State of Bihar vs Gopi Kishore Prasad

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 488 of 1957

Decision Date: 25 November 1959

Coram: B.P. Sinha (C.J), P.B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subbarao, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

In this appeal, the Court recorded the case titled State of Bihar versus Gopi Kishore Prasad, which was decided on 25 November 1959, and was cited as AIR 1960 SC 689. The appeal, designated as Appeal (Civil) 488 of 1957, was heard before a bench comprising Chief Justice B. P. Sinha, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. Subbarao, Justice K. C. Das Gupta, and Justice J. C. Shah. The petition was filed by the State of Bihar and the respondent was Gopi Kishore Prasad. The judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Sinha. The central issue for determination was whether the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution applied to a probationer in the Bihar Subordinate Civil Service who had been discharged as unsuitable on the grounds of notoriety for corruption and unsatisfactory performance in the discharge of his public duties.

The factual backdrop of the case was concise. The respondent had been appointed as a temporary Sub-Deputy Collector in 1944. Two years later, in 1946, he was vested with the powers of a First-Class magistrate. In December 1947, he secured a substantive post in the Bihar Subordinate Civil Service, albeit on probation. During his probationary tenure, he served initially at Jamshedpur in the Singhbhum district and subsequently at Nawada in the Gaya district. The Government initiated proceedings against him and, by a letter dated 4 November 1952, sent through the District Magistrate of Gaya, required him to show cause why his services should not be terminated forthwith.

The Government’s letter alleged that throughout the year 1948 and up to the end of May 1949, while employed as a Sub-Deputy Magistrate at Jamshedpur, the respondent had acquired notoriety for corrupt practices. It further asserted that from May 1949 to March 1951, during his posting at Nawada, his reputation remained poor, and that his judicial work at Jamshedpur had been examined closely by the Government, leading to the “discovery of incredibly perverse decisions” rendered by him. The letter also recited details of eight specific cases to support these allegations.

The proceedings concluded with an order of the Government of Bihar dated 23 July 1953. The relevant portions of that order stated, “Certain facts were brought to the notice of Government about the unsatisfactory work and conduct of Mr. Gopi Kishore Prasad, Sub-Deputy Collector, on probation, while posted at Jamshedpur and Nawadah, which raised grave doubts regarding his integrity and indicated that he was a corrupt and unreliable officer. Confidential enquiries were made and it was found that while employed at Jamshedpur Mr. Gopi Kishore Prasad had the reputation of being a corrupt officer. Two successive Deputy Commissioners of Singhbhum, under whom Mr. Prasad had served, had also mentioned in their annual confidential reports that this officer had a bad reputation at Jamshedpur. The judicial work of Mr. Prasad, while at Jamshedpur, was subjected to a careful scrutiny and Government found ample materials…”

After the reports that Mr Gopi Kishore Prasad had engaged in corrupt practices were found to be justified, the Government transferred him from Jamshedpur to Nawadah. Both the District Magistrate of Gaya and the Commissioner of Patna Division reported that his honesty at Nawadah was doubtful, and consequently he was transferred to Gaya. At Gaya his performance was evaluated as wholly unsatisfactory. In view of these circumstances the Government provisionally decided to terminate his probation and to remove him from service. Accordingly, the Government issued a show-cause notice requiring him to explain why he should not be discharged. The explanation he submitted was examined carefully and was held to be unsatisfactory. After consulting the Public Service Commission, the Government resolved to discharge Mr Prasad from service forthwith. An order dated 23 July 1953 declared that Mr Gopi Kishore Prasad, a probationary Sub-Deputy Collector, was discharged from service with effect from the date the order was served upon him, and that a copy of the resolution be forwarded to the District Magistrate of Gaya for service on Mr Prasad. The order bore the signature of B N Sinha, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Bihar, dated 24-July-1953.

The respondent then filed an application before the Patna High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, challenging the Government’s order. The High Court, comprising Justice V Ramaswami and Justice K Sahai, delivered its judgment on 19 January 1955, allowed the petition and set aside the discharge order of 23 July 1953. Justice Ramaswami, after considering the arguments raised on behalf of the respondent and after examining the relevant provisions of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules together with Article 311(2) of the Constitution, concluded that the respondent was not entitled to a full enquiry as prescribed in paragraph 1 of Rule 55 of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, but that he was entitled to the protection afforded by Article 311(2). He further held that the principles of natural justice had been breached because the special reports of the Commissioner of Chotanagpur Division and of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, had not been produced to the respondent. On these grounds, Justice Ramaswami declared the discharge order illegal and ultra-vires. Justice Sahai did not pronounce a definitive view on whether Article 311(2) applied, observing that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decision in I M Lall’s case (L.R. 75 I.A. 225) dealt with a confirmed officer, whereas the respondent was only a probationary officer. Nonetheless, Justice Sahai concurred with Justice Ramaswami in the final result, agreeing that the order must be set aside due to the violation of natural-justice principles.

In this matter the State of Bihar applied to the High Court for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, invoking the provision for special leave to appeal contained in Article 132(1) of the Constitution. The application was heard by Chief Justice S K Das, who was then the Chief Justice, together with Justice Kanhaiya Singh. The High Court, by an order dated 8 August 1955, denied the request for leave on the ground that the dispute had not been primarily concerned with the interpretation of Article 311 of the Constitution, but rather rested largely on an alleged breach of the principles of natural justice. After this refusal the State of Bihar filed a petition before this Court seeking special leave to appeal, and the Supreme Court granted such leave on 28 November 1955, thereby bringing the case before this Court. The central issue that this Court is required to consider is whether the safeguards embodied in Article 311(2) of the Constitution apply to a public servant who was still serving as a probationer and had not yet been confirmed in a permanent post. The question of whether there had been any violation of the principles of natural justice, which formed the basis of the High Court’s decision, was not raised before this Court. While the judgment of the High Court could have been left to rest solely on that ground, the fact that this Court granted special leave indicates that it intended to examine the question of the applicability of Article 311(2). Consequently, we feel it necessary to express our view on that aspect of the case. At the time this petition was being considered, the decision of this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (1958 (1) LLJ 544) had not yet been pronounced; had it been available, the special leave might not have been granted. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the controversy presented here is fully covered by the earlier Constitution Bench judgment in Dhingra. In that case the principal question was whether the appellant, Dhingra, had been demoted as a punitive measure by an order of the General Manager of the Railway. Although this Court ultimately held that the order in question did not amount to a demotion, the judgment contained an extensive analysis of service conditions, referring in particular to the Railway Service Rules, Section 240 of the Government of India Act 1935, and Article 311 of the Constitution. That detailed discussion examined every stage of public-service employment, including temporary appointments, probationary service, and confirmed positions. From those observations, the Court distilled principles applicable to the termination of service or discharge of a probationary public servant. The first principle stated that an appointment to a probationary post does not confer any right to the post, and consequently the employer may terminate the probationer’s service without resorting to the procedural safeguards laid down in the relevant service rules.

The Court explained that dismissing a public servant or removing him from service attracted different consequences depending on the circumstances. It held that when a person occupying a post on probation was terminated without any inquiry, such termination could not be said to deprive him of any right to the post and therefore did not constitute a punishment. However, the Court observed that if the employer, instead of terminating the service outright, conducted an inquiry into alleged misconduct, inefficiency, or any similar ground, the resulting termination amounted to a punishment because it placed a stigma on the employee’s competence and affected his future career prospects. In such a situation, the employee was entitled to the protection guaranteed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The Court further noted that if a probationer were discharged on any of those grounds without a proper inquiry and without being given a reasonable opportunity to show cause, the discharge would be regarded as a removal within the meaning of Article 311(2) and would be liable to be set aside. Conversely, if the employer simply terminated the services of a probationer without holding an inquiry and without providing a reasonable chance to show cause, the probationary civil servant could not maintain any cause of action, even though the true motive might have been the employer’s belief that the servant was unsuitable for the post because of misconduct or inefficiency.

The Court then applied these principles to the instant case. It observed that although the respondent was only a probationer, the Government had, after an inquiry, concluded that he was unsuitable for the post he held on probation. That conclusion, whether correct or not, was reached by a process that branded the respondent as dishonest and incompetent, thereby constituting a punishment. Consequently, the respondent was entitled to the protection of Article 311(2). The appellant argued that, as a mere probationer, the respondent could be discharged without any inquiry and that such discharge could not amount to punishment because the respondent had no right to the post. The Court agreed that the Government could, in principle, discharge a probationer without an inquiry if it merely decided that the person was unfit to hold a public-service post and did so without casting aspersions on his honesty or competence. In that limited scenario, the discharge would not amount to a removal by way of punishment, and the employee would have no grievance. However, in the present case the Government chose the more arduous route of conducting proceedings and branding the respondent as dishonest and incompetent, thereby invoking the protective ambit of Article 311(2).

The Court observed that the protection guaranteed by the Constitution under Article 311(2) had not been extended to the respondent. Because that statutory safeguard was denied, the respondent was entitled to approach the judiciary for relief. Accordingly, the Court held that the respondent had been improperly deprived of the protection provided by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. As a consequence of that deprivation, his removal from public service could not be said to comply with the constitutional requirements laid down in Article 311. The Court explained that Article 311(2) requires that before an employee of the public service can be removed, a reasonable opportunity of being heard must be given and the decision must be based on an inquiry prescribed by law. The Court noted that these procedural safeguards were not observed in the present case, rendering the removal arbitrary. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the denial of a hearing violated the principle of natural justice, which is embedded in the constitutional provision. As a result, the order of removal could not be sustained. The Court therefore concluded that the dismissal of the respondent did not satisfy the procedural and substantive safeguards mandated by the Constitution. In view of these findings, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the costs of the proceedings be borne by the appellant, in accordance with the standard rules governing appellate costs.