State of Punjab vs Shadi Lal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 4 September, 1959

Coram: S. Jafer Imam, K.N. Wanchoo

In this matter the Supreme Court heard appeals that were brought on a certificate issued under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution by the High Court of Punjab. The respondent had been working as an Accountant in the office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police at Jullundur in 1949. It was alleged that in that year he had misappropriated certain sums of money, a fact that only became known in 1950. Consequently a criminal case was lodged against him at the Jullundur Cantonment Police Station on 15 August 1950. Following that registration three separate prosecutions were instituted. Charges in those prosecutions were framed under Sections 409 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. While the proceedings were approaching conclusion, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (Act 46 of 1952) came into operation. That statute provided that every offence covered by the Prevention of Corruption Act must be tried before a Court of a Special Judge. In compliance with the new requirement the three pending cases were transferred to a Special Judge. The respondent raised an objection before that judge, contending that the investigations had not been carried out in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Relying on that objection the Special Judge discharged the respondent. The High Court of Punjab, however, set aside the discharge order and directed the Special Judge to continue with the trial. The High Court judge acted in accordance with a decision of a Full Bench of that High Court which had earlier governed the relevant issue.

When the trial proceedings were reinstated another objection was raised, this time asserting that the charge under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code could not be pursued together with the charge under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act because of a decision of the Punjab High Court. The Public Prosecutor accepted that position and formally withdrew the charge under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Accordingly, the Special Judge again discharged the respondent. The three matters were then transferred to a Magistrate for further trial. The respondent again objected, arguing that the charge under Section 409 could not be tried before a Magistrate. The Magistrate allowed the objection and held that the trial could proceed only on the remaining charges, namely Sections 420, 465, 468 and 477 of the Indian Penal Code. The State of Punjab treated the Magistrate’s order as an acquittal on the charge under Section 409 of the IPC. Consequently, the State filed three separate appeals before the High Court under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court dismissed those appeals, relying upon the earlier decision of that Court in The State v. Gurcharan Singh.

The Court noted that the earlier decision reported in AIR 1952 Punj 89 had held that, as long as Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act remained in force, Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code was deemed to be repealed pro tanto insofar as it concerned offences alleged to have been committed by public servants. The Court then observed that, after the judgment rendered by this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., it became clear that the principle laid down by the Punjab High Court in the Gurcharan Singh case was no longer good law. The Punjab High Court had expressed the view that, because the Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to the Punjab High Court’s earlier ruling, the appellant was entitled to be issued a certificate authorising an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, and consequently the present appeal was filed. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent on the ground that the certificate could not be issued, relying on observations made by this Court in State Govt., Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkrishna Ganpat Rao Limsey, wherein this Court had explained that Article 134 permits an appeal by special leave only in the limited situation where a High Court, on appeal, reverses an order of acquittal and imposes a death sentence, and that the provision does not extend to appeals where a High Court, on appeal, reverses a conviction and orders an acquittal. The respondent further relied upon the cases of State of Orissa v. Minaketan and Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Government of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 59 Cal WN 1042, both of which drew upon the principles articulated in the Limsey decision. The Orissa High Court decision set out the criteria that it would apply in granting a certificate. The Court also pointed out that, in the earlier cited case, the discussion concerned Clause (a) of Article 134(1) rather than Clause c, and that the observation was intended to demonstrate that, in a special-leave appeal by the State against a judgment of acquittal, the State could not claim a right to be heard on questions of fact. Consequently, the earlier decision did not state that a certificate could not be granted under Clause c of Article 134(1) when a High Court affirmed an acquittal but a substantial question of law remained, especially where the Supreme Court’s law conflicted with the High Court’s decision on that very question.

In this matter the Court explained that the earlier decision of this Court had not been intended to declare that a certificate could not be issued under Clause (c) of Article 134(1) when a High Court upheld an acquittal but nevertheless considered that a substantial question of law remained, especially where the law laid down by the Supreme Court conflicted with the view expressed by the High Court on that very point. The Court held that the preliminary objection raised by the respondent was unfounded and therefore had to be rejected. It further observed that, irrespective of whether the High Court possessed the authority to grant such a certificate, this Court always retained the power to grant special leave of appeal in appropriate cases. The Court was of the view that there was no doubt that it would have granted special leave even if the High Court had declined to issue a certificate or had been unable to do so. Consequently, the preliminary objection could not bar this Court from hearing the present appeal should special leave be granted. The Court added that it was unnecessary to elaborate further because, in its opinion, the preliminary objection failed since the decision relied upon by the respondent did not constitute authority for the proposition that the High Court was powerless to grant a certificate under the circumstances of the present case. Finally, the Court concluded that the High Court did, in fact, have the power to grant a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution and that, given the facts of this case, the High Court had correctly exercised that power by issuing the certificate.

The Court then turned to the substantive charge against the respondent. Relying on the judgment in Om Prakash Gupta’s case, the Court stated that there could be no doubt that the respondent was liable to be tried for an offence punishable under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. It held that the lower courts had erred in concluding that the respondent could not be tried for that offence and therefore set aside those conclusions, declaring that the respondent could indeed be tried under Section 409. The respondent had argued that the incident giving rise to the charge occurred almost ten years earlier and that he had suffered sufficient harassment as a result of the protracted proceedings. The Court expressed regret over the length of the delay but noted that the delay was largely attributable to the numerous objections raised by the respondent at various stages of the trial, as well as to the State’s appeal against the magistrate’s order refusing to proceed with the charge under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court found that the magistrate’s order was wholly erroneous, set it aside, and directed that the trial should continue. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed, and the orders of the magistrate and the High Court were set aside, with the trial Court being directed to proceed with the trial of the respondent under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code.

In this case the Supreme Court set aside the earlier orders of the Magistrate and the High Court and then gave a clear direction to the trial Court. The Court instructed that the trial Court must now continue the proceedings against the respondent, invoking the charge provided for in Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The direction required the trial Court to commence the trial as if the earlier dismissal had never occurred, and to treat the matter as a fresh proceeding under the statutory provision. The Court emphasized that all procedural safeguards applicable to an offence under Section 409 must be observed, and that the trial should be conducted in accordance with the law governing such cases. The direction further required that the trial be carried out without any further unnecessary delay, ensuring that the respondent would face trial for the alleged offence as provided for in the Indian Penal Code. By issuing this order, the Court intended to ensure that the trial would proceed properly, that the respondent would be given an opportunity to be tried for the alleged offence, and that the administration of justice would be completed in a timely manner.