The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and Others vs Hotel Workers' Union
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 31-33 of 1958
Decision Date: 21 May 1959
Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar
The case was titled The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and Others versus Hotel Workers’ Union and the judgment was delivered on 21 May 1959 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice K.N. Wanchoo and the bench consisted of Justice K.N. Wanchoo together with Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar. The petitioners were the management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and other related hotel establishments, and the respondent was the Hotel Workers’ Union. The matter was reported in the 1959 All India Reporter at page 1342 and in the 1960 Supreme Court Reporter (First Series) at page 476. The dispute concerned the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, particularly sections 10(4) and 33, and involved the employer’s request for permission to dismiss certain workmen as a result of an enquiry, the suspension of those workmen pending the Tribunal’s decision, the validity of such suspension, and whether the suspended workmen were entitled to wages during the period of suspension. The petitioners sought an order that the workmen should not receive any wages while their dismissal applications were pending before the Tribunal.
According to the headnote, the appellants, who were the management of three hotels, had conducted enquiries that found several workmen guilty of misconduct. Based on those findings, the management decided to dismiss the guilty workmen and, pending the receipt of permission from the Industrial Tribunal under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, they suspended the workmen without pay. The workmen then applied to the Industrial Tribunal for interim relief while their dismissal applications were being considered. The Tribunal granted the relief sought, ordering the payment of full wages to each workman together with an additional amount of Rs. 25 per head per month as a food allowance. The management appealed against the Tribunal’s order, but the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The management then obtained special leave to bring the matter before this Court.
The Court identified two principal questions for decision. The first question was whether any wages were payable to the suspended workmen while the employer’s application for permission to dismiss them under section 33 of the Act was pending. The second question was whether the Industrial Tribunal possessed the authority to grant interim relief without issuing a formally published interim award. In addressing the first question, the Court observed that under the ordinary master-servant relationship, the power to suspend a servant without pay does not arise by implication in a standard employment contract; it must be founded on either an express term in the contract or a statutory provision governing the employment. The Court cited the authorities Hanley v. Pease & Partners, Limited (1915 1 KB 698), Wallwork v. Fielding and Ors. (1922 2 KB 66), Secretary of State for India in Council v. Surendra Nath Goswami (ILR 1939 1 Cal 46) and Rura Ram v. Divisional Superintendent, North Western Railway (ILR VII 1954 Punj 415) to support this proposition.
Turning to the statutory framework, the Court noted that section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 removed the employer’s unilateral right to dismiss an employee and made such dismissal permissible only with the Tribunal’s permission. By doing so, the statute introduced a fundamental change in industrial law, modifying the common-law rule. The Court held that this statutory change implicitly empowered the employer to suspend the employment contract, thereby relieving the employer of the obligation to pay wages and relieving the employee of the duty to render services during the period of suspension, subject to the Tribunal’s decision on the application for dismissal. The reasoning concluded that the employer could lawfully suspend the workmen without wages while the Tribunal considered the application for dismissal, and that the Tribunal was competent to grant interim relief without a formally published interim award.
The Court explained that, after a proper enquiry, if the employer concluded that an employee ought to be dismissed, the employer could suspend the employee’s service. In the special circumstances created by the enactment of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was considered just and fair that Industrial Tribunals, which possessed powers beyond those of ordinary master-servant law, should imply a term in the contract of employment that permitted such suspension. Consequently, when an Industrial Tribunal granted permission under section 33, the suspended contract would be deemed ended, and the employer would have no further obligation to pay wages after the date of suspension. Conversely, if the Tribunal refused permission, the workmen would be entitled to receive all wages from the date of suspension onward. The Court referred to Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, [1949] F.C.R. 321 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Brijnandan Pandey, [1956] S.C.R. 800 for support, and also considered the authorities Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup, [1956] S.C.R. 916; The Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Dhuban Singh, C.A. 768/57, decided 20-April-1959; M/s. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, C.A. 746 and 747/57, decided 29-April-1959; and Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, [1960] (1) S.C.R. 32. However, the Court held that the employer’s power of suspension could not defeat the Tribunal’s power to grant interim relief to workmen under the Act. The wording “incidental thereto” in section 10(4) of the Act indicated that interim relief, when permissible, could be granted as an incidental matter to the main question referred to the Tribunal, even if not expressly mentioned in the reference terms. The Court noted that it was unnecessary to decide whether such interim relief amounted to an interim award. Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the Tribunal could grant interim relief only by way of an interim award that required publication, this limitation would not prevent this Court from granting interim relief in the same manner as the Tribunal. Sections 15, 17 and 17A of the Act would not apply to any order issued by this Court. Ordinarily, interim relief would not constitute the entirety of the relief the workmen could obtain upon final success, and the appellants should not be required to pay more than half of the amount adjudged by the Industrial Tribunal as interim relief in such cases.
Special leave was granted to appeal three decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, and the Court chose to dispose of the three appeals together because they raised common questions. The three appellants were the managements of Imperial Hotel, New Delhi; Maiden’s Hotel, Delhi; and Swiss Hotel, Delhi. The respondents were the workmen employed by each of those hotels, and the workmen were represented collectively by the Hotel Workers’ Union, headquartered at Katra Shahanshahi, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. The factual background showed that disputes over the conditions of labour in the three hotels had been persisting for some time. These disputes intensified toward the end of September 1955 and culminated in a general strike by all the workmen of the three hotels on 5 October 1955. Before the general strike, a separate disturbance occurred only in Imperial Hotel in August 1955. In that earlier incident, the management served charge-sheets on twenty-two workmen and conducted an internal enquiry which concluded that those workmen were guilty of misconduct; consequently the management decided to dismiss them. Notices were therefore served in October 1955 on the twenty-two workmen informing them that their dismissal would be effected subject to obtaining the required permission under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter “the Act”). This step by the management of Imperial Hotel is said to have triggered the general strike across all three hotels on 5 October 1955. On that same day, each of the three hotel managements issued notices to their respective workmen ordering them to report for duty within three hours, warning that failure to comply would result in further action. When the workmen did not comply within the stipulated period, fresh notices were issued later on the same day requiring the workmen to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against them, and informing them that they would be placed under suspension. Subsequently, on 7 October 1955, the three managements sent additional notices declaring that the workmen were being dismissed and that they were suspended pending the grant of permission under section 33 of the Act. Because the disputes were already before the Government, an order of reference was issued on 12 October 1955 concerning Imperial Hotel. That reference sent a large number of matters to adjudication, including the case of the twenty-two workmen whose dismissal had been decided on 4 October 1955. However, the reference did not include the workmen whose dismissal had been decided on 7 October 1955. The management later conducted further enquiries and ultimately confirmed the disciplinary action taken on 7 October 1955 against nineteen workmen. Those nineteen workmen subsequently filed applications under section 33-A of the Act, contending that they had been suspended without pay for an indefinite period and that such suspension amounted to punishment contrary to the provisions of the Act.
In this matter the dispute concerning Imperial Hotel involved a total of forty-four workmen. Twenty-five of those workers had been included in the reference order dated 12 October 1955. The remaining nineteen workmen had filed applications under section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, alleging that they had been suspended without pay. The record shows that Imperial Hotel did not submit any application under section 33 of the Act seeking permission to dismiss those nineteen workmen, although an application under section 33 was filed on 22 October 1955 for the twenty-two workmen whose dismissal had been decided on 4 October 1955. With respect to Maiden’s Hotel the controversy related to twenty-six workmen whose management, after further inquiry following 7 October 1955, concluded that dismissal was necessary. An order of reference for those twenty-six workmen, together with other matters, was made on 23 November 1955. Subsequently, on 10 December 1955, twelve of the twenty-six workmen were reinstated, leaving a genuine dispute concerning the remaining fourteen workmen. In the case of Swiss Hotel further inquiries were also conducted after the October 7 notices. During that period the union filed an application under section 33-A of the Act with the conciliation officer. The record indicates that on 10 November 1955 a reference was made to the tribunal for adjudication of the dispute involving fourteen workmen of Swiss Hotel. The Industrial Tribunal then considered the applications for interim relief that had been filed on behalf of the workmen in all three hotels. The applications were filed on 22 October 1955 for Imperial Hotel and on 26 November 1955 for both Maiden’s Hotel and Swiss Hotel. The respective managements filed replies to those applications on 5 December 1955, and on the same day the tribunal issued its interim orders. For Imperial Hotel the tribunal ordered that forty-three of the forty-four workmen who had sought interim relief should receive their wages together with an additional allowance of rupees 25 per month per person as compensation for food, pending a final decision on their dismissals. Regarding Maiden’s Hotel, the tribunal directed that the twelve workmen whom the management was ready to re-employ should report for duty no later than 10 December 1955. It further ordered that those twelve workmen, until they were reinstated, and the remaining thirteen workmen, until their cases were finally decided, should be paid their wages from 1 October 1955 together with the same rupees 25 per month per head as a food allowance. No interim order was made concerning the twenty-sixth workman, identified as the sweeper Chiranjilal. In the Swiss Hotel matter, the tribunal ordered that six of the workmen whom the management was prepared to take back should report for duty on or before 10 December 1955, and the remaining terms of the order were analogous to those set in the Maiden’s Hotel case.
After the interim relief orders were issued, the three hotels each filed an appeal against the respective orders. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed all three appeals on 28 May 1956. Following those dismissals, the hotels applied to this Court for special leave to appeal, and the Court granted that leave. The hotels also sought a stay of the Industrial Tribunal’s order that required payment of wages together with a sum of Rs 25 per month per head in lieu of food. This Court granted the stay on 5 June 1956, subject to the condition that the employers would pay the employees an amount equal to one-half of the sum adjudicated payable by the 5 December 1955 orders for arrears accrued up to that date, and that they would continue to pay a proportionate amount in the same manner until the dispute was finally resolved. Subsequent to the June 5 stay order, the three hotels reinstated the workmen who had not been re-employed after the 5 December 1955 orders. On 15 July 1956, the Swiss Hotel took back two workmen, the Maiden’s Hotel reinstated thirteen workmen, and the Imperial Hotel reinstated forty-three workmen. The hotels advanced two principal contentions. First, they argued that any wages were absolutely barred for workmen who were suspended while permission for dismissal under section 33 of the Act was being sought. Second, they questioned whether an industrial tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to grant interim relief without issuing an interim award that should have been published. Regarding the first contention, the hotels maintained that suspension pending a section 33 application created an absolute bar to wage payment. Conversely, the respondents contended that, under ordinary master-servant law, suspension that involved non-payment of wages could not be inferred absent an express term in the employment contract. They pointed out that there were no standing orders that permitted suspension without wages, and therefore the employers could not withhold wages merely because they were unwilling to assign work. In their view, the right of the workmen to receive wages persisted, and the employer remained bound to pay wages during the so-called suspension. Both the Industrial Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal had agreed that, in the absence of an express contractual term, wages could not be withheld even though the employer might suspend the workman in the sense of refusing to provide work. Consequently, the first question for determination concerned the extent of the employer’s power to suspend an employee under the ordinary law of master and servant.
In this case the Court examined how far an employer may suspend an employee under the ordinary law of master and servant. The Court observed that it is well settled that the power to suspend—that is, the right to forbid a servant from working—is not an implied term in a standard master-servant contract. Such a power can arise only when it is created either by a statute that governs the contract or by an explicit term that is written into the contract itself. Consequently, when neither an express contractual clause nor any rule made under a statute provides for suspension, the master has no legal authority to suspend a workman. If the master nevertheless tries to forbid the employee from working, the Court held that the employer must continue to pay the employee’s wages for the period that is described as a suspension. On the other hand, where the contract of employment, a relevant statute, or rules framed thereunder do contain a power to suspend, that suspension temporarily halts the master-servant relationship. During such a period the servant is not obliged to render service and the master is not bound to pay wages. The Court noted that these principles of the ordinary master-servant law are well settled and have not been contested by either party. For support the Court cited the authorities Hanley v. Pease and Partners, Limited, Wallwork v. Fielding, Secretary of State for India in Council v. Surendra Nath Goswami, and Bura Ram v. Divisional Superintendent, N. W. Railway.
The next issue before the Court was whether the same principles apply when a master decides to dismiss a servant but cannot do so immediately because permission must be obtained under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In such a situation the master may suspend the workman until the required permission is granted. The Court explained that, in ordinary circumstances where section 33 does not intervene, the master could dismiss the servant according to the ordinary master-servant law, and wage obligations would end as soon as the contract terminated. However, section 33 has introduced a fundamental change to the law of master and servant for cases that fall within the Act. Therefore, the Court needed to determine whether Industrial Tribunals dealing with matters under the Act must continue to apply the ordinary master-servant law as described, or whether they may imply a term in the contract because of the special circumstances created by section 33. The Court considered that when the master has completed his inquiry, decided that dismissal is appropriate, and then suspends the servant pending permission under section 33, the master possesses the power to order such a suspension, which temporarily halts the contractual relationship.
In this case, the judgment noted that suspending the relationship of master and servant meant that the servant was no longer obliged to render service and the master was no longer obliged to pay wages. The authority of an Industrial Tribunal in matters of this kind, as reflected in earlier decisions such as (1) [1915] 1 K.B. 698, (2) [1922] 2 K.B. 66, (3) I L.R. [1939] 1 Cal. 46 and (4) I.L.R. VII (1954) Punj. 415, was examined by the Federal Court in Western India in Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal, Bombay. Justice Mahajan, then a judge, made the following observations at page 345: “Adjudication does not, in our opinion, mean adjudication according to the strict law of master and servant. The award of the tribunal may contain provisions for settlement of a dispute which no Court could order if it was bound by ordinary law, but the tribunal is not fettered in any way by these limitations.” The judgment also cited Volume 1 of Labour Disputes and Collective Bargaining by Ludwig Teller, which states at page 536 that industrial arbitration may involve extending an existing agreement, creating a new one, or generally creating new obligations or modifying old ones, whereas commercial arbitration generally concerns the interpretation of existing obligations and disputes relating to existing agreements. The observation was held to accurately describe the functions of an industrial tribunal in labour disputes. Later, in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Brijnandan Pandey, the Court affirmed the correctness of the earlier Federal Court dictum and observed that a distinction exists between commercial and industrial arbitration. Referring again to the passage in Ludwig Teller (Vol. 1, p. 536), the Court stated at page 810: “A Court of law proceeds on the footing that no power exists in the courts to make contracts for people; and the parties must make their own contracts. The Courts reach their limit of power when they enforce contracts which the parties have made. An Industrial Tribunal is not so fettered and may create new obligations or modify contracts in the interests of industrial peace, to protect legitimate trade union activities and to prevent unfair practice or victimisation.” Consequently, it is clear that Industrial Tribunals possess the authority to go beyond the ordinary law of master and servant when circumstances justify such action. In the present matters, the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was based strictly on the ordinary law of master and servant without considering the fundamental change introduced by section 33 of the Act. All the cases previously referred to concerning the ordinary law of master and servant had no occasion to consider the impact of section 33 on that law as it relates to the power of the master to suspend.
In this case, the Court examined whether it would be reasonable for an Industrial Tribunal, when addressing a matter to which section 33 of the Act applied, to imply a term in the employment contract that gave the employer the authority to suspend a servant after the employer had, following a proper enquiry, concluded that the servant had committed misconduct deserving dismissal but was unable to dismiss the servant because section 33 required the employer to obtain the Tribunal’s permission. The respondents argued that the wording of section 33 did not support the conclusion that an employer, while seeking permission under the provision, could suspend the workmen “concerned.” The Court observed that this argument presupposed that if section 33 contained an explicit power to suspend, it would be expressed plainly in the statute, and no issue of an implied term would then arise. Consequently, the real question was whether, in the absence of an express power of suspension in section 33, it would be reasonable for an Industrial Tribunal, considering the extraordinary circumstances created by the effect of section 33, to imply a contractual term that permitted the employer to suspend the employment contract, thereby relieving the employer of the duty to pay wages and the servant of the duty to perform work. The Court held that, given the unique situation produced by the enactment of section 33, it was just and fair for Industrial Tribunals to imply such a term in the employment contract. The Court noted that it had previously considered this issue in four decisions, although the point had not been framed in exactly the same way as now. Those earlier cases consistently indicated that, even without an explicit argument, the Court’s view was that a term should be implied granting the employer the power to suspend the contract after a proper enquiry concluded that dismissal was warranted and while the employer sought the Tribunal’s permission under section 33. In the decision of Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup (1), the standing orders allowed suspension for four days without pay, yet the employer, having determined that the employees should be dismissed, suspended them without pay pending the Tribunal’s permission. The Court held that this suspension was not a punishment, even though it exceeded four days, and emphasized that the suspension was only an interim measure lasting until the application for permission was made and the Tribunal decided. The Court further observed that if permission was granted, the workman would not receive pay during the suspension; if permission was denied, the workman would be entitled to full payment for the suspension period. In The Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Bhuban Singh (2), the Court pointed out that, but for the prohibition created by section 33, the employer would have been entitled to dismiss the employee immediately after completing the enquiry and concluding misconduct, thereby ending the contract of service and absolving the employee of any further wage claim. Section 33, however, intervenes and prevents immediate dismissal, compelling the employer to seek the Tribunal’s permission. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the employer, having taken all steps possible to terminate the contract, not to be required to continue paying wages while awaiting the Tribunal’s decision.
The Court explained that when the Tribunal gave permission under section 33, the workman would not receive any wages for the period of his suspension; conversely, if the Tribunal refused permission, the employer would be required to pay the workman his full wages for the entire period of suspension. The Court then referred to the earlier decision in The Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Bhuban Singh, observing that, but for the prohibition created by section 33, the employer would have been entitled to dismiss the employee immediately after completing a proper enquiry and concluding that the employee was guilty of misconduct. In such a situation, the contract of service would have terminated at the moment of dismissal and the employee would not have any claim to further remuneration. However, section 33 intervenes and prevents the employer from effecting an immediate dismissal on the basis of the enquiry’s conclusion, obliging the employer to obtain the Tribunal’s permission before termination. Accordingly, the Court found it reasonable that an employer who had already taken all steps within his power to end the contract should not be expected to continue paying the employee after that point. The Court further noted that, because the time taken by the Tribunal to grant permission under section 33 lay beyond the employer’s control, the employer would be justified in suspending the employee without pay during that interval. The Court also emphasized that this arrangement would not impose hardship on the employee; if the Tribunal granted permission, the employee would receive no pay from the date of his suspension, whereas if the Tribunal denied permission, the employee would become entitled to his back wages from the date of suspension.
In support of this reasoning, the Court cited the decision in Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd., indicating that the principle laid down in that case applied only in situations where section 33 was applicable. The Court then turned to Messrs Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, where the earlier view was reiterated with an additional observation that, where the employer failed to hold an enquiry and to suspend the workman pending permission, the employer would be required to continue paying the workman’s wages until the proceedings under section 33 concluded and the Tribunal finally granted permission to dismiss. The Court further referred to Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, where the rider articulated in the Sasa Musa case was extended to adjudication under section 15 of the Act. It was pointed out that, should there be any defect in the employer’s enquiry, the employer could remedy that defect by presenting the necessary evidence before the Tribunal; however, the employer would still be obliged to pay the employee’s wages up to the date of the Tribunal’s award, even if the award ultimately favoured the employer. Finally, the respondents contended that there were standing orders, particularly in the Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills case, which gave the employer power to suspend for a certain period, and therefore further suspension might be justified on the basis of those standing orders.
The Management of Ranipur Colliery (4) held that it possessed authority to suspend a workman for a certain period, and therefore any further suspension could be justified on the basis of the Standing Orders that existed. The Court then referred to the earlier decisions in Messrs. Sasa Musa Sugar (1) [1956] S.C.R. 916, (3) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 32, (2) C.As. 746 & 747/57, (4) C.A. 768/57, which were decided on April 29 1959 and on April 20 1959 respectively, and to Works (P) Ltd. (1). In those cases, however, there were no Standing Orders in force at the relevant time. The Court observed that the reasoning adopted in those judgments did not depend on whether Standing Orders were present or absent. It stressed that there is only a minimal distinction in principle between situations where Standing Orders allow a brief suspension without pay and where a much longer suspension without pay is imposed, and situations where no Standing Orders provide for suspension without pay at all.
The Court expressed the view that, although the earlier cases did not expressly rely on an implied term in the employment contract to suspend the employee and thereby temporarily suspend the master-servant relationship, such an implied term must underlie the decisions. The Court explained that without implying such a term it would be impossible to hold, as those cases did, that when a proper enquiry had been conducted and the employer had decided to dismiss the workman, applied for permission, and consequently suspended the workman, the employer would have no obligation to pay wages from the date of suspension if permission were granted under section 33. Accordingly, the Court opined that the ordinary common-law rule on suspension in the master-servant relationship should be regarded as modified by the fundamental change introduced by section 33. An implied term should be read into the employment contract by the Industrial Tribunals, providing that where the master, after a proper enquiry, concludes that the servant should be dismissed and therefore suspends him pending the required permission under section 33, the master may effect such suspension, thereby temporarily suspending the contract of employment. Under this implied term, the master would have no duty to pay wages and the servant would have no duty to work. The Court stressed that the decisive consideration introduced by section 33 is that the well-established common-law right of a master to dismiss a servant for proper cause is now subject to a statutory ban. In fairness, this means that, pending the removal of the statutory bar, the master may, after holding a proper enquiry, temporarily terminate the master-servant relationship by suspending the employee pending the proceedings under section 33. Consequently, if the tribunal grants permission, the suspended contract of employment would end, and there would be no further obligation to pay wages.
When the employer obtains permission under section 33 to suspend a workman, the employer’s liability to pay wages ends on the date the suspension begins. Conversely, if the required permission is denied, the suspension is unlawful and the workman becomes entitled to receive his full wages from the date the suspension was imposed. The issue does not end with the determination of wage liability, however, because the question of granting interim relief remains. Even if an implied term of the employment contract authorises the employer to suspend the workman under the circumstances described, that implied authority does not diminish the tribunal’s power to grant interim relief. The tribunal retains its statutory power to award interim relief under the Act irrespective of any contractual provision that might exist. The presence of such an implied term therefore cannot bar the tribunal from granting interim relief where the legislation permits it. Having resolved that point, the Court turned to the second matter raised in the appeals, namely the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction after a dispute is referred to it under section 10 of the Act.
Section 15 requires the tribunal, after a dispute is referred, to conduct its proceedings promptly and, upon conclusion, to submit its award to the appropriate government. Section 2(b) defines an “award” as either an interim or a final determination by an Industrial Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of any question relating to it. Where an order referring an industrial dispute specifies the points for adjudication, section 10(4) obliges the tribunal to limit its adjudication to those points and to matters incidental thereto. The appellants argued that because the question of interim relief was not expressly referred, the tribunal could not decide it. The Court rejected this submission, observing that the phrase “incidental thereto” in section 10(4) clearly includes questions such as the grant of interim relief that arise in connection with the main dispute. For example, when the tribunal is asked to determine reinstatement or compensation, the issue of granting interim relief pending a final decision is incidental and does not require a separate referral. Consequently, interim relief may be granted as an incidental matter without an explicit reference. The Court then considered how the tribunal should proceed if it decides to grant such relief. Since the definition of “award” encompasses both interim and final determinations concerning the whole dispute or any related question, the tribunal is free to issue an interim award addressing the interim relief while the substantive dispute remains pending.
In this case, the Court observed that the tribunal possessed authority to render an award covering the whole industrial dispute at the conclusion of all proceedings, which would constitute a final determination of the dispute referred to it. The Court also noted that the tribunal could, alternatively, issue an award concerning only a portion of the matters that had been referred, leaving other questions undecided; such an award would be characterised as an interim determination relating to those specific questions. In either circumstance, the Court stressed that the award had to be published in accordance with section 17 of the Act. However, the Court distinguished such awards from interim relief, explaining that awards—whether final or interim—resolved the industrial dispute or a question arising from it, whereas interim relief was granted under the power conferred on the tribunal by section 10(4) for matters incidental to the points of dispute that required adjudication. The appellants submitted that, although the tribunal was empowered by section 10(4) to grant interim relief of the type granted in the present proceedings, such relief could be given only by submitting an award under section 15 to the appropriate Government, invoking sections 15, 17 and 17-A of the Act. They argued that once the tribunal made any determination, whether interim or final, it was obligated to forward that determination to the Government, which would then publish it as an award pursuant to section 17, after which the provisions of section 17-A would become applicable. In response, the respondents relied on the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Allen Berry and Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1), where it had been held that an interim award need not be sent to the Government for publication and that the award would take effect from the date of the order. The Court indicated that it did not consider it necessary to resolve, for the present purposes, whether an order granting interim relief fell within the meaning of an award under section 2(b) and therefore required publication under section 17. Assuming that the interim order issued by the Industrial Tribunal on 5 December 1955 could not be enforced because it was, in effect, an award, the Court held that such an order should have been submitted to the Government and published under section 17 to become enforceable under section 17-A. Nevertheless, the Court retained the authority to issue an order granting interim relief despite the alleged technical defect in the Tribunal’s order. The Court affirmed that it could grant interim relief in the same manner as the Industrial Tribunal, and that its own order did not need to be sent to the Government for publication, since sections 15, 17 and 17-A did not apply to a decree of this Court, just as they had not applied to the decision of the Appellate Tribunal governed by the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (No. XLVIII of 1950), which has since been repealed. The Court also recalled that it had previously passed an order…
In the order dated June 5, 1956, the Court set out the conditions under which it stayed the operation of the order issued on December 5, 1955, by the Industrial Tribunal. The Court expressed the view that the June order represented the appropriate measure for granting interim relief to the workmen involved. It observed that interim relief ordinarily should not amount to the full relief that the workmen would obtain if their claim succeeded at the final hearing. In order to be fair to both the Industrial Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal, the Court noted that those tribunals had awarded the entire wages together with a sum of Rs. 25 per mensem per head in lieu of food, on the ground that no suspension of employment was possible in the circumstances and that, consequently, the employment contract continued and full wages were payable. The Court added that the tribunals might have issued different orders, as indicated by the citation (1) [1951] 1 L.L.J. 228, had they reached an opposite conclusion. Considering the facts, the Court deemed it just and equitable to direct the appellants to pay each of the concerned workmen one-half of the amount that had been adjudicated payable by the December 5, 1955 order, for the whole period applicable, namely from October 1, 1955 to either December 10, 1955 or July 15, 1956, the latter date being when, as previously noted, virtually all the workmen had been reinstated in service. Accordingly, the Court made that order. The respondents argued that because all the workmen had been taken back into service, they should receive full wages for the interim period, contending that the act of re-employment amounted to a waiver of the earlier dismissal and the consequent suspension order. The Court declined to opine on that contention, stating that the proceedings were still at an early stage and that, without the complete facts, the effect of re-employment on a possible waiver could not be determined at this point. The Court emphasized that the order it had issued constituted only interim relief and that it could be altered in either direction when the Industrial Tribunal completed its final determination of the issues referred to it, taking into account the observations made concerning suspension. Consequently, the appeals were allowed in part and the December 5, 1955 order granting interim relief was modified as described. The Court directed each party to bear its own costs and, noting that more than three years had elapsed since the references were made, expressed confidence that the Industrial Tribunal would now dispose of the matter as swiftly as possible. Appeals were allowed in part.