Sardar Sarup Singh and Others vs The State Of Punjab and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petition No. 13 of 1959

Decision Date: 01/04/1959

Coram: S.K. Das, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, Sudhi Ranjan

Sardar Sarup Singh and others filed a petition against the State of Punjab and others, and the matter was decided on 1 April 1959. The petition was heard by the Supreme Court of India, the bench being composed of Justices S. K. Das, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, P. B. Gajendragadkar, and K. N. Wanchoo. The judgment was recorded by Justice S. K. Das and is reported in 1959 AIR 860 and 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 499. The case concerned fundamental rights, in particular the alleged violation of Sikh religious affairs by the statutory provisions governing the election of the Sikh Gurdwara Board. The relevant statutes were the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 (Punjab Act 8 of 1925), as amended by the Punjab Act 1 of 1959, specifically sections 43, 43A and the newly inserted section 148B, together with the Constitution of India, article 26(b) and 26(d).

The Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 had been enacted to improve the administration of certain Sikh gurdwaras, and after the merger of the former State of Patiala and the East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) with Punjab, the Act was extended to the previously excluded territories by the Sikh Gurdwaras (Amendment) Act, 1959. Under section 43, a Board—known as the Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee—had been created to manage the principal Sikh gurdwaras and to supervise all other committees formed under the Act. The Board consisted of three categories of members: elected members, designated members, and co-opted members, the latter including persons residing in PEPSU and elsewhere in India. Section 148B, added by the 1959 amendment, provided that from the commencement of the amendment, (a) every person who, immediately before that date, was a member of the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, appointed by the Punjab Government, would be deemed a member of the Board under section 43; and (b) thirty-five Sikhs, including six Sikhs belonging to the Scheduled Castes from the extended territories, would be elected by the persons specified in sub-section (2) in accordance with rules made by the State Government, and would become members of the Board. The petitioners, who professed and practiced the Sikh faith, invoked article 32 of the Constitution to challenge the constitutional validity of section 148B, contending that the provision infringed the fundamental right guaranteed by article 26(b) of the Constitution, which permits every religious denomination or any of its sections to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.

The petitioners, who professed and practiced the Sikh faith, argued that section 148B of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act infringed the constitutional guarantee under article 26(b) that every religious denomination, including the Sikh denomination, has the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. They advanced several specific points. First, they claimed that the 1959 amendment was enacted with the intention of preventing a particular group of Sikhs from regaining the majority they had lost on 16 November 1958 during the annual election of the Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. Second, they contended that the members of the Interim Board at Patiala, who were deemed to be members of the board created under section 43 by virtue of subsection 148B(1)(a), had been appointed solely by a Punjab Government notification and were therefore government nominees who did not genuinely represent the Sikh community. They further argued that the thirty-five Sikhs from the extended territories introduced onto the board under section 148B were selected through an indirect electoral process in which the limited Sikh electorate itself was elected by a mixture of Sikhs and non-Sikhs. The petitioners maintained that the right guaranteed by article 26(b) was held by all members of the Sikh denomination collectively, and that only Sikhs should elect their representatives for the management of Sikh gurdwaras. Consequently, they asserted that the manner of introducing new members from the extended territories under section 148B violated the Sikhs’ religious right and constituted an infringement of their fundamental right under article 26(b).

The Court held that, in determining whether a statutory provision is constitutionally valid, the judiciary is not required to examine public policy considerations, assess the political wisdom of the legislature, or speculate on the motives that guided the legislative enactment of a law that is otherwise within the legislature’s competence. The Court further observed that a direct election of the entire Sikh community for the purpose of managing gurdwaras is not an essential element of the Sikh religion. Finally, the Court concluded that the representation scheme for the extended areas prescribed by section 148B was motivated solely by considerations of convenience and expediency and did not engage any principle of religion. Accordingly, the Court found that section 148B did not affect “matters of religion” within the meaning of article 26(b) and therefore did not contravene the fundamental right guaranteed by that article. The Court referred to the precedents set in Commissioner, Hindu, Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiyar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954) 1005 SCR and Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, (1958) 895 SCR in support of its reasoning.

The matter arose as original jurisdiction petition No. 13 of 1959, filed under article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners presented their case, while the State of Punjab was represented by the Advocate-General and the respondents were also represented. The petition was heard on 1 April 1959, and the judgment was delivered by Justice S K DAS.

The Sikh Gurdwaras Act of 1925, designated as Punjab VIII of 1925 and referred to as the principal Act, was amended by the inclusion of section 148-B through the Sikh Gurdwaras (Amendment) Act of 1959, which is termed the amending Act of 1959. The petitioners, who profess and practice the Sikh faith, claimed that they have a direct interest in the upkeep and administration of Sikh gurdwaras that have been scheduled and notified under the principal Act. Their principal argument was that section 148-B infringes upon the fundamental right guaranteed by article 26(b) of the Constitution, which allows every religious denomination, including the Sikh denomination, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The respondents to the petition consisted of, first, the State of Punjab, and second, the President and twelve members of the Interim Gurdwara Board of Patiala, who, by virtue of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 148-B, are deemed members of the board established under section 43 of the principal Act. This board is presently known as the Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. The contention against the petition was raised solely by respondent number one, that is, the State of Punjab, which argued that section 148-B does not in any manner violate the fundamental right given to the petitioners or other Sikh denomination members under article 26(b). Consequently, the sole issue before the Court was whether section 148-B of the principal Act contravenes the fundamental right accorded to Sikhs under article 26(b). The Court indicated that it would first set out the provisions of section 148-B and other pertinent sections of the principal Act, but before doing so it deemed it necessary to outline certain factual background concerning the enactment of the amending Act of 1959. It was placed before the Court that around the year 1919 there was considerable unrest among Sikhs in Punjab regarding the management of their gurdwaras and shrines. In 1922 the Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Act was enacted, but it failed to satisfy Sikh demands. Accordingly, in 1925 the principal Act was passed, with its preamble declaring an intention “for the better administration of certain Sikh gurdwaras and for enquiries into matters and settlement of disputes connected therewith.” The principal Act underwent periodic amendments. On 1 November 1956 the former State of Patiala and the East Punjab States Union, abbreviated as PEPSU, were merged into the State of Punjab. In February 1957 the Punjab Government appointed an advisory committee to examine whether the principal Act should be extended to the territories formerly comprising PEPSU. The committee, in September 1957, recommended that such an extension be effected. Following this, on 8 April 1958, the Sikh Gurdwaras (Amendment) Bill of 1958 was introduced in the Punjab Vidhan Sabha and subsequently referred to the regional committees constituted for further consideration.

By an order of the President, known as the Punjab Regional Committees Order, 1957, and issued under paragraph (1) of Article 371 of the Constitution, regional committees were created to examine the Sikh Gurdwaras (Amendment) Bill, 1958. These committees considered the Bill and made certain recommendations, but the Court found it unnecessary to recount the detailed proceedings before them for the purposes of the present application. In November 1958 a meeting of the Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee was held to conduct its annual election. Counsel for the petitioners informed the Court that at this meeting a majority, determined by a very narrow margin of three votes, favored a particular group of Sikhs and opposed another group identified as the “Shiromoni Akali Dal.” Within a week a notice was issued to convene a meeting for consideration of the provisions of the amending Bill; however, that meeting could not take place because a stay order was obtained from the Judicial Commission that had been constituted under the principal Act. In December 1958 a special session of the Vidhan Sabha was summoned to consider the amending Bill. It was asserted that the original draft of the Bill did not contain the provisions later incorporated in section 148-B. Consequently, the Bill was returned to the regional committees, and on 27 December 1958 those committees submitted a final report recommending the addition of the provisions that eventually became section 148-B of the principal Act. The report indicated that even within the regional committees there was some opposition to the proposed provisions. On 31 December 1958 the Vidhan Sabha passed the Bill, and on 3 January 1959 the Legislative Council also passed it. The Governor gave his assent on 8 January 1959, after which the measure became Punjab Act No. 1 of 1959, the Amending Act of 1959. The Act came into force immediately, and a few days later certain rules under the Act were promulgated. The petition before this Court was filed on 2 February 1959, and on 14 February 1959 the election of thirty-five Sikhs, contemplated under paragraph (b) of sub-paragraph (1) of section 148-B, was completed. The Court noted that it was necessary to refer both to some of the earlier provisions of the principal Act and to the new provisions added by the 1959 Amending Act. The Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, hereinafter referred to as the Board, functions as the management committee for several major Sikh gurdwaras and also bears the responsibility of ensuring that every committee of management handles the property and income of the gurdwaras in accordance with the Act. To fulfil this duty, the Board exercises control, direction, and general superintendence over all committees appointed under the principal Act, as provided in section 125. The Board itself is constituted under section 43 of the principal Act.

In the original Punjab Act No 44 of 1953, section 43 specified that the Board would be composed of four distinct groups: first, eighty-four members who were to be elected; second, the head ministers of certain well-known Sikh gurdwaras; third, twelve members who were to be nominated by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu; and fourth, seventeen members who were residents of India, of whom no more than four could be residents of Punjab. The latter seventeen were to be co-opted by the members of the Board described in the first three categories. Later in 1953 the Punjab Act No 44 was amended, and the amended section 43 was expressed in the following terms. The Board was to consist of one hundred and thirty-two elected members; the head ministers of the Darbar Sahib at Amritsar together with the heads of the four Takhts – Sri Akali Takht Sahib at Amritsar, Sri Takht Kesgarh Sahib at Anandpur, Sri Takht Patna Sahib at Patna, and Sri Takht Nazur Sahib at Hyderabad in the Deccan; and twenty-five members who were residents of India, of whom at least twelve were to be residents of Pepsu, at least nine were to be residents of parts of India other than Punjab and Pepsu, and not more than four were to be residents of Punjab. These twenty-five members were to be co-opted by the members of the Board as described in the first two clauses. From this amendment it followed that, after the passage of the 1953 Act, the Board comprised only three categories of members: elected members, designated head ministers, and the twenty-five co-opted members.

The discussion then turned to section 148-B, a provision that was introduced by the amending Act of 1959. Section 148-B provided that, from the date the Amending Act came into force and until the next election of a new Board under section 43-A, two additional kinds of members would be deemed to belong to the Board. Firstly, every person who, immediately before the commencement of the Amending Act, was a member of the Interim Gurdwara Board at Patiala—created by the Punjab Government Home Department under Notification No 18-Gurdwaras dated 10 January 1958—was to be deemed a member of the Board formed under section 43. Secondly, thirty-five Sikhs, including six Sikhs belonging to the Scheduled Castes and residing in the extended territories, were to be elected. These thirty-five individuals were to be allocated among the various districts of the extended territories in proportion to the Sikh population of each district as prescribed. They were required to be elected within forty days of the commencement of the Amending Act by the persons named in subsection (2), in accordance with rules made by the State Government, and would become members of the Board on the date specified in subsection (3). Subsection (2) further stipulated that the election of these thirty-five persons would be carried out by (i) the persons deemed to be members of the Board under clause (a) of subsection (1); and (ii) the twelve members of the Board who were residents of Pepsu, as referred to in clause (iii) of subsection (1) of section 43.

Section 43 enumerated the categories of electors who were entitled to vote for the members of the board. The list comprised: (i) the sitting Sikh members of Parliament and the two houses of the State Legislature who had been returned from any constituency or part thereof within the extended territories; (ii) the Sikh members of Municipal Committees operating in the extended territories; (iii) the Presidents or Chairmen of Singh Sabhas together with the Managers or Secretaries of Sikh educational institutions or Sikh religious organisations that had been registered on or before 1 December 1958 in the extended territories; and (iv) the Sikh Sarpanches and the Sikh Nayay Pardhans of Nagar Panchayats and Panchayati Adalats respectively. The provision further stipulated a proviso that the electors falling under clauses (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) could not be disqualified under the proviso to section 49 of the Act.

The Court observed that section 148-B was situated in chapter XII-A, whose heading read “Temporary and Transitional Provisions,” thereby indicating that the provisions contained in sections 148-B through 148-F were intended to be temporary and transitional. Counsel for the petitioners argued that, according to the amending Act of 1959, a fresh election of the board was scheduled to occur within about a year under section 43-A, and that the temporary provisions in chapter XII-A would apply only for the intervening period. Section 43-A, also introduced by the 1959 amendment, prescribed that whenever a new board within the meaning of section 51 was constituted, it would consist of (i) one hundred and forty elected members; (ii) the Head Ministers of the Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, and the four Takhats – namely the Sri Takhat Sahib, Amritsar; the Sri Takhat Keshgarh Sahib, Anandpur; the Sri Takhat Patna Sahib, Patna; and the Sri Takhat Hazur Sahib, Nanded; and (iii) fifteen members resident in India, of whom not more than five could be residents of Punjab, who would be co-opted by the elected members and the Head Ministers. Sub-section (2) required the State Government to promptly convene a meeting of the members described in clauses (i) and (ii) for the purpose of co-opting the members described in clause (iii). After co-option, the State Government was to publish a notification declaring that the board had been duly constituted; the date of that publication was to be deemed the date of the board’s constitution.

Consequently, the Court noted, the permanent board to be formed under section 43-A would be composed of one hundred and forty elected members, five designated members, and fifteen co-opted members, leaving no scope for any nominated members. The petitioners had not contested the constitution of the board under section 43-A; their objections were confined solely to the constitution of the board under section 148-B, even though that provision was expressly temporary and transitional. The Court then posed the question of what specific objections the petitioners raised in relation to the alleged infringement of their fundamental right under article 26(b) of the Constitution.

In response to the allegation that the petitioners’ fundamental right under Article 26(b) of the Constitution had been violated, counsel for the petitioners first criticized what he described as an undue haste in the passage of the Amending Act of 1959. He recounted that the former PEPSU region had been merged with the State of Punjab in November 1956 and that, for roughly two years, the Punjab Government showed no serious inclination to extend the principal Act to that area. He argued that, however, from the date of the Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee’s annual election on 16 November 1958 until the Amending Act was enacted in January 1959, the legislature moved quickly to pass the amendment and to constitute the Board, allegedly so that a particular group of Sikhs could not regain the majority it had lost on 16 November 1958. The Court noted that, irrespective of whether those submissions are correct, they do not bear on the issue that is before it. The petitioners have not specifically alleged that the State Government acted with malice or bad faith. While acknowledging that individuals may criticize the political wisdom of a legislative or executive measure, the Court held that it is not called upon to conduct an inquiry into public policy, to investigate questions of political wisdom, or to examine the motives of the legislature in enacting a law that it was otherwise competent to make. The Court further clarified that, although it does not remain aloof from the broader currents of society, it will intervene when a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is violated. Nevertheless, a fundamental right such as freedom of religion possesses an enduring character that must transcend shifting public opinion. Consequently, the Court’s function in this matter is limited to examining the constitutionality of section 148-B, and it confines its analysis to that specific question.

The principal argument raised by counsel for the petitioners is that Article 26(b) confers upon every religious denomination, or any section thereof, the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, a right that is subject only to the restraints of public order, morality and health. According to counsel, this right is vested in all members of the Sikh denomination and not in any particular subset, and therefore the management of Sikh gurdwaras must be exercised by all Sikhs, who alone should elect their representatives for that purpose. He contended that, to the extent section 148-B departs from this principle, it infringes the right guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 26(b). The Court, while addressing this contention, reiterated that its role is to assess whether section 148-B is constitutionally valid, and it proceeded to consider the arguments in that context.

In this case the Court said that it could not agree with the petitioners’ submission. Article 26 of the Constitution, as it is relevant for the present issue, provides that subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right (a) … … (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. The Court immediately observed that clause (b) and clause (d) are distinct. Clause (d) expressly requires that the administration of property be carried out “in accordance with law”, whereas clause (b) contains no such qualification. The Court referred to the earlier decision of The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1), where it had explained that the administration of property by a religious denomination is placed on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The latter, according to that judgment, is a fundamental right that no legislature may take away, while the former may be regulated by statutes that the legislature is competent to enact. The Court then turned to the expression used in clause (b), namely “in matters of religion”. It asked what meaning should be attached to the word “religion”. The question had been examined in two earlier cases of this Court: The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1) and Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore (2). Both authorities held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion is not limited to belief alone but also embraces essential religious practices, subject to the constitutional restrictions on public order, morality and health. The Commissioner case, at page 1026, observed that under Article 26(b) a religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy to determine which rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion it follows, emphasizing the word “essential”. The later decision in Sri Venkataramana Devaru reiterated that the term “matters of religion” in Article 26(b) includes practices that the community regards as part of its religion. Having set out this doctrinal background, the Court identified two questions that arose from the petitioners’ contentions. First, whether section 148-B, which was inserted into the principal Act by the amending Act of 1959, relates only to the administration of the property of Sikh gurdwaras and therefore should be assessed under clause (d) of Article 26. Second, whether the same provision intrudes upon “matters of religion” within the meaning of clause (b) of Article 26. The petitioners argued that the principal Act, as amended by section 148-B, does not merely deal with the administration of gurdwara property but also touches upon religious matters, because it brings new members onto the Board and thus affects the religious affairs of Sikhs.

In this case, the petitioners contended that section 148-B of the principal Act did not merely deal with the administration of Sikh gurdwara properties but also touched upon religious matters, arguing that the provision’s effect of introducing new members onto the Board inevitably impacted the religious affairs of Sikhs. The respondent State, however, maintained that section 148-B left untouched the essential beliefs and practices of the Sikh faith, and further asserted that none of the other relevant sections of the principal Act interfered with Sikh religion. To assess these claims, the Court examined the provisions contained in Chapter X, which prescribe the powers and duties of the Board, and those in Chapter XI, which govern the powers and duties of the Committees. Section 125, already referred to, imposes on the Board the duty of ensuring that every Committee manages the property and income of the gurdwara or gurdwaras under its charge in accordance with the Act; in fulfilment of this duty, the Board is vested with control, direction and general superintendence over all committees created under the Act. Section 129 provides that the Board, in any meeting, may consider and discuss any matter within its statutory powers and any matter directly connected with the Sikh religion, but it may not consider, discuss, or pass any resolution or order on any other matter. The Advocate-General for the State argued that when section 129 is read subject to section 125, the Board’s powers and duties, in substance and effect, are confined to the administration of gurdwara property and matters ancillary thereto, and they bear little reference to “matters of religion.” Section 133 sets out, in general terms, the powers of the Committees, one of which is to enforce the proper observance of all ceremonies and religious observances in connection with the gurdwara or gurdwaras and to take all measures necessary to ensure proper management of the gurdwara, efficient administration of its property, income and endowments. Counsel for the petitioners highlighted the portion of that section dealing with “the proper observance of all ceremonies and religious observances,” contending that because the Board functions as the Committee for certain principal gurdwaras, it has a duty to ensure that all essential religious ceremonies of the Sikh faith are observed, and that this duty falls within the ambit of a matter of religion. Under section 134, a Committee possesses the power, among other things, to dismiss an office-holder or minister if he fails to perform any rituals and ceremonies in accordance with the teachings of the Sri Guru Granth Sahib or if he has ceased to be a Sikh; the petitioners argued that this power also constitutes a “matter of religion” within the meaning of Article 26(b). Without a fuller and more detailed examination of

In this case the Court expressed reluctance to make a final determination on the broader issue of whether any other provisions of the principal Act impact matters of religion, and it held that it was unnecessary to resolve that larger question in the present proceedings. The Court indicated that the petition could be resolved on a narrower basis, even if it were to assume that certain provisions of the principal Act do indeed pertain to religious matters and that the Board, whether exercising its supervisory authority over other committees or acting in its capacity as the committee for specific gurdwaras, may issue orders concerning religious affairs. The Court noted that the preamble of the principal Act makes clear that the legislation is primarily intended to provide for the more efficient administration of certain Sikh gurdwaras, and it accepted that, insofar as the Board’s powers relate merely to the administrative management of gurdwara property in either of its two roles, such administration must conform to the law and that the appropriate legislature is competent to prescribe the applicable legal standards. The decisive question for the petition, the Court observed, was whether section 148-B interferes with matters of religion. The Court pointed out that sections 133 and 134 of the principal Act were not the subject of the challenge; the only provision under scrutiny was section 148-B. The Court further observed that section 148-B had not altered in any way the powers that the Board or the Committee already possessed under sections 133 and 134. The grievance advanced by the petitioners was that section 148-B, even as a temporary measure, introduced additional designated Sikh members to the Board by clause (a) of sub-section (1) and also provided for the election of thirty-five Sikhs from the PEPSU area through an indirect method, whereby the limited Sikh electorate itself is chosen by both Sikhs and non-Sikhs. The Court explained that, to succeed, the petitioners must demonstrate not merely that some provisions of the principal Act deal with religious matters, but that the manner of introducing new members to the Board for the expanded PEPSU territories, as envisaged by section 148-B, by itself infringes the Sikhs’ constitutional right in a matter of religion. Accordingly, the petitioners were compelled to argue that a direct election of Board members by the entire Sikh community constituted a religious matter and therefore fell within the scope of the right guaranteed by article 26(b). The Court found this argument unconvincing, stating that no authoritative source had been produced to show that a direct election by the whole Sikh community for the management of gurdwaras forms part of Sikh religious practice, and consequently it concluded that such a position was not supported by article 26 of the Constitution.

The Court observed that the principal Act, as it existed prior to the amending Act of 1959, offered no support for the petitioners’ contention that the method of direct election constituted a religious right under Article 26(b) of the Constitution. While the Court expressed respect for the democratic principle of direct elections, it held that, given the provisions of the principal Act and the specific circumstances that led to the insertion of section 148-B, the concept of universal denominational suffrage could not be elevated to the status of religion within the meaning of Article 26(b). The Court explained that if the election process were treated as a religious matter, then the co-option of certain members—an aspect not challenged by the petitioners—would also breach the alleged fundamental right. Likewise, any restrictions imposed by the principal Act or its subsidiary rules on matters such as the qualification to vote, including age limits, would likewise be deemed violative. The Court stressed that these matters are clearly secular and not matters of religion, and warned that classifying them as religious would amount to conflating religion with contemporary political considerations.

The Court further noted that the principal Act was designed to create a Board representing Sikhs both within Punjab and beyond its borders. Consequently, the Act provided for a mixture of election, nomination, designation of the head ministers of certain principal Sikh gurdwaras, and co-option, with the aim of rendering the Board as broadly representative as possible. Because the Punjab legislature could not directly legislate for the election of members from constituencies outside Punjab, mechanisms of nomination, designation and co-option became necessary. The designation of the head ministers of the five principal Sikh shrines was justified on the ground that these individuals performed essential functions and therefore deserved Board membership. In 1953, the provision for nomination was abolished and the number of co-opted members was increased to twenty-five, of whom at least twelve were required to be residents of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (Pepsu). This adjustment preceded the extension of the principal Act to the Pepsu area. When the amending Act of 1959 extended the principal Act to include Pepsu, an immediate problem arose regarding how to provide representation for Sikhs in the newly added territories, both for the interim period before the next Board election and as a permanent solution. Section 148-B was introduced to furnish interim representation, while section 43-A was intended as a permanent measure. After considering section 148-B in view of these historical and legislative circumstances, the Court concluded that it did not infringe the Sikhs’ fundamental right under Article 26(b). The interim representation scheme, the Court held, was driven solely by practical considerations of convenience and expediency and bore no religious significance. The Court clarified that the issue was not whether a more satisfactory interim arrangement could have been devised, but whether the existing scheme interfered with the freedom of religion, a question it found the petitioners had not established.

The Court noted that counsel for the petitioners had observed that many Sikhs of influence and standing in the Pepsu area would be unable to cast a vote during the interim period. The Court regarded this circumstance as unfortunate but irrelevant to the issue before it, namely whether there had been any interference with the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court then turned to examine the specific complaints raised by the petitioners concerning the persons who would become members of the Gurdwara Board under section 148-B. Regarding the members of the Interim Board, Patiala, who were deemed under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 148-B to be members of the Board formed under section 43, the petitioners argued that these individuals had been appointed by a Punjab Government notification dated 10 January 1958, that although they were Sikhs they did not represent the Sikh community, and that they were merely nominees of the Government. The petitioners further contended that these members were not subject to the disqualifications specified in sections 45 and 46 of the Act that applied to elected and co-opted members respectively. The Court recalled that the principal Act, prior to 1953, contained a provision for the nomination of twelve members by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu, and that after 1953 the co-opted members comprised twelve residents of Pepsu. By an order of the Maharaja of Patiala, the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, had been set up to manage certain gurdwaras in the Pepsu area, and following the merger the appointment power passed to the Governor of Punjab. Section 148-A, introduced by the 1959 amendment, terminated the functioning of the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, and section 148-B(1)(a) consequently made the members of that Interim Board members of the Board constituted under section 43. The Court concluded that the designation of such members, as an interim measure to represent the gurdwaras they actually administered, did not violate any fundamental right. Moreover, the Court held that the fact that the disqualifications in sections 45 and 46 did not apply to these members did not support the petitioners’ case. The principal Act contained no provision for disqualifying designated members; disqualification rules applied only to elected, nominated or co-opted members, and after nominations ceased in 1953, only to elected or co-opted members. The Court deemed it reasonable to presume that the legislature was aware that the designated members were not disqualified, and noted that the petitioners had not alleged any disqualification of the Interim Board members under sections 45 or 46.

The Court then addressed the petitioners’ threefold contention concerning the thirty-five Sikhs to be elected under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 148-B. First, the petitioners claimed that the electorate described in sub-section (2) of section 148-B was not representative of all Sikhs. Second, they argued that some members of the electorate, such as Sikh members of Parliament and municipal committees, were themselves elected by joint constituencies consisting of both Sikhs and non-Sikhs. Third, the petitioners asserted that certain members of the electorate, namely Sikh sarpanches and Sikh naya pradhans, were in government service and therefore subject to governmental influence. The Court held that these considerations were not determinative of the question before it. It reiterated that the method of representation for the extended areas, as an interim measure, was a matter of administrative convenience and not a religious issue. The Court observed that the fact that some electors were chosen by constituencies containing both Sikhs and non-Sikhs was a remote and indirect circumstance, insufficient to constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion. Moreover, the Court stressed that the electorate itself consisted entirely of Sikhs, who were required to elect thirty-five Sikh members, and that there was no substantive basis for the contention that non-Sikhs could influence the Board. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petitioners’ arguments regarding the composition of the electorate or the potential governmental influence over certain electors.

The Court observed that certain individuals who formed part of the electorate, such as Sikh members of Parliament and members of Municipal Committees, were themselves elected by constituencies that combined Sikhs and non-Sikhs. It also noted that some of the electorate, for example Sikh Sarpanches and Sikh Naya Pradhans, were employed by the Government and therefore potentially subject to governmental influence. The Court stated that it did not accept these observations as decisive factors for resolving the issue before it. It reiterated that the method adopted for representing the extended areas on the Board, being an interim arrangement, was not rooted in any religious consideration. The Court further held that the fact that some members of the electorate were chosen by mixed constituencies of Sikhs and non-Sikhs was too remote and indirect to amount to an infringement of the freedom of religion. Since every member of the electorate was itself a Sikh and was required to elect thirty-five Sikh representatives, the Court found no substantive basis for the argument that non-Sikhs could influence the composition of the Board, unless one relied on purely abstract reasoning. The Court also rejected the contention that Sikh Sarpanches and Naya Pradhans, by virtue of their government service, violated the Sikhs’ right under Article 26(b) of the Constitution when they were included as members of the electorate. It further pointed out that the twelve existing members of the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, together with the thirty-five Sikh members elected from the PEPSU area, would together form a numerical minority when compared with the one hundred and thirty-two elected members and twenty-five co-opted members of the Board. On the basis of these considerations, the Court concluded that the petitioners had not demonstrated any violation of their fundamental rights. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the petitioners were ordered to pay costs.