The State Of Bihar and Others vs Sm. Charusila Dasi

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1955

Decision Date: 15 April, 1959

Coram: S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah

In this matter the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 15 April 1959. The case was styled The State of Bihar & Others versus Smt Charusila Dasi and the judgment was authored by Justice S K Das. The bench hearing the appeal comprised Justice S K Das, Justice P B Gajendragadkar, Justice K N Wanchoo and Justice M Hidayatullah. The parties were identified as the petitioner, the State of Bihar together with other respondents, and the respondent, Smt Charusila Dasi. The decision was reported in the 1959 All India Reporter at page 1002 and in the Supreme Court Reports Supplement 2 at page 601, with citations also appearing in later reports such as F 1959 SC 1073 (paragraphs 9, 12, 13, 15), F 1963 SC 853 (paragraphs 10, 12), F 1976 SC 871 (paragraph 31) and RF 1977 SC 1523 (paragraph 21).

The substantive issue concerned the applicability of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar 1 of 1951) to a trust whose property included land situated outside the State of Bihar, and whether the legislation was constitutionally valid and within the legislative competence of the State. The Act, particularly sections 1(2), 2(1) and 3, was examined in relation to the Constitution of India, specifically articles 245 and 246, Schedule VI, List I, Item 28, to determine whether the State could legislate on a Hindu religious trust that possessed properties beyond its territorial jurisdiction and whether the Act could be applied to a private trust. The question also arose as to whether the trust created by the respondent was a public religious trust falling within the scope of the Act or a private family endowment.

The headnote of the judgment summarised the factual background. On 2 March 1938, while residing in the town of D in Bihar, the respondent executed a deed of trust that identified several parcels of land listed in the schedules annexed to the deed; some of these parcels lay outside Bihar. In the deed the respondent described herself as the settlor and recited that the settlor had installed a deity named Iswar Srigopal in her residence and had thereafter performed regular worship and puja of that deity. The settlor also directed the erection of a Nat Mandir in memory of her deceased son. Further, the deed provided for the construction of two adjoining temples, termed “Jugal Mandir”. In one of these temples the deity Srigopal together with other deities was to be installed, while the second temple was to house a marble image of the settlor’s preceptor. The administration of the temples was to be managed by a committee consisting of the shebait for the Jugal Mandir at that time and six pious Hindus who were residents of D, of whom at least four were to be “Begalis”. One clause of the trust deed stipulated that the “pranamis” and perquisites offered to the deities and the image in the Jugal Mandir would form part of the “Srimati Charusila Trust Estate” and that neither the shebait nor any other person would have any interest or claim over such offerings.

The deed also contained provisions for conducting large-scale ceremonial distributions of food and water and for celebrating festivals that were well known among the Hindu community, with the intention that a great number of persons could participate. Additionally, the deed provided for the establishment of a hospital dedicated to Hindu women and a charitable dispensary intended to serve patients of any religion or creed. The question before the Court was whether these features rendered the trust a public religious trust subject to the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, or whether it remained a private family endowment beyond the Act’s reach.

The trust deed also made provision for a dispensary that would serve patients of any religion or creed. After the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, came into force, the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts initiated proceedings under sections 59 and 70 of that Act against the respondent, alleging that the trust was a public trust to which the Act was applicable. The respondent then filed an application before the Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ or order that would set aside the Board’s proceedings. In her petition she advanced four principal grounds: first, that the trust deed dated March 11, 1938, constituted a private endowment created for the worship of a family idol and therefore did not involve the public; second, that the Act was inapplicable to private trusts; third, that several provisions of the Act were ultra vires the Constitution because they interfered with the rights guaranteed to her under Part III; and fourth, that even if the Act were applicable, it could not cover the trust because some of its properties were situated outside the State of Bihar. The Court held that, when properly construed, the deed of trust dated March 11, 1938, created a religious and charitable trust of a public character, relying on the authority of Deoki Nandan v. Murlidar, [1956] S.C.R. 756, and the explanation given in In re Charusila Dasi, I.L.R. [1946] I Cal. 473. The Court noted that a key factor in determining whether a trust is public is whether the deed grants any right of worship to the public or to any particular section of the public. It further held that the Act does not apply to private endowments, following Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Sahi, [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 583. The Court also affirmed that the provisions of the Act do not diminish or abridge any rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, citing Mahant Moti Das v. S. P. Sahi, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 563. Moreover, section 3 of the Act renders it applicable to all public religious and charitable institutions located within Bihar, and the definition clause in section 2(1) includes any property of such institutions situated in the State. The Court reasoned that when a trust is situated in Bihar, the State possesses legislative authority over the trust, its trustees, and their agents who must be present in Bihar to manage the trust. Since the purpose of the Act is to ensure better administration of Hindu religious trusts in Bihar and to protect their assets, the State may achieve this purpose concerning property located outside Bihar by exercising control over the trustees personally, without invoking any extra-territorial operation of the Act. Finally, the Court observed that the temples housing the deities are located in Bihar and that the hospital and charitable dispensary are to be established in Bihar for the benefit of the Hindu public there, thereby establishing a sufficient territorial connection for the Bihar legislature to legislate with respect to such a trust.

In the matter before the Court, it was observed that the statute could not be said to operate beyond the territorial limits of Bihar. The Court noted that the very fact that the temples in which the deities were installed were physically located in Bihar, and that the proposed hospital and charitable dispensary were to be set up in Bihar for the benefit of the Hindu public of that State, created a sufficient territorial nexus. This nexus, the Court held, authorised the legislature of Bihar to enact a law governing such a trust. In arriving at this conclusion the Court relied on the precedent set in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1958] S.C.R. 1355, and The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamaybaugwala, (1957) S.C.R. 874. The Court distinguished the earlier authority of Saydar Gurdyal Singh v. The Rajah of Faridkote, (1894) L.R. 21 I.A. 171, as not applicable to the present facts.

The judgment concerned a civil appeal, identified as Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1955, which was filed against the order dated 5 October 1953 issued by the Patna High Court in M. J. C. No. 128 of 1953. The appeal was heard on 15 April 1959, and the judgment was delivered by Justice S. K. Das. The parties before the Court comprised the State of Bihar, the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, and the Superintendent of that Board as appellants, while the respondent was the settlor of the trust. The Advocate-General for the State of Bihar and counsel for the appellants were represented, and counsel for the respondent also appeared. The appeal centred on the Srimati Charusila Trust and the assets that formed part of that trust. The Patna High Court had previously held that the trust was a private trust created solely for the worship of a family idol, a matter in which the public had no interest, and therefore concluded that the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar I of 1951) – hereafter referred to as the Act – was inapplicable. Consequently, the High Court entertained an application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and set aside the proceedings initiated against the respondent under sections 59 and 70 of the Act.

The trust at issue had been constituted by a trust deed executed on 11 March 1938. The settlor, Srimati Charusila Dasi, was the widow of Akshaya Kumar Ghose, whose address was No. 3, Jorabagan Street, Calcutta. At the material time, Srimati Charusila Dasi resided in a residence known as Charu Niwas, situated in Deoghar, within the Santhal Parganas district of Bihar. In the deed she identified herself as the settlor and declared that she possessed certain properties enumerated in three schedules. Schedule B described three bighas and an odd amount of land located in the Mohalla Karanibad of Deoghar town, together with the buildings and structures standing thereon. Schedule C comprised the house Charu Niwas, also located in Karanibad, Deoghar. Schedule D listed several houses and parcels of land situated in Calcutta, the combined market value of which was estimated at approximately Rs. 8,50,000. Subsequent to the execution of the deed, a letter was addressed to the Superintendent of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts on behalf of Srimati Charusila Dasi, setting out further particulars relating to the trust.

The records showed that the total annual income generated from all of the trust properties was approximately Rs 87,839. The trust deed stated that the settlor had installed a deity called Iswar Srigopal in her residence and had since been regularly worshipping that deity and performing the puja associated with it. The deed further described that the settlor was constructing a twin temple, known as a jugal mandir, together with a Nat Mandir or entrance hall on the plot of land listed in schedule B, and that the twin temple was to be named in memory of her deceased son, Dwijendra Nath. The settlor also expressed a desire to install in one of the two temples the deity Srigopal, along with any other deities she might wish to establish during her lifetime, while the other temple was to contain a marble image of Sri Sri Balanand Brahmachari, who was her religious preceptor and was regarded by his disciples as a divine person. In addition, the trust deed recorded that the settlor wished to establish and found a hospital at Karanibad for Hindu females, to be called Akshaya Kumar Female Hospital, in memory of her deceased husband. By virtue of the trust deed the settlor transferred to the trustees the properties described in schedules B, C and D. The trustees comprised five individuals: Srimati Charusila Dasi, the adopted son of her late husband, Debi Prasanna Ghosh, and three persons who were not members of the settlor’s family, namely Amarendra Kumar Bose, Tara Shanker Chatterjee and Surendra Nath Burman. Amarendra Kumar Bose later resigned from the trusteeship and was subsequently replaced by Dr Shailendra Nath Dutt. The trust deed imposed several specific obligations on the trustees. First, they were required to complete the construction of the two temples and the Nat Mandir at a cost not exceeding three lakhs, to be funded from the trust estate and any donations that might be received. Second, upon completion of the temples, they were to install or cause to be installed the deity Iswar Srigopal in one temple and the marble image of Sri Balanand Brahmachari in the other, and thereafter to hold a consecration ceremony and a festival in connection with those installations. Third, after the installation ceremonies and associated festivals, the trustees were to provide for the payment and expenditure of the daily sheba puja and periodic festivals each year for the deity Srigopal and any other deities that might be installed, limiting the annual sum for these activities to Rs 13,600. In addition, they were to provide for the daily sheba of the marble image of Sri Balanand Brahmachari and to celebrate each year in his memory three specific festivals: the Janma-tithi, marking the anniversary of the image’s installation; Gurupurnima, the full moon in the Bengali month of Ashar; and Tirodhan, the anniversary of the day Sri Balanand Brahmachari departed his body, with the total cost for these observances not to exceed Rs 4,500 per annum. Finally, the deed directed the trustees also to establish and manage a hospital for Hindu females, named Akshaya Kumar Female Hospital, together with an attached outdoor charitable dispensary serving out-patients of any religion or creed, and to allocate from the income of the hospital and dispensary an annual sum of Rs 12,000 or such other amount as might be available after satisfying the expenses of the temples, the sheba allowances, and the trustees’ and temple committee members’ remuneration.

In the trust deed it was provided that a hospital for Hindu females only, to be called Akshaya Kumar Female Hospital, should be established, run and managed in Deoghar. An outdoor charitable dispensary was also to be attached to the hospital and made available to all out-patients irrespective of religion or creed. The deed specified that an annual sum of Rs 12,000, or any other amount that might be available after meeting the expenses of the two temples, should be paid out of the income of the hospital and the dispensary. This payment was to be made after the charges and expenditures of the temples had been met and after the allowance to the “shebait”, the trustees and the members of the temple committee had been satisfied. The deed further stated that the work of establishing the hospital and the dispensary should not begin until the construction of the temples and the installation of the deities mentioned earlier were completed. Both parties before the Court agreed that the temples and the Nat Mandir had indeed been constructed and that the deity and the marble image had been installed, but that neither the hospital nor the charitable dispensary had yet been built. The deed also laid down the powers, functions and duties of the trustees, and Schedule A contained detailed rules for convening annual general meetings, special meetings and ordinary meetings of the trustees, matters to which the Court indicated it would later attend.

On 27 October 1952 the Superintendent of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts in Patna sent a notice to Srimati Charusila Dasi invoking section 59 of the Act, requiring her to furnish a return in respect of the trust. In reply Srimati Charusila Dasi contended that the trust was a private endowment created merely for the worship of a family idol, that the public had no interest in it, and therefore the Act did not apply. On 5 January 1953 the Superintendent wrote again, informing her that the Board did not consider the trust to be private and consequently held that the Act was applicable. Subsequent correspondence took place between the solicitor of Srimati Charusila Dasi and the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, but this exchange did not advance the matter further. On 5 February 1953 the President issued a notice stating that he had been authorized to assess a fee under section 70 of the Act in respect of the trust. Finally, on 6 April 1953 Srimati Charusila Dasi filed an application before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, praying that a writ or order be issued to quash the proceedings initiated by the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts. She advanced two grounds: first, that the trust was a private trust to which the Act did not apply; and second, that the Act was ultra vires the Constitution because its provisions interfered with the rights guaranteed to her as a citizen.

In the earlier petition, Srimati Charusila Dasi invoked the right to practice religion guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. The State of Bihar and the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts opposed the petition, yet neither party filed an affidavit in response. When the High Court examined the terms of the trust deed, it concluded that the trust was entirely a private arrangement established for the worship of a family idol, a purpose in which the general public had no interest. On that basis, the Court held that the statutory provisions of the Act were inapplicable to the trust. Accordingly, the High Court granted the relief sought by the petitioner, issuing a writ of certiorari that set aside the proceedings initiated under sections 59 and 70 of the Act, and also issuing a writ of prohibition that barred the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts from pursuing any further action against Srimati Charusila Dasi concerning the disputed trust.

Subsequently, the appellants applied to the High Court for a certificate confirming that the matter satisfied the requirements of Article 133 of the Constitution, and the certificate was granted. The present appeal was filed on the strength of that certificate. In connection with several civil appeals—numbers 225, 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 1955—a judgment had been pronounced earlier on the same day. In that judgment, the Court provided an overview of the relevant provisions of the Act and examined the constitutional validity of those provisions in light of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. The Court held that the Act did not extinguish or abridge any of the rights protected by that part, as reflected in the earlier decision cited as Mahant Moti Das v. S. P. Saki. In another contemporaneous judgment, Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955, the Court considered the definition clause contained in section 2(1) of the Act and concluded that the Act did not apply to private endowments. The Court further explained the essential distinction in Hindu law between private and public religious trusts.

The Court chose not to repeat the reasoning set out in those two prior decisions. Instead, it focused on two questions that remained for determination in the present appeal. The first question asked whether, upon a true construction of the trust deed dated 11 March 1938, the Charusila Trust was indeed a private endowment created for the worship of a family idol, a conclusion that the High Court had previously reached. The second question, contingent upon a negative answer to the first, sought to know whether section 3 of the Act would nonetheless apply to trust property situated outside the State of Bihar. The Court indicated that it would address these two questions in the order presented. Representing the appellants, counsel argued that a proper construction of the deed of trust required the Charusila Trust to be held to

In the appeal it was submitted that the Charusila Trust must be regarded as a public religious trust. The learned Judges of the High Court had focused on the introductory portion of the trust deed, where it was recorded that the settlor had installed a deity called Iswar Srigopal in her own residence and had been regularly worshipping that deity. According to those Judges this circumstance demonstrated that, at its origin, the endowment was a private one created for the worship of a family idol, and that the general public had no interest in it. The High Court further held that the later installation of the same deity in one of the two temples built under the trust, and the placement of a marble image of Sri Balanand Brahmachari in the other temple, did not alter the character of the trust, which they continued to describe as a private endowment. They also expressed the view that the provision in the deed for the establishment of a charitable dispensary for female patients, and the clause relating to the trust-hospital intended for persons of the Hindu religion or creed, were merely incidental to the main objects of the endowment. Those findings, together with the observation that the hospital provision was incidental, have been seriously and strenuously challenged before this Court. While we acknowledge the reasoning of the High Court, we are of the opinion that the learned Judges did not give adequate consideration to several material clauses of the trust deed, and that those clauses have a substantial impact on the question presently before us. It is indeed true that the settlor narrated that she had installed the deity Iswar Srigopal in her house and that she had been regularly worshipping that deity since the installation. If the trust had been created solely for the purpose of continuing that private family worship, the conclusion would inevitably be that the endowment was wholly private and that the public had no interest. However, the deed shows that this was not the intention. The settlor founded the trust for the construction of two temples: one to house the deity Iswar Srigopal and the other to house a marble image of her spiritual preceptor. The trustees appointed under the deed included three individuals who were strangers to the settlor’s family, although the settlor retained an absolute discretion to remove any one or more of the trustees on grounds such as misconduct or a change of religion. A crucial point for determination is whether the trust deed confers any right of worship upon the public or upon any identified segment of the public. One specific clause of the deed provides that “the pronamis and perquisites to be offered to the deities and image in the Jugal Mandir shall form part of the Srimati Charusila Trust Estate and neither the shebait nor anyone else shall have interest or claim in or over the same.” The learned Judges of the High Court did not refer to this clause, yet the language of the clause indicates that the right of worship was not confined solely to the settlor’s family or to the founder, but was intended to be available to others as well.

In the present case, the Court observed that the trust deed expressly extended the right of worship to members of the Hindu public who were prepared to offer “pronamis” and other perquisites to the deities, and that the offerings made in this manner were to become part of the trust estate. Schedule E of the deed sets out in detail the festivals and ceremonial observances that were to be performed for the deity and for the image of Sri Balanand Brahmachari. Among these observances is a ceremony called “Jal Chhatra”, which involves the free distribution of water to devotees; another is “Annakoot”, a distribution of food that takes place at the time of Diwali, for which the deed fixes an approximate expenditure of five hundred rupees. A third ceremony is a “bhandara”, which culminates in the free distribution of food to the Mataji of Sri Balanand Brahmachari. Although these ceremonies may be described as ancillary to the service of the deity (deva-sheba), they appear on their face to provide a benefit to the general body of worshippers. The Court noted that, while the existence of such ceremonies is not by itself conclusive proof that the trust was intended for the public, they must be examined together with the other principal provisions of the trust deed. The deed also obliges the trustees to celebrate a number of well-known festivals for the deity, including Rath Yatra, Jhulan, Janmashtami, Rash and Dol (Holi). These festivals are traditionally attended by large numbers of Hindus, and the scale of expenses prescribed in the deed indicates that they are to be conducted on a large scale so that a substantial number of persons may take part. Likewise, the special festivals associated with Sri Balanand Brahmachari—namely the observances on his birthday (Janma tithi), Gurupurnima and Tirodhan—are also intended to be celebrated on a large scale so that other disciples of Sri Balanand Brahmachari may join them. The Court further examined the composition of the board of trustees, finding that its structure demonstrates that the endowment was not a mere private settlement. The trust deed provides that, whenever a vacancy arises, the trustees must ensure that the board includes, where available, the senior-most lineal male descendant of Akshaya Kumar Ghose (the deceased husband of the settlor), provided that he is eligible, willing and capable of acting as a trustee; a trustee who is a member of the Sree Sree Balanand Trust created at Deoghar by the late Sree Balanand Brahmachari; and a third trustee who is a disciple of the Sree Sree Balanand order, meaning any disciple of the aforesaid Brahmachari, his successors or their disciples, provided that such a disciple is also willing, eligible and capable. The deed further requires that the total number of trustees shall always be five, and that no individual shall be eligible to serve as a trustee unless he is an adult male, pious, Bengali Hindu, and meets the other qualifications set forth in the instrument.

The settlement deed stipulated that, under no circumstances other than the settlor herself, any person could serve as a trustee while the settlor was alive. The settlor was expressly designated to act simultaneously as a trustee and as the shebait for the duration of her life. The Court observed that the trust deed also described the constitution of a temple committee. According to the deed, the committee was to include the Jugal Mandir shebait, who would serve ex officio as the committee’s president. In addition, the trustees were to appoint six other members, all of whom had to be pious Hindus residing in Deoghar, and at least four of those six had to be Bengalis. The Court noted that, if the trust had been created merely for the worship of a family idol, it would be unusual to vest the management of the temple and the associated “sheba puja” in members of the public who were external to the settlor’s family. Beyond these provisions, the deed expressly created a trust in favour of the public concerning a hospital and a charitable dispensary. The Court therefore turned to clause 8 of the deed, which set out the purpose, scope and financial parameters of those public-benefit institutions.

Clause 8 provided that a hospital for Hindu females only was to be established in Deoghar in memory of the settlor’s deceased husband, to be called the “Akshaya Kumar Female Hospital”, together with an attached outdoor charitable dispensary open to out-patients of any religion or creed. The income of the hospital and dispensary was to be used each year to meet their objectives, with an amount of rupees twelve thousand—or any greater sum that remained after payment of the necessary expenses—being allocated after first meeting the charges specified in the deed, paying the allowance of the shebait, the trustees, the members of the temple committee, and covering the establishment costs of offices in Calcutta and Deoghar as well as the temple establishment itself. However, the trustees were expressly prohibited from commencing the hospital or dispensary work until the temple had been constructed and its deities installed. The deed further required that, while the settlor was alive, the hospital and dispensary be housed in a rented dwelling in Deoghar, and that after her death they be shifted to Charu Niwas. The Court noted that Charu Niwas was later sold by order of the Calcutta High Court and that the sale proceeds were applied to satisfy the debts and liabilities of the trust estate. Finally, a specific clause defined the object of the hospital as providing Hindu females with free medical, surgical and maternity advice and assistance, and admitting them as indoor patients in accordance with the standards prescribed in the deed.

In the trust deed, the trustees were authorized to formulate rules and regulations that could be made with the sanction of the Board of Trustees, and the outdoor Charitable Hospital was to be operated according to the rules established by the trustees. The deed further permitted the use of the hospital’s funds for making subscriptions or contributions to convalescent homes, similar institutions, and other special hospitals, and also allowed for sending patients to such institutions and maintaining them there, provided that the amount spent in any one year did not exceed one thousand rupees or any other sum that the trustees might fix from time to time. The learned judges of the High Court had expressed the view that these provisions for establishing a hospital and a charitable dispensary were merely incidental or ancillary to the other principal objects of the trust. With great respect, the Court could not accept the argument that the establishment of a hospital and a charitable dispensary, as described in the trust deed, could be characterized as ancillary or incidental to the other objects of the trust, namely the construction of two temples and the installation of the deities therein. The Court observed in clear and unequivocal terms that the trust deed created a distinct and independent trust intended for the benefit of a considerable section of the public, and that the hospital and the charitable dispensary were to be established for that public benefit. It acknowledged that the deed stipulated that the hospital and dispensary should be set up only after the temples were constructed and the deities installed; however, the Court held that this timing requirement did not diminish the importance of the hospital and dispensary trust, nor did it render it merely incidental or ancillary to the temple-related trusts. Rather, the timing merely established the chronological priority for giving effect to the different trusts created by the deed. The High Court had relied upon the decision in Prasaddas Pal v. Jagannath Pal (1). In that case, the deed of endowment dedicated certain houses and premises to the “sheba” of a family idol, to feeding the poor, and to other charitable objects; the deity was installed inside a residential quarter, the “shebaitship” was confined to members of the founder’s family, and the feeding of the poor and students, when income from the endowed property increased, was deemed part of the “debasheba.” Consequently, the feeding activity was held not to be an independent charity but incidental to the main purpose of the endowment, which was the worship of the deity. The Court was unable to apply the same reasoning to the present trust. The Court also referred to Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar (2), where it had examined the principles for determining whether an endowment was public or private, and had observed that the essential question was the founder’s intention regarding who was permitted to benefit from the endowed property.

The central issue that required resolution was whether the founder intended that only particular individuals would be entitled to worship at the shrine, or whether the shrine was meant to be accessible to the general public or to some defined segment of the public. According to established legal theory, when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, the endowment is classified as private rather than public, because only members of the family – a clearly identifiable group – are permitted to perform worship at the deity’s shrine. Conversely, as noted in the authorities (1) (1932) I.L.R. 60 Cal. 538 and (2) [1956] S.C.R. 756, 762, where the beneficiaries do not belong to a family or any specifically named individual, the endowment must be treated as public, intended to serve the broader body of worshippers. One factual circumstance that was regarded in that precedent as indicating a public endowment was the placement of the idol in a separate structure built expressly for that purpose on a vacant site, rather than within the confines of residential quarters. The present Court does not regard that circumstance as alone determinative of the question. The location of the temple outside a dwelling is merely one factor that may support a finding of a public temple, especially in the Madras region (excluding Malabar); nevertheless, private temples in Bengal have also been constructed outside donors’ residences, as observed in the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, Tagore Law Lectures by the late Dr. B. K. Mukherjea, 1952 edition, p. 188. In the matter currently before the Court, two temples were indeed erected outside the residential quarters, but this is only one of several relevant considerations. The deed of trust must be interpreted by examining all its clauses, and on that comprehensive construction the Court was convinced that the trusts created a public endowment. Another point worthy of notice is that the deed of trust in the present case is drafted in the English form, with the settlor transferring the property to trustees who are to hold it for specific religious and charitable purposes; while this fact is not decisive, it does represent a noteworthy departure from the manner in which private religious endowments are commonly constituted. It is now necessary to refer to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in In re Charusila Dasi (1), which dealt with the very same trust. The matter before that Court concerned the assessment of income-tax on the trust’s income for the accounting year 1938-39, where the trustees had been assessed on the entire income of the trust. The trustees appealed the assessment, contending that the whole trust was established for public, religious and charitable purposes and that the entire income (1) I.L.R. [1946] 1 Cal. 473 fell within clause (1) of sub-section 3 of section 4 of the Income-Tax Act. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, however, maintained that the trust was merely a private religious trust and that its income did not accrue to the public, except for the portion of income earmarked for the hospital and dispensary, to which the latter part of clause (1) applied.

The Commissioner maintained that the trust was a private religious trust and that its income did not accrue to the public, except for the portion that was to be applied to the hospital and dispensary, which fell within the latter part of clause (1). Consequently, a reference was made to the High Court, and the issue framed before that Court was whether, on a proper construction of the deed of trust, the portion of the trust’s income that was not applied to the construction and maintenance of the female hospital could be exempted from tax under section 4(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The learned counsel for the trustees pointed out before the High Court that during the accounting year no part of the trust’s income had been devoted to the hospital and dispensary, and it was conceded that any portion of future income earmarked for those institutions would fall within the exempting clause. It so happened that the counsel who had argued the income-tax reference for the trustees in the Calcutta High Court was the same counsel appearing before this Court on behalf of Srimati Charusila Dasi. The present contention is that the trust, taken as a whole, is a private religious trust. In support of the proposition that the entire trust, as discerned from the trust deed, was of a public nature, the counsel relied on eleven circumstances that he had earlier advanced in the income-tax reference. Gentle, J., joined by Ormond, J., held that, on a proper construction of the deed of trust, the income not applied to the construction and maintenance of the female hospital was not exempt from tax under section 4(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act. That decision, it must be said, does not wholly support the present respondent. With respect to the hospital and the dispensary, the trust was held to be a public trust. The Court is of the view that, considering the main clauses of the trust deed already referred to, the trusts in favour of the deity Iswar Srigopal and the image of Sri Balanand Brahmachari are likewise of a public nature. One point emphasized before the Calcutta High Court concerned the provision relating to prānām and perquisites to be offered to the deity and the image. The High Court observed that “this provision does not indicate the creation of a trust in favour of the public; on the contrary, it denies the right of anyone, including any member of the public, to the prānām. In its terms, the deed negates that benefit is conferred upon the public.” Those observations are, in the present view, based on a misconception. When a member of the public makes an offering to a deity, he does not retain any right to that offering.

In this case, the Court explained that when a person makes an offering to a deity, the offering ceases to belong to the person and becomes the property of the deity. Consequently, the public’s right, or the right of a large segment of the public, concerns only the right to worship the deity and to make offerings in the course of worship, not any right to retain or claim ownership of those offerings after they have been presented. The Court also noted that its view differed from that of the learned judges who previously decided the income-tax reference, and it reiterated that the earlier discussion already set out this reasoning, making further repetition unnecessary. After examining the terms of the trust deed, the Court concluded that the deed establishes a religious and charitable trust that is of a public nature. Having reached this interpretation, the Court then turned to the second issue presented for determination.

The Court proceeded to analyse the scope of Section 3 of the Act, which declares that the Act shall apply to all religious trusts, irrespective of when they were created, whenever any portion of the trust’s property is situated in the State of Bihar. Counsel for the respondent argued that, under Article 245 of the Constitution, Parliament may legislate for the whole or any part of India, while a State legislature may legislate only for the whole or any part of the State. Article 245, clause 2, further provides that a law made by Parliament is not to be regarded as invalid merely because it has extra-territorial effect. Article 246 distributes legislative powers, assigning exclusive authority to Parliament over matters in the Union List, concurrent authority to both Parliament and State legislatures over matters in the Concurrent List, and exclusive authority to a State over matters in the State List. Item 28 of the Concurrent List includes “charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions.” On this basis, the respondent’s counsel contended that the Bihar Legislature, relying on the provisions of Articles 245 and 246 together with Item 28, lacked the power to enact a law whose operation extended beyond the territorial limits of Bihar. The counsel further argued that because Section 3 makes the Act applicable to any religious trust with any part of its property in Bihar, the enactment would in effect bind trusts located outside Bihar whenever a small portion of their property lies within the State, rendering the provision ultra vires the Bihar Legislature. The counsel also maintained that even if the Act were to apply to a trust that holds a minor parcel of property in Bihar, the provisions could not lawfully reach the portions of the trust’s property situated outside Bihar, such as the properties located in Calcutta that are relevant to the present dispute.

It was argued that the legislature could not enact a law that would apply to religious institutions whose properties lay in more than one State. The argument further asserted that even if the Act were applicable to a religious institution located in Bihar, the provisions of the Act could not extend to any portion of that institution’s property situated outside Bihar, such as the property located in Calcutta that formed the subject of the present dispute. Accordingly, the Court first needed to ascertain the precise reach of the Act in relation to sections 1(2) and 3, read together with the preamble. The preamble declared that “Whereas it is expedient to provide for the better administration of Hindu religious trusts in the State of Bihar and for the protection and preservation of properties appertaining to such trusts.” From this statement the Court understood that the Act was intended solely for the better administration of Hindu religious trusts that were situated within Bihar. Section 1(2) expressly provided that the Act extended to the whole of the State of Bihar, and section 3, as previously quoted, dealt with the applicability to trusts. When these two provisions were interpreted in the context of the preamble, they could be read to mean that the Act applied only where (a) the religious trust or institution was located in Bihar and (b) any part of the property of that institution was situated in Bihar. In other words, both conditions needed to be satisfied before the Act could operate.

The Court noted that there existed a well-settled presumption that a legislature does not intend to act beyond its constitutional jurisdiction, and that a sovereign legislature’s enactments should, wherever possible, be given an interpretation that renders them operative rather than ineffective. The Court referred to earlier decisions such as In re the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act 1937, The Hindu Women’s Rights to Property (Amendment) Act 1936, In re a Special Reference under section 213 of the Government of India Act 1935, and the judgment in R M D Chamarbaugwalla v the Union of India. Applying those principles, the Court held that section 3 made the Act applicable to all public religious trusts—that is, all public religious and charitable institutions as defined in section 2(1)—provided that those trusts were situated in the State of Bihar and that any portion of their property lay within Bihar. Consequently, both conditions had to be fulfilled before the Act could take effect. The Court concluded that, properly understood, none of the provisions of the Act possessed extra-territorial effect, nor did they exceed the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature. It was further affirmed that the Bihar Legislature possessed the power to legislate, under item 28 of the Concurrent List, on matters concerning “charities, charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions” situated in the State of Bihar.

The Court observed that the statutory reference to “religious institutions situated in the State of Bihar” narrowed the inquiry to whether the Bihar Legislature, in enacting the law, possessed the authority to affect trust property that might lie outside Bihar but that was nevertheless attached to a trust whose seat was located in Bihar. The Court held that the answer to this question was affirmative. It emphasized that, with respect to an interest under a trust, the sole right of the beneficiaries is to have the trust administered in accordance with its terms, and that such a right can ordinarily be enforced only at the place where the trust or the religious institution is situated or at the residence of the trustees, as explained in Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (7th ed., p. 506). The Act, the Court noted, sought to do nothing more than what was set out in its preamble: to provide for better administration of Hindu religious trusts within Bihar and to protect the properties belonging to those trusts. The Court explained that this objective was to be achieved by exercising personal control over the trustees. Because the trust was situated in Bihar, the State possessed legislative authority over the trust itself as well as over its trustees, their servants and agents, who were required to be in Bihar in order to administer the trust. Consequently, the Court found no basis for suggesting that the Act operated beyond the territorial limits of the State. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the temples where the deities were installed were located in Bihar, and that the hospital and charitable dispensary contemplated by the trust were to be established in Bihar for the benefit of the Hindu public residing there. These facts, the Court said, created a sufficient territorial connection to enable the Bihar Legislature to enact a law concerning such a trust. The Court further referred to its earlier application of the doctrine of territorial nexus in cases involving income-tax, sales-tax and gambling-tax legislation. Referring to Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, the Court reiterated that a valid territorial connection required two elements: first, that the connection be real and not illusory; and second, that the liability imposed be pertinent to that connection. The Court affirmed that when a religious endowment is situated in Bihar and its trustees function there, the connection between the religious institution and the property that belongs to it is indeed real and not illusory; the institution and its property constitute an integrated whole that cannot be separated. Accordingly, any liability imposed on the trustees would necessarily affect the trust property. The Court also quoted its earlier observation in the Tata Iron & Steel case that it was unnecessary to formulate a sweeping principle about the applicability of the nexus theory to all legislation, noting that the discussion was sufficient for the matter presently before it.

The Court observed that it had found no justification for limiting the application of the territorial-nexus principle to income-tax legislation alone, noting that the principle had already been extended to sales-tax statutes and to statutes imposing tax on gambling. Consequently, the Court saw no reason why the approach adopted in The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala (2) should not be followed in the matter before it. In the Chamarbaugwala decision, the respondent was the organiser of a prize competition whose operations were situated outside the State of Bombay; the newspaper used to publish the competition was also printed and issued outside the State of Bombay. Nevertheless, the newspaper enjoyed a wide circulation within the State of Bombay and the activities that a gambler is ordinarily expected to undertake were largely, if not wholly, carried out inside the State. The Court in that case held that these circumstances created a sufficient territorial nexus that authorised the State of Bombay to levy a tax on the gambling that occurred within its borders, and that the statute could not be invalidated on the ground of extra-territoriality. Applying the same reasoning to the present dispute, the Court concluded that because the religious endowment itself is situated in Bihar and the trustees perform their functions there, the Act in question is applicable to them and its provisions cannot be set aside on a claim of extra-territorial reach.

Turning to the authorities cited by counsel for the respondent, the Court examined four decisions: Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. The Rajah of Faridkote (3); Commissioner of Wakfs, Bengal (1) [1958] S.C.R. 1355; Madangopal Bagla v. Lachmidas (2); and Maharaj Kishore Khanna v. Raja Ram Singh (3). The Court held that none of these cases were applicable because they addressed completely different legal questions. In Sirdar Gurdyal Singh’s case, a court in Faridkote had issued an ex parte decree of money against a defendant who had formerly been the treasurer of Faridkote but who at the time of the suit resided in Jhind and was a domiciled subject of that State. The decree was declared a nullity under international law. The ratio of the decision was expressed by Lord Selborne: “Territorial jurisdiction attaches (with special exceptions) upon all persons either permanently or temporarily resident within the territory while they are within it; but it does not follow them after they have withdrawn from it, and when they are living in another independent country........... In a personal action, to which none of these causes of jurisdiction apply, a decree pronounced in absentem by a foreign Court, to the jurisdiction of which the defendant has not in any way submitted himself, is by international law an absolute nullity.” The Court further noted that the decision in Commissioner of Wakfs, Bengal v. Narasingh Chandra Daw & Co. (1) addressed a separate issue concerning the construction of section 70 of the Bengal Wakf Act and therefore did not provide guidance for the present controversy.

In the matter of Chandra Daw & Co., the Court examined the meaning of section 70 of the Bengal Wakf Act, noting that this provision was similar in form to section 3 of the same Act. Section 70 required that a notice be given to the Commissioner of Wakfs before any wakf property could be sold. The Court considered whether a court situated in Assam was legally bound to issue such a notice under the Bengal legislation. After reviewing the scope of the Bengal Wakf Act, the Court concluded that the Act did not extend to the state of Assam and that section 70 occupied a distinct category from the other provisions of the Bengal Act. The Court explained the reasoning as follows: the status of the Commissioner, conferred by the Bengal Act, allowed him to operate even outside the province, so that the Commissioner could institute suits under sections 72 or 73 in courts beyond Bengal. However, section 70 was different because it imposed a duty on the court itself to send notice to the Commissioner in certain situations. The Court further observed that section 70(1) dealt with suits or proceedings concerning wakf property, and when such property lay outside Bengal, the court having jurisdiction over it was also outside Bengal; consequently, the Bengal Act could not apply beyond its territorial limits.

The Court also referred to two earlier decisions, namely Madangopal Bagla v. Lachmidas and Maharaj Kishore Khanna v. Raja Ram Singh, both of which involved the interpretation of provisions of the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act, 1934 (U.P. Act 25 of 1934). In the first case the specific issue was whether a decree-holder, who possessed a decree issued by the Original side of the Calcutta High Court, was barred from executing that decree because of certain proceedings that had previously occurred before the Special Judge of Banaras under the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act. The Court held that the decree-holder was not barred and based its decision on a construction of section 18 of the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act read together with sections 7, 13 and 14(7) of the same Act. It explained that the exclusive jurisdiction intended for the Special Judge, which superseded the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts, applied only to debts enforceable through courts within the province, and that the term “creditor” in section 10 should be limited to those who must enforce their rights solely through such provincial courts. The Court then turned to the Patna case, where the question was whether section 14(7) of the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act should be interpreted to treat a decree of a Special Judge as equivalent to a decree of a civil court.

The Court observed that the decree issued by the Special Judge of Banaras did not acquire the character of a decree of a civil court beyond the territorial limits of the United Provinces. Consequently, the Subordinate Judge of Purnea in Bihar lacked jurisdiction to enforce such a decree or to order attachment of the judgment-debtor’s property located in Purnea for execution of that decree. The Court clarified that the earlier decisions it cited dealt exclusively with the interpretation of certain provisions of the Bengal Wakf Act and the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act, and therefore addressed a problem entirely distinct from the one presently before it. As a result, those earlier rulings could not be regarded as authorities for resolving the broader constitutional issue under consideration in the present appeal.

The Court then turned to a decision of this Court, Petition No. 234 of 1953, decided on 18 March 1953, which presented a factually similar controversy. In that case the head of a math situated in Banaras filed an application under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus against the State of Bombay and its Charity Commissioner, requesting that they refrain from enforcing the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, on the ground that the Act could not apply to a math located outside Bombay or to any of its places of worship. During the hearing, the Attorney-General for Bombay stated unequivocally that the Government of Bombay and the Charity Commissioner had no intention of applying the Bombay Act to any religious institution situated beyond the State’s territory, and that any application of the Act would be limited to places of religious instruction or worship that are actually within Bombay. Because of those submissions, the Court did not render a decision on the question raised, and therefore the judgment could not be treated as a final determination of the issue presented in the present case. After reviewing the arguments and applying the reasoning already set out, the Court held that the Act in question does apply to the Charusila Trust, which is located in Bihar, and that its provisions cannot be invalidated on the basis of extra-territoriality. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed with costs, the High Court judgment and order dated 5 October 1953 were set aside, and the petition of Srimati Charusila Dasi was dismissed with costs.