State Of Madhya Pradesh and Ors vs Shardul Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 2554 of 1966

Decision Date: 2 December, 1959

Coram: Hegde J

In the matter titled State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Shardul Singh, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 2 December 1959. The petitioner was the State of Madhya Pradesh together with other respondents, while the respondent was Shardul Singh, who held the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police. The case was placed before a Bench of the Supreme Court and the operative provisions were taken from the Constitution of India, specifically Article 311(1) and the proviso to Article 309. The central question presented to the Court concerned the meaning of “conditions of service” and whether a rule could require that the authority empowered to dismiss an officer must itself initiate or conduct the disciplinary inquiry that leads to dismissal.

The factual matrix recorded by the Court showed that the Superintendent of Police, exercising his powers under the Central Provinces and Berar Police Regulations, started a departmental inquiry against the Sub-Inspector on account of certain charges. After completing the inquiry as prescribed, the Superintendent found the officer guilty and forwarded his report to the Inspector-General of Police, who possessed the statutory authority to dismiss the officer. The Inspector-General sent a copy of the report to the Sub-Inspector, summoned him to show cause against the contemplated dismissal, considered the Sub-Inspector’s explanation, and finally issued an order effecting dismissal. The Court noted that the entire procedure conformed to Regulations 228 and 229 of the Central Provinces and Berar Police Regulations, which were framed under section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and corresponded to the power to make rules under Article 309 of the Constitution. The pivotal issue was whether those Regulations were ultra vires because Article 311(1) appeared to require that the dismissing authority itself must commence or conduct the inquiry. The Court held that the proviso to Article 309 authorises the President of India and the Governor of a State to make rules governing the conditions of service of civil servants until a legislative provision is made. “Conditions of service” was interpreted to include all matters regulating a post from appointment through retirement, encompassing pension and also rules relating to dismissal. While Article 311(1) safeguards a civil servant from being dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority, it does not stipulate that the same authority must also conduct the disciplinary inquiry. Consequently, the Court concluded that rules under Article 309 could validly address conditions of service other than those expressly covered by Article 311(1), and therefore the Regulations in question were not ultra vires the Constitution. The judgment relied upon earlier decisions, namely Pradyat Kumar Bose v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court [1955] 2 SCR 1331, P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India [1958] SCR 1052, and North West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand (1948) LR 75 IA 343. The case proceeded as Civil Appeal No. 2554 of 1966, an appeal from the judgment and order dated

In the appeal filed under certificate, the Court considered the scope of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. The appeal arose from a judgment and order dated 4 November 1965 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 646 of 1964. Counsel I N Shroff appeared for the appellants, while counsel A K Sen, M M Kshatriya and G S Chatterjee represented the respondent. The judgment was delivered by Justice Hegde. The High Court had held that the power of dismissal and removal mentioned in Article 311(1) required that only the authorities specified in that article could initiate and conduct the disciplinary proceedings that might lead to the dismissal or removal of a wayward officer.

The respondent in the present case was a Sub-Inspector of Police employed by the State of Madhya Pradesh. On 24 June 1962 the Superintendent of Police, Surguja, initiated a departmental enquiry against him on the basis of certain charges, and conducted the enquiry in accordance with the Central Provinces and Bihar Police Regulations. After completing the enquiry, the Superintendent submitted his report to the Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Pradesh, through the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Raipur. The Superintendent concluded that the respondent was guilty of the charges and recommended his dismissal. The Inspector-General forwarded a copy of the report to the respondent and required him to show cause why he should not be dismissed. The respondent answered the show-cause notice, after which the Inspector-General dismissed him from service on 30 November 1963. The respondent’s subsequent appeal to the Government against the dismissal order was rejected, prompting him to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari to set aside the dismissal. He challenged the order on several grounds, but the High Court rejected all except one. It held that the Superintendent of Police, Surguja, who had been appointed by the Inspector-General, was not competent to initiate or conduct the enquiry, and therefore the enquiry was without legal authority and contrary to the mandate of Article 311(1). Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned dismissal order. The High Court observed that the Superintendent had acted under Regulations 228 and 229 of the Central Provinces and Bihar Police Regulations, which were framed on the authority of Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, permitting State Governments to make rules regulating recruitment and conditions of service of State servants. Regulation 228 provides that in every case of dismissal, reduction in rank, grade or pay, or withholding of increment for a period exceeding one year, a formal proceeding must

The Court explained that Regulation 228 requires that, for every case of dismissal, reduction in rank, grade or pay, or withholding of increment for a period exceeding one year, a formal proceeding must be recorded by the District Superintendent in the prescribed form. The record must set out the charge, the evidence on which the charge is based, the defence of the accused, the statements of any witnesses, the finding of the District Superintendent together with the reasons on which it is based, and finally the District Superintendent’s final order or recommendation, as the case may be. Regulation 229 provides that where the District Superintendent is not empowered to pass a final order, he must forward his proposals for dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of an officer of the rank of Sub-Inspector or above to the proper authority through the District Magistrate, except where the officer is not serving in a district. The Court noted that there was no dispute that the Superintendent of Police had complied with the requirements of Regulations 228 and 229. The issue before the Court was whether the power conferred on the Superintendent of Police under those regulations was ultra vires Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Article 311(1) states that no person who is a member of the Civil Service of the Union or of an All-India Service or Civil Service of a State, or who holds a civil post under the Union or a State, shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The Court observed that this provision does not require that the authority empowered to dismiss or remove an official must itself initiate or conduct the disciplinary enquiry that precedes the dismissal or removal, nor that the enquiry must be undertaken at its own instance. The only guarantee given to a civil servant under the provision is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by a subordinate authority. The respondent argued that this guarantee inherently includes the requirement that the disciplinary enquiry be initiated and conducted by the authorities mentioned in the article, a contention that the High Court had accepted. The Court then set out to examine whether the High Court’s view was correct. The Court turned to Article 310(1), which declares that every person who is a member of the civil service of a State or holds any civil post in a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of that State. However, that doctrine of pleasure is limited by other constitutional provisions, notably Articles 309 and 311. Article 309 provides that, subject to the Constitution, Acts of the appropriate legislature may regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. The proviso to that article states that it shall be competent for the President, or such person as he may direct, in the case of Union services, and for the Governor of a State, or such person as he may direct, in the case of State services, to make rules regulating recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to such services until a provision is made by or under an Act of the appropriate legislature, and that any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act.

The provision states that, for services and posts that are connected with the affairs of the Union, the President or a person designated by him may make rules regulating recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed to such services and posts until a law to that effect is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article; likewise, for services and posts that are connected with the affairs of a State, the Governor of the State or a person designated by him may make such rules until a legislative provision is enacted, and any rules so made shall have effect only to the extent that they are consistent with the provisions of any such Act. One of the powers created by this proviso is the authority to frame rules that govern the conditions of service of persons appointed to the civil services of the Union or of a State, as the case may be.

The term “conditions of service” is a phrase of broad meaning. In the decision of this Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose v. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, the Court observed that dismissal of an official falls within the ambit of “conditions of service” of public servants. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in North West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand, held that the right of dismissal is a condition of service within the meaning of the expression used in section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Lord Thankerton, speaking for the Board, remarked that, except where the context gives the expression a special significance, the provisions that prescribe the circumstances in which an employer may terminate service—whether those provisions are contractual or statutory—must be understood as part of the natural meaning of “conditions of service.”

In the case of P. Balakataiali v. Union of India and Ors., this Court affirmed that a rule providing for the termination of a railway official’s service may be made under the powers conferred on the Government by sections 241(2), 247 and 263(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Court explained that “conditions of service” includes all the terms that regulate the holding of a post by a person from the moment of appointment through retirement and even beyond, covering matters such as pension. The Court further observed that, but for the inclusion of Article 311 in the Constitution, even for matters dealt with in that article, rules could have been framed under Article 309. The provisions of Article 311 add extra rights for civil servants. Consequently, the Court could not agree with the High Court’s view that the guarantee contained in Article 311(1) also encompasses a further guarantee requiring that disciplinary proceedings leading to dismissal or removal of a civil servant must be initiated and conducted by the authorities specified in that article.

The Court observed that the discussion had been focused on the provision contained in that Article. Having examined the material, the Court determined that the appeal filed by the petitioner should be allowed. In consequence of that determination, the judgment that had been rendered by the High Court was set aside in its entirety. The order of the High Court was therefore vacated and the writ petition that had been before the High Court was dismissed. The Court further considered the particular facts and the overall circumstances of the matter and held that it would be inappropriate to levy any costs against either side. Accordingly, no order as to costs was made and the parties were left without any cost liability. The final direction of the Court recorded that the appeal stood allowed and that the relief sought by the petitioner was granted. The judgment concluded with the citation of the authority referred to as (1) [1958] S.C.R. 1052 and also noted the abbreviation Y.P. as appearing in the original order.