State Of Delhi vs Shri Ram Lohia

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 9 December, 1959

Coram: S.J. Imam, J.L. Kapur, K.N. Wanchoo

In this matter the State of Delhi obtained a special leave to appeal the decision of the Punjab High Court, which had acquitted Shri Ram Lohia of an offence alleged to have been committed under Section 5 of the Indian Official Secrets Act. The trial court had originally found the respondent guilty and imposed a monetary penalty of one thousand rupees, with a default provision for six months of rigorous imprisonment. The respondent appealed the conviction and sentence, but the Additional Sessions Judge of Delhi dismissed that appeal. Subsequently, the Punjab High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, set aside both the conviction and the sentence.

The High Court’s reversal was based on the observation that the sole evidence against the respondent derived from the testimony of R C Aggarwal, who was designated as a prosecution witness and classified as an accomplice. The Court held that the testimony of an accomplice required corroboration in material particulars that would connect the accused with the alleged crime. Because no such corroboration was found, the High Court concluded that a conviction could not be sustained on Aggarwal’s testimony alone. In the special leave petition, the State contended that the High Court erred in law by treating Aggarwal as an accomplice, arguing that Section 5(2) of the Act rendered the offence complete the moment the respondent received the secret documents, and that Aggarwal was not committing an offence when he obtained the documents from the respondent, who had directed him to make copies. The Supreme Court, however, indicated that it would not need to interpret the provisions of Section 5(2), as the appeal could be disposed of on other grounds. While acknowledging that the High Court had classified Aggarwal as an accomplice, the Court expressly refrained from commenting on the correctness of that classification. It further noted that even if the High Court’s classification were mistaken, a conviction could not be sustained unless Aggarwal’s testimony were found to be truthful. The prosecution’s case, as summarised, alleged that the respondent, being one of the two proprietors of a firm, had obtained a confidential Government file containing office notes related to the illegal import of certain goods and the penalties proposed for the offenders. According to the prosecution, Aggarwal, employed as a typist in the respondent’s firm, copied the file towards the end of November 1950. A search of the firm’s premises on 5 February 1951 resulted in the seizure of two typed copies of the documents. The prosecution further alleged that the respondent’s interest in the secret file was motivated by pending proceedings against his firm concerning illegal importation of the goods in question.

At the relevant time, legal proceedings were pending against the respondent’s firm for the illegal import of certain goods. The Court observed that, without believing the testimony of the witness Aggarwal, no conviction could be sustained because the remaining circumstantial evidence was insufficient. In his examination‑in‑chief, Aggarwal recounted that toward the end of November 1950 he saw a file marked O. G. L. II (Ext. P. B.) in the office of the respondent’s firm. He said the respondent handed the file to him with the instruction to type a copy and to complete that task to the exclusion of all other work. Aggarwal began typing but was unable to finish on the same day, and he placed the partially typed portions of the file Ext. P. B. on the respondent’s office table. The following day he informed the respondent that he could not understand certain portions of the file. The respondent then read the relevant sections aloud, a comparison was made, and Aggarwal made the necessary corrections and additions in his own handwriting on the already typed copies. After completing these amendments, Aggarwal handed both the original file Ext. P. B. and the typed copies back to the respondent. The Court noted that if Aggarwal’s evidence were accepted, the elements of an offence punishable under Section 5(4) of the Act would appear to be proved against the respondent.

The Court then turned to Aggarwal’s cross‑examination, which it found to reveal his unreliability. Aggarwal was examined both before and after the charge under Section 5(4) of the Act was framed. In the cross‑examination that occurred before the charge was framed, he testified: “In this premises merchants, including those from Bombay as well as persons connected with Bombay Hardware Traders Association used to come. I was permitted by my employers to do their type work of small nature. One day before this incident of typing out, a person from Bombay approached me with a file but I do not know which that file was asking me to make certain copies from it. I told that man that it was a big job and that I would not do it unless I am asked by Shri Ram Lohia my employer as I had much other work to do. Since I did not read that file, I cannot say whether it is Exhibit P. B. or not. I think Shri Ram Lohia accused was not in the office on that day as that man with the file left office immediately. I do not remember if that man came again next day with the file but I remember that he did come on the next day. At that time Shri Ram Lohia was present in the office. That man from Bombay went to the table of Shri Ram Lohia accused. After this Shri Ram Lohia accused gave me instructions to make the typed copies as I have said in my examination‑in‑chief. I cannot say whether Shri Ram Lohia accused gave me the instructions for typing out immediately after that Bombay man had seen him.” This testimony suggested that a man from Bombay, not the respondent, had brought the file for copying, thereby contradicting Aggarwal’s earlier statement that the respondent had given him the file. Aggarwal further expressed uncertainty about whether the respondent himself had compared the typed copies with the original. The Court concluded that this cross‑examination established Aggarwal as an unreliable witness. In the subsequent cross‑examination after the charge was framed, Aggarwal’s statements continued to demonstrate his lack of reliability, as he began his testimony with the words, “My statement was recorded in connection with…”.

On the day following the incident, the individual from Bombay remained in the office while the witness made the necessary corrections. The witness recalled that it was not the Bombay individual who performed the comparison of the original document with the copies, but rather Shri Ram Lohia, who is described in the record as the accused. The witness qualified this recollection by stating that the comparison was made “if I am not mistaken.” This admission suggests that the Bombay individual had originally brought a file for copying, thereby weakening the witness’s earlier claim that the respondent had handled the file and handed it to him for typing. Moreover, the witness’s description of the comparison process indicates that he was hesitant to assert definitively that the respondent had conducted the comparison. He expressed only a tentative belief that the respondent performed the comparison, contingent upon his memory not being mistaken. The court observed that this line of testimony, offered during cross‑examination, demonstrated the witness’s unreliability. The court noted that the witness’s inconsistent statements regarding who compared the copies with the original further eroded his credibility.

The subsequent cross‑examination, which took place after the charge was framed, revealed additional contradictions in the witness’s testimony. The witness explained that his statements had been recorded by Inspector Gurdas Mal on five or six occasions. He said that his first statement was probably recorded in August 1951, at which time he could not recall the name of the person who had handed him the file identified as Exhibit P B, and therefore he omitted that detail. Approximately ten to fifteen days later, he gave a second statement in which he remembered that Hari Chand Kalra had provided the file, and he recorded that name before the police. Inspector Gurdas Mal, identified as PW‑1, challenged this recollection, suggesting that the file could have been given either by Tara Chand or by Sri Ram. The inspector hinted that a colleague named Saxena had indicated Sri Ram as the source. The witness reported meeting Mr Saxena, who confirmed the suggestion, leading the witness to recall that Sri Ram had indeed given the file, and he subsequently recorded this version in a statement made in October 1951. The witness further recounted that on 1 October 1951, Sri Ram informed him that his services were terminated and advised him to seek other employment. He alleged that Sri Ram might have held personal grievances against him, noting that he was a favourite of Tara Chand, and that Tara Chand and Sri Ram were not on good terms. According to the witness, this strained relationship caused Tara Chand to attempt to retain the witness in service, while Sri Ram opposed the retention, resulting in a dispute over the termination. Even after the termination, Tara Chand allegedly told the witness that he would try to keep him employed. Inspector Gurdas Mal, PW‑1, was reported to have taken the witness to a magistrate during the investigation, where a statement was recorded under the threat of a penalty for non‑compliance.

During the investigation, the witness was taken to a magistrate who recorded his statement. The witness recalled that he had received a general warning from the police constable Gurdasmal, who told him that if he did not give a statement before the magistrate, he would be charged. The witness described an incident in which a man from Bombay asked him to type a file. He could not remember whether any description was written on the cover of the file, but he noted that the colour of the cover was similar to that of the document marked Exhibit P.B. He further stated that on one occasion he saw typed copies of the document Exhibit P.B. placed in a drawer of a table that was adjacent to his own. That table belonged to a typist who had left the service. The witness said that he had seen the police constables Dev Raj Gupta and Kishan Chand in the court at that time, and he suggested that perhaps it was Dev Raj Gupta who had brought the file for typing. In the cross‑examination, the witness, identified as Aggarwal, gave a wholly different account of who had actually handed him the file to copy. The narrative he offered in cross‑examination contradicted the version he had given in his examination‑in‑chief. The effect of this contradictory testimony was to raise serious doubt about the role played by the respondent in delivering the file marked Exhibit P.B. to Aggarwal for copying.

The magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge concluded that Aggarwal’s statements made during cross‑examination were false and that he had been influenced by the respondent. They held that the statements he made in his examination‑in‑chief were reliable. On behalf of the appellant, it was argued that the two courts of fact had accepted Aggarwal’s examination‑in‑chief testimony and that the High Court had not disbelieved him, thereby justifying the respondent’s conviction. The appellant contended that the High Court’s acquittal was based on the erroneous assumption that Aggarwal was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration.

The Additional Sessions Judge, in his judgment, referred to Aggarwal’s testimony and observed that, in the later cross‑examination, Aggarwal had made damaging statements that cast doubt on his earlier account. The judge noted that these statements were made long after the initial testimony and after the discharge of Tara Chand, the accused. Consequently, the judge inferred that Aggarwal had been won over and had deliberately misled the court under the influence of the accused, who had formerly been his employer. The judge supported this inference by pointing to a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code on 20 October 1951, in which Aggarwal claimed that he was still employed by Messrs Iron and Hardware (India) Company. At the same time, Aggarwal asserted in court that he had already been dismissed by Sri Ram, another accused, due to Sri Ram’s dispute with Tara Chand. The judgment indicated that the judge had relied on the Section 164 statement, although that statement had not been directly put to Aggarwal for confirmation.

Statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code are not substantive evidence in a trial and may be relied upon only to corroborate or to contradict a witness. Even when a witness admits that a statement was made under Section 164 and asserts that the contents of that statement are true, such an admission does not render the whole statement admissible, nor does it allow any portion of it to be used as substantive evidence. Accordingly, the Additional Sessions Judge committed a legal error by basing a conclusion that Aggarwal had been “won over” on the content of Aggarwal’s Section 164 statement. If that statement is excluded from consideration, the inference that Aggarwal was influenced after the completion of his examination‑in‑chief is merely speculative. Because the Additional Sessions Judge erred in law, the Court was required to assess Aggarwal’s testimony independently and to determine whether he could be regarded as a reliable witness whose evidence might support a conviction of the respondent. The various declarations made by Aggarwal during cross‑examination, both before and after the charge was framed, clearly show him to be an utterly untrustworthy witness. The Court was satisfied that relying on his testimony would be highly dangerous. In the absence of Aggarwal’s evidence, the remaining evidence in the case fails to establish that the respondent committed the offence with which he was charged. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.