The Corporation Of The City Of Nagpur vs Its Employees

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 14 December 1959

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, K. Subba Rao, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In this case, the Court noted that the three connected appeals under consideration concerned the determination of whether, and to what extent, the activities carried out by the Corporation of the City of Nagpur fell within the meaning of “industry” as defined in section 2(14) of the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (referred to as the Act). The appellant was identified as the Corporation of the City of Nagpur, which had been created by the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (Madhya Pradesh Act No. 2 of 1950). Various disputes subsequently arose between the corporation and its employees who were employed in a number of departments. The disputes related to matters such as wage scales, gratuity, provident fund, house rent, confirmation of service, allowances and similar conditions of service. By an order dated 23 October 1956, the Government of the State of Madhya Pradesh referred those disputes to the State Industrial Court at Nagpur under section 39 of the Act, assigning the reference the number Industrial Reference No. 18 of 1956. The appellant then filed a statement before the Industrial Court, asserting, among other points, that the corporation should not be treated as an industry within the meaning of the Act. On 13 February 1957, the Industrial Court issued a preliminary order holding that the corporation did constitute an industry, but it indicated that the further question of whether any specific department of the corporation qualified as an industry would be resolved on the basis of evidence. Dissatisfied with that preliminary order, the appellant challenged its correctness by filing a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur; that petition was dismissed because the award was rendered before the petition could be heard. Subsequently, on 3 June 1957, the Industrial Court made a full award, reiterating that the corporation was an industry and extending that finding to all of its departments, thereby bringing them within the definition of “industry.” The award also revised the employees’ pay scales and accepted the principal demands that had been made by the workers. On 15 July 1957, the appellant again approached the High Court at Nagpur, this time questioning both the validity and the correctness of the award. A division bench of that High Court, by an order dated 11 September 1957, rejected the appellant’s contention that the corporation was not an industry as defined by the Act. The High Court directed that the matter be remanded to the State Industrial Court for a detailed determination of which specific departments of the corporation fell within the statutory definition of “industry,” for a re‑examination of the schedules and categories of persons concerned, and for the restriction of the award to those persons who were covered by the definition of “industry” in the Act. On that remand, the Industrial Court further examined the activities of each department.

The Industrial Court examined the functions of each department belonging to the Corporation and concluded that every department, except those engaged in (i) the assessment and collection of house‑tax, (ii) the assessment and collection of octroi, (iii) the removal of encroachments and the demolition of dilapidated houses, (iv) the prevention and control of food adulteration, and (v) the maintenance of cattle pounds, fell within the definition of “industry” under the Act. The Court also made findings concerning the disputes between the parties and determined which persons were entitled to the reliefs sought. The precise particulars of those findings and the reliefs awarded by the Industrial Court were not set out, because they were not material to the present appeal.

The appellant, by way of special leave, filed Civil Appeal No 143 of 1959 in this Court challenging the award rendered by the Industrial Court. In addition, the appellant filed, also by special leave, Civil Appeal No 144 of 1959 contesting the order of the High Court which had held that the Corporation’s activities fell within the definition of “industry” in the Act and had remitted the matter back to the Industrial Court for a merits determination with respect to each individual activity of the Corporation.

The third appeal in this group, Civil Appeal No 545 of 1958, originated from a reference made by the State Government of Madhya Pradesh concerning the disputes between the appellant, the Corporation of the City of Nagpur, and the employees of its Fire Brigade Department, who represented themselves and other employees. This reference was identified as Industrial Reference No 1 of 1957. Because similar disputes had been raised earlier in Industrial Reference No 18 of 1956, the Industrial Court heard the two references together and, with the consent of the parties, considered the evidence that had been recorded in Reference No 18 of 1957. On 14 December 1957, the Court issued an award in Reference No 1 of 1957, basing its conclusions on the findings articulated in the award made in Reference No 18 of 1956. The Industrial Court held that the Fire Brigade Department constituted an industry within the meaning of the Act and, on that basis, granted the appropriate reliefs to the employees.

Mr Aggarwala, counsel appearing for the appellant in the first two appeals, advanced several points before this Court. First, he asserted that no service provided by the Corporation could be characterised as an industry under section 2(14) of the Act. Second, he argued that even if some services of the Corporation were captured by the definition of “industry,” those services would have to be analogous to a business or trade to satisfy the statutory criteria. Third, he maintained that, irrespective of any analogy, the Corporation’s activities would need to possess the usual characteristics common to an industry. Fourth, he contended that the Industrial Court’s finding that the various departments of the Corporation were industries was erroneous, because the services rendered by those departments did not meet either of the aforementioned tests.

The Court observed that the first issue raised by the appellant – whether any service rendered by the corporation could be deemed an industry under section 2(14) of the Act – need not be considered because that question had already been settled by two authoritative decisions of this Court against the appellant. In the earlier case of D. N. Banerji v. P. K. Mukherjee, the chairman of a municipality had dismissed a sanitary inspector and a head clerk. The municipal workers’ union challenged the dismissals, seeking reinstatement, and the matter was referred by the Government to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court was asked two questions: first, whether the dispute constituted an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act; and second, whether the Act was invalid because it permitted the Tribunal to order reinstatement, thereby encroaching on the chairman’s power to appoint and dismiss employees. The Court held that the Act was not invalid, emphasizing that it was essentially a law dealing with industrial and labour disputes. The Court further held that the conservancy service provided by the municipality qualified as an industry, and that the conflict between the municipality and the employees of the conservancy department was an industrial dispute as defined by the Act. This reasoning was subsequently affirmed in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen. The later judgment summarized the earlier decision, stating that it was “now finally settled…that a municipal undertaking of the nature we have under consideration here is an ‘industry’ within the meaning of the definition of that word in section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the expression ‘industrial dispute’ in that Act includes disputes between municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be regarded as analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business.”

In the Baroda case, the workmen employed in the electricity department of the Baroda Municipality had demanded a bonus. The Court held that the electricity undertaking of the municipality was an industry and that the dispute between the municipality and its employees was an industrial dispute. The refusal of the bonus on other grounds was noted but was not the focus of the present analysis. Consequently, these two decisions conclusively established that municipal undertakings could be classified as “industry” for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant attempted a subtle distinction between the definition of “industry” in the Industrial Disputes Act and that in the Act under consideration. Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act defined “industry” to mean “any business trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and to include any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.” In contrast, section 2(14) of the Act divided the definition into three parts: (a) any business, trade, manufacturing or mining undertaking or calling of employers; (b) any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of employees; and (c) any branch of an industry or a group of industries. A comparative study of the two sections revealed that while the former definition listed certain matters and expressly included others, the latter encompassed three distinct categories. Moreover, the former placed “undertaking” in a separate category from “manufacturing or mining,” whereas the latter qualified “undertaking” with the words “manufacturing or mining.” The Court concluded that these textual differences did not warrant a departure from the earlier decisions, and therefore the municipal departments in question satisfied the statutory definition of industry.

Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act defined “industry” to include “any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and to include any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.” Section 2(14) of the Act under consideration divided the definition into three parts: (a) any business, trade, manufacturing or mining undertaking or calling of employers; (b) any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of employees; and (c) any branch of an industry or a group of industries. A comparison of these two sections revealed several differences. While the definition in the Industrial Disputes Act listed certain categories and then expressly included others, the definition in the Act encompassed three distinct categories. Moreover, the earlier Act placed “undertaking” in a separate category from “manufacturing or mining,” whereas the later Act qualified “undertaking” with the words “manufacturing or mining.” The Court held that these differences did not warrant a departure from the earlier decisions of this Court. Clause (a) described industry with reference to the employer, and clause (b) described it with reference to the employee. Even if the phrase “manufacturing or mining undertaking” were omitted from clause (a), the remaining wording in clauses (a) and (b) was broad enough to cover all the categories that the Industrial Disputes Act’s definition covered. The Court also noted that the decision in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee ([1953] S.C.R. 302) did not suggest a different outcome had the word “undertaking” been qualified by “manufacturing or mining.” That earlier decision rested on a wider analysis, considering the legislative history, the corresponding definitions in the Act, and the inclusive portion of clause (b) of section 2(14). Consequently, the Court concluded that a service provided by a corporation, if it satisfied the conditions implicit in the definition—conditions that would be examined later in the judgment—would constitute an “industry” within the meaning of the definitions in the Act.

The next issue addressed by the Court was whether the activity of the corporation could be excluded from the meaning of “industry” unless it possessed the common characteristics of an industry. The Court identified five characteristics that it regarded as implicit in the definition: (i) the activity must involve the production or distribution of goods or services; (ii) it must be intended to serve others rather than the provider itself; (iii) it must require cooperative effort between employer and employee, or between capital and labour; (iv) it must be conducted as a commercial transaction; and (v) it must not be a purely governmental function. The Court had previously examined these aspects in State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha with reference to the definition of “industry” in the Industrial Disputes Act, and it had formulated broad principles. However, because the present case concerned the definition of “industry” in a different statute, the Court indicated that it would briefly revisit the law on the subject, focusing specifically on the situation of a corporation.

The Court began by indicating that the discussion must now turn to the law governing a corporation and, in particular, to the meaning of the term “industry” within the relevant statute. It then proceeded to examine the definition of “industry” with a view to determining whether the various conditions that have been identified are expressly incorporated in the statutory language or whether they merely constitute background considerations. According to the Court, the proper way to discover the true meaning of the provision is to look to the intention that the Legislature expressed when it enacted the section. In support of this approach, the Court cited Maxwell’s treatise “On the Interpretation of Statutes”, noting that Maxwell observes that when words are read in their natural and ordinary sense they themselves best declare the legislative intention. The Court found that the words employed in the section are clear, unambiguous and, at first glance, are capable of a very wide application. It further pointed out that the section is divided into three parts. Clause (a) provides a definition of “industry” that is directed at employers, while clause (b) supplies a complementary definition aimed at employees. Clause (c) then widens the definition to include any branch of an industry or any group of industries that fall within the meanings given in clauses (a) and (b). The Court noted that, in construing the definition, it is necessary to apply the rule of construction known as noscuntur a sociis. Referring again to Maxwell, the Court explained that this doctrine holds that when two or more words capable of analogous meaning are placed together, they are understood in a cognate sense; the more general term is limited to a meaning analogous to the more specific term. Applying this principle, the Court observed that the words that follow “any business, trade, manufacturing or mining undertaking” are intended to share the characteristics of such undertakings, just as the phrase “any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of employees” is meant to possess the qualities of an industrial occupation or avocation. In other words, the general word “calling” in clause (a) is qualified by the preceding words, and the series “calling, service, etc.” in clause (b) is narrowed by the succeeding words “industrial occupation or avocation”. The Court referred to its earlier decision in State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, where it had examined the scope of the noscuntur a sociis rule. In that case, the Court had observed that the rule is only a rule of construction and cannot be applied where the Legislature has deliberately used broader words to give a wider scope to the defined term. The rule may be employed only when the legislative intent in coupling broader words with narrower ones is doubtful, or when the meaning of the broader words themselves is uncertain. Where the Legislature’s purpose in using broader language is clear and without ambiguity, the Court said, the noscuntur a sociis rule cannot be forced upon the interpretation.

The Court observed that the rule of construction previously discussed could not be applied where the legislature’s intention was unmistakable and free from doubt. It held that the language employed in the statutory provision was plain and admitted no ambiguity. The wording of the first portion of clause (b) was unqualified, and any qualification appeared only in the subsequent part. Consequently, if the terms “calling, service, employment, handicraft” were truly meant to be limited by the adjective “industrial,” the legislature would have attached that adjective to the initial word “calling” rather than to the final word “occupation.” The Court noted that an inclusive definition is a well‑recognised tool for expanding the meaning of a defined term, and therefore the word “industry” must be interpreted to encompass not only its ordinary sense but also the matters expressly listed in the definition, as explained in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, vol. 2, p. 1416. Accordingly, under such a construction every calling, service, employment of an employee or any business, trade or calling of an employer would fall within the meaning of “industry.” However, the Court warned that this excessively broad meaning would exceed the objects for which the Act was enacted, and therefore the term must be confined on permissible grounds, taking into account the overall purpose, scope and aim of the legislation. To ascertain the true meaning of the words, the Court referred to the approach set out by Lord Coke in Heydon’s case ([1584] 3 Rep. 7 b), which requires consideration of four matters: (1) the law that existed before the Act was passed; (2) the mischief or defect that the previous law failed to address; (3) the remedy that Parliament intended to provide; and (4) the reason for that remedy. The Court further pointed out that the presence of “employers” in clause (a) and “employees” in clause (b) indicated that the fundamental basis for applying the definition was the existence of an employer‑employee relationship. This interpretation was reinforced by the cognate definitions of “industrial dispute,” “employer” and “employee.” Moreover, the long title of the Act and its preamble revealed that the legislation was enacted to promote industries and to facilitate the peaceful and amicable settlement of disputes between employers and employees engaged in organised activity through conciliation and arbitration, along with certain other purposes. When the preamble was read together with the historical context of the Act’s enactment, it became evident that the legislation represented a significant step toward achieving social justice. The Act aimed to improve the service conditions of workers, to provide a mechanism for resolving their conflicts, and to encourage cooperative effort in the service of the community. The historical development of labour legislation in both England and India likewise demonstrated that the statute was intended primarily to enhance the conditions of labour engaged in organised activities, rather than to reach personal services that do not depend on the employment of a labour force.

When the Court examined the positive aspects of the definition of “industry,” it observed that matters which do not fall within the meaning of industry may still be considered for exclusion. The Court emphasized that however broad the definition of “industry” might be construed, it could not be stretched to embrace the regal or sovereign functions of the State. This principle formed the common foundation of the arguments presented before the Bar, although the learned counsel differed on the precise scope of such functions. The counsel representing the Corporation sought to broaden the scope so that all welfare activities undertaken by a modern State would be treated as part of industry, whereas the counsel for the respondents urged that the definition be limited to what may be described as “the primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional government.” It was submitted that, in a modern State, sovereign power extends to every statutory function of the State except to the business of trade and industrial transactions performed in the State’s quasi‑private capacity. The argument drew support from Holland’s jurisprudence, wherein the author partitions “public law” into four sub‑headings and, under the heading “Administrative Law,” discusses topics that include the welfare and social activities of a State. The Court, however, held that Holland’s treatment of public law and the writings of other scholars did not aid in discerning the true scope of regal powers, which have acquired a distinct connotation. Referring to Lord Watson’s observation in Coomber v. Justices of Berks ((1883‑84) 9 App. Cas. 61, 74), the Court reiterated that functions such as the administration of justice, the maintenance of order and the repression of crime constitute the primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional government. In addition, the Court cited the dissenting judgment of Isaacs, J. in The Federated State School Teachers’ Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria ((1929) 41 C.L.R. 569) at page 585, where the judge explained that regal functions are inescapable and inalienable, encompassing legislative power, administration of laws and the exercise of judicial power. The judge further explained that non‑regal functions may be assumed through legislative authority, but when assumed the State operates merely as a large corporation, and its actions under the legislation, insofar as they are not regal execution of law, are analogous to those of a privately authorised company. These pronouncements clearly delineate the ambit of regal functions as distinct from other State powers. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Legislature could not have intended to subsume the State’s regal functions within the definition of industry so as to confer jurisdiction on industrial courts to decide disputes concerning those functions. Accordingly, the Court excluded the regal functions of the State from the definition of “industry.”

The discussion then turned to the question of whether the Corporation could be said to exercise regal functions through legislative delegation. The Court noted that the Corporation operates under a statute, and that its powers, duties and liabilities are governed by that statute. It was pointed out that the Corporation is a juristic person capable of suing and being sued in its own name. The statute that created the Corporation may confer upon it certain powers, and the Court was required to examine whether any of those powers amounted to the exercise of regal functions. The analysis therefore focused on the nature of the powers delegated to the Corporation and whether such delegation could transform the Corporation’s activities into functions that are intrinsically regal, as defined by the earlier authorities. The Court indicated that this inquiry was essential to determine the extent to which the Corporation’s actions could fall within the ambit of industrial disputes or remain excluded as non‑industrial, regal functions.

The Court observed that a municipal body could perform both strictly regal functions and ordinary municipal functions. It cited the decision in Country Council of Middlesex v. Assessment Committee of St. George's Union (1896) 2 Q.B.D. 143, where certain premises were used for the administration of justice as well as for municipal purposes. The question before that Court was whether the premises were rateable. The Court held that the premises were rateable only to the extent that they were occupied for municipal purposes, and they were not rateable for the portion used for the administration of justice, which it described as a function of the Crown. The Court also referred to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Verisimo Vasquez Vilas v. City of Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 356; 55 L. Ed. 491, 495, which explained the dual character of a municipal corporation. The quoted passage stated: “They exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of a private or business character. In the one character a municipal corporation is a governmental sub‑division, and for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State. In the other character it is a mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter character it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred.” The judgment then quoted Isaacs and Rich, JJ., from The Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees’ Union of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation (1918‑19) 26 C.L.R. 508, 530‑531, which articulated the principle of Crown exemption. Their observation explained that if a municipality either (1) is legally empowered to perform and does perform any function for the Crown, or (2) is lawfully empowered to perform and does perform any function that is constitutionally a Crown function—such as the administration of justice—the municipality is presumed in law to represent the Crown and the Crown exemption applies. If neither condition is satisfied, the municipality falls outside that exemption, and any implied exemption would have to be based on a different principle. They further noted that the making and maintenance of streets in a municipality did not fall within either proposition.

The Court thereafter explained that a corporation could discharge a dual function. It could be statutorily entrusted with strictly regal functions, such as the making of laws or the judicial disposal of certain cases, while at the same time it could undertake other welfare activities. The Court emphasized that the former category—delegated regal functions—must be excluded from the definition of “industry.” The next point of exclusion was presented by counsel for the appellant. Counsel argued that a modern municipality also operated as a trading and industrial corporation, and in that capacity it was empowered to carry on undertakings that possessed the character of business and trade. According to counsel, the definition of “industry” in the Act captured only such undertakings and did not extend to other statutory activities. In other words, the contention was that activities that resembled the character of trade and business when performed by a private individual would be regarded as industry if performed by a municipal corporation.

In the argument that an activity undertaken by a corporate body should be treated as an industry, counsel relied upon certain observations of this Court in the case of D .N. Banerji v P R Mukherjee (1953 SCR 302). The learned judge, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., while speaking for the Court, stated at page 317 that, when the wording of the Act is read in light of the legislative purpose, the range of disputes contemplated between employers and work‑men, and the variety of situations that may arise, the Court is compelled to conclude that the definition in the Act also embraces disputes that may arise between a municipality and its employees in those branches of work which can be described as being analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business.

Reference was made to the specific expression “analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business”. An argument was then constructed on the basis of those words, asserting that the Court had held that only those municipal activities that are analogous to trade or business could fall within the meaning of “industry” as defined in the Act. The present submission, however, is premised on a mis‑reading of the Banerji decision. The issue before the Court in that case was whether the sanitary department of a municipality qualified as an “industry” for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act and whether the disagreement between that municipal department and its employees constituted an industrial dispute under the statute. At page 311, the learned judge addressed a contention that relied on the placement of certain words within the definition, and observed that although the term “understanding” is positioned between “business and trade” on one side and “manufacturing” on the other, it would be unnecessary to insert a separate word if it were intended merely to mean a business or trade undertaking. He further explained that the broader meaning becomes clearer when the latter part of the definition, which mentions “calling, service, employment, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen”, is considered. The words “undertaking” in the first part and “industrial occupation or avocation” in the second part, he said, clearly signify a scope that extends far beyond the ordinary idea of trade or business, and that the definition was evidently designed to include activities that might not be strictly called a trade or business venture.

The passage therefore leaves no doubt that the Court interpreted the definition of “industry” to encompass activities that are not strictly characterised as trade or business. Consequently, the expressions “not strictly be called a trade or business venture” and “analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business” are to be understood as highlighting the organised, systematic character that typifies a trade or business, rather than equating all other municipal functions with trade or business. The learned judge clarified this point further when he expressly reserved his opinion on the broader question of whether purely administrative work falls within the ambit of the definition.

In this case, the Court noted that, as expressed on page 318 of the earlier decision, it was unnecessary to determine whether disputes arising from purely administrative work fell within the section’s scope. Consequently, the Court disagreed with the argument that the earlier decision, by expressly accepting the broad meaning inherent in the language of the section, sought to limit the wide reach of the provision solely to trade or business activities. The Court further observed that a fair reading of the provision did not support such a restrictive construction. Having already expressed its view on the construction of the provision, the Court emphasized the importance of the clear wording that referred to “business or activities analogous to trade or business.” The Court then turned to a more practical and reasonable test derived from an Australian decision that had been cited before and that this Court had also adopted. In the case of Federated Engine‑Drivers and Firemen’s Association of Australia and Others v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited and Others, a distinction was drawn between trading and non‑trading operations, but the question of how far non‑trading operations fell within the definition of “industry” was left unresolved. That unresolved issue was later addressed in The Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees’ Union of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation (1918‑19) 26 C.L.R. 508, 530‑531). The Court described that decision as illuminating and highly relevant to the matter before it. The High Court of Australia held that the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration possessed authority to determine, by award, a dispute between an organization of employees registered in connection with “municipal and shire councils, municipal trusts and similar industries” and municipal corporations created under state law. The dispute concerned the municipal corporations’ activities of making, maintaining, controlling, and lighting public streets. The learned judges in that case examined at length the meaning of “industrial dispute” under section 51 (XXXV) of the Australian Constitution. From that judgment, the Court inferred that even municipal activities that could not be described as trading could constitute the subject‑matter of an industrial dispute. Isaacs, J., in his dissent in The Federated State School Teachers’ Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria, succinctly expressed the principle that the material question is whether the function performed is a service that the State could have left to private enterprise and, if so, whether a dispute over that service qualifies as “industrial.” The Court held that this test avoids the requirement that an industry must be a trading activity. Accordingly, if a service performed by an individual qualifies as an industry, it remains an industry even when undertaken by a corporation. The Court also mentioned another test suggested by the learned council, which proposes that, absent a quid pro quo for the service, the activity cannot be regarded as an industry, and indicated that this test would be examined further.

The argument that a service must be exchanged for a monetary consideration in order to qualify as an industry was rejected by this Court. It was observed that such a view merely recasts the requirement that the service be of a trading nature under a different label. In the decision of D N Banerji v P R Mukherjee ([1953] S.C.R. 302) the Court held that neither the deployment of capital nor the existence of a profit‑seeking motive is a necessary condition for the modern concept of industry. The notion that a service rendered to the public must be paid for in cash before it can be described as an industry was described as an “exploded theory”. Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar explained that contemporary industrial disputes are determined more by the status of the parties than by the terms of a contract. Likewise, Justices Isaac and Rich, in the Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees’ Union of Australia v Melbourne Corporation ([1918‑19] 26 C.L.R. 508, 530‑531), articulated a contemporary definition of industry at page 554. They stated that an industrial dispute arises when, in relation to operations where capital and labour cooperate to satisfy human wants or desires, the participants in that cooperation disagree about the basis to be observed, whether concerning a share of the product or any other terms and conditions of their cooperation. The learned Judges further observed at page 564 that the question of profit‑making might be relevant for income‑tax purposes, as it is in many municipal cases in England, but it is irrelevant for the purpose of determining an industrial dispute. Whether the expenditure is covered by passenger fares or by municipal rates does not affect the characterization, because in each case the municipality is performing a function, and the source of funding merely varies.

Justice Isaac expanded upon this theme in his dissent in The Federated State School Teachers’ Association of Australia v The State of Victoria ([1929] 41 C.L.R. 569) at page 577. He described the contention that monetary payment is essential as a “echo from the dark ages of industry and political economy”. He clarified that such disputes are not simply a claim to a share of material wealth that can be quantified statistically; rather, they represent a struggle by the employed group, cooperating with the employing group, to render services essential to the community’s higher welfare and to obtain a greater share of that welfare. He emphasized that all industrial enterprises, to varying degrees, contribute to the general welfare of the community, and this contribution is a material consideration when the present question is examined apart from the specific matters raised at the Bar. Consequently, monetary considerations for a service are not an essential characteristic of industry in a modern State. Following this line of reasoning, counsel for the respondent sought to divide municipal activities into three categories: (i) the activities of the department that directly performs services, (ii) the activities of the department that imposes, collects and administers taxes, and (iii) the activities of departments that merely exercise administrative control over other departments. The Court found no justification for such an artificial segmentation of municipal functions.

In the present case the learned counsel attempted to separate the functions of a municipal corporation into three distinct categories. The first category was described as the department that actually provides public services. The second category was said to consist of the department that merely imposes taxes, collects the revenue and administers those taxes. The third category was identified as the departments that exercise purely administrative control over other departments. The Court found no justification for creating such an artificial division of municipal activity. Apart from the regal functions that are intrinsic to a municipality, the Court observed that if a particular activity, when performed by an individual, would qualify as an industry, the same activity carried out by a municipal corporation would likewise qualify as an industry. The Court further reasoned that it would be unrealistic to draw a sharp line between a department that delivers a service and a department that supervises or feeds that service, because supervision and actual performance are integral parts of a single activity. Accordingly, whether the three functions are carried out by a single department or are split among three separate departments, the entire organisational activity of the municipality must be regarded as an industry.

The Court also noted that it had incidentally addressed this aspect of municipal activity in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen, reporting that under the Municipal Act a municipality may perform a variety of functions, some obligatory and some discretionary, and that the activities may be of a composite nature. In that earlier decision it was observed that some departments are primarily earning departments, such as the department that collects municipal taxes or other municipal revenue, while other departments, such as the sanitary department or other service departments, are primarily spending departments. The Court further acknowledged that there may be departments in which the earning and spending aspects almost balance each other. The present Court extracted that passage not because it agreed with the conclusion reached in the earlier case, but simply to illustrate that the earlier observations run counter to the present discussion. The question of any bonus entitlement was held to be irrelevant to the appeal before this Court.

These observations support the view that the integrated activities of a municipality cannot be dissected so that some portions fall within the definition of “industry” while others are excluded. The Court further explained that different situations may arise. If a particular municipal activity falls within the definition of “industry” and the financial and administrative departments are solely responsible for that activity, there is no difficulty in treating those two departments as part of the industry. However, there may be cases in which those departments also handle other activities that lie outside the definition of “industry.” In such circumstances a working rule may be devised to promote social justice in line with the principles of equity. The solution in those cases depends upon whether the department in question is primarily and predominantly concerned with industrial activity or only incidentally connected with it.

Finally, the Court summarized the discussion by stating that the definition of “industry” in the Act is very comprehensive and is expressed in two parts: one part defines industry from the standpoint of the employer and the other part from the standpoint of the employee. If an activity falls within either part of the definition, it is deemed an industry within the meaning of the Act.

The Court explained that the definition of “industry” in the Act is given from two perspectives: first, from the point of view of the employer, and second, from the point of view of the employee; if an activity satisfies either perspective, it falls within the meaning of “industry” under the Act. The Court further noted that the historic development of industrial disputes and the related legislation embraces the basic principle that the activity must be organised and not merely private or personal employment. The Court observed that the primary and inalienable functions of the State, even when delegated by statute to a corporation, are expressly excluded from the definition; such regal functions are confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power. The Court held that if a service provided by an individual or a private person qualifies as an industry, the same service performed by a corporation is likewise an industry. Consequently, when a corporation provides a service that is an industry, the workers in the departments connected with that service—whether they are in financial, administrative or executive roles—are entitled to the benefits of the Act. The Court added that when a municipal department performs many functions, some of which fall within the definition of industry and some that do not, the dominant function of the department must be the test for applying the Act. The Court then listed the various departments of the Nagpur City Corporation, namely the General Administration Department, the Octroi Department, the Tax Department, the Public Conveyance Department, the Fire Brigade Department, the Lighting Department, the Water Works Department, the City Engineer Department, the Enforcement (encroachment) Department, the Sewage Pumping Station Department, the Sewage Farm Department, the Health Department, the Market Department, the Cattle Pound Department, the Public Gardens Department, the Public Works Department, the Assessment Department, the Estate Department, the Education Department, the Printing Press Department, the Workshop Department and the Building Department. The State Industrial Court held that all of these departments, except those dealing with (i) assessment and levy of house‑tax, (ii) assessment and levy of octroi, (iii) removal of encroachment and demolition of dilapidated houses, (iv) maintenance of cattle pounds and (v) prevention and control of food adulteration, qualify as industries. Even for the departments that the Tribunal classified as industries, relief was denied to persons who did not fall within the definition of “employees” under the Act. Since the employees did not file any appeal against the award insofar as it affected them, the Court found that no further discussion was required regarding the five excluded departments. Before examining whether any of the Corporation’s departments fall within the definition of “industry,” the Court found it useful to consider the scheme of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (Madhya Pradesh Act No 2 of 1950). Section 7 gives the Corporation the status of a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. Section 6 identifies the municipal authorities entrusted with the execution of the Act as (a) the Corporation, (b) the Standing Committee and (c) the Chief Executive Officer.

In this case, the Court noted that the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, had designated three municipal authorities: the Corporation itself, the Standing Committee, and the Chief Executive Officer. Chapter II of Part II of the Act contained the sections that established the Constitution of the Corporation and prescribed the mode of election to that body. Chapter III of the same Part laid down the procedure for conducting the business of the Corporation. Chapter IV provided for the appointment of municipal officers and servants and also set out the provisions for their punishment and removal. Chapter V dealt with the powers, duties and functions of the municipal authorities and distinguished between the obligatory duties that the Corporation must perform and the discretionary duties that it may choose to exercise. Under section 57 the Corporation was required to make adequate provision, by any lawful means, for such services as lighting of public streets, cleaning of public streets, disposal of night‑soil and rubbish, maintenance of the fire‑brigade and other welfare activities that were in the public interest. Section 58 conferred a further discretionary power on the Corporation to provide other amenities that were not covered by section 57, were not absolutely essential, but were considered necessary for the happiness of the people of the State. Provisions of Chapter VI empowered the municipality to hold and acquire property and to manage public institutions that were maintained from municipal funds. Section 79 directed the municipality to apply the funds available to it to discharge its statutory duties and to pay the salaries and allowances of its various servants.

Chapter IX enabled the municipality to raise loans on its debts for meeting capital expenditure. Part IV empowered the municipality to impose taxes for the purposes of the Act and also described the procedure for collecting those taxes. Part V conferred additional powers and imposed duties on the Corporation and its officers with respect to public health, safety and convenience. This part covered matters relating to public convenience, drains and privies, conservancy, sanitary provisions, water supply and drainage, regulation of factories and trades, markets and slaughter places, as well as food, drink, drug and dangerous articles, the prevention of infectious diseases and the disposal of the dead. Part VI authorised the Corporation to prepare town‑planning schemes, to regulate erection and re‑erection of buildings, to close public streets, to remove obstructions in streets, to regulate the laying of new streets, to dispose of mad and stray dogs, to control public begging and to prohibit brothels. Part VIII contained the general provisions for carrying out municipal administration and permitted the Corporation to make by‑laws to implement the intentions of the Act. In short, the Court observed that the Act created the Corporation as a juristic person capable of holding and disposing of property, conferred on it the power to impose and collect taxes and licence fees, to borrow money, to adjudicate disputes in the first instance, treated the amounts collected as the municipal fund from which it met its liabilities and paid the salaries of its employees, and imposed upon it a duty to carry out various welfare activities for the public.

In this case the Court explained that the municipal corporation existed to serve the interest of the public. It was given powers to implement its duties satisfactorily and also to make by‑laws for regulating its various functions. The Court described the corporation as being comparable to a large public company that performs many of the activities that a private company could undertake, except that the corporation possessed certain statutory powers that enabled it to carry out its functions more effectively. With that background the Court turned to examine each of the departments of the corporation that the State Industrial Court had held to be governed by the Municipal Corporation Act. The first department considered was the Tax Department. The Court noted that the principal functions of this department were the imposition and collection of conservancy tax, water tax and property tax. No separate staff had been employed for the assessment and levy of property tax; the same personnel handled the assessment and collection of water rates as well as the scavenging taxes. The Court observed that the work of assessing and levying water rates and scavenging rates for private latrines was far heavier than the other tasks assigned to the department. No effort had been made to allocate a specific proportion of staff to the different functions. Accordingly, the Court accepted the finding of the State Industrial Court that the clerical and manual staff of the department performed the work connected with scavenging taxes and water rates predominantly. The Court explained that these rates were essentially fees for services rendered. The services of scavenging and water supply could equally be performed by a private firm or an individual for remuneration, and the fact that the municipality performed the same duties did not exclude them from the definition of “industry”. The Court further stated that it preferred to sustain the finding on a broader basis. There could be no distinction between property tax and other taxes collected by the municipality for the purpose of designating the tax department as an industry or not. The scheme of the Municipal Corporation Act was that taxes and fees were collected in order to enable the municipality to discharge its statutory functions. If those functions, once discharged, fell wholly or predominantly within the definition of “industry”, it would be illogical to exclude the tax department from that definition. While private individuals or firms receive cash or other payment for services, public institutions provide services to the public and use the taxes collected as a fund for performing those services. Because most of the services rendered by the municipality fell within the definition of “industry”, the Court concluded that the employees of the tax department were also entitled to the benefits contemplated under the Act.

The Court then turned to the Public Conveyance Department. This department dealt with a wheel‑cum‑road tax, commonly described as a wheel tax. Its purpose was to regulate the use of cycles, rickshaws, bullock‑carts and similar conveyances. The department collected registration fees for rickshaws, licence fees from rickshaw drivers and wheel tax from bullock‑carts. In addition, it collected a cycle tax on every cycle used within the limits of the corporation, as evidenced by the testimony of the first witness. The Court observed that these taxes were, in effect, fees collected by the corporation for the services it provided to the owners of cycles and other conveyances, namely the maintenance and construction of roads. The Court noted that such services could equally be performed by a private individual or a private firm for remuneration. Having satisfied the tests laid down by the Court, the Public Conveyance Department was deemed to be an industry within the meaning of the definition contained in the Municipal Corporation Act.

In this case the Court examined the nature of the activities carried out by several municipal departments to determine whether each department could be classified as an industry within the meaning of the Act. Regarding the cycle tax, the Court noted that the Corporation collects a tax on every cycle used within its limits, as shown by the evidence of Witness No 1 for Party 1. These collections are essentially fees that the Corporation levies in order to provide services to the owners of cycles and other conveyances, specifically the maintenance and construction of roads. The Court pointed out that the same services could equally be performed by a private individual or a private firm in exchange for remuneration. Accordingly, the cycle‑tax department satisfies the criteria established by the Court and is therefore an industry under the definition contained in the Act. Turning to the Fire Brigade Department, the Court referred to Exhibit N A 22, which sets out the duties of a driver‑cum‑fitter of the Fire Brigade, and to the testimony of Witness No 3 for Party 1, who explained that the fire‑brigade is tasked with supplying water at marriage ceremonies and other public functions without receiving any additional payment for those extra services. While acknowledging that the department occasionally provides such ancillary services, the Court emphasized that its principal function is to respond to fire calls, a function that can also be undertaken by private bodies. The Court examined the powers conferred by section 333 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, which authorize designated officers to remove persons who obstruct fire‑extinguishing operations, to close streets near a fire, to break into premises for the purpose of extinguishing a fire, and to take any measures deemed necessary to protect life or property. The Court considered the argument that only the fire‑brigade can perform its duties because of these statutory powers to be misleading, noting that the powers relate to the execution of the service rather than to the nature of the service itself. The legislature could, if it chose, grant comparable powers to a private individual or a private firm, and the underlying service of fighting fires satisfies the tests laid down by the Court; consequently, the fire‑brigade department is also deemed an industry. Finally, the Court examined the Lighting Department, which is responsible for arranging street lighting throughout the Corporation area. The Court explained that street lighting is provided through two systems: electric lighting, which the Corporation contracts out to Nagpur Light and Power Co., and kerosene lamp lighting, which the Lighting Department carries out directly. The contracted company is required to install electric lights according to a program specified by the Corporation, and the Corporation also determines the hours during which the lights may be illuminated. The Court observed that the Corporation does not charge the public for street lighting, as corroborated by the evidence of Witness No 5 for Party 1. The Court concluded that, because the services rendered by the Lighting Department meet both the positive and negative criteria set forth in its earlier analysis, this department likewise qualifies as an industry within the meaning of the Act.

After considering the testimony of Witness No. 5 for Party No. 1, the Court reiterated that a payment made in exchange for services was not a mandatory requirement for a body to fall within the definition of “industry”. The Court observed that the services provided by the department satisfied the wording of the definition and also met both the positive and negative criteria previously laid down. Consequently, the Court concluded that the department qualified as an industry. The Court then turned to the Water Works Department, noting that it operated three head‑works at Kanhan, Gorewara and Ambazeri, each equipped with pumping stations. At the Kanhan and Gorewara stations the water was filtered and pumped into Nagpur’s service reservoir. Separate staff were employed at each pumping station, and an additional staff was assigned to distribution duties. The Department also maintained a distinct assessment division responsible for levying water cess on consumers, as evidenced by Witness No. 9 for Party No. 1. The Court pointed out that these three branches possessed both administrative and executive personnel. Whether or not the services involved a manufacturing process, the Court held that they undeniably fell within the broad definition of “industry” pursuant to the tests previously articulated. The Court further emphasized that none of these functions entailed delegated regal powers of the State and that a private individual could, in principle, perform them, leading to the conclusion that the Water Works Department was an industry. Regarding the City Engineers Department, the Court noted that its principal role was to supervise and administratively control its subordinate departments, with the City Engineer serving as its head, as shown by the evidence of Witness No. 5 for Party 1. Since the Court had already determined that the subordinate departments qualified as industries, it reasoned that the department exercising administrative control over them should likewise be regarded as an industry. The Court then examined the Enforcement (Encroachment) Department, a section of the Estate Department, whose function was to eliminate encroachments, unauthorized constructions and dilapidated houses. The Court referred to the testimony of Witness No. 5 for Party 1 and addressed the contention that these functions were purely statutory and could not be performed by a private party. While acknowledging that statutory authority was vested in the Corporation to protect its property and remove encroachments, the Court distinguished between the source of the power and the nature of the service rendered. It observed that the service of detecting and removing encroachments was not unique to a municipal corporation; a private firm could also be engaged to manage property, identify encroachments and pursue recovery of possession. The only distinction, the Court noted, was that a corporation could exercise its statutory power directly, whereas a private firm would have to obtain relief through the courts. Accordingly, the Court held that the nature of the service—protecting public property from encroachment—satisfied both the definition of “industry” and the established tests, and therefore the Enforcement Department also fell within the meaning of an industry.

In the case of municipal removal of an encroachment, the corporation may physically eliminate the intrusion, yet it does not bar the aggrieved owner from approaching a civil court to assert his title; by contrast, a private firm lacks authority to act on its own and must obtain a court order before any encroachment can be removed. The Court explained that, when the nature of the service is examined – namely, safeguarding public property by preventing unlawful occupation and by recovering possession of lands that have been taken – there is no essential difference between the activity performed by the corporation and the analogous activity that a private firm may undertake for a client. The Court found that the service satisfies both the wording of the statutory definition of “industry” and the specific tests that had been articulated earlier. Nonetheless, it was argued that the reasoning above could not be applied to the municipal function of demolishing dilapidated houses, on the ground that such work is carried out in the exercise of a governmental function that a private individual cannot perform. The Court observed that this argument confuses the incidental governmental power with the character of the service itself. To illustrate, a private firm may agree to remove dilapidated houses for customers who retain it, but the firm does not possess the authority to remove such houses belonging to persons who have not hired its services. The Court held that this limitation on the firm’s power does not alter the essential character of the service, and therefore concluded that the department responsible for removing dilapidated houses also qualifies as an industry. (viii) Sewage Department; the sewage pumping station operated by the corporation is intended to pump sewage to the outfall of the underground sewer system, and the discharged sewage is then used on land that forms part of a broad irrigation scheme where certain crops are cultivated. Evidence of Witness No. 8 for Party No. 1 showed that, after the irrigation of the corporation‑maintained farm, any remaining sewage is sold to neighboring farms. On the basis of these facts, the Court held that the sewage department likewise satisfies the statutory criteria and must be treated as an industry.

(ix) Health Department; this department is responsible for activities such as scavenging, sanitation, control of epidemics, control of food adulteration, and the operation of public dispensaries. Counsel for the respondents argued that the control of food adulteration and the control of epidemics are functions that cannot be performed by private individuals or institutions. The Court rejected that view, observing that private medical units may be engaged on a remunerative basis to assist in detecting adulterated food items and to take appropriate action against offending traders, and that such units may also provide inoculations and medical advice to help prevent epidemics. Accordingly, the Court found that private entities are capable of performing the same services that the municipal health department provides, and that the department therefore meets the remaining tests laid down by the Court and falls within the meaning of “industry” in the Act. (x) Market Department; the function of the Market Department is to issue licences, collect ground‑rent and registration fees, and to detect short‑weight measures, thereby providing a public service that prevents cheating in the market. The Court concluded that these activities satisfy the statutory definition of an industry, and therefore the Market Department is also an industry within the meaning of the Act.

The market department collects rent from persons who wish to enter corporation land and conduct business there, and it also charges fees for services that detect short weights and measures. The collection of rents enables the corporation to permit entry onto its premises, while the detection of short weights and measures protects the public from being cheated in the market. By setting aside designated market places and supervising the use of weights and measures, the department provides services that benefit the community, and the fees that are collected constitute remuneration for those services. The court observed that these functions could, in principle, be performed by any private individual, yet the department satisfies the positive and negative tests laid down by the court for determining an industry. Accordingly, the court concluded that the market department qualifies as an industry within the meaning of the Act.

The Public Gardens Department is responsible for maintaining existing public parks and gardens, for creating new parks and gardens, and for planting trees along the sides of roads. Evidence for these functions was provided by Witness No. 5 on behalf of Party No. 1. The court noted that the nature of this work falls within the definition of “industry” as previously articulated, and the fact that a municipal body carries out these duties does not alter the character of the service. The department meets the criteria set forth by the court, and therefore the court held that the Public Gardens Department is also an industry.

The Public Works Department oversees the construction and upkeep of public infrastructure, including roads, drains, buildings, markets, and public latrines. For public convenience, the department is divided into zones, each of which has its own office. The outdoor workforce comprises assistant engineers, overseers, sub‑overseers, time‑keepers, mates, carpenters, masons, blacksmiths and laborers, while clerical and peon staff perform indoor duties. Witness No. 5 for Party No. 1 testified regarding these arrangements. The department carries out both administrative and executive functions, and the services it renders could equally be performed by private individuals. Consequently, the department satisfies both the positive and negative tests articulated by the court for an industry. The court therefore held that the Public Works Department is an industry within the meaning of the Act.

The Assessment Department is tasked with assessing taxes, fees and rates. The same personnel conduct assessments not only for taxes strictly defined as such but also for other fees and rates. The court observed that the services involved, such as scavenging and water supply, can be performed by private individuals, and the State Industrial Court had previously held that these activities fall within the definition of “industry.” Accordingly, the assessment of fees and rates is part of that industry. The court found no justification for distinguishing between the assessment of taxes and the assessment of fees and rates, noting that taxes are collected solely to enable the corporation to provide services to the public. Since most of those services satisfy the industry definition, the court concluded that the Assessment Department is an industry within the meaning of the Act. Moreover, the State Industrial Court affirmed that the same staff perform the assessment work, reinforcing this conclusion.

The Court observed that the department responsible for assessment carries out the work of assessing house‑tax as well as other fees and rates, and that its activities are mainly concerned with the assessment of scavenging tax and water rate. By applying the test of “paramount and predominant duty,” the Court concluded that this department falls squarely within the meaning of “industry” under the Act. The Estate Department, according to the Court, maintains records of property that has been acquired, vested or transferred to the Corporation, and also keeps track of all buildings and roads constructed by the Public Works Department. This department also lets out lands and houses belonging to the Corporation through public auction, and the income generated is credited to the common fund. The Court noted that a similar department would be necessary in a private company that performs comparable functions. Maintaining records of acquired properties, constructed buildings and roads, and leased properties is a necessary administrative function that is directly linked to the corresponding services. Since the service of constructing buildings and roads qualifies as an industry, the Court held that the administrative wing that supports those services must also be regarded as an industry, and therefore the Estate Department as a whole, with both its administrative and executive components, is an industry. Regarding the Education Department, the Court stated that it is responsible for providing compulsory primary education within the limits of the Corporation, as evidenced by the testimony of the first witness for the first party. The Court pointed out that this service could equally be provided by private persons, and that the department satisfies the other tests applied by the Court. Consequently, the employees of the Education Department fall within the definition of “employees” under the Act and are therefore entitled to the benefits provided by the Act. The Printing Press Department, the Court explained, is maintained by the Corporation to print passes, by‑laws, rules, proceedings and forms, and the printed by‑laws and rules are sold to the public. By reference to the reasoning previously applied to the Water Works Department, the Court held that this printing press department also qualifies as an industry. Finally, the Court considered the Building Department, describing it as essentially a “building permission” department whose function is to regulate the construction of buildings by private individuals and to take action against violations of the by‑laws and the provisions of the Corporation Act pertaining to this department. Although it was argued that the department’s functions are statutory and cannot be performed by private individuals, the Court clarified that the issue is not whether the Corporation’s discharge of certain functions has statutory backing, but whether those functions could equally be performed by private persons. The Court noted that the Corporation Act and the by‑laws set out specific requirements for the submission of plans and for the sanction of the appropriate authorities before a building is erected, and that the same procedures can be carried out by a cooperative society or a private individual. Cooperative societies and private individuals are also capable of allotting land for the construction of houses in accordance with the conditions prescribed by law. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the services provided by the Building Department are analogous to those performed by a private individual, and therefore the department satisfies the criteria for being classified as an industry.

The Court noted that the distinction between the two types of entities lay in the source of authority governing them: one operated under a statutory sanction while the other functioned in accordance with contractual terms. It observed that the department in question performed its duties for the benefit of the public and that the services it provided satisfied both the positive and the negative criteria previously set out by the Court. Accordingly, the Court held that this department fell within the meaning of “industry” as defined in the applicable legislation.

Turning to the General Administration Department, the Court explained that this department coordinated the activities of all other departments within the corporation. The State Industrial Court had described its composition as including a treasury, an accounts section, a records section that maintained the records of all the various departments, and a public relations section. In addition, the department contained a committee section whose responsibilities were to arrange meetings, prepare agendas, record minutes of proceedings, and draft by‑laws, while the records section also kept files for departments such as health and engineering. The Court observed that any large organization with multiple divisions would possess a similar general administration unit. It reasoned that if the various divisions linked to this department were classified as industries, then the general administration unit itself should likewise be regarded as part of the industry. The Court emphasized that the efficient delivery of all services depended on the proper functioning of this department, for without it there would be confusion and chaos. The State Industrial Court had previously held that, with the exception of five departments, all departments of the corporation were covered by the definition of “industry.” Consequently, the Court concluded that the General Administration Department, which dealt principally with industrial departments, also qualified as an industry and that its employees were therefore entitled to the benefits provided by the Act. The Court further noted that the State Industrial Court had found five departments did not fall within the definition of “industry,” and that no appeals had been filed against that finding. The Court declined to express a final opinion on the correctness of that determination. In the final analysis, the Court dismissed the appeals, ordered costs, and affirmed that the appeals were dismissed.