that expressly identified the hierarchy of subordination for the purposes of the Act, the mere administrative subordination could not satisfy the requirement of section 44A. On the other hand, the appellant contended that the language of section 44A should be given effect even though it did not specify the exact manner in which the officer was subordinate to the Transport Commissioner.

In examining the provisions, the Court observed that Section 44A expressly empowered the State Government, notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, to authorize any officer who was subordinate to the Transport Commissioner to exercise and discharge, in place of any other authority, the powers and functions that might otherwise belong to that authority. The language of the section did not make its operation dependent on the existence of rules framed under Section 133A. Section 133A itself was described as an enabling provision allowing a State Government, if it so chose, to establish a Motor Vehicles Department for the purpose of giving effect to the objectives of the Act. Accordingly, until such a Department was actually created, there was no occasion for the Government to formulate rules under Section 133A. The record, including the Madras Road Traffic Code, did not contain clear material indicating the exact date on which the Madras Government had established a Motor Vehicles Department. However, a notification dated 20 December 1955 inserted clause (m) into Rule 3, defining “Transport Department” as the Motor Vehicles Department created under Section 133A. This amendment demonstrated that prior to that date the term “Transport Department” referred to an entity different from the Motor Vehicles Department established under the said section. Consequently, when the Government of Madras issued Notification G.O. MS. No. 527 on 14 February 1953, the Regional Transport Officers were indeed officers subordinate to the Transport Commissioner. Even assuming that a Motor Vehicles Department was later constituted, the Government of Madras had not framed any rules pursuant to Section 133A(3). Had such rules been framed and indicated that the Regional Transport Officers were not subordinate to the Transport Commissioner, a conflict would have arisen concerning the interpretation of the phrase “any officer subordinate to him,” because the officers would be administratively subordinate yet not subordinate under the statutory rules. Since no rules were framed under the enabling section, the Court held that, for the purposes of Section 44A, any officer who was subordinate to the Transport Commissioner in any manner necessarily included the Regional Transport Officers within the Transport Department. The wording of the section was therefore sufficiently broad to support this inclusive interpretation and could not be limited as the respondent suggested. The Court also noted that concerns about possible anomalies—such as the fact that a Regional Transport Officer, acting as Secretary of a Regional Transport Authority, might be able to vary permit conditions that the higher State Transport Authority had refused to vary—did not aid in the textual interpretation of the provision.

In interpreting section 44A, the Court observed that the wording of the provision was sufficiently broad to include any officer who was subordinate to the Transport Commissioner; consequently, the Court could not narrow the meaning merely because of a hypothetical possibility that the Government of Madras might misuse its authority. The Court therefore affirmed that the language of the statute must be given effect, and that a plain construction of the provision precluded any implication that the Government could be excluded from exercising the power conferred.

Accordingly, the Court held that the Regional Transport Officer in Tiruchirappalli possessed the jurisdiction to vary the conditions of a transport permit by virtue of the authority granted under Government Order No. G.O. MS. 527 issued by the Government of Madras. By virtue of that order, the Government itself retained the power under section 64A to perform the same act that the Regional Transport Officer could have performed, but had elected not to exercise that power. The Court concluded that the appeal was successful, and therefore set aside the decisions of the single Judge and of the Appellate Court of the High Court. The matter was remanded to the High Court for a fresh hearing of the writ petition before the single Judge, because several issues raised in that petition remained unresolved.

The Court noted that the single Judge had allowed the petition solely on the ground that the Government of Madras should be required to set aside its own decision, on the premise that the Regional Transport Officer lacked jurisdiction to vary the permit conditions, and consequently the Government could not exercise its revisional jurisdiction. Since other points raised in the writ petition had not been decided, the case was ordered to return to the single Judge for consideration of those additional questions. The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal, while the costs incurred in the High Court would be determined in accordance with the final outcome of the rehearing.

Justice Subba Rao then expressed that he had carefully reviewed the judgment of his brother Justice Imam. He stated that he could not concur with the conclusion reached on the principal issue, namely whether the Regional Transport Officer fell within the meaning of “subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner” under section 44A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. He observed that the factual background had been fully narrated by Justice Imam and therefore required no repetition. He reproduced the text of section 44A, which reads: “The State Government may appoint a State Transport Commissioner, and notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, may, by notification in the Fort St. George Gazette, authorize such Commissioner or any officer subordinate to him, to exercise and discharge in lieu of any other authority prescribed by or under this Act, such powers and functions as may be specified in the notification.” He explained that this provision authorises the State Government to appoint only the State Transport Commissioner and does not, by itself, create a power to appoint any officer subordinate to that Commissioner; such power must be sourced elsewhere in the Act or in rules made thereunder. Furthermore, the section does not empower the State Government to confer any additional powers or functions on the Commissioner beyond those that may be exercised by any authority under the Act.

The Court noted that there was a conflict of opinion on the construction of section 44A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The disagreement was between the full‑bench decision of the Madras High Court in T. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar v. P. S. Palani Pillai and the full‑bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in B. Veeraswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh. In the Madras case, Justice Balakrishna Ayyar, delivering the judgment of the Court, summarized the position of the three views that had been placed before the judges and indicated a preference for the third view, which he described as “statutory subordination.” He explained that this view was the most rational and free from objections, and that it accorded with well‑established rules of statutory interpretation. He added that it did not require the introduction of new words into the section, as the theory of “functional subordination” would, and that it possessed the advantage of being more flexible and practical because it permitted the transfer or delegation of powers not only at the State level but also at the regional level. According to his reasoning, such an approach would ensure that any transfer or delegation of powers could occur only to officers whose subordination had been determined by rules properly framed under the Act, thereby avoiding the anomaly whereby a secretary of a body might be empowered to vary the conditions of a permit granted by that body. Consequently, the Madras Court adopted the statutory‑subordination view. By contrast, Justice Satyanarayana Raju, speaking for the full bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, articulated a different perspective. He described the Regional Transport Officer as an individual invested with authority and required to perform duties incidental to an office, thereby qualifying as an officer. He further observed that, in the performance of his various duties, the Regional Transport Officer was subject to the direction and control of the Transport Commissioner, and therefore was an officer subordinate to the Transport Commissioner. The Court then asked which of these two views should be preferred. It held that the answer must be determined by examining the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. The Court reminded that the Act had been enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles and that it covered a wide range of subjects, including licensing of drivers, registration of vehicles, control of transport vehicles, construction, equipment and maintenance of vehicles, control of traffic, temporary entry or exit of vehicles from India, insurance against third‑party risks, offences, penalties, procedure, and miscellaneous matters. Each chapter, except chapter X, dealt with a specific aspect of motor vehicles, was self‑contained within its own scope, and contained the relevant provisions governing that aspect.

The Court explained that the Act contained a separate provision that gave the Government authority to make rules for implementing the provisions of each chapter. Specifically, Section 133A of the chapter that dealt with miscellaneous matters authorised the Government, for the purpose of giving effect to the Act, to establish a motor‑vehicles department, to appoint officers to that department, to make rules—including rules to regulate the functions and duties of those officers—and to designate the authorities to which they would be subordinate. In other words, the Act was intended to be comprehensive and self‑contained; the powers and duties of the various authorities, as well as their relationships with one another, were all set out in the Act and in the rules made under it. With that background, the Court turned to the relevant provisions of Chapter IV of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Chapter IV, titled “Control of Transport Vehicles,” imposed the following framework. Section 42 prohibited the owner of a transport vehicle from using or permitting the use of the vehicle in any public place unless it was done in accordance with the conditions of a permit. Section 43 gave the State Government the power to control road transport. Section 43A, which had been inserted by Act 20 of 1948, allowed the Government to issue administrative directions to Transport Authorities created under the Act. Section 44 empowered the State Government to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities for different regions, enabling them to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified in the Act throughout their respective areas. Section 44A, inserted by Madras Act 20 of 1948, further authorised the State Government to appoint a State Transport Commissioner and, by notification, to delegate to him or to any officer subordinate to him any powers and functions that might otherwise be exercised by another authority prescribed by the Act, as specified in that notification. The duties and functions of this authority and its subordinates were limited to the statutory functions and duties that had been notified and that were imposed on other authorities under the Act in whose place they were appointed. Sections 45 to 56 outlined the procedure that a Regional Transport Authority had to follow when issuing permits for stage, contract, private and public carriages, and also gave that authority the power to vary or cancel any conditions attached to such permits. Section 58 dealt with the duration and renewal of permits, while Section 59 set out the statutory conditions that were to be attached to a permit. Section 60 enabled the Transport Authority that granted a permit to cancel or suspend it on any of the grounds mentioned in the provision. Section 64 granted an aggrieved party the right to prefer an appeal against an order of the State or Regional Transport Authority within the prescribed time to the prescribed authority, concerning matters mentioned in that section. Section 64A gave the State Government revisional jurisdiction to call for the records of any order passed by any authority or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of ascertaining the legality, regularity or propriety of that order. Finally, Section 68 conferred on the State Government the power to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of Chapter IV; sub‑section (2)(a) specifically authorised the State Government to make rules concerning the period of appointment, the terms of appointment, the conduct of business of Regional and State Transport Authorities, and the reports that they were required to furnish.

Section 68 gave the State Government authority to formulate rules needed to give effect to the provisions of the chapter. Sub‑section (2)(a) specifically empowered the State Government to make rules concerning the length of appointments, the terms of appointment, the manner in which Regional and State Transport Authorities should conduct their business, and the reports that those authorities must submit. Consequently, the chapter follows the same structure that the Act itself adopts: it creates various transport authorities, delineates their powers and duties, and sets out how those authorities are to relate to one another. In accordance with the powers granted by section 44, the State Government established a State Transport Authority and several Regional Transport Authorities, and it appointed members to each body. The composition of these bodies was altered at different times. Notably, on 19 July 1954, the State Transport Authority was identified as the Central Road Traffic Board, with the State Transport Commissioner serving as its Chairman. At the same time, the State Government constituted Regional Transport Authorities as Boards, and their membership was periodically revised. During the period relevant to this case, each Regional Transport Authority comprised the District Magistrate, the District Superintendent of Police, the President of the District Board, and one non‑official person nominated by the Government.

The judgment of Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu, which referred the matter to the full bench of the Madras High Court, indicated that the State Government had also created a Motor Vehicles Department under section 133A of the Act and had appointed Regional Transport Officers to staff that department. The powers of those officers were governed by rules made under the Act. Rule 124 designated the Regional Transport Officer as the Secretary and executive officer of the Board, that is, the Regional Transport Authority. Rules 131, 134, 134B and 135 set out the specific duties to be performed by the Secretary. Rule 134A permitted the Board, in order to discharge its business promptly and conveniently, to delegate to the Secretary certain functions and to issue general instructions on how the Secretary should exercise those delegated powers. According to rule 147, any aggrieved party could appeal to the Central Board against particular orders issued by the Secretary or the Board. These rules clearly establish that the Regional Transport Officer was subordinate to the Board, that he performed statutory duties under the control of the Board, and that, for certain quasi‑judicial functions, an appeal lay to the Central Road Traffic Board. Thus, it is evident that the Regional Transport Officer was appointed by the Government under the authority of section 133A, that his duties were defined by statute, and that, pursuant to the applicable rules, he was made subordinate to the Board, i.e., the Regional Transport Authority.

The Court observed that, according to the applicable rules, the Regional Transport Officer was expressly placed under the authority of the Board, meaning the Regional Transport Authority. Turning to the position of the State Transport Commissioner, the Court noted that the State Government possessed authority to appoint the Commissioner under section 44A of the Act, a provision inserted in 1948, and that the Commissioner therefore held the status of a statutory authority. Both parties had proceeded on the premise that the State Government had created a Motor Vehicles Department and that the Commissioner served as an officer within that Department. The division bench of the Madras High Court, which had referred the question to a full bench, had accepted the fact that the Madras Government had established a Motor Vehicles Department pursuant to section 133A of the Act and that the Commissioner was an officer of that Department. Similarly, the full bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had based its conclusion on the statement that “the Transport Commissioner is constituted the head of the department of transport which is the Motor Vehicles Department.” In addition, clause (m), inserted in rule 3 on 20 December 1955, clarified the situation by providing that the Transport Department was the Motor Vehicles Department created under section 133A of the Act. Consequently, the Court found it clear that the State had indeed created a Motor Vehicles Department and had appointed the Commissioner as an officer of that Department. Neither section 44 nor section 133A made any officer subordinate to the Commissioner; section 44 merely enabled the State Government to vest in him any powers, duties and functions assigned to any authority under the Act. The Court further stated that no notification issued by the Government authorising the Commissioner to perform any of the functions specified in the Act had been placed before it, and no rule had been framed under subsection (3) of section 133A making the Regional Transport Authority subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner. The only material before the Court concerning the Commissioner’s role was a notification appointing him as Chairman of the Central Road Traffic Board. While the Act and its rules allocated certain statutory duties and functions to the Central Road Traffic Board, they did not confer any separate powers on the Chairman apart from his membership of the Board. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, under the Act and the rules made thereunder, the Regional Transport Officer was not made subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner. The parties contended, however, that although no statutory subordination existed, the Government had administratively made the Regional Transport Officer subordinate to the Commissioner. The Court noted that no order of the Government establishing such administrative subordination had been produced. The only document relied upon was a Government notification dated 20 October 1955, which purported to show that the Regional Transport Officer was subordinate to the Commissioner. The Court held that this notification was issued after the date of the impugned order and therefore had no relevance to the present enquiry.

In the present proceedings the Court observed that no earlier governmental notification establishing the Regional Transport Officer as subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner had been produced; the only notification cited was dated after the impugned order and therefore was irrelevant. Because the appellant failed to produce any such earlier notice, the Court inferred that no such notification existed. Consequently, the only evidentiary materials relating to the organisational hierarchy were (i) the Madras Financial Code, which listed the heads of departments of the Madras State and identified the Transport Commissioner as a departmental head, and (ii) the Half‑Yearly List of Gazetted Officers of the Madras State Government, which merely recorded the names of Regional Transport Officers within the department. The Court held that while the Financial Code confirmed the Commissioner’s status as a head of department, it did not demonstrate that the Regional Transport Officer was his subordinate, and the mere inclusion of Regional Transport Officers in the gazetted list was insufficient to establish subordination. On this record, the Court concluded that it could not be said, even administratively, that the Regional Transport Officer was subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner. For the purpose of deciding the case, however, the Court assumed that the Government treated the Regional Transport Officer as a subordinate officer to the Commissioner. The central issue then became whether such an administrative classification, made in clear disregard of the statutory scheme, could confer upon the Regional Transport Officer the authority to act under section 44A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court summarised the relevant statutory framework, noting that the Act is a self‑contained statute that authorises the Government to create a State Transport Authority, Regional Transport Authorities, and a State Transport Commissioner. Section 44A does not empower the Government to appoint officers subordinate to the Commissioner; it merely permits the conferral of statutory powers on an officer who is already subordinate. Under section 133A the State Government had exercised its power to establish a Motor Vehicles Department and to appoint a Commissioner, Regional Transport Officers and other officials, but it had not promulgated any rules making the Regional Transport Officer subordinate to the Commissioner. On the contrary, the rules designated the Regional Transport Officer as the executive officer of the Regional Transport Board, indicating subordination to the Board rather than to the Commissioner. Thus, both the statute and the subordinate‑rules showed that the Regional Transport Officer was not subordinate to the Commissioner. The Attorney‑General argued that section 133A only gives the State Government a discretionary power to frame rules specifying the officers to which the appointed officials shall be subordinate, and therefore the Government is not obliged to do so. Assuming that the word “may” indeed conveys discretion, the Court examined whether the Government could achieve the same effect by administrative action rather than by rule‑making. It concluded that if the Government chooses not to exercise the power conferred by sub‑section (3) of section 133A, it may refrain from acting, but it cannot obtain the same result merely through administrative measures.

The Court observed that the State Government could not create a subordination relationship by any means other than by promulgating a statutory rule. Accepting the opposite contention would imply that the legislature intended to insert a redundant provision into the statute. If the Government were permitted to act administratively on matters covered by sub‑section (3) of section 133A, the purpose of that subsection would be defeated. Whether rules are made or not, the Government could attain the same objective, which explains the legislature’s clear preference for statutory rules. Statutory rules must be presented to Parliament for approval, whereas administrative regulations remain wholly at the discretion of the executive. Because statutory authorities under the Act exercise powers that affect significant citizen rights, Parliament’s oversight is essential to prevent misuse. The power to issue permits and to alter their conditions influences large public interests, providing a further reason for the legislature to demand statutory rules. Consequently, the only sensible construction of section 133A is that subordination of one officer to another can be created solely through statutory rules and not through any other mechanism. Thus, the Court concluded that the Government may establish such subordination only by invoking sub‑section (3) of section 133A and issuing a formal rule.

Applying that construction, the Court found that no statutory rule existed that placed the Regional Transport Officer under the authority of the State Transport Commissioner. Conversely, a rule was in force that assigned the Regional Transport Officer to the Regional Transport Authority, thereby establishing a clear line of subordination. Given this factual matrix, the Court held that the Regional Transport Officer could not be deemed a subordinate of the State Transport Commissioner within the meaning of section 44A of the Act. The finding relied on the plain language of the statute and the absence of any rule creating the contemplated subordination. Accordingly, the appeal challenging the lack of subordination failed and was dismissed with costs awarded against the appellant. The order of the Court therefore recorded the dismissal of the appeal and the imposition of costs on the losing party. Because the majority judgment was considered, the appellate division allowed the appeal to continue with costs and ordered a remand to the High Court for a fresh hearing before a single judge. The High Court will bear the costs of that remand in accordance with the result of the appellate decision. Thus, the final order confirmed that the appeal was allowed, with costs, and that the matter would be reheard by a single judge of the High Court.