State of Bihar and Others vs Bhabapritananda Ojha

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 236 of 1954

Decision Date: 15 April 1959

Coram: S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah

In the matter titled State of Bihar and others versus Bhabapritananda Ojha, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 15 April 1959. The opinion was authored by Justice S K Das and was pronounced by a bench comprising Justices S K Das, P B Gajendragadkar, K N Wanchoo and M Hidayatullah. The petitioner in the proceeding was the State of Bihar together with other respondents, while the respondent was Bhabapritananda Ojha. The case is cited as 1959 AIR 1073 and also reported in the Supreme Court Supplement, volume 2, page 624, with subsequent citation in the 1963 Supreme Court Reports.

The controversy centered on the constitutional validity of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951). Specific provisions of that Act, namely sections 3, 4(5), 28 and 29, were examined in relation to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, particularly section 92, and the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution of India. The factual backdrop involved an ancient temple located in the State of Bihar. In 1897 a dispute arose between the high priest of the temple and the group known as the “pandas” over control of the temple. The disagreement gave rise to a suit filed under section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has since been renumbered as section 92, before the District Judge of Burdwan. The Additional District Judge subsequently issued a decree that incorporated a scheme aimed at the proper management of the temple. That decree was affirmed by the Calcutta High Court, and the High Court later amended the scheme on several occasions.

After the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, came into force, the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, acting under section 59 of that Act, served a notice on the respondent, who had been appointed Sardar Panda for the temple under the scheme. The notice required him to furnish a statement concerning the temple and the properties attached to it. In response, the respondent filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Patna High Court, challenging the validity of the notice. He pleaded three grounds: first, that the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, was beyond the legislative power of the Bihar Legislature; second, that the Bihar Legislature lacked competence to legislate concerning the temple because certain properties belonging to the temple were situated outside the territorial limits of Bihar; and third, that the Act could not apply to the temple because the temple and its assets were administered under a scheme devised by the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court, both institutions being located outside Bihar, and that applying the Act would consequently interfere with the jurisdiction of courts outside Bihar, creating an extra-territorial effect.

The Court, after considering the submissions, held that the first ground raised by the respondent was untenable and proceeded to examine the remaining issues, beginning with the question of whether the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, fell within the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature.

The Court held that the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act of 1950 was within the legislative competence of the Bihar State Legislature, relying on the authority in Mahant Moti Das v. S. P. Sahi, [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 563. The Court further observed that the Bihar Legislature possessed the power to enact legislation concerning religious trusts situated in Bihar even if certain trust properties extended beyond the state’s territorial limits, a view supported by State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi, [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 601. The Court affirmed the validity of the provision contained in subsection (5) of section 4 of the Act, which excludes the application of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure to any religious trust located in Bihar. Consequently, the Court concluded that, under section 4(5) of the Act, religious trusts in Bihar are removed from the reach of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure; therefore, the jurisdiction of the District Judge of Burdwan or the Calcutta High Court to entertain matters concerning the temple in question under section 92 ceases to exist. In this manner, the Court found that the Act and its various provisions do not suffer from any extra-territorial defect and that the Act duly applies to the temple and the properties associated with it.

The appeal arose from a judgment and order dated 9 October 1953 of the Patna High Court in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 181 of 1953, and was filed as Civil Appeal No. 236 of 1954. The matter concerned a temple commonly known as the Baidyanath Temple, located in the town of Deoghar within the Santal Parganas district of Bihar. The judgment was delivered by Justice S. K. Das on 15 April 1959. The State of Bihar was represented by the Advocate-General for the State of Bihar and counsel for the appellants, while the respondent was represented by counsel for the respondent. For the purpose of the appeal, the Court referred to earlier litigation concerning the temple. The historical background of the temple was acknowledged as extending to remote antiquity. Hindu tradition, as recorded in the Siva Purana and Padma Purana and cited in scholarly works, attributes the origin of the temple to the Treta Yuga, the second epoch in Hindu cosmology. Parallel to this, a Santal tradition concerning the temple’s origin is reported in historical accounts such as those of Sir William Hunter. The Court noted that these traditional narratives do not provide concrete evidence regarding the specific time or individual who installed the idol or constructed the temple.

The shrine that housed the lingam and was dedicated to Mahadeva was situated in a stone-paved quadrangular courtyard. Within that courtyard stood eleven additional temples, each smaller and regarded as less important than the main Baidyanath temple. Large numbers of pilgrims visited the complex and presented flowers and money in silver or gold as offerings. Wealthy devotees also contributed horses, cattle, palanquins, gold ornaments and other valuable items, and on occasion they donated rent-free land to support the daily worship. At the head of the temple hierarchy was a chief priest known as the Sardar Panda. Historical records indicated that during the Muhammadan regime the Sardar Panda paid a fixed rent to the Rajas of Birbhum, and the whole administration of the temple was then placed entirely in the hands of the chief priest. Approximately three hundred families of “pandas,” who belonged to a branch of Maithil Brahmins, were attached to the temple; these families earned their livelihood by assisting pilgrims in performing the various ceremonies connected with the worship of the deity.

When British rule was established, the authorities decided to assume control of the temple’s management. To this end, an establishment comprising priests, collectors and watchmen was organised in 1787 at the expense of the Government. The revenue soon declined because the chief priest obstructed the approaches to the temples by sending emissaries who persuaded pilgrims to make their offerings before reaching the shrine, as recorded in the District Gazetteer. Consequently, in 1791 the Government relinquished its claim to a share of the offerings and entrusted the management of the temple to the head priest, on the condition that he would keep the temples in repair and perform all the usual ceremonies. This agreement was executed between Ram Dutt, the ancestor of the present respondent and then high priest of the temple, and Mr Keating, who was then the Collector of the district.

According to the statements of Mr Keating, the temple’s income in 1791 consisted of the proceeds from offerings on thirty-two villages and one-hundred eight bighas of land, which he estimated to be about Rs 2,000 per year. A few years later the total income was estimated at Rs 25,000 per year. Under the system introduced by the 1791 agreement, the temple suffered from chronic mismanagement, which became a continual source of complaint. The temples and the accompanying ghats were frequently found to be in a state of disrepair, and the chief priest was accused of alienating villages that belonged to the temple and of using his position to enrich himself and his family.

The chief priest died in 1820, and a dispute arose over his succession between his uncle and his nephew. The nephew, Nityanand, was eventually appointed, but he failed to fulfil the obligations imposed by his appointment. He was later charged with malversation of the temple’s funds, and in 1823 the uncle, Sarbanand, was installed in his place. A faction opposed to Sarbanand’s continuation in office petitioned the Government for interference in the internal management of the temple. In 1835 the Government declined to intervene, leaving the disputing parties to resolve their differences without official assistance.

After the death of Sarbanand in 1837, his son Iswaranund Ojha was elected to the position of Sardar-Panda. Iswaranund was later succeeded by his grandson, Sailajanund Ojha. Relations between the high priest and the pandas remained strained, and disputes over control of the temple continued to arise. In 1897 a suit was instituted under section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 92) before the Court of the District Judge of Burdwan. The suit, identified as Suit No. 18 of 1897, was decided by the learned Additional District Judge of Burdwan in a judgment dated 4 July 1901. The Additional District Judge dismissed Sailajanund Ojha from his office, holding that his conduct and behaviour had caused loss to the Debutter properties and therefore rendered him unfit and disqualified to continue as Sardar-Panda and as a trustee of the Baidyanath temple. The judge further ordered that a suitable person be elected as Sardar-Panda by the pandas of the temple and that the temple’s affairs be administered under a scheme framed by the judge and incorporated into the decree. Under that scheme three individuals were to be appointed to supervise the temple and its properties in order to ensure proper administration, and one of the three was required to be elected from among the descendants of Ram Dutt Jha. Following the implementation of the scheme, Umeshanund Dutt Jha, the second son of Iswaranund Ojha, was elected Sardar-Panda. After the death of Umeshanund Dutt Jha, Bhabapritananda Ojha—who had previously been the petitioner before the High Court and who now appeared as the respondent—was appointed Sardar-Panda. Bhabapritananda Ojha is the grandson of Sailajanund Ojha, and the judgment refers to him henceforth as the respondent. The scheme that resulted from the decision in Civil Suit No. 18 of 1897 was later confirmed by the Calcutta High Court, the decision being reported in Shailajananda Dut Jha v. Umeshanunda Dut Jha (1905) 2 C.L.J. 460. In 1909 the scheme was modified after a committee member applied to the District Judge for a modification. That application was initially dismissed, prompting the matter to be taken to the Calcutta High Court. On 8 September 1910 the Calcutta High Court, relying on the Judicial Committee’s decision in Prayag Doss v. Tirumala and with the consent of counsel on both sides, directed the insertion of two clauses into the decree. The first clause guaranteed any interested person the liberty to apply to the District Court of Burdwan concerning the implementation of the scheme’s directions, and the second clause reserved to any interested person the liberty to apply from time to time to the Calcutta High Court for any further relief concerning the scheme.

In this case, the Court observed that the two clauses added to the earlier decree allowed any person with an interest to approach the District Court of Burdwan for directions concerning the execution of the scheme, and also allowed any interested person to petition the Calcutta High Court from time to time for any modification of the scheme that might appear necessary or convenient. Acting under those provisions, the members of the committee subsequently filed an application before the District Judge of Burdwan requesting that certain directions be issued to the high priest. The high priest objected, contending that the application was essentially a request to alter the scheme and that such a request could be entertained only by the High Court. The learned District Judge rejected the high priest’s objection and allowed the application to proceed. The matter was again taken to the Calcutta High Court, which, in its order, directed that (1) the committee must prepare an annual budget of income and expenditure; (2) a provision must be made for a quarterly audit and an annual inspection of the accounts; (3) a provision should be made for joint control of the temple funds after they have been realised; (4) there must be no undue interference by the committee with the high priest in the internal management of the temple; and (5) no person who has any pecuniary interest in the temple properties or who is a creditor of the endowment should serve on the committee. The High Court further ordered that clauses embodying the foregoing five directions be inserted into the scheme. That decision of the Calcutta High Court is reported in Umeshananda Dutta Jha v. Sir Ravaneswar Prasad Singh. The Court then turned to more recent events that gave rise to Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 181 of 1953, reported in I.L.R. 30 Mad. 138 and 17 C.W.N. 871. The Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act I of 1951), hereinafter referred to as “the Act,” received the President’s assent on 21 February 1951 and came into force on 15 August 1951. The Act created the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts to discharge the functions assigned to it by the statute. In August 1952, the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, acting under section 59 of the Act, requested the respondent to furnish a statement concerning the Baidyanath temple and the properties attached to it. The respondent replied that the administration of the temple and its properties was in the hands of a committee constituted under a scheme made by the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court, and that, because those courts were outside the jurisdiction of the Bihar Legislature, the Act did not apply to the temple. Consequently, the respondent stated that it was not in a position to comply with any directions of the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts that might conflict with those of the Calcutta High Court. Nevertheless, the Board proceeded to assess and demand a fee of Rs. 1,684-6-6 from the respondent in respect of the Baidyanath temple under section 70 of the Act. The respondent then filed an application under article 226 of the Constitution before the Patna High Court, and that application gave rise to the present proceedings.

In Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 181 of 1953, the respondent asserted that the Bihar Religious Trusts Act was ultra vires the Bihar Legislature, and even assuming it was intra vires, the Act should not apply to the Baidyanath temple and its properties because they were administered under a scheme created by the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court, both situated outside the territorial limits of Bihar. The State of Bihar, the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, and the President of that Board, who are now appellants, contested the respondent’s application. They relied on two principles: first, that jurisdictional conflict between two equally competent authorities should be avoided as far as possible; second, that the Bihar Legislature cannot be said to have intended to exceed its jurisdiction, and that, where two possible constructions of the Act exist, the construction that renders the Act intra vires should be preferred. Applying these principles, the High Court concluded that the expression “religious trust” defined in section 2(1) of the Act must not be given its ordinary plain meaning but must be narrowed to exclude trusts administered under a scheme made by a court situated outside Bihar. Consequently, the Court held that the Act did not extend to the Baidyanath temple and that the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, created under the Act, lacked jurisdiction to institute any proceedings against the respondent under its provisions. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the respondent’s application, set aside the proceedings initiated by the Board, and issued a writ prohibiting the Board from taking any further action against the respondent under any provision of the Act. The State of Bihar, the Board and its President subsequently obtained a certificate under article 132 of the Constitution from the High Court, and they filed the present appeal in accordance with that certificate. For brevity, they will be referred to collectively as the appellants. The Court has before it several appeals challenging the validity of the Act on various grounds; in some of those appeals, additional questions have arisen concerning the Act’s applicability to private religious trusts and to public trusts whose properties lie outside Bihar. These appeals have been classified into four categories and heard sequentially. Although separate judgments are being delivered for each category, the Court clarified that reasoning common to all or to several of the appeals need not be repeated in every judgment. In Civil Appeals Nos.

In the appeals numbered 225, 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 1955 (1), which belong to the first category, the Court examined whether the Act was invalid because certain provisions were alleged to infringe the appellants’ fundamental rights under Article 14, Article 19(1)(f) and Articles 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution, or because the Act was said to impose an unauthorised tax. The Court explained the reasons for concluding that the Act was not invalid on any of those grounds. Those reasons have already been set out in earlier judgments and therefore need not be repeated here; they also apply to the present appeal wherever the Act is challenged on the same grounds. In Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955 (2), which falls in the second category, the Court gave a detailed analysis of the definition clause that describes a “religious trust” and considered its relationship with other provisions of the Act. The conclusion reached was that the Act does not extend to private trusts. In the appeal that is presently before us, the accepted fact is that the Baidyanath temple is a public trust, a finding that was established in the earlier litigation mentioned earlier and upon which the scheme was based in Suit No. 18 of 1897. In Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1955 (3), representing the third category, the Court considered whether the Act suffered from the defect of extra-territoriality because of the wording in section 3, which states that the Act applies to all religious trusts, irrespective of when they were created, if any part of their property is situated in the State of Bihar. The Court held that two conditions must be satisfied for the Act to apply: first, the religious trust or institution must be located in Bihar; second, some portion of its property must be situated in Bihar. Both conditions are satisfied in the present case because the Baidyanath temple is located in Bihar and, although the temple’s assets are mainly in Bihar, it is admitted that some properties are located in the districts of Burdwan, Murshidabad and Birbhum, which are now part of the State of West Bengal. Having dealt with those earlier categories, the Court now turns to the issues specifically raised in the present appeal, which constitute the fourth and final category. The appellants have argued very strongly that the High Court erred in invoking the doctrine of comity of jurisdictions and in limiting the scope of the Act on that basis. They submit that the doctrine of comity of jurisdictions is inapplicable to the facts of this case and that there can be no possibility of any conflict or clash of jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities.

The appellants asserted that the situation did not involve any conflict or clash of jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities. They highlighted that item twenty-eight of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India enumerates “Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions.” On that basis, they argued that the Bihar Legislature possessed full legislative competence to enact the statute that is before the Court. The appellants further submitted that, provided the Act does not suffer from the vice of extra-territoriality, the statute is valid and all courts are bound to give it effect. They pointed out that under section four sub-paragraph five of the Act, section ninety-two of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ceases to apply to any religious trust as defined by the Act. Consequently, after the commencement of the Act, no suit may be instituted under section ninety-two of the Code against religious trusts in Bihar that fall within the ambit of the Act. The appellants therefore contended that there can be no question of a jurisdictional conflict between the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts and a court in Bihar on one side, and courts outside the State of Bihar on the other, with respect to such trusts. On these submissions, counsel for the appellants argued that the real issue for determination is whether the Act or any of its provisions suffers from extra-territoriality. If that issue is answered in favour of the appellants, the High Court would have erred in restricting the scope of the Act by invoking the doctrine of comity of jurisdictions. At this juncture, it is appropriate to outline briefly the argument advanced by the respondent’s counsel, Mr P R Das, in support of the High Court’s judgment. The High Court, in one part of its reasoning, referred to the principle that every statute must, insofar as its language permits, be interpreted and applied so as not to be inconsistent with the comity of nations or with established rules of international law, citing several decisions to that effect. Mr P R Das openly conceded before this Court that no question of inconsistency with the comity of nations or with established international law arises in the present case, and he does not contend that the Act or any of its provisions violate any such rule. Accordingly, that portion of the High Court’s judgment need not be examined further. Mr P R Das then developed his argument by first submitting that Suit No 18 of 1897, instituted in the court of the District Judge of Burdwan concerning the Baidyanath temple and its properties, remains pending, and that the administration of the temple and its assets is being carried out by a committee appointed under a scheme devised by the District Judge of Burdwan.

In his submission, counsel argued that the scheme created by the District Judge of Burdwan and subsequently approved and modified by the Calcutta High Court placed the District Judge of Burdwan together with the Calcutta High Court in complete possession of the trust and its properties. Consequently, the counsel maintained that the Legislature of Bihar lacked any authority to remove or interfere with the jurisdiction exercised by either the District Judge of Burdwan or the Calcutta High Court. To support this position, counsel referred to clause 39 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court, specifically to item (a) of the first proviso contained in that clause. The clause was quoted in full, stating that the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal in any matter transferred to the High Court of Judicature at Patna would cease from the date of publication of the presents, and that all proceedings pending in the former court on that date would be transferred to the latter court. The proviso further provided that the High Court of Judicature at Fort William would continue to exercise jurisdiction in three categories: (a) in all proceedings pending on the date of publication in which a decree or order, other than an interlocutory order, had already been passed or made, or in which the validity of such a decree or order was directly challenged; (b) in all proceedings not covered by paragraph (a) that were pending under the various enumerated clauses of the Letters Patent dated 28 December 1865; and (c) in all proceedings instituted in that court on or after the date of publication with reference to any decree or order passed or made by that court. The proviso also stipulated that any doubt as to whether a case fell within the first proviso should be referred to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William, whose decision would be final. Based on this provision, counsel argued that the scheme devised by the District Judge of Burdwan could be altered only by the Calcutta High Court, and that the Calcutta High Court retained jurisdiction over the scheme by virtue of item (a) of the first proviso to clause 39. Counsel further contended that clause 41 of the Letters Patent did not confer upon the Bihar Legislature any power to amend any of the clauses of the Letters Patent. Additionally, counsel cited a decision of the Calcutta High Court dated 9 February 1917, which held that any application seeking enforcement of the scheme should be filed before the District Judge of Burdwan and not before the Deputy Commissioner of Dumka.

In this case the Court noted that the scheme was directed to the District Judge of Burdwan and not to the Deputy Commissioner of Dumka, and it pointed out that Burdwan lies in the State of West Bengal while Dumka lies in the State of Bihar. Counsel for the petitioner, identified as Mr P R Das, argued that the provisions of the Act interfere with the jurisdiction of courts outside Bihar and therefore have extra-territorial operation, which would render them invalid. He relied on Article 245 of the Constitution, which permits the Bihar Legislature to make laws for the whole or any part of Bihar but bars it from making any law that has extra-territorial effect. He specifically drew attention to sections 3, 4(5), 28 and especially section 29 of the Act, contending that these sections extend beyond Bihar’s territorial limits. After setting out the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and the respondent, the Court turned to consider them on their merits. It agreed with counsel for both sides that no question arose of any conflict with the doctrine of comity of nations or with any established rule of international law. The real issue, the Court said, was whether any provision of the Act possesses extra-territorial operation. This question had two aspects. First, section 3 provides that the Act shall apply to all religious trusts, any part of whose property is situated in the State of Bihar. The petitioner's contention was that the Bihar Legislature lacked power to legislate concerning trust property located outside the territorial limits of Bihar and that the portion of section 3 that sought to operate on such property made the Act invalid on the ground of extra-territorial operation. The Court noted that this argument had already been fully dealt with and rejected in the decision relating to the Charusila Trust, Civil Appeal No 230 of 1955. The second facet, which Mr P R Das emphasized, was that certain provisions of the Act seek to interfere with the jurisdiction of courts outside Bihar, and that this interference constituted an extra-territorial defect. The Court could not accept this contention. It reiterated that section 3 had already been considered. Sub-section (5) of section 4 states that section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall not apply to any religious trust in the State of Bihar as defined in the Act. The Court had examined the effect of this sub-section in the Charusila Trust case and held that the Act applies when the trust, temple, deity or math is situated in Bihar, even if some of its property is located elsewhere. Consequently the Court concluded that the Bihar Legislature may validly legislate concerning religious trusts situated in Bihar and that the provisions in question do not interfere with the jurisdiction of courts outside the state.

The Court observed that a religious trust whose seat and a portion of its property are located in Bihar falls within the legislative authority of the State of Bihar, and that the trustees, their servants and agents must also be present in Bihar to manage the trust; consequently, the Act could not be said to operate extraterritorially. The Court held that this reasoning also answered the contention raised by Mr P R Das. Because the Bihar Legislature is competent to enact laws concerning religious trusts situated in Bihar, it may, as it did in sub-section (5) of section 4 of the Act, declare that section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to any religious trust within the State. If that sub-section is valid, there is no longer any question of interfering with the jurisdiction of the District Judge of Burdwan or of the Calcutta High Court in respect of the Baidyanath temple, since those courts derived their jurisdiction from section 92, a provision that ceased to apply to the temple and its associated properties after the Act came into force. The Court noted that the Act indeed puts an end to the operation of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to all courts dealing with religious trusts situated in Bihar, but it does so by removing those trusts from the purview of section 92 rather than by stripping any court outside Bihar of its jurisdiction. In other words, a court located outside Bihar, acting under section 92, will refuse to entertain a suit involving a Bihar-situated religious trust just as it would decline to hear a case concerning a private religious or charitable trust. The Court further pointed out that civil procedure, including all matters covered by the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution, is listed as item 13 of the Concurrent List, and that it had not been contested that the Bihar Legislature may amend the Code of Civil Procedure when legislating on religious endowments and institutions in Bihar. Having obtained the President’s assent, the law enacted by the Bihar Legislature would, under article 254(2) of the Constitution, prevail within the State for all religious trusts situated there. On this basis, the Court found it unnecessary to examine additional questions such as whether Suit No 18 of 1897 remained pending, the precise scope and effect of clause 39 of the Patna High Court’s Letters Patent, or the authority competent to amend the Letters Patent. Even if Suit No 18 of 1897 were still considered pending, the Court indicated that further discussion on those points was not required.

In this case, the Court observed that any further action under the scheme concerning the Baidyanath temple and its properties could be initiated only by the District Judge of Burdwan or by the Calcutta High Court, and that such action was permissible solely if the jurisdiction provided by section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code remained applicable to the temple and its assets. The Court explained that if that jurisdiction had ceased to exist with respect to the Baidyanath temple and its properties, then no issue of conflicting jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities could arise at all. Moreover, the Court noted that the broader and more contentious question—whether the Bihar Legislature on the one hand and the courts in Bengal on the other could be regarded as equally competent authorities concerning a religious trust situated in Bihar—became irrelevant. The essential inquiry, the Court said, reduced to whether the Act was invalid on the ground of extraterritorial operation because it removed certain religious trusts located in Bihar from the scope of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court stated that if the answer to that question were negative, then all the obstacles raised by the counsel of Mr P R Das would disappear; a valid Act would bind all courts and no jurisdictional conflict could arise. The counsel for the respondent then made a specific reference to sections 28 and 29 of the Act. Section 28 deals with the general powers and duties of the Board, and the Court recalled that those powers and duties had been examined in its earlier decision in the connected Civil Appeals numbered 225, 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 1955, where it had held that nothing in those powers could be said to have an extraterritorial effect. The Court further directed attention to clause (j) of subsection (2) of section 28, which authorises the Board, upon an application by a trustee or any other person interested in the religious trust, to sanction the conversion of any property of the trust into another form of property, provided the Board is satisfied that such conversion would be beneficial to the trust. The Court emphasized that these powers are intended solely for the fulfilment of the trust and do not in any manner prejudice the rights of the trustees. Section 29, as quoted, states: “29(1). Where the supervision of a religious trust is vested in any committee or association appointed by the founder or by a competent Court or authority, such committee or association shall continue to function under the general superintendence and control of the Board, unless superseded by the Board under subsection (2). (2) The Board may supersede any committee or association referred to in sub-section (1) which in the opinion of the Board, is not discharging its functions satisfactorily and, if the Board does so, any decree or order of a Court or authority by which such committee or association was constituted shall be deemed to have been”. The Court noted that this provision gives the Board the authority to intervene in the administration of the religious trust when a committee or association is deemed ineffective, thereby reinforcing the Board’s supervisory role over such trusts.

Section 29 of the Act provides that before the Board makes any order under sub-section (2) to supersede a committee or association, the Board must first inform that committee or association of the reasons for the proposed supersession. The Board must also allow a reasonable time for the committee or association to present any objections or explanations. If the Board proceeds under sub-section (2), the affected committee, association, or any other person interested in the religious trust may, within thirty days of the Board’s order, file an application before the District Judge seeking to vary, modify, or set aside that order. Subject to the District Judge’s decision on such an application, the Board’s order remains final and binding on the applicant and on every person interested in the trust. Furthermore, when a committee or association has been superseded, the Board is empowered to make any arrangements it deems necessary for the administration of the religious trust.

The parties argued that subsection (1) of section 29 grants the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts the authority to interfere with a committee that was appointed either by the founder of the trust or by a competent court or authority. Specifically, it was contended that the Board could now interfere with, and even supersede, the committee that had been appointed under the scheme devised by the District Judge of Burdwan and subsequently approved by the Calcutta High Court. The Court addressed this contention by noting that the answer to it is the same as previously explained. The crucial question is whether the Act is invalid because it operates extraterritorially, or whether it is valid. If the Act is found to be invalid on the ground of extraterritorial operation, then it would be reasonable to narrow the scope of section 29 so that it would apply only to committees appointed by a competent court or authority situated in Bihar. Conversely, if the Bihar Legislature is capable of amending the Civil Procedure Code in respect of a religious trust situated in Bihar and thereby removing that trust from the operation of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, there is no justification for restricting the ambit of section 29 in the manner suggested by the High Court.

The Court observed that a State’s legislation is generally territorial and that the general rule is that a judgment pronounced outside the territory is not to be complied with. Nevertheless, the Court held that this rule does not prevent the Bihar Legislature, when legislating about a trust that is located in Bihar, from prescribing the measures needed to achieve the objects of that trust. In doing so, the Legislature may supplant an older jurisdiction with a new one appropriate to the trust’s needs. The doctrine of territorial nexus, which had been discussed at length by counsel for the respondent, was therefore relevant. The Court also referred to its earlier consideration of the doctrine and the case law on that point in the decision relating to the Charusila Trust, Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1955, noting that the doctrine and the decisions relating to it had been examined extensively.

In 1955 the Court stated that it would not repeat the detailed reasoning already expressed in an earlier judgment. The Court then explained that after careful consideration it concluded that the statute and each of its provisions were not afflicted by the problem of extra-territorial application as had been argued by counsel for the respondent. The Court further observed that no conflict of jurisdiction existed between the statute and the powers asserted by the respondent. Consequently the Court held that the statute was valid and could be enforced with respect to the Baidyanath temple and the assets that belong to that temple. Because the statute was held to be applicable, the Court found that the appeal was successful and ordered that it be allowed together with an award of costs to the appellant. The Court also set aside the judgment and order of the High Court dated 9 October 1953 and declared that the High Court’s earlier finding had been erroneous. In addition, the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by the respondent was dismissed, also with costs. The decision thereby clarified that the legislative competence of the State extended to matters concerning trusts situated within its territory, and the appeal was formally allowed.