The Manager, Hotel Imperial vs The Chief Commissioner and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 291 of 1956

Decision Date: 13 May 1959

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar

The case titled The Manager, Hotel Imperial versus The Chief Commissioner and Others was decided on 13 May 1959 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice K.N. Wanchoo, who sat with Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and P.B. Gajendragadkar. The petitioner in the appeal was the manager of the Hotel Imperial, while the respondents included the Chief Commissioner and other parties. The official citation for the decision is reported in 1959 AIR 1214 and in the 1960 volume of the Supreme Court Reports (first series) at page 279. The matter concerned an order of reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, specifically the question whether an order that identified the workmen as being represented by a union was formally defective, and under what circumstances individual workmen must be named. The relevant statutory provisions were Sections 2(k), 10 and 36 of the 1947 Act.

The headnote of the judgment summarised the factual backdrop: an industrial dispute had arisen between the Hotel Imperial and its workmen and the dispute was referred to an Industrial Tribunal. The hotel challenged the form of the order of reference, arguing that the order was incompetent because it purported to make the union a party to the reference, contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, and also because the order allegedly failed to specify the number and categories of workers involved. The Court held that the order of reference was perfectly competent where the parties to the dispute and the nature of the dispute were clearly identified. The Court explained that the inclusion of the union’s name served only a convenience function, enabling the Tribunal to know to whom notice should be sent; it did not prevent the workmen from being represented by another union or by appearing as individual parties. The Court further observed that under Section 10 it is unnecessary to name individual workmen when the dispute concerns a general question of terms of employment or conditions of labour affecting a body of workmen. Naming of individual workmen becomes relevant only when the dispute pertains to the dismissal or similar action against specific individuals as represented by a union. The decision referred to the precedent State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy, reported in 1953 SCR 334, for support.

The judgment was rendered under civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 291 of 1956, which arose from the judgment and order dated 25 November 1955 of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi in Civil Writ Application No. 189-D of 1955. The counsel for the appellant included Jai Gopal Sethi, J.B. Dadachanji, S.N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. Vohra. The respondents were represented by R.H. Dhebar and T.M. Sen for the first respondent, and G.S. Pathak, V.P. Nayar and Janardan Sharma for the third respondent. The judgment was delivered on 13 May 1959 by Justice Wanchoo, who noted that the appeal was before the Court on a certificate granted by the Punjab High Court under Article 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution.

The Court noted that the appeal arose on a certificate granted by the Punjab High Court under Article 133 (1) (a) and (c) of the Constitution. The appellant was identified as the manager of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi, hereinafter referred to as “the hotel.” The respondents comprised the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the Additional Industrial Tribunal of Delhi, and the Hotel Workers’ Union located at Katra Shahanshahi, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. Among these, the Union was described as the principal contesting respondent. The factual background recorded that a dispute emerged between the hotel and its workmen in October 1955. The Chief Commissioner of Delhi referred the matter to an Industrial Tribunal on 12 October 1955. The order of reference, as extracted for this judgment, stated that a report from the Director of Industries and Labour, Delhi, filed under section 12 (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (as amended), indicated the existence of an industrial dispute between the hotel’s management and its workmen represented by the Union, and that the Chief Commissioner, after considering the report, was satisfied that the dispute should be referred to a tribunal. Following this, the order formally referred the dispute to the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, and set out the terms of reference. The hotel subsequently filed a writ application in the Punjab High Court challenging the order on several grounds. The High Court heard the application and dismissed it on 25 November 1955. The hotel then sought leave to appeal to this Court, which was granted on 13 January 1956. On 27 February 1956, this Court stayed the proceedings before the Additional Industrial Tribunal. Consequently, a dispute that might otherwise have been resolved long ago remained at its initial stage.

The hotel’s principal contention was that the reference was incompetent, basing its argument on two grounds. First, it asserted that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter “the Act”) did not permit the Union to be made a party to the reference. Second, it claimed that the reference was vague because it failed to specify how many of the 480 workers, who were employed in thirty different categories, were involved in the dispute. The Court examined these contentions and held that they possessed no merit. For the purposes of this judgment, the Court recalled that section 2 (k) of the Act defined an “industrial dispute” as any dispute or difference between employers and workmen that related to employment, non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour of any person. Section 10 (1) of the Act empowered the appropriate government, when it was of the opinion that an industrial dispute existed or was likely to arise, to refer the dispute to a tribunal for adjudication. The Court observed that, on the facts, a genuine dispute existed between the hotel and its workmen, as evidenced by the hotel’s decision to dismiss a large number of workers on 7 October 1955 and the nature of the disagreement concerning terms of employment and conditions of labour. Accordingly, the Chief Commissioner was within his authority under section 10 (1) to refer the dispute to a tribunal. The Court concluded that the hotel’s objections to the form of the reference were unfounded, and that the reference was valid and competent.

The Court noted that the dispute arose because the hotel had decided to dismiss a large number of its workmen on 7 October 1955. It was undisputed that the disagreement centred on the terms of employment and the conditions of labour applicable to those workmen. Consequently, the Chief Commissioner possessed authority under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act to refer the matter to a tribunal for adjudication. The hotel challenged the reference on the ground that the manner in which the reference had been framed rendered it incompetent. The Court observed that the order of reference clearly identified the two parties to the dispute: first, the employer, which was the management of the hotel, and second, the workmen employed by the hotel. The hotel’s objection, however, focused on the inclusion of the words “as represented by the Hotel Workers’ Union, Katra Shahanshahi, Chandni Chowk, Delhi” in the order, contending that the union could not be made a party to the reference and that this made the reference defective. The Court considered this objection to be a mere technicality that did not affect the validity of the order of reference.

The Court explained that the dispute referred to the tribunal was unmistakably between the hotel’s management and its employees, who were described in the order as the workmen. The addition of the phrase “as represented by the Hotel Workers’ Union, Katra Shahanshahi, Chandni Chowk, Delhi” was intended solely for convenience, enabling the tribunal to know to whom notice should be sent when dealing with the reference. The Court emphasized that this phrasing did not prevent the workmen from seeking representation by any other union, applying to the tribunal for such representation, or appearing before the tribunal as individual parties. Under section 36 of the Act, any workman who is a party to a dispute may be represented in proceedings by (a) an officer of a trade union of which he is a member, (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which his union is affiliated, or (c) if he is not a member of any trade union, by an officer of any trade union connected with the industry or by any other workman employed in that industry. Accordingly, the Court held that the inclusion of the union’s name for the purpose of directing notice did not render the reference incompetent. The further objection that the reference did not name an individual officer of the union was likewise deemed a technicality, because service upon a union is effected through its officers, such as its president or secretary, who would actually represent the workmen before the tribunal.

The Court observed that the reference mentioned the union itself rather than an individual officer of the union. It considered this to be a mere technicality, noting that a union, being an artificial entity, can be served only through an officer such as a president or secretary, and that such an officer would actually represent the workmen before the tribunal. Accordingly, the Court held that the reference remained valid and did not become incompetent merely because it stated that the workmen would be represented by the named union in the dispute. The Court further explained that the great majority of references made under the Act are drafted in this manner, primarily for the convenience of directing the tribunal to the appropriate party to which notices should be sent on behalf of a large number of workmen.

Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that the reference was defective simply because the order of reference included the words “as represented by the Hotel Workers’ Union, Katra Shahanshahi, Chandni Chowk, Delhi.” The Court also found no merit in the second ground of attack, which alleged that the reference was inadequate because it failed to specify how many of the 480 workmen belonging to thirty different categories were involved in the dispute. The Court held that, for the purposes of section 10, when a dispute is of a general nature concerning the terms of employment or conditions of labour of a body of workmen, it is unnecessary to list the names of individual workmen who may have been parties to the dispute. Only in cases where the dispute concerns the dismissal or similar action against particular workmen, as represented by the union, would it be desirable to mention the names of those workmen.

In the present case, the dispute also involved workmen who had received notices of dismissal, and the names of those workmen were indeed mentioned in the order of reference. The Court then referred to the decision in State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, where a similar challenge to the competence of a reference was raised on the ground of vagueness. In that case, the reference was phrased as follows: “WHEREAS an industrial dispute has arisen between the workers and managements of the cinema talkies in the Madras City in respect of certain matters… AND WHEREAS in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor of Madras, it is necessary to refer the said industrial dispute for adjudication.” The subsequent order of reference did not even contain the specific terms of reference, but indicated that the Industrial Tribunal could, at its discretion, resolve the issues after a preliminary enquiry. The Commissioner of Labour was requested to send copies of that order to the managements of the cinema talkies.

The Court observed that, in the earlier decision, it was held that a reference made to the Tribunal under section ten of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 could not be declared invalid merely because the reference failed to identify the particular disputes or the specific parties involved in those disputes. It further noted that the judgment in that earlier case explained that the Government must possess sufficient knowledge of the nature of the dispute to be satisfied that the matter qualifies as an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, for example where the dispute concerns retrenchment or reinstatement of workmen. However, the Court emphasized that beyond this minimal requirement, the Government is under no obligation to determine the detailed particulars of the dispute before issuing a reference under section ten, nor is it required to list those particulars in the order of reference. Applying this principle to the present reference, the Court found that the present reference could not be described as vague. The parties to the dispute were expressly identified as the management of the hotel and the hotel’s workmen, and the terms of reference clearly set out the nature of the dispute. Consequently, the Court held that it was unnecessary to include in the order of reference the names of the individual workmen who were responsible for the dispute. The Court therefore concluded that the argument of vagueness advanced by the appellant was untenable and that the appeal lacked any merit. As a result, the appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to respondent number three. Noting that more than three years had elapsed since the reference was issued, the Court expressed confidence that the Additional Industrial Tribunal would now proceed to dispose of the matter as quickly as possible. The appeal was dismissed.