State Of Jammu and Kashmir And Others vs Thakur Ganga Singh And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 217 of 1959

Decision Date: 26 November 1959

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah, Subbarao J.

In this matter, the Court recorded that the case was styled State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others versus Thakur Ganga Singh and Another, and that the judgment was delivered on 26 November 1959 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. C. Das Gupta and Justice J. C. Shah, with the bench being identified as the Subbarao, K. bench. The petitioner was the State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others and the respondents were Thakur Ganga Singh and another. The citation of the decision was reported at 1960 AIR 356 and 1960 SCR (2) 346, with subsequent citation information given as R 1965 SC 682 (11). The operative statutory provision concerned the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, specifically the grant of special leave to appeal under Article 132(2) of the Constitution of India, and the question of when such leave may be granted on the basis of a substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution.

The factual background disclosed that the respondents had originally filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu challenging the Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules. The High Court held that the impugned rule was ultra vires because it contravened Article 14 of the Constitution. The appellants then applied to the same High Court for a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution, but that application was rejected on the ground that the case did not involve a substantial question of constitutional interpretation. Thereafter the appellants sought special leave to appeal to this Court under Article 132(2). The Court granted that special leave, but it allowed the respondents to raise the issue of whether the appeal was maintainable.

The dispute that remained was not about the meaning of Article 14 itself, for both parties agreed that the provision required a test of reasonable classification. The respondents raised a preliminary objection, contending that this Court could grant special leave under Article 132(2) only if it were satisfied that the case presented a substantial question of law concerning constitutional interpretation. They argued that, because the interpretation of Article 14 had already been settled by a series of decisions of this Court, no such substantial question could arise, and consequently special leave should not have been granted. In contrast, the appellants argued that any question of classification inherently involves the interpretation of Article 14 as applied to the classification at issue.

The Court held that the underlying principle of Article 132(2) is that the ultimate authority for interpreting the Constitution must rest with the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the provision is intended to be free from the other limitations imposed by Articles 133 and 134, and it permits the widest possible right of appeal whenever a case raises a substantial question of law concerning constitutional interpretation, regardless of the nature of the proceedings. The Court explained that the interpretation of a provision means the method by which the true sense or

The Court explained that interpretation referred to the method by which the true sense or meaning of a word was understood. It observed that when the parties agreed on the correct interpretation of a provision or when no party raised any question concerning that provision, the proceeding did not involve any question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution. The Court further noted that a substantial question of law could not arise if the particular law had already been finally and authoritatively decided by this Court. Accordingly, the Court held that the issue presented in the present case did not raise any question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. The Court relied upon several earlier decisions, namely T.M. Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor General in Council (1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) 1; Bhudan Choudury v. The State of Bihar, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045; Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, [1950] S.C.R. 869; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, [1959] S.C.R. 279; and Mohammad Haneef Quayeshi v. State of Bihar, [1959] S.C.R. 629. The matter proceeded under Civil Appeal No. 217 of 1959, which was an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 20 June 1958 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Writ Petition No. 108 of 1958. Counsel for the appellants included the Additional Solicitor-General of India, a senior government advocate, and two other advocates, while counsel for the respondents comprised a team of five lawyers. The judgment was delivered on 26 November 1959 by Justice Subba Rao and addressed the scope of Article 132(2) of the Constitution. The first respondent was identified as a shareholder of the second respondent, the Jammu Kashmir Mechanics and Transport Workers Co-operative Society Limited, hereafter called the Society, which had been registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Co-operative Societies Act No. 6 of 1993 (Vikrimi). The Society had submitted several applications to the third appellant seeking stage-carriage and public-carrier permits for various routes within the State of Jammu & Kashmir. All such applications were rejected on the ground that Rule 4-47 of the Jammu and Kashmir Motor Vehicle Rules permitted a service licence to be issued only to a person or a company registered under the Partnership Act, and that the Society, being neither a person nor a partnership, was ineligible for a licence under that rule. Consequently, the respondents filed a petition before the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir under Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, challenging the constitutionality of Rule 4-47. The appellants, namely the Government of Jammu & Kashmir State, the Transport Minister, the Registering Authority and the Traffic Superintendent, were made party-respondents to that petition. The High Court held that the impugned rule was ultra vires because it violated Article 14 of the Constitution, and on that basis it issued a writ of mandamus directing the appellants to refrain from enforcing the rule. Following that decision, the appellants filed an application in the High Court seeking a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution.

The appellants first applied to the High Court for a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution, but the High Court refused the application on the basis that the matter did not involve any substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. After that refusal, the appellants filed an application for special leave to appeal under Article 132(2) of the Constitution, and this Court granted the special leave. The order that granted special leave expressly permitted the respondents to raise the issue of whether the appeal was maintainable when the appeal was finally heard. The counsel for the respondents then raised a preliminary objection concerning the maintainability of the appeal. In short, the objection stated that, according to Article 132(2), special leave may be granted only when the Supreme Court is satisfied that the case presents a substantial question of law about the interpretation of the Constitution. The objection further argued that the interpretation of Article 14 of the Constitution had already been conclusively settled by a series of decisions of this Court, and therefore no question of law regarding constitutional interpretation, let alone a substantial one, arose for consideration. Consequently, the objection asserted that special leave could not be granted under the said article. The learned Additional Solicitor-General responded by arguing that whenever a question of classification is raised, it inevitably involves the interpretation of Article 14 with reference to the classification that is being challenged. In other words, the core issue in each case is whether the classification offends the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. Accordingly, determining whether a registered firm, a limited company or an individual possesses equal attributes is a question of interpreting Article 14. Before examining the merits of the competing contentions, it was necessary to identify precisely what question the High Court had considered and what decision it had rendered. The Society’s argument before the High Court was that Rule 4-47 permitted a licence to be issued only to a person or a firm registered under the Partnership Act and not to a corporation registered under the Co-operative Societies Act or any other body, and therefore the rule was discriminatory and violative of Article 14. The learned Advocate-General for the appellants countered that Article 14 allows rational classification and that the legislature had framed the impugned rule on a rational basis aimed at protecting the public interest. After weighing the rival arguments, the High Court expressed the view that the rule lacked any rational basis for classification and that, by arbitrarily singling out a corporation for discriminatory treatment, the rule violated the equality clause of the Constitution. The appellants, in their petition for special leave filed in this Court, challenged the correctness of the High Court’s conclusion.

In the appeal, the petitioners contended that the rule challenged by the High Court was founded upon a reasonable classification and therefore could not be declared violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. They argued that their submission was reiterated on other grounds in order to highlight the differing attributes of the two classes, thereby demonstrating an intelligible differentia for classification. The petitioners expressly framed the questions they sought to raise in the appeal as follows. Ground IV was stated: “The aforesaid rule 4-47 (of the Motor Vehicles Rules) is based upon reasonable classification and is and was perfectly intra vires and valid and could not be struck down as repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.” Ground VI was phrased: “There is a marked difference between a corporate body and partnership registered under the provisions of the Partnership Act and these points of difference provide an intelligible differentia for classification. The Hon’ble High Court has only referred to one point of difference and has overlooked other points of distinction and has erred in striking down the aforesaid rule 4-47.” Ground VIII was expressed: “Rule 4-47 was framed in the light of local conditions prevailing. Co-operative Societies and Corporations in the matter of transport were not considered to be proper objects for the grant of licence or permit. The classification is rational and reasonable. The exclusion of artificial persons from the ambit of the Rule is natural and not discriminatory.” The remaining grounds advanced by the petitioners were limited to further clarification of the foregoing points. In a portion of their statement of case, the petitioners affirmed: “It is now well-established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation.” The respondents, in their statement of case, accepted this legal proposition but contested the contention that a reasonable classification existed. Consequently, it was clear that the parties did not dispute the interpretation of Article 14 itself; rather, their dispute was confined to whether the impugned rule satisfied the test of reasonable classification. The petitioners then raised the question of whether special leave could be granted to them under Article 132(2) of the Constitution. Article 132(2) provides: “Where the High Court has refused to give such a certificate, the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, grant special leave to appeal from such judgment, decree or final order.” Under clause (2) of Article 132, special leave may be awarded only if two conditions are fulfilled: (i) the case must involve a question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution, and (ii) that question must be a substantial question of law. The principle underlying the article is that the ultimate authority for interpreting the Constitution rests with the Supreme Court, and the article is intended to operate free from the other limitations imposed by subsequent provisions.

Arts. 133 and 134, together with the broad right of appeal, may be exercised irrespective of the type of proceedings whenever a case presents only a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. The Court first explained what “interpretation of a provision” means. It described interpretation as the method by which the true sense or meaning of a word is understood. According to this description, a question of interpretation arises only when two or more possible constructions are placed on a provision – that is, when one party proposes one construction and the opposite party proposes a different construction. Conversely, where the parties agree on the true interpretation of a provision, or where no question is raised about that provision, the case cannot be said to involve any question of law regarding the interpretation of the Constitution.The Court then turned to the interpretation of Art. 14, noting that a series of its own decisions has developed the doctrine of classification. It observed that, at no stage of the present proceedings, either party questioned the correctness of the interpretation of Art. 14 or the principles that govern the doctrine of classification. Accepting that doctrine, the appellants maintained that a valid classification existed under the rule, while the respondents argued the opposite. The learned Additional Solicitor General, for the first time before this Court, contended that the appeal raised a new aspect of the equality doctrine, namely whether an artificial person and a natural person possess equal attributes within the meaning of the equality clause, and therefore asserted that the case involved a question of constitutional interpretation. The Court regarded that submission as merely a restatement of the same contention in different language. Upon analysis, the argument reduced to the proposition that, because an artificial person and a natural person have different attributes, the classification between them is valid. The Court found that this argument does not propose a new interpretation of Art. 14 but merely seeks to place the rule within the established doctrine of classification. Consequently, the Court held that the question raised does not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that the case did raise a constitutional interpretation issue, the Court considered whether such a question would constitute a “substantial question of law” within clause (2) of Art. 14. It referred to the Federal Court’s decision in T. M. Krishnaswamy Pillai v. Governor-General in Council, which examined the provisions of section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 205(1) provides that an appeal lies to the Federal Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Act or any order in council made thereunder. The Court noted that the Madras High Court had issued a certificate stating that the case involved a substantial question of law, thereby illustrating the application of that test.

In the case before the High Court, the issue was whether it involved a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 240(3) provides that a person who was a member of the civil service of the Crown in India or who held any civil post under the Crown could not be dismissed or demoted unless he had been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. The High Court, after examining the facts, concluded that the appellant had indeed been afforded such a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, and therefore it issued a certificate under section 205(1) of the same Act. When the propriety of granting that certificate was considered, Justice Zafrulla Khan, speaking for the Court, observed succinctly on page 2 of the report that the counsel had argued that the case raised a question of interpretation of subsection (3) of section 240. He further stated that any guidance that might have been required on that interpretation had already been supplied by the Court in the earlier decision of Secretary of State for India v. I.M. Lal [(1945) F.C.R. 103]. Justice Khan added that the remaining matter was a pure question of fact and that, in the Court’s view, no substantial question of law regarding the interpretation of the Constitution Act arose, and consequently the certificate could not be based on such a question under section 205(1). The Court then turned to the interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution, citing Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar [(1955) 1 S.C.R. 1045, 1049] which explained that article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification. The decision set out two criteria for a permissible classification: first, the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes the group from those excluded; second, that differentia must have a rational relation to the object of the statute. The classification may be based on geography, objects, occupations, or similar bases, but there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the statutory purpose. The Court noted that this principle restated the law earlier articulated in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India and reaffirmed in later cases such as Rama Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar.

The Court observed that the decision in Mohammed Haneef Qureshi v. State of Bihar (3) made clear that no further scope existed for any new interpretation of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution in relation to the doctrine of classification. The Court explained that the interpretation of Article 14 when applied to classification had already been finally settled by the highest Court of the land, and that, by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution, such an interpretation was binding on every court throughout the territory of India. Consequently, the only task remaining for the High Court was to apply that settled interpretation to the factual circumstances that were before it in the present case. The Court further held that, because the law on this point had already been authoritatively decided, a substantial question of law could not arise in the proceedings. In the result, the Court accepted the preliminary objection raised by the respondent, dismissed the appeal, and ordered that the costs of the proceedings be awarded to the respondent. Thus, the judgment affirmed the precedent and left no room for re-examination of the principle governing classification under Article 14. The appeal was therefore dismissed. (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869. (2) [1959] S.C.R. 279. (3) [1959] S.C.R. 629.