Shri V. V. Giri vs Dippala Suri Dora And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 539 of 1958

Decision Date: 20 May 1959

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam, J.L. Kapur, K.N. Wanchoo

In the case titled Shri V. V. Giri versus Dippala Suri Dora and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 20 May 1959. The opinion was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar and was decided by a bench comprising Justices P. B. Gajendragadkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam, J. L. Kapur and K. N. Wanchoo. The petitioner was Shri V. V. Giri and the respondents were Dippala Suri Dora and others. The case is reported in 1959 AIR 1318 and 1960 SCR (1) 426. The matters under consideration arose under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, particularly section 54(4), and the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952, section 8, and involved the election of members in a double-member parliamentary constituency in which one seat was reserved for Scheduled Tribes and the other seat was a general seat. Four candidates filed nominations: G1 and G2 for the general seat and S1 and S2 for the reserved seat. At the poll the order of votes received was S1, S2, G1 and G2. Following the provisions of section 54(4), S1 was declared elected to the reserved seat and, among the remaining candidates, S2 secured the highest number of votes and was therefore declared elected to the general seat. G1 filed an election petition seeking a declaration that the election of S2 was void and that he himself should be declared elected to the general seat. The petition was based on three grounds: first, that a proper construction of section 54(4) would preclude a candidate who had nominated for the reserved seat from being elected to the general seat; second, that if the provision were otherwise, it was ultra-vires of the Constitution; and third, that S2 had ceased to be a member of a Scheduled Tribe at the relevant time, rendering his nomination invalid. The Court held, with Justice Kapur expressing a dissenting view, that S2 had been properly and validly declared elected. The Court observed that the Constitution and the Act indicate that an election in a double-member constituency is conducted for the entire constituency rather than for individual seats, and that a candidate nominating as a member of a Scheduled Tribe is entitled to contest both seats. On a fair construction of section 54(4), after S1’s election to the reserved seat, the votes of the remaining three candidates must be considered to determine the winner of the general seat. The Court further held that a member of a Scheduled Tribe does not lose the right to seek election to a general seat simply by availing the additional concession of standing for the reserved seat, and that filing two separate nomination papers for the two seats is not required. The Court found that section 54(4) does not offend article 14 or article 330 of the Constitution and is not unconstitutional. The petitioner failed to establish that S2 had ceased to be a member of a Scheduled Tribe and had become a Kshatriya; caste status, the Court noted, is determined by birth and the recognition of the community and cannot be altered merely by personal volition, education, culture or status.

The Court observed that a person could not be barred from contesting the general seat merely because he had availed himself of the additional concession of standing for the reserved seat by making the prescribed declaration for that purpose. The Court explained that it was not required for such a candidate to file two separate nomination papers, one for each seat. It further held that Section 54(4) of the Act did not offend Article 14 or Article 330 of the Constitution and therefore was not unconstitutional. The Court also noted that the appellant had failed to establish that S2 had ceased to be a member of the scheduled tribe and had become a Kshatriya. While acknowledging that the origin of Hindu castes and tribes in ancient times may have been rooted in concepts such as guna, karma and subhavana, the Court observed that over the ages castes gradually came to be based on birth alone. Consequently, a person who belonged by birth to a depressed caste or tribe would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attain the status of a higher caste solely through his own volition, education, culture or personal status. The Court stated that the caste status of any individual had to be determined by the recognition he received from the members of the caste into which he sought entry; unilateral claims by the individual asserting a higher status were not sufficient to establish such status. The Court expressed a hope that this situation would change, and that in time the ideal of a casteless society based on true social equality might be realised through the doctrine of social justice and equality proclaimed by the Constitution, the implementation of relevant statutes, the spread of secular education, the growth of a rational outlook and the development of proper social values. Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that at present it would be unrealistic and utopian to ignore the considerable difficulties that a member of a depressed tribe or caste faces when trying to claim a higher status among his co-religionists.

Per Justice Kapur’s judgment, the election of S2 to the general seat was not valid. The Court explained that when a member of a scheduled tribe or caste offers himself for election to a reserved seat, he can be elected only to that reserved seat and not to the general seat. The provisions of the Constitution and of the Act, the Court said, show that an election in a constituency is for filling a specific seat in that constituency, not for the constituency as a whole. Accordingly, a candidate who wishes to contest both the reserved and the general seats must file two separate nomination papers—one for each seat—and must make two separate deposits. The Court further observed that Section 8(2) of the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952, effectively destroyed the operation of Section 54 of the Act. The judgment also discussed the origin of caste in Hinduism, noting that it was originally based not on birth but on qualities such as guna, karma and subhavana (quality, actions and character). The Court described caste as essentially a division of labour and remarked that Hinduism might at one time have become static, indicating that the earlier fluid basis of caste had given way to a more rigid, birth-based system.

The court observed that caste in Hinduism is not fixed by birth alone but is determined by a person’s actions, known as karma, and that an individual can elevate his social status through his deeds; consequently, Section 2 recognized that a person who, by his actions, raised himself to the status of a Kshatriya ceased to belong to the scheduled tribe or caste. The matter before the court was Civil Appeal No 539 of 1958, filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 13 March 1958 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Special Appeal No 4 of 1957, which itself arose from the judgment and order dated 18 November 1957 of the Election Tribunal, Hyderabad, in Election Petition No 83 of 1957. Counsel for the appellant, counsel for respondent 1 and counsel for respondent 2 appeared. The judgment was delivered on 20 May 1959 by the learned judges B P Sinha, Jafar Imam, P B Ganjendragadkar and K N Wanchoo, with a separate judgment authored by J J L Kapur. The appeal concerned an election petition filed by V V Giri, the appellant, challenging the validity of the election of Dippala Suri Dora, respondent 1. The contested constituency was Parvatipuram in the State of Andhra Pradesh, a double-member parliamentary constituency in which one seat was reserved for scheduled tribes and the other was a general seat. In the 1957 general election to the House of the People four candidates were nominated from that constituency: the appellant and B Satyanarayana Dora, identified as respondent 2, were candidates of the Congress Party, while respondent 1 and V Krishnamoorthy Naidu, identified as respondent 3, were candidates of the Socialist Party. Polling in the constituency was conducted between 25 February and 19 March 1957, and the counted votes were as follows: the appellant received 124,039 votes, respondent 1 received 124,604 votes, respondent 2 received 126,792 votes and respondent 3 received 118,968 votes. The result declared on 19 March 1957 announced that respondent 2 had been elected to the reserved seat and respondent 1 to the general seat. On 16 April 1957 the appellant filed Election Petition No 83 of 1957 challenging respondent 1’s election. He contended that respondent 1 had offered himself as a candidate for the reserved seat and therefore was not entitled to be elected for the general seat; alternatively, he asserted that respondent 1 was not a member of the scheduled tribe at the material time, rendering the declaration made by him false. Consequently, the appellant argued that respondent 1’s nomination had been improperly accepted and that this error had materially affected the election outcome. The appellant therefore sought two declarations: that the election of respondent 1 under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act 43 of 1951) was void, and that he himself had been duly elected to the House of the People from the Parvatipuram parliamentary constituency for the general, non-reserved seat.

In this case, the appellant alleged that the election of respondent 1 was invalid and that the appellant himself had been duly elected to the House of the People from the Parvatipuram Parliamentary Constituency for the general, non-reserved seat. Respondent 1 denied these allegations. Broadly, the appellant’s case rested on two principal grounds. First, the appellant pointed out that both the Congress and Socialist Parties had nominated two candidates each, one for the reserved seat and another for the general seat. Respondent 1 had been nominated for the reserved seat and, in the nomination forms filed on his behalf, he had made the statutory declaration that he belonged to a scheduled tribe. The appellant argued that respondent 1 conducted his election campaign on the basis that he was a candidate for the reserved seat, and that the electorate must have voted for him with that understanding. Accordingly, if the rival candidate for the reserved seat, respondent 2, obtained a larger number of votes and was declared elected to that seat, respondent 1 could not subsequently claim election to the general seat. The appellant framed the question: if a candidate offers himself for one seat, how can he then claim to be elected for the other? Second, the appellant conceded that reservation of seats for scheduled castes or tribes is a special concession granted because members of those groups are educationally, socially and financially backward. The appellant also acknowledged that members of scheduled castes or tribes are permitted to contest the general seat. However, the appellant maintained that a member of a scheduled tribe must decide which seat he wishes to contest. If he intends to contest the general seat, he should not make the declaration required for a reserved-seat candidature; conversely, if he wishes to contest the reserved seat, he must make the declaration and focus his campaign on that seat. Once a candidate has made the election for a particular seat, he cannot afterwards rely on the right to be elected for the other seat. The appellant argued that this reasoning was both plausible and attractive. Respondent 1, on the other hand, disputed the validity of the appellant’s contention. He argued that while reservation of seats is an additional special concession to scheduled castes or tribes, it does not deprive members of those groups of the same right as other citizens to be elected to the general seat. In his view, a member of a scheduled tribe is entitled to seek election either to the reserved seat or to the general seat in a double-member constituency where one seat is reserved. When a scheduled-tribe member makes a declaration on his nomination form, it merely indicates his eligibility for the reserved seat; it does not preclude him from also contesting the general seat.

The Court explained that when a candidate states his status on the nomination form, the statement simply indicates that he is claiming the extra advantage of being eligible for the reserved seat. The Court held that even if the candidate loses the contest for the reserved seat to a rival, that loss does not diminish or eliminate his entitlement to seek election to the general seat. Moreover, if the electorate places the candidate at the top of the remaining list of candidates, the Court said that he has a right to be elected to the general seat. The Court observed that the purpose of reserving seats is to instill confidence among the backward castes and tribes and to assure them of welfare and a future role in the political system. This purpose, the Court noted, necessarily requires that members of those castes and tribes be given a dual chance to contest elections in a double-member constituency. The Court further observed that Respondent 1 did not admit that he had contested the election only for the reserved seat. It was conceded that Respondent 1 had made the required declaration and had likely informed voters that he belonged to a scheduled tribe, which was inevitable because he was seeking the reserved seat. Nevertheless, the Court said that if, by law, the election is conducted for the constituency as a whole rather than for separate seats, the reference on the nomination paper to “the reserved constituency” and any statements during the campaign about his tribal status do not prejudice his right to claim the general seat. Respondent 1 argued that his declaration to the general seat was fully consistent with the explicit language of section 54(4) of the Act, while the appellant contended that the interpretation advanced by Respondent 1 was unreasonable and that, if it were not unreasonable, the provision would be ultra vires. The Court noted that the three principal issues raised in the election petition were decided differently by the Election Tribunal at Hyderabad and by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The Tribunal upheld the appellant’s arguments, made the two declarations sought by the appellant, and allowed the election petition with costs. On appeal, the High Court accepted Respondent 1’s arguments, reversed the Tribunal’s findings and declarations, and dismissed the appellant’s election petition with costs throughout. The High Court also rejected the appellant’s application for a certificate. Consequently, the appellant obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, bringing the matter before us. The Court then turned to the question of the true constitutional and legal position governing elections to the House of the People from a double-member constituency in which one seat is reserved for members of scheduled tribes or castes.

The issue was whether a seat in a double-member constituency reserved for scheduled tribes or scheduled castes depended on the applicable constitutional provisions and the relevant statutes. To answer this, the judgment first examined the articles of the Constitution that related to electoral rolls and adult suffrage. Article 325 prescribed a single general electoral roll for each territorial constituency for elections to either House of Parliament and barred exclusion on the basis of religion, race, caste, or sex. Article 326, dealing with elections to the House of the People, required adult suffrage, meaning every Indian citizen aged at least twenty-one who was not disqualified could be registered as a voter. Consequently, the Court observed that the electoral roll was prepared on a purely secular basis, without reference to religion, race, caste, or sex, and that voter qualification was likewise universal. The judgment then turned to the constitutional articles governing the composition of the House of the People and the qualifications for parliamentary membership. Article 81(1), subject to Article 331, stipulated that the House of the People would consist of not more than five hundred members elected directly from territorial constituencies in the States. This provision envisioned the division of each State into constituencies and provided for the election of up to five hundred representatives from those constituencies. Article 84 enumerated the qualifications for election to Parliament, requiring that a person be an Indian citizen and be at least twenty-five years old for the House of the People. It further provided that any additional qualifications could be prescribed by law made by Parliament. By virtue of clause (c) of Article 84, Parliament enacted two statutes: the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (Act 43 of 1950) and the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Court indicated that it would later refer to the relevant provisions of those Acts. The judgment also highlighted Article 330, which lay in Part XVI of the Constitution and dealt with special provisions for certain classes. Article 330 provided for the reservation of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the House of the People.

In this case, the Court explained that Article 331 of the Constitution requires that seats in the House of the People be reserved for the three categories listed in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that provision. The present dispute concerned the second category, namely the scheduled tribes. Article 330(2) further provides that the number of seats reserved in any State for the scheduled tribes, as determined under sub-clause (1), shall, as far as practicable, bear the same proportion to the total number of seats allotted to that State in the House of the People as the population of the scheduled tribes in the State (or the relevant part of the State) bears to the total population of the State. By employing this proportional method, the Constitution sought a fair, just and equitable way of fixing the number of reserved seats for scheduled tribes. The Court also noted that Article 334 states that the reservation of seats created by Article 330 will cease to have effect after a period of ten years from the commencement of the Constitution, subject to a specific proviso. Consequently, even when a constituency is a double-member constituency in which one of the two seats is reserved for members of scheduled tribes, the Constitution, while showing a clear intention to protect scheduled tribes, deliberately chose not to adopt a system of separate electorates. The constituency remains a single constituency, and the election is conducted from a common electoral roll that applies uniform qualifications to all voters. In relation to double-member constituencies such as Parvatipuram, the Constitution did not create a special constituency limited only to members of scheduled tribes; instead, it provided merely for the reservation of a seat for members of the tribes or castes in the manner described. All voters in the constituency, regardless of tribal affiliation, are entitled to vote for the reserved seat. Therefore, the reservation of a seat in a double-member constituency does not alter the fundamental fact that the constituency is a single entity that returns representatives to the House of the People through a joint electorate. The Court then turned to the relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act. It began by examining the definitions contained in the Act: Section 2(f) defines a “parliamentary constituency” as a constituency established by law for the purpose of elections to the House of the People, while Section 2(d) defines “election” as an election to fill a seat or seats, inter alia, in the House of Parliament. These definitions demonstrate that a parliamentary constituency sends representatives to fill seats in the House of the People, and that elections are held from such constituencies, with duly elected candidates occupying the seats to which they are elected.

The Court explained that the statutory definitions indicate that a parliamentary constituency is the unit that sends representatives to occupy seats in the House of the People. Accordingly, elections are conducted in each such constituency and the candidates who are duly declared elected thereafter fill the seats to which they have been chosen in the House of Parliament. Section 4 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, enumerates the qualifications required for membership of the House of the People. Sub-section 4(b) expressly states that a person cannot be qualified to be chosen for a seat in the House of the People unless, in the case of a seat reserved for the scheduled tribes, the person is a member of any scheduled tribe and is an elector for some parliamentary constituency. This provision makes explicit the constitutional requirement that a candidate for a reserved seat must belong to the relevant tribe and must also be an elector in the constituency concerned. Section 32 governs the nomination of candidates for election and provides that any person may be nominated as a candidate for a seat if, under the Constitution and the Act, the person satisfies the qualifications for being chosen for that seat. The Court then turned to Section 33, which deals with the presentation of nomination papers and sets out the conditions for a valid nomination. Sub-section 33(2) is particularly pertinent because it provides that in any constituency where a seat is reserved, a candidate shall not be deemed qualified to be chosen for that seat unless the nomination paper contains a declaration specifying the particular tribe to which the candidate belongs and the area of the state in which that tribe is scheduled. Sub-section 33(6) adds that nothing in this section prevents a candidate from being nominated by more than one nomination paper for election in the same constituency. The operative effect of Section 33(2) is that a member of a scheduled tribe who fails to make the required declaration cannot lay claim to election for the reserved seat. In other words, a scheduled-tribe candidate who does not wish to be considered for the reserved seat may simply omit the declaration, thereby limiting his contest to the general seat only. However, the Court noted that making the declaration does not strip the candidate of the right to contest the general seat as well. It was further observed that the prescribed nomination paper, Form 24, is a common form for all candidates, but for those contesting a reserved seat the form includes the specific declaration required by Section 33(2). The discussion then proceeded to the issue of deposits required under Section 34, which the Court indicated would be addressed subsequently.

The Court observed that the electoral law provides a concession in favour of members of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. Specifically, while a candidate standing for election from a parliamentary constituency must normally deposit five hundred rupees, the required deposit is reduced to two hundred and fifty rupees for members of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. The Court emphasized that this concession is not limited to members of a scheduled tribe who contest only the reserved seat; the reduced deposit is also available to them when they choose to contest the general seat. Section thirty-five of the Act obliges the publication of a notice of nominations together with the time and place for their scrutiny, and section thirty-eight mandates the publication of a list of all contesting candidates. The two prescribed forms for these notices, Forms three-A and four, do not refer to the two separate seats but instead record the particulars of every candidate in the same columns. The Court noted that column six of Form three-A requires the caste or tribe of candidates belonging to scheduled castes or scheduled tribes to be recorded, which is consistent with the requirement of section thirty-three subsection two. Consequently, the Court found that the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act mirrors the scheme of the corresponding constitutional articles and is clear. The election to the House of the People from a double-member constituency is conducted as an election for the whole constituency, not as two separate seat elections. Accordingly, nomination papers are filed on that basis, the notices of nomination are published, and the list of validly nominated candidates is announced for the entire constituency. Vote counting is likewise performed with reference to all candidates. Only at the stage of declaring the result does the Court explain that votes of candidates who have made the prescribed declaration are first considered to determine the winner of the reserved seat, after which the votes of the remaining candidates are taken into account to determine the winner of the general seat. Section sixty-three of the Act further assists in resolving the dispute. Section sixty-three paragraph one provides that in plural-member constituencies, except council constituencies, each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected, but no elector may give more than one vote to any single candidate. The Court held that voters in a double-member constituency are not compelled to vote with reference to the two distinct seats. Had the Act intended a seat-wise election, it would have prescribed voting on a seat-by-seat basis and required electors to cast their two votes respectively for each seat.

Section 63(1) of the Act permits each elector in a double-member constituency to use his two votes for any two candidates of his choosing. The two votes may be cast for two candidates who both seek the general seat, for two candidates who both seek the reserved seat, or for one candidate who seeks the general seat and another who seeks the reserved seat. This statutory scheme therefore does not require the election to be conducted on a seat-by-seat basis. The Court observed that this method of voting directly contradicts the appellant’s contention that the election in a double-member constituency must be held separately for each seat. The same conclusion is reinforced by Section 54(4), which articulates an identical approach.

Section 54(1) states that its provisions apply to any election in a constituency where one or more of the seats to be filled are reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Sub-section (4) provides that when the number of candidates eligible for the reserved seats exceeds the number of such seats, and the total number of candidates exceeds the total number of seats, a poll must be taken. After the poll, the returning officer is required first to declare the candidates who are qualified for the reserved seats and who have obtained the highest number of votes as duly elected to those reserved seats. Subsequently, the returning officer must declare, from among the remaining candidates, those who have secured the highest number of votes as duly elected to the unreserved seats. Applying this provision to the present case, the Court noted that after respondent 2 had been declared elected to the reserved seat, the votes obtained by the three other candidates had to be considered before declaring the winner of the general seat. The returning officer performed exactly this procedure when he declared respondent 1 duly elected to the unreserved seat. The illustration that accompanies Section 54(4) clarifies the operation of the provision. The illustration describes a constituency with four seats, two of which are reserved, and six candidates labeled A, B, C, D, E and F. In the illustration, candidates B and C are qualified for the reserved seats and receive the highest votes among the qualified candidates, so they are declared elected to the reserved seats. Then, among the remaining candidates, A and D receive the highest votes and are declared elected to the two unreserved seats. The Court held that both the language of Section 54(4) and its illustration are fully consistent with the relevant provisions of the Constitution and with the Act. While discussing Section 54, the Court also referred to the appellant’s reliance on Section 6(2)(c) of the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952, which provides that in every two-member constituency one seat shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and the other seat shall not be so reserved.

The Court observed that the provision stipulates that a seat shall not be so reserved. It was submitted that, because of this provision, the situation described in the illustration to section 54(4) is unlikely to arise now, and therefore the illustration might be considered redundant. The Court acknowledged that this observation may have some truth, but emphasized that the illustration remains important because it demonstrates concretely how the reservation of seats for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes operates in elections within the relevant constituencies.

The Court noted another argument raised by the appellant, namely that section 54(4) is ultra-vires because it allegedly conflicts with Articles 14 and 330 of the Constitution. In rejecting this claim, the Court referred to Articles 15(3) and 15(4), explaining that these provisions demonstrate that section 54(4) does not offend Article 14. Regarding Article 330, the Court pointed out that the constitutional reservation of seats is intended to secure a minimum number of seats for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Consequently, if members of those communities also win additional seats that are not reserved, there is no inconsistency with the Constitution. The Court therefore concluded that there is no substance to the assertion that section 54(4) is ultra-vires.

The Court then turned to section 55 of the Act, which it considered necessary to discuss. Section 55 expressly provides that a person belonging to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe is not disqualified from holding a non-reserved seat if, aside from that factor, he satisfies the constitutional and statutory qualifications for such a seat. The Court warned that if the appellant’s contention were accepted, section 55 would lose its effect for a scheduled-tribe candidate merely because he had made the required declaration in his nomination to claim a reserved seat. The Court found no justification for such a limited and artificial interpretation of section 55. In the Court’s view, section 55, like section 54(4), is fully consistent with the relevant constitutional provisions and the Act.

The Court explained that a scheduled-tribe candidate is entitled to contest a reserved seat and must make the prescribed declaration to do so; however, making that declaration does not bar him from also contesting a general (non-reserved) seat, should the circumstances require it. Once it is understood that an election is conducted on the basis of the whole constituency rather than on two separate and distinct “beats,” there is no difficulty in accepting the returning officer’s decision to declare respondent I duly elected for the general seat. The Court acknowledged that certain constitutional articles and statutory sections refer to seats in the context of elections to the House of the People, but reiterated that such references are appropriate and do not undermine the reasoning applied to the present matter.

In this case, the Court observed that references to the word “seat” in constitutional provisions and in the statutory framework must be understood in their proper context and do not create a separate category of election apart from the constituency. The Court noted that Article 81(2)(b) speaks of seats in order to maintain a uniform ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allotted to that constituency; consequently the use of the term “seats” was unavoidable in that provision. Similarly, Article 84, which sets out the qualifications for members of Parliament, states that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen “to fill a seat” in Parliament unless he satisfies the tests prescribed in clauses (a), (b) and (c); again, the expression “to fill a seat” is necessary in the context of describing the act of becoming a member. The Court further indicated that the same reasoning applies to the use of “seat” in Articles 101(2) and 330. It was emphasized that when a candidate is duly elected from any constituency to the House of the People, he or she indeed fills a seat as the elected representative of that constituency, and therefore the phrase “filling the seat” is naturally employed whenever the situation demands it. The Court then turned to the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and held that Section 32 uses the phrase “to fill a seat” in the same contextual manner, meaning that a person may be nominated as a candidate for election if he is qualified for that purpose; the nomination is not for a particular seat but for the constituency as a whole. After the poll, the elected candidate is qualified to fill a seat in the House of the People to which he has been returned. The Court said that the same interpretation applies to the language in Sections 33(2), 53(2), 54 and 55. Consequently, the presence of the word “seat” or the expression “fill the seat” in certain constitutional articles or statutory sections does not imply that an election from a double-member constituency is conducted as two separate elections for two distinct seats. The Court further observed that in practice, political parties contesting double-member constituencies usually field two candidates—one for the general seat and one for the reserved seat—and that the Election Commission’s statutory order assigns the party’s symbol to both candidates, distinguishing the reserved-category candidate by enclosing the symbol within a thick black circle. The Court explained that this labeling is intended solely to help largely illiterate voters identify the party affiliation and to indicate which candidate is eligible for the reserved seat; it does not alter the nature of the election, which remains a single election for the constituency as a whole, with reservation of seats as a matter of classification rather than a bifurcation of the contest.

The Court explained that the Election Commission’s order assigning a distinct symbol to the scheduled-caste or scheduled-tribe candidate of a political party was intended solely to help the very large number of illiterate and uneducated voters recognise the political affiliation of each candidate and to identify which candidates were eligible for the reserved seat; the order was not intended to alter the nature of the election nor could it be said to do so. Likewise, a candidate who has made the prescribed declaration under section 33 may withdraw his candidature under section 37, which simply means that he is no longer contesting any seat in the constituency; this withdrawal does not support the inference that his original candidature was for a separate reserved seat. The Court stressed that, in a double-member constituency, the election is a single general election that includes a reservation of seats; there are no separate compartments for the reserved and the general seats. The appellant had argued that a member of a scheduled tribe who wishes to contest either the reserved seat or, failing that, the general seat should file two nomination papers. The Court found this contention un-founded, noting that no provision exists for filing two nomination papers for two different seats in the same constituency and that such a view would be inconsistent with the basic character of a double-member constituency election. In the Court’s view, a scheduled-caste or scheduled-tribe person does not lose the right to seek the general seat merely because he avails himself of the additional concession of the reserved seat by making the required declaration; the claim to the reserved seat is an additional claim and does not exclude a claim to the general seat, and both claims must be decided on the basis that there is one election from the double-member constituency. By analogy, the Court referred to educational institutions where, in addition to prizes and scholarships open to all candidates, some prizes are reserved for candidates belonging to backward communities; those backward candidates may still compete for the general prizes. Accordingly, the Court was satisfied that the High Court was correct in rejecting the appellant’s argument that respondent 1 could not have been validly elected to the general seat from the constituency of Parvatipuram. The Court then turned to the appellant’s alternative contention that respondent 1 had ceased to be a member of the scheduled tribe at the material time because he had become a Kshatriya, noting that any consideration of this issue must be guided by the broad and recognized features of the hierarchical social structure prevailing among Hindus.

In this case the Court observed that the hierarchical social structure that exists among Hindus does not need to be traced from its origin for the purpose of the present dispute. It was sufficient to note that, regardless of how Hindu castes and tribes may have originated in ancient times, they have gradually become determined solely by birth. It is well-known that a person who is born into a depressed caste or tribe finds it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to acquire the status of a higher caste through his own efforts, education, culture or social standing. The Court remarked that the history of social reform over the past century and more demonstrates how hard it is to break or even to relax the rigid and exclusive character of the caste system. While it may be hoped that, in time, the ideal of a casteless society based on social equality will be achieved through the powerful impact of the Constitution’s doctrine of social justice, the spread of secular education, the growth of a rational outlook and a proper sense of social values, the Court considered that at present it would be unrealistic and utopian to ignore the difficulties that a member of a depressed tribe or caste must face in trying to claim a higher status among his co-religionists. In light of this background the Court turned to the appellant’s alternative plea. The evidence placed before the Court by respondent I showed that in all documents dated from 1885 to 1928 he was consistently described as a Mukka Dora, that is, as a member of the scheduled tribe. The appellant, however, produced documentary material indicating that from 1928 onward respondent I described himself and his family as belonging to the Kshatriya caste. In addition, the appellant led oral evidence intended to demonstrate that respondent I had, for some years, adopted the customs and rituals associated with the Kshatriya caste. The oral evidence showed that marriages in respondent I’s family were celebrated in the manner of Kshatriyas, that a homa ceremony was performed on such occasions, that the family had marital connections with certain Kshatriya families, that a Brahmin priest officiated at the religious ceremonies conducted by respondent I, and that he wore a sacred thread. The High Court held that even if the appellant’s documentary and oral evidence were taken at face value, it was far from sufficient to establish that respondent I had become a Kshatriya at the material time. The Court emphasized that a person’s caste status in this context must be determined by the recognition he receives from the members of the caste into which he seeks entry. There is

The Court observed that there was absolutely no evidence on the point concerning the caste status of respondent 1. The material produced by the appellant consisted only of certain acts performed by respondent 1 that were clearly intended to project a higher social rank. However, the Court held that isolated, unilateral actions of this sort could not be readily accepted as proof that the claim to a higher status, which those acts were meant to assert, had been established. The Court noted that this was precisely the view adopted by the High Court and expressed the opinion that the High Court’s conclusion was entirely correct. Consequently, the alternative claim advanced by the appellant could not succeed. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, the appellant’s case failed, and the order was made that the costs be awarded in favour of respondent 1.

Justice Kapur then expressed a dissenting view, stating a regret that he could not agree with the judgment prepared by his learned brother Justice Gajendragadkar and indicating that he would set out the reasons for his disagreement. He began by describing the basic principle of parliamentary elections: a candidate seeks the votes of electors by offering to stand for a seat in a parliamentary constituency, and voters exercise their franchise in favour of a candidate contesting a particular seat, whether the constituency returns a single member or two members. He pointed out that the language employed in the Constitution as well as in the election statutes indicates that an election, although organised within a constituency, is fundamentally for the purpose of filling a seat, and that it is for that purpose that the electorate casts its votes. He further observed that the Constitution itself explicitly demonstrates that an election is intended to fill a seat in a constituency, and that the overall scheme of the Constitution, when dealing with Parliament and elections to Parliament, supports this interpretation. He then referred to the specific constitutional provisions, noting that Parliament, its composition, and the qualifications for membership are dealt with in Chapter 11 of Part V. Article 81 governs the composition of the House of the People; sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 81 stipulates that there shall be no more than five hundred members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies and no more than twenty members to represent Union territories. Clause (2) of Article 81 provides that each State shall be allotted a certain number of seats in the House of the People in such a manner that the ratio between the number of seats and the population of the State is the same for all States, and sub-clause (b) requires that the State be divided into territorial constituencies so that the ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allotted to it is uniform throughout the State. Article 84 sets out the qualifications of persons to be chosen to fill a seat in Parliament, and clause (c) of that article declares that such qualifications shall be as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament. He further noted that Part XV of the Constitution deals with elections, and that under Article 324 there is a single general electoral roll for every territorial constituency, with no exclusion from that roll on the basis solely of religion.

In this case the Court observed that the Constitution expressly prevents any exclusion from the electoral roll on the ground of race, caste, creed, or sex, and that Article 327 empowers Parliament to make provisions concerning elections to the legislatures. Part XVI of the Constitution makes special provisions for certain classes, and under Article 330 seats in the House of the People are reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their population in each State, with the reservation and special representation slated to cease after ten years pursuant to Article 334. The Court emphasized that the constitutional scheme focuses on seats: the total number of seats, including those reserved, is fixed, and elections are held for the purpose of filling those seats, with the qualifications of candidates laid down by parliamentary legislation. A review of the cited provisions shows that there is no separate electoral roll; elections are conducted on the basis of a joint electorate. Although a portion of the seats is reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the Constitution does not exclude members of those communities from contesting general seats, and every citizen, irrespective of caste, creed, or sex, is entitled both to vote and to stand for election provided he or she meets the other qualifications. The reservation was introduced as a temporary concession to address the social and educational backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and it was intended to be limited in duration; nevertheless, members of those groups are not barred from seeking election to the unreserved, or general, seats. To give effect to the constitutional intent, Parliament enacted two statutes: the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (Act 43 of 1950), hereinafter called the “1950 Act,” and the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act 43 of 1951), hereinafter called the “1951 Act.” The purpose of the 1950 Act was to provide for the allocation of seats and the delimitation of constituencies for elections, while the purpose of the 1951 Act was to regulate the conduct of elections to the Houses of Parliament and to prescribe the qualifications and disqualifications for membership. Section 2(f) of the 1950 Act defines a Parliamentary constituency as a constituency established for the purpose of electing a member to the House of the People. Part II of that Act contains provisions for the allocation of seats in the House of the People and for the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, confirming that the seats allotted to each State must be filled by direct elections. The language throughout these provisions consistently refers to a “seat,” indicating that the electoral process is intended to fill a seat rather than a broader category of voters. The Court then turned to the 1951 Act, in which the term “election” is defined accordingly.

Section 2(d) of the 1951 Act defined an election as an election to fill a seat or seats in either House of Parliament. Section 2(e) defined an elector as the person whose name appeared in the electoral roll of a constituency. Section 4 of the same Act specified the qualifications for membership of the House of the People. It provided that a person could not be chosen for a reserved seat unless he belonged to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and was an elector for any Parliamentary constituency. For any other seat the only qualification required was that the person was an elector in a Parliamentary constituency. Part V of the Act dealt with the nomination of candidates. Section 31 required a public notice of elections, and Section 32 prescribed the procedure for nominating candidates. Under Section 32, no person could be nominated for a seat unless he satisfied the qualification for that seat. Section 33 set out the presentation of nomination papers and the conditions for a valid nomination. Sub-section (1) required that a nomination paper be completed in the prescribed form and signed as required, and that it be presented to the Returning Officer. Sub-section (2) stipulated that where any seat in a constituency was reserved, the candidate’s nomination papers had to contain a declaration specifying the caste or tribe to which the candidate belonged, because the candidate could not be chosen for that reserved seat without such a declaration. Sub-section (6) allowed a candidate to file more than one nomination paper for election in the same constituency. Section 34 required a deposit for a valid nomination; the deposit was Rs 250 for members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and Rs 500 for other candidates. The appellant argued that these provisions demonstrated that an election was fundamentally an election to fill a specific seat, and therefore a Scheduled Caste or Tribe candidate had to decide which seat he was contesting. He said that there was no prohibition on a Scheduled Caste or Tribe candidate standing for a general constituency, but that the candidate had to inform the electors of his intention because voters cast their votes for the election of a candidate to a particular seat and not to any other seat. The appellant further explained that each elector possessed two votes, but only one of those votes could be cast for a particular candidate, and that each candidate needed a symbol to assist an electorate that was largely illiterate. The appellant noted that each political party was allotted a symbol, and in the present case the successful candidate, Mr Dippala Suri Dora, contested the reserved seat on behalf of the Socialist Party and had been allotted the tree as his party symbol.

In the election under consideration the successful candidate, Mr Dippala Suri Dora, was listed with the symbol of his political party, which in this case was a tree. For a seat that is reserved for a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, the electoral symbol is marked with a black circle surrounding it so that voters can immediately recognise that the candidate is contesting the reserved seat. Although the basic format of Form 2A is identical whether a candidate is contesting a reserved seat or a general seat, a person standing for a reserved seat must also make an additional declaration that he belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The same uniform Form 3A is used for the notice of nomination for both kinds of seats, but column (6) of that form requires the candidate to specify the particular caste or tribe, thereby indicating which candidates belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; without that information the caste detail would have no purpose. Likewise, Form 7A, which presents the final list of candidates after any withdrawals, records each candidate’s name, address and allotted symbol, and it distinguishes candidates who are members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes by placing special marks beside their names. All of these distinguishing features are incorporated to ensure that each elector, when casting his vote, can identify which candidates are vying for the reserved seat and which are contesting the general seat. If such identification were not the purpose, the requirement to state caste would be meaningless; it is not intended to contravene the ideal of a casteless society.

The respondents argued that Section 32 of the Act merely governs the procedure for filing nominations to fill a seat and does not relate to the eligibility qualifications, which are laid down in Section 33. They further contended that sub-sections (2) and (6) of Section 33 demonstrate that the election concerns a constituency rather than a specific seat, and therefore the requirement to declare caste is unnecessary. This argument overlooks the definition of “election” provided in the Act, which expressly means an election to fill a seat. Consequently, whenever the term “election” is used in the context of a constituency, it must be interpreted as an election to fill a particular seat within that constituency. Moreover, sub-section 2 of Section 33 makes it clear that a candidate cannot be deemed qualified to fill a reserved seat unless he makes a specific declaration of his caste or tribe, reinforcing the emphasis on a seat rather than a mere constituency. Although a candidate is required to deposit a sum of money as part of the nomination process for an election within a constituency, the word “election” in that provision likewise refers to the election to fill a seat. These statutory provisions, together with the definition of “election” in Section 2(d) of the 1951 Act, collectively show that when a person offers himself for election in a constituency, he does so to fill a definite seat. At the polling station, each elector is entitled to cast one vote for one candidate and a second vote for another candidate. It was contended that it was open…

It was argued that nothing in the law required an elector to cast one vote for a general seat and the other for a reserved seat. The argument further suggested that an elector could cast both votes for the two candidates contesting the general seat, for the two candidates contesting the reserved seat, or for one candidate in each category. However, that line of reasoning did not help resolve the issue. In the present case only four candidates were in the fray – two belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and two who were not. If a voter were to cast both votes for the two Scheduled-Caste candidates, or both votes for the two non-Scheduled-Caste candidates, such voting would amount to a waste of his votes. The Court presumed that an elector who took the trouble to go to the polling booth did not intend to waste his votes. In this case the political party that nominated Mr. Dippala Suri Dora presented him as a candidate for the Scheduled-Caste constituency, as shown by the party’s application. The final list of candidates for Parliament (Exhibit P3(c)) recorded Mr. Dippala Suri Dora as the candidate for the reserved seat in the Parvatipuram double-member constituency. His nomination papers also indicated that he was standing for election from the Parvatipuram reserved parliamentary constituency. Accordingly, Mr. Dippala Suri Dora had clearly communicated to the electorate that he sought their votes to fill the reserved seat, and the contest, as understood by both him and the voters, concerned only the reserved seat. The electorate therefore voted for him with the intention of filling the reserved seat and not the general seat.

Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Dippala Suri Dora, contended that the manner in which the respondent filled his nomination papers should not alter the interpretation of the statutory provisions. He argued that if, under the law, a nomination such as the respondent’s were deemed to be for both seats, then the different way the form was completed would be immaterial. The Court accepted that proposition but reiterated that, as previously indicated, an election is held to fill a specific seat in a constituency, and a nomination must be construed to pertain to that particular seat and not to any other. The respondent’s arguments also relied on sections 53, 54 and 55 of the 1951 Act. The Court noted that subsection (4) of section 54 provides that when the number of candidates qualified to be chosen for the reserved seat exceeds the number of such seats, …

The Court explained that when the number of qualified candidates for the reserved seat exceeds both the number of reserved seats and the total number of seats to be filled, the election process must proceed as follows: after the poll is taken, the qualified candidate who receives the highest number of votes for the reserved seat must be declared elected; thereafter, among the remaining candidates, those who have obtained the next highest numbers of votes must be declared elected to fill the other seats. The Court pointed out that an illustration appended to the statutory provision reinforces the respondent’s argument. However, the Court observed that in view of section 8 of the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952, which provides for readjustments and delimitations, there is doubt whether the provisions of section 54(4) continue to have effect. Under clause (2) of section 8 of the Delimitation Act, every constituency is required to be either a single-member constituency or a two-member constituency, and, wherever practicable, seats may be reserved for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in a single-member constituency; but in every two-member constituency one seat must be reserved for a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The Court held that this requirement defeats the operation of section 54. If a single-member constituency may have a seat reserved for a Scheduled Caste, meaning that only a Scheduled Caste candidate can be elected to that seat, then the effect of reserving a seat in a double-member constituency is that a Scheduled Caste candidate who offers himself for election to a reserved seat can be elected only to that reserved seat and to no other seat. The Court further supported this view by referring to the definition of “electoral rights” in section 79 of the 1951 Act, which defines the right as the right of a person to stand or not to stand as a candidate at an election, that is, an election to fill a seat in either House of Parliament. Accordingly, the electoral right of a citizen is to stand for election to fill a specific seat, and a successful candidate is one who secures the largest number of votes cast for that seat. From this definition, the Court concluded that the respondent, Mr Dippala Suri Dora, who contested the election for a reserved seat, could be elected only to that reserved seat and not to the general seat. The Court then turned to the next contention raised on behalf of the appellant, namely that if a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe wishes to contest both the general and the reserved seats, he must file two separate nomination papers and pay two deposits. In light of the foregoing discussion and in view of sections 32 and 33 of the Act, together with the definition of the word “election,” the Court held that such a candidate must indeed file two nomination papers—one for the general seat and another for the reserved seat—each setting out the qualifications required by law. Similarly, the candidate must make two deposits under section 34 for the same reason. The Court also noted that an important question has been raised regarding whether a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe can, by his own action, transform himself into a different or higher caste.

The Court observed that the question of whether a person could transform himself into a different and higher caste depended on the view taken of the caste system and on whether caste was determined by birth or varied as a result of guna, karma and subhavana, that is, merit based on qualities, actions and character. It noted that in Hinduism caste had originally arisen from vocation and was not dependent upon birth. The Court explained that the idea of birth as the sole criterion of caste was a much later development, and that caste became rigid and hereditary only when vocations themselves became hereditary. Thus caste was essentially a division of labour. The Court cited a high authority to support the view that in Hinduism caste was dependent upon actions and not on birth. It referred to the Bhagavad Gita, fourth discourse, which states: “The four castes were created by me in accordance with their aptitude and actions; know me the author of these castes, though I am actionless and inexhaustible.” The Court also mentioned verses in the Mahābhārata that support this perspective, for example: “Truth, charity, fortitude, good conduct, gentleness, austerity and compassion—he in whom these are observed is a Brahmana. If these marks exist in a Śūdra and are not found in a twice-born, the Śūdra is not a Śūdra nor the Brahmana a Brahmana” (teaching given by Yudhiṣṭhira). Further, the Bhagavata Purāna declares: “One becomes a Brahmana by his deeds and not by his family or birth; even a Chandala is a Brahmana, if he is of pure character.” The Chandogya Upaniṣad recounts the incident of Satyakāma, who was raised to the position of a Brahmana because he spoke the truth, illustrating that character, not birth, determined caste. The Court also referred to historical examples of individuals who elevated themselves to Brahmana status through merit, such as the sage Matanga, who was a Chandala, and Viśvāmitra, who was a Kṣatriya and became a Brahmana. Although Hinduism may have become static at one stage, the Court noted that its modern history shows that caste is not strictly birth-based but linked to actions. The doctrine of karma, the Court observed, undermines any claim that caste is dependent upon birth.

The Court then expressed the opinion that Mr. Dippala Suri Dora, by his own actions, had raised himself to the status of a Kṣatriya and was therefore no longer a member of the Scheduled Caste or Tribe; on that ground, his election could not be supported. Accordingly, the Court stated that it would allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore the order of the Tribunal, and award costs of this Court as well as costs of the Courts below to the appellant. The order that followed read: in view of the majority judgment of the Court, the appeal was dismissed with costs in favour of Respondent No. 1, and the appeal was dismissed.