Sardar Kapur Singh vs The Union Of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1959

Decision Date: 15 December 1959

Coram: B.P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India heard an appeal that had been listed on 15 December 1959. The petition was filed by Sardar Kapur Singh against the Union of India. The judgment was authored by Justice J.C. Shah, and the bench comprised Justices B.P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, K.C. Das Gupta and J.C. Shah. The citation for the decision is reported as 1960 AIR 493 and 1960 SCR (2) 569, with subsequent references appearing in later law reports. The case concerned the interpretation of provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, and Articles 511 and 314 of the Constitution of India.

The appellant, Sardar Kapur Singh, was a member of the Indian Civil Service who, at the relevant time, occupied a posting in the Punjab. The Government of East Punjab suspended him and, invoking the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, appointed the Chief Justice of the East Punjab High Court to act as Enquiry Commissioner. The Commissioner was tasked with conducting an inquiry into a series of charges that alleged misappropriation and other misconduct on the part of the appellant. After an extensive inquiry in which evidence was taken, the Commissioner concluded that the appellant was guilty of most of the allegations and forwarded a report to the Government of East Punjab. The Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, then provided a copy of that report to the appellant and informed him that, after careful consideration of the findings, the President had provisionally decided to dismiss him from service. The President also expressed a desire that the appellant be given an opportunity to show cause and to make a representation against the contemplated dismissal. The appellant responded with a detailed representation. Following consultation with the Union Public Service Commission, the President issued an order that dismissed the appellant from service with immediate effect. The appellant challenged that order by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking relief from the High Court of Punjab.

The High Court dismissed the petition, and, after obtaining a certificate of fitness for appeal, the appellant brought the present appeal before this Court. In support of his appeal, the appellant contended that: (i) the Government of East Punjab lacked authority to direct an inquiry against him because, as a member of the Indian Civil Service, he was not employed under that State Government; (ii) the inquiry could only be lawfully conducted under rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, and not under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850; and (iii) the manner in which the inquiry was held under the Act was discriminatory and therefore violated the principle of equality set out in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court examined each of these submissions and determined that they were without merit and could not be sustained.

The Court then addressed the interpretation of the term “Government” that appears in section 2 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. It held that the word “Government” meant, as defined by section 23 of the same Act, the Central Government in the case of persons who were employed under that Government, and the State Government in the case of persons who were employed under a State Government. The Court observed that a member of the Union civil service, although holding his office at the pleasure of the President, does not acquire the power of dismissal as a source of authority to order an inquiry under the Act. Moreover, there was no constitutional provision that stripped a State of the power to direct an inquiry pursuant to section 2 of the Act. The Court found that, at the date the inquiry was initiated, the appellant was indeed employed under the East Punjab Government. Consequently, the order directing an inquiry against him under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, was perfectly valid in law. The Court further emphasized that there was no basis for the contention that members of the Indian Civil Service were outside the scope of the Act, which was intended to regulate inquiries into the conduct of senior public servants whose removal required sanction from the Government. The Court concluded that the appellant’s arguments were untenable and that the dismissal order stood affirmed. The word “Government” in s. 2 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, means, as defined by S. 23 of the Act, the 73 570 Central Government in the case

In this case the Court explained that the term “Government” in section 2 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 is interpreted, according to section 23 of the same Act, to mean the Central Government when the employee works for the Union and to mean the State Government when the employee works for a State. The Court observed that a member of the Union Civil Service indeed holds his office at the pleasure of the President, but the power to dismiss such a member cannot be treated as the same power that allows a State to order an inquiry under the Act. Moreover, the Constitution contains no provision that deprives a State of its authority to direct an inquiry under section 2 of the Act. The Court noted that the appellant was posted in Punjab and, at the time the inquiry was ordered, he was employed by the East Punjab Government; consequently, the order directing an inquiry against him under the 1850 Act was fully valid under law. The Court rejected the contention that members of the Indian Civil Service are outside the scope of the Act, which is intended to regulate inquiries into the conduct of senior public servants who cannot be removed except with the sanction of the Government. It further held that members of the Indian Civil Service, whether they serve the Union or a State, are not employees of the President and therefore cannot be dismissed from their appointments without the Government’s sanction. Regarding Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the Court explained that the rule permits an inquiry to be conducted either under the procedure prescribed by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 or under the procedure laid down in the rule itself. The rule does not require a second inquiry after an inquiry under the Act before a civil servant can be dismissed. The Court clarified that the expression “without prejudice” in the opening clause of Rule 55 does not mean “notwithstanding,” and cited the decision in S. A. Venkataraman v. Union of India for support. The Court further held that it is incorrect to describe an inquiry under the Act as discriminatory or as a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. While Article 311(2) guarantees every public servant a reasonable inquiry into conduct, the Constitution does not guarantee an inquiry under any particular statutory provision or set of administrative rules. Article 314, the Court said, extends to members of the Indian Civil Service the same disciplinary rights they possessed before the Constitution came into force, which means that an inquiry could be conducted either under the 1850 Act or under Rule 55, whichever was in operation at the time. The essential constitutional guarantee, therefore, is a reasonable inquiry, not a specific procedural form. The Court concluded that no discrimination arises merely because one procedure is chosen over the other, unless it can be shown that the chosen procedure caused prejudice to the public servant, citing Khem Chand v. Union of India. Finally, the Court observed that although the procedure laid down by the 1850 Act is more detailed than that in Rule 55, the substantive differences are not material. Both procedures require notice of charges, provision of material on which the charge is based, and, if the servant wishes, an oral hearing to examine witnesses. Consequently, it is not correct to argue that sections 11 and 19 of the Act make its procedure discriminatory. Even though Rule 55 allows a somewhat more flexible process, it contains implicit provisions analogous to those sections, and the opportunity to make an oral representation is not a mandatory element of the “show-cause” requirement under Article 311. The President, therefore, is not bound by Article 311 to hear witness evidence before issuing a dismissal order.

Although the procedure prescribed by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 is more detailed than the procedure laid down in rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the two procedures are substantively the same and not materially different. Under either form of inquiry the public servant must be given notice of the charges against him, must receive the material on which each charge is based, and, if he so desires, may request an oral hearing for the examination of witnesses. For this reason it is not correct to argue that the provisions contained in sections 11 and 19 of the Act make the procedure discriminatory. While rule 55 provides a somewhat more flexible or elastic procedure, it nevertheless contains implicit provisions that correspond to those found in the two sections of the Act. The Constitution does not require that an opportunity to make an oral representation be a necessary condition of the opportunity to show cause within the meaning of article 311. Accordingly, the President of India is not bound by that article to hear evidence of witnesses before passing an order of dismissal. Article 311 does not envisage that, after a full and fair enquiry has been conducted, a further enquiry in which witness testimony is recorded viva voce must be held before an order of punishment can be passed against a public servant. The Court has referred to the decisions in The High Commissioner of India and Another v. 1. M. Lal, 75 I.A. 225 and Khem Chand v. The Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 1080 in support of this view.

The matter before the Court was a civil appeal, number 230 of 1959, arising from the judgment and order dated 7 October 1955 of the Punjab High Court in civil writ petition number 322 of 1953. Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondents, including the Additional Solicitor-General of India, appeared for the parties. The judgment was delivered on 15 December 1959. The appellant, Sardar Kapur Singh, had been admitted to the Indian Civil Service by the Secretary of State for India in Council after succeeding in a competitive examination held at Delhi in 1931. Following a period of training in the United Kingdom he returned to India in November 1933 and was posted as Assistant Commissioner, Ferozepore, in the Province of Punjab. He served in various capacities in the province from 1933 to 1947. In July 1947 he was appointed Deputy Commissioner at Dharamsala and continued in that office until 11 February 1948, when he was transferred to Hoshiarpur, where he remained Deputy Commissioner until a few days before 14 April 1949. On 13 April 1949 the Government of East Punjab issued an order suspending him from service. On 5 May 1950 the appellant lodged a representation with the President of India, protesting the suspension imposed by the Government of East Punjab and requesting that he be removed from the control of the Punjab Government and that any disciplinary action that might be taken against him be conducted outside the province by persons appointed by the Government of India in an atmosphere free from prejudice and hostility.

In his representation to the President, the appellant requested that the Punjab Government be removed from any control over him and that, should any disciplinary action be contemplated, such action be taken outside the Province of Punjab by officials appointed by the Government of India. He further asked that the proceedings be conducted in an atmosphere “free from prejudice and hostility.” In response, the Government of East Punjab, on 18 May 1950, appointed Mr Eric Weston, who then held the position of Chief Justice of the East Punjab High Court, as Enquiry Commissioner under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, XXXVII of 1850. The Commissioner was tasked with conducting an enquiry against the appellant on twelve distinct articles of charge, and a notice of these charges was duly served on the appellant.

On 5 November 1950, acting on the suggestion of the Enquiry Commissioner, the Government of East Punjab withdrew charges numbered eleven and twelve, and the enquiry continued on the remaining ten charges. Charges 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10 alleged that the appellant had misappropriated various sums of money that had been received by him or entrusted to him, and that he had failed to render accounts for those amounts. Charge 3 concerned the appellant’s attempts to obtain a firearm that belonged to an engineer, his unauthorized retention of that weapon, and his procurement of sanction from the Government of East Punjab for its purchase. Charge 4 related to a sanction granted under the Alienation of Land Act for the sale of a plot of land by an agriculturist to a non-agriculturist; the appellant was the beneficiary of that transaction and was accused of abusing his authority as Deputy Commissioner to have the land transferred to his name without awaiting the government’s sanction. Charge 5 involved the award of a government contract to Sardar Raghbir Singh for the supply of fire-wood without inviting tenders or quotations, at rates that were unreasonably high, and the acceptance of wet and inferior wood that, when dried, weighed only half of the quantity purchased, resulting in a loss of Rs 30,000 to the State. Charge 6 alleged that the appellant, by abusing his authority, purchased a motor car in violation of the government’s order dated 21 March 1949, entered into a bogus sale of that car with M/s Massand Motors, and adjudicated an appeal concerning that car in which he had a personal interest. Charges 1 to 4 and 7 to 10 pertained to the appellant’s official conduct while he served as Deputy Commissioner at Dharamsala, whereas charges 5 and 6 related to his tenure as Deputy Commissioner at Hoshiarpur.

The Enquiry Commissioner heard the State’s evidence at Dharamsala between 31 July and 21 August 1950. The enquiry was then resumed at Simla on 5 September and continued until 23 October, the date on which the State’s evidence was closed. On 27 October, the appellant lodged a list of defence witnesses. He also filed a detailed written statement and thereafter gave evidence on

In this case the appellant took his oath of testimony between the dates of 28 November and 5 December. Following the oath, the defence witnesses were called and examined during the period from 5 December to 28 December. The record indicates that at the close of that examination the appellant expressed no intention to call any further witnesses, and consequently the commission treated the appellant’s case as concluded on 28 December.

After the closure of the case on 28 December 1950 the appellant lodged a number of applications and affidavits seeking specific directions from the Enquiry Commissioner and also requesting the production of information from the State. The Commissioner, on 2 January 1951, adjourned the proceedings in anticipation of the winter vacation. The enquiry resumed on 12 March 1951, at which stage the Commissioner recorded the formal testimony of two police officers, Sub-Inspector S. Gurbachan Singh and Sub-Inspector Ch. Mangal Singh. Their evidence concerned statements that had been made earlier by certain defence witnesses during the investigation; it was alleged that those earlier statements differed materially from the statements previously recorded before the Commissioner. After hearing argument on the relevance and effect of the contradictory statements, the Commissioner formally closed the enquiry.

The Commissioner drafted his final report on 14 May 1951. In that report he concluded that the appellant had obtained the sum referred to in charge number one from the Government on the basis of a claim presented by Raja Harmohinder Singh, a claim that the appellant had himself advocated. The report further found that the appellant had also received the sum described in charge number two, and that the appellant had admitted receipt of the amounts implicated in charges seven, nine and ten. Regarding charge eight, the Commissioner held that the appellant had secured the amount from the Government through a fraudulent claim that he had authorized, fully aware of its false nature. Accordingly, the Commissioner calculated that the appellant had received a total of Rs 16,734-11-6. Although the appellant claimed to have made certain disbursements to refugees, the Commissioner observed that the appellant had failed to produce any account or any figure approximating the amount disbursed, and therefore the charge of misappropriation was deemed proved, even though the exact quantum of the unaccounted amount could not be precisely determined.

The report recorded no finding against the appellant on charges three and four. On charge six, the Commissioner recorded an adverse finding insofar as it related to the appellant’s conduct in deciding an appeal in which the appellant himself had a personal interest. Concerning charge five, the Commissioner concluded that the appellant’s decision to award a contract to Sardar Raghbir Singh amounted to a dishonest preference, and that the appellant knowingly allowed the contractor to defraud the Government, resulting in a considerable loss for which the appellant was held responsible.

The completed report was forwarded to the Government of East Punjab. Subsequently, on 11 February 1952, the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, transmitted a copy of the report to the appellant and informed him that, after a careful consideration of the report and, in particular, of the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Commissioner concerning each of the charges, …

After reviewing the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Commissioner on each of the charges, the President of India formed the view that the appellant was “unsuitable to continue” in Government service and therefore provisionally resolved that the appellant should be dismissed from Government service. The appellant was subsequently notified that, before any action was taken, the President wished to give him an opportunity to show cause against the proposed dismissal and that any written representation he might make would be considered by the President prior to a final decision. Accordingly, the appellant was directed to file his written representation within twenty-one days of receiving the notice. On 7 May 1952, the appellant submitted a detailed written statement that extended to three hundred twenty-one printed pages of the record. The President then sought the opinion of the Union Public Service Commission and, by an order dated 27 July 1953, dismissed the appellant from service with immediate effect.

The dismissal order was challenged by the appellant through a petition filed in the East Punjab High Court seeking a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that petition the appellant prayed that the Court issue a writ quashing both the Enquiry Commissioner’s proceedings and report, and also grant a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the Union of India to reinstate him in the Indian Civil Service from the date of his suspension. The High Court, by separate but concurring judgments of Chief Justice Bhandari and Justice Khosla, dismissed the petition. Undeterred, the appellant filed the present appeal against the order dismissing his petition, relying upon a certificate of fitness that had been granted by the High Court.

The appellant relied upon statutory provisions that were applicable before the Republic was proclaimed. He contended that it had been enacted that every person appointed by the Secretary of State to a civil service of the Crown in India, who continued to serve after the appointed day under the Government of the Dominion of India or any province or part thereof, was entitled to receive the same conditions of service with respect to remuneration, leave, pension and disciplinary rights, and likewise the same tenure of office. Moreover, under sub-section 2 of section 240 of the Government of India Act, as amended, a person appointed by the Secretary of State who remained in the establishment of the Dominion of India could not be dismissed by any authority subordinate to the Governor-General or the Governor, insofar as that person was serving in connection with the affairs of the Dominion or a province. The appellant further argued that, since India became a Republic, Article 310(1) of the Constitution provides that every person who is a member of a civil service of the Union, an all-India service, or who holds any civil post under the Union, holds office during the pleasure of the President. However, the appellant submitted that the power to dismiss a member of such a service could not be exercised in the same manner as the authority conferred by statute upon the State to direct an inquiry into charges of misdemeanour against a public servant.

The Court observed that the power to dismiss a member of the Union civil service or an all-India service could not be treated as the same power that a statute gave to the State to order an inquiry into alleged misdemeanours by a public servant. Section 2 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 provided that whenever the Government thought there were sufficient grounds to make a formal public inquiry into any accusation of misbehaviour by a person in the service of the Government who could not be removed without the Government’s sanction, the Government could frame the accusations as distinct charges and could order a formal public inquiry to determine the truth of those charges. Section 23 of the same Act defined “Government” to mean the Central Government when the person concerned was employed by that Government, and consequently the officers of the Indian Civil Service, who could not be dismissed without the Government’s sanction, fell within the scope of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, subject to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, stipulated that no order of dismissal, removal or reduction could be made against a service member—except where a criminal court or court-martial conviction had already occurred—unless the person had been given written notice of the grounds for action, the grounds had been reduced to definite charges communicated together with a statement of the allegations and any other circumstances to be considered, and the person had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit a written defence and to indicate whether he wished to be heard in person. If the person desired a personal hearing, or if the authority directed it, an oral inquiry would be held, during which oral evidence would be taken on any allegation not admitted; the person charged could cross-examine witnesses, give evidence in person and summon witnesses of his choosing, although the officer conducting the inquiry could refuse to call a witness for a special and sufficient reason recorded in writing. The proceedings had to contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and their basis. The rule did not apply where the person had absconded or where it was otherwise impracticable to communicate with him, and it allowed, in exceptional cases, a written waiver of any provision for special and sufficient reasons without causing injustice to the person charged. It was submitted that, relying on this rule, no dismissal or removal order could be passed against an Indian Civil Service member unless an inquiry was held as prescribed by Rule 55. However, the rule expressly stated that the inquiry was “without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850”, indicating that a dismissal order could not be passed without an inquiry conducted either under the procedure of the 1850 Act or under the procedure set out in the rule, and the rule therefore did not support the contention that even if an inquiry were held under the Public

In the regulation, it was provided that where a person could not be contacted for reasons that made communication impracticable, the rule might be relaxed. The text further allowed that any or all of its provisions could be set aside in exceptional situations, provided that special and sufficient reasons were recorded in writing, a difficulty existed in meeting the rule’s exact requirements, and waiving those requirements would not cause injustice to the charged individual. Relying on this provision, it was argued that no order of dismissal or removal of a member of the Indian Civil Service could be issued unless an enquiry prescribed by Rule 55 was conducted. However, the language of the rule expressly states that such enquiry is to be held “without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850.” Consequently, the rule was understood to mean that an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank may not be passed unless an enquiry is held either under the procedure set out in the 1850 Act or under the procedure detailed in the Rule itself. The rule does not require a second, separate enquiry under Rule 55 after an enquiry has already been conducted pursuant to the 1850 Act. The appellant’s argument therefore rested on an assumption that the phrase “without prejudice” in the rule signified “notwithstanding,” an interpretation not supported by the language or context. To clarify the true meaning of the opening clause, the Court referred to the observations of Mr. Justice Mukherjea in S. A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India and Another, where it was held that Rule 55, located in the same chapter, prescribes the procedure to be followed before any dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. No such order may be made unless the officer has been notified in writing of the grounds for action and has been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. An enquiry into conduct may be conducted either in accordance with the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 or in a less formal, less public manner as provided by the Rule. The Court therefore sought to dispel any doubt about the opening clause and examined whether conducting an enquiry under the 1850 Act infringes the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The appellant submitted that the Government possessed the authority to choose either mode of enquiry, and that directing an enquiry under the 1850 Act imposed stricter provisions than those that might apply if a similarly situated public servant were subjected to an enquiry under Rule 55, thereby raising an Art 14 equality issue.

In this case the Court explained that Article 311(2) of the Constitution guarantees a public servant who is charged with a misdemeanour that he cannot be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank unless he is afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. The Court referred to the decision in Khem Chand v. Union of India and Others, where it was held that the “reasonable opportunity” contemplated by the constitutional provision comprises three distinct elements. First, the servant must be given the chance to deny his guilt and to establish his innocence; this can be done only if he is informed of the specific charges and the factual allegations on which those charges are based. Second, the servant must be permitted to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses who have been produced against him and by calling his own witnesses, including himself, to support his defence. Third, after the inquiry has concluded, the competent authority must give the servant an opportunity to make a representation on why the contemplated punishment should not be imposed, and the authority must communicate the tentative punishment it intends to impose after having considered the gravity of the proven charges.

The Court further observed that for public servants who are not members of the Indian Civil Service, the Constitution enshrines a guarantee of a fair enquiry into their conduct. This guarantee requires that the servant be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself by challenging the reliability or truth of the evidence upon which the charges rest and by presenting his own evidence and witnesses. In addition, the servant must be allowed to show cause against any punishment that may be imposed. However, the Constitution does not assure an enquiry that is conducted under any particular statutory power or administrative rule; the guarantee is confined to the procedural fairness aspects described above.

The Court then noted that the guarantee applicable to members of the Indian Civil Service differs slightly. Article 314 provides that a civil servant who was appointed by the Secretary of State to a Crown civil service in India continues, subject to any express constitutional provision, to serve under the Government of India or a State on the same terms of service that existed before the Constitution came into force. Those terms include conditions of remuneration, leave, pension and, importantly, the same disciplinary rights that existed prior to the Constitution. The Court pointed out that Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, as it stood before the Constitution, required that no order of dismissal or removal could be passed except after an enquiry. Consequently, under Article 314, civil servants appointed by the Secretary of State retain the same disciplinary rights that were available to them before the Constitution was adopted.

The Court observed that the Constitution guarantees that a member of the Indian Civil Service is entitled to an enquiry before any disciplinary action is taken against him, and that such an enquiry may be conducted either under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, or under rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules that were in force at the commencement of the Constitution. The Court further explained that because the guarantee is expressed in terms of an enquiry directed under one of two alternative statutory powers, the exercise of authority under either of those alternatives is not prima facie illegal. The Court then set out the procedural requirements prescribed by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act. It held that the Enquiry Commissioner must supply the accused person with a copy of the articles of charge together with a list of the documents and witnesses that will be used to sustain those charges at least three days before the enquiry begins. Under section two, the prosecutor is required to exhibit the articles of charge, which are read to the accused, who must then plead either guilty or not guilty to each charge; the plea is recorded, and if the accused refuses or, without reasonable cause, neglects to appear to answer the charge either personally or through counsel or an agent, the law deems him to have admitted the truth of the articles of charge. Sections thirteen, fourteen, fifteen and sixteen prescribe the sequence for examining witnesses, while section eighteen provides the method for maintaining notes of oral evidence. Section nineteen allows the prosecutor, after the accused has presented his defence, to make a general oral reply on the whole case and to exhibit evidence intended to contradict any evidence placed by the defence; however, the accused is not entitled to any adjournment of the proceedings even if that new evidence was not included in the list previously furnished to him. Section twenty empowers the Enquiry Commissioner to amend the charge. The Court noted that this procedure is set out in greater detail than the procedure prescribed by rule fifty-five. Turning to rule fifty-five, the Court explained that the rule requires the grounds on which action is proposed to be reduced to a definite charge and communicated to the public servant together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstances that may be taken into consideration in passing an order. The public servant must be given a reasonable period to submit a written statement of his defence and to indicate whether he wishes to be heard in person; if he so desires or if the authority directs, an oral enquiry must be held. At such an oral enquiry, the public servant is granted the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the prosecution, to present his own evidence, and to examine his own witnesses.

In this case, the Court observed that the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 were drafted in great detail because, at the time of its enactment, no codified law of evidence existed in India. Nevertheless, the Court held that the procedure laid down in Act XXXVII of 1850 and the procedure prescribed by rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules are not materially different in substance. Under either system, the public servant who is the subject of an enquiry must receive notice of the specific charges, must be supplied with the material upon which those charges are based, and, if he so wishes, may demand an oral hearing at which both the prosecution’s witnesses and his own witnesses may be examined. The appellant’s counsel argued that the Act imposes a heavier burden on the public servant in two respects. First, section 11 of Act XXXVII provides that if the accused refuses to appear or neglects to answer the charge without reasonable cause, his refusal will be deemed an admission of the truth of the charge, a provision that does not exist in rule 55. Second, section 19 of the Act permits the prosecutor, even after the defence has closed its evidence, to introduce additional evidence intended to contradict the defence and to proceed without adjournment, even though that new evidence was not listed for the accused; again, rule 55 contains no comparable provision. While acknowledging that rule 55 is somewhat more flexible, the Court noted that the same substantive possibilities relied upon by the appellant’s counsel as discriminatory are implicitly available under rule 55. Specifically, if the public servant does not request an oral enquiry, the authority is under no obligation to hold one, and the rule does not prevent the authority from presenting prosecutorial evidence after the defence case has closed when such evidence is meant to rebut the defence’s case. The Court further emphasized that the principal constitutional guarantee for a member of the Indian Civil Service is the right to a reasonable opportunity to be heard in an enquiry conducted under the powers conferred either by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act or by rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules. Discrimination, therefore, does not arise merely because one of the two procedural sources is used, unless it can be shown that the chosen procedure operated to the prejudice of the public servant. Consequently, the Court concluded that the enquiry held against the appellant was not performed in a manner materially different from an enquiry that could be conducted in accordance with rule 55, and that the appellant’s claim of inequality before the law could not be sustained.

The Court observed that the Enquiry Commissioner could not be declared void merely because the enquiry was conducted in a manner that the appellant claimed should have been adopted, even though the manner used was permissible under law. The appellant’s contention that the Enquiry Commissioner had conducted the enquiry in violation of the principles of natural justice was therefore open to consideration. During the enquiry the appellant examined a total of eighty-two witnesses and also produced a substantial body of documentary material. The High Court had previously held that the Enquiry Commissioner addressed each charge in an exhaustive way and that the enquiry was conducted in a just and thorough manner. According to the learned judges of the High Court, every application filed by the appellant resulted in an order from the Enquiry Commissioner, and in the majority of those orders the commissioner provided detailed reasons for refusing the appellant’s requests. The judges further held that the appellant possessed no inherent right to compel the commissioner to summon every witness that he cited, and that a failure to summon particular witnesses could not, by itself, constitute a reasonable ground for challenging the procedure as being contrary to the rules of natural justice.

In paragraph seven of his petition the appellant alleged that his written request to the Enquiry Commissioner to hold the enquiry at Delhi or Simla, rather than at Dharamsala where he reasonably feared that witnesses might be improperly influenced, had been summarily rejected; nevertheless all of the appellant’s witnesses were examined at Simla and not at Dharamsala. In paragraphs eight, nine and ten the appellant claimed that he had informed the Enquiry Commissioner of a conspiracy involving certain senior government officials and influential politicians, but that the commissioner declined to permit evidence of the alleged conspiracy to be placed on the record. The commissioner further observed that he would not make any definite finding against any functionary or high officer of the Government, a circumstance which the appellant argued vitiated the enquiry. That specific contention was not pressed before this Court. By paragraph ten the appellant also asserted that the commissioner did not order the production of documents that the appellant sought to call for the purpose of rebutting the specific charges; instead the commissioner directed that any copies of such documents that the appellant possessed could be filed in the court and would be treated as a legal substitute for the original documents. The appellant contended that this extraordinary procedure resulted in the exclusion of admissions by high functionaries of the Punjab Government, admissions that would have shown that the charges against him arose from a conspiracy. Neither of these grounds was pressed before this Court. In paragraph II the appellant stated that the proceedings taken and the charges framed against him were mala fide and the result of a conspiracy, bringing the discussion to a close.

In this case the appellant alleged that the proceedings and the charges against him were fabricated and resulted from a conspiracy, and that the Enquiry Commissioner had deliberately excluded documentary and oral evidence that could have shown the charges to be the product of such a conspiracy. He further contended that the Commissioner had imposed a discriminatory procedure by requiring the appellant, for each item of evidence or each witness, to specify in advance what the document contained or what the witness would say before the Commissioner would agree to summon or record the defence evidence, a requirement that was not imposed on the prosecution. Before the Court these allegations of mala-fides and of discrimination between the facilities afforded to the prosecutor and to the appellant had not been raised. Nevertheless, reliance was placed on the ground that the appellant had not been given an opportunity to examine the witnesses he wished to examine nor to produce certain documentary evidence, and that on some applications filed by the appellant the Commissioner had not issued any orders. The record showed several applications filed on or after 28 December 1950. On that date the last witness for the appellant was examined, and the appellant’s counsel submitted an application requesting that the documents and files already admitted by the parties be formally exhibited for ease of reference. This request indicated that the appellant had no further evidence to lead after 28 December 1950. The record did not contain an express order on this application; assuming that no direction was given to exhibit the documents, the Court could not perceive how the procedure followed had operated to the appellant’s prejudice. On 29 December 1950 the appellant applied that the Advocate General appearing for the prosecution be directed to give “final and complete answers” to a series of seven queries and to produce the documents supporting those answers. An application dated 30 December 1950 showed that the Commissioner asked the appellant to remodel the questions, and a fresh application with the revised questions was filed. On that application the Commissioner ordered that he had no objection to allowing the appellant to give evidence concerning an incident referred to as “Pauji Mela,” although no reference to that matter had been made at any earlier stage. However, the Commissioner declined to permit any further evidence to be called, observed that he had not accorded any special privilege to the prosecutor, and noted that the prosecutor had not been instructed to give any express directions to district officers in the administration of trust funds. The appellant also filed another application on 30 December 1950 requesting that the prosecutor be asked to answer the questions and to produce supporting documents. The Commissioner ordered that the answers could be given on affidavits, thereby removing the need to consider the prayer for further evidence, and directed the prosecutor to file the answers within one month.

In the matter before the Enquiry Commissioner, the appellant submitted an application requesting that the Prosecutor answer a series of questions and produce supporting documents. The Commissioner directed that the answers be given on affidavit, thereby removing the need to consider a request for additional evidence, and instructed the Prosecutor to file the affidavits within one month. Subsequently, on 29 December 1950, the appellant filed an affidavit in which he described a meeting that had taken place among the Governor of East Punjab, the Chief Secretary, the Deputy Commissioners of several districts and the superintendents of police, and he made further submissions concerning the record that had been produced. On 31 December 1950, relying on the order that permitted him to give evidence regarding the “Fauji Mela,” the appellant asked the Commissioner to direct the Prosecutor to file an affidavit on certain facts set out in the appellant’s application so that he could take additional steps to advance his contentions. The Commissioner replied that the Prosecutor was unable to make any statements and, in view of the circumstances of the case, he could not permit any further inquiries. On 2 January 1951, the appellant produced a postcard he claimed to have received and contended that it was relevant to his evidence; he prayed that, if the Commissioner had no objection, the author of the postcard, identified as Suraj Parkash Bakhshi, should be called as a defence witness before the defence was closed. No effort appears to have been made to summon or retain the writer before the Commissioner. After the winter recess, when the Commissioner resumed the enquiry on 12 March 1951, the appellant’s counsel submitted a narrative alleging victimisation of certain witnesses. The Commissioner ordered that he could not launch an inquiry into the alleged victimisation. On the same day, the appellant filed another application asking that immediate steps be taken to examine one Tikka Nardev Chand of Guler in light of certain extra-judicial statements, and that the clerk of the Court of Wards of the Deputy Commissioner’s Office be summoned with the necessary papers to demonstrate when the property of the Raja of Guler was taken into possession and when the allowances of the Raja and his dependants were fixed. The Commissioner observed that the application was untimely; although he was away from Simla, he was reachable by post and his location was known, and he could not allow such further evidence to be placed on record. At the instance of the Prosecutor, the Commissioner permitted two witnesses, S. Gurbachan Singh and Ch. Mangal Singh, to formally prove the statements previously made by Bishan Das Gupta and Shahbaz Singh, who had been alleged to have given on- oath statements in the enquiry that were inconsistent with those made during the investigation.

In this case the record indicated that Shahbaz Singh was alleged to have given, under oath during the inquiry, statements that conflicted with those he had made during the earlier investigation. Following the Enquiry Commissioner’s order dated 30 December 1950, the prosecutor submitted on 13 March 1951 answers to the questions that the Commissioner had required to be answered. The appellant’s counsel acknowledged that the complete record of the Enquiry Commissioner was not placed before this Court. Both learned judges of the High Court observed that, for every application filed by the appellant, the Enquiry Commissioner issued an order, and that in the great majority of those orders detailed reasons were provided. This Court declares that it is not called upon to pass judgment on the correctness of those orders; its sole task is to determine whether the proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated the rules of natural justice. The petition presented to the High Court contained, beyond a vague reference in paragraph 1 that certain documentary and oral evidence showing that the specific charges against the appellant were the result of a conspiracy “was not allowed to go in,” no specific particulars. Consequently, the Court is unable to conclude that the proceedings were conducted contrary to natural-justice principles. The appellant failed to set out, in his petition before the High Court, detailed instances in which evidence was sought to be adduced, to explain the relevance of that evidence, or to demonstrate how the exclusion of such evidence prejudiced him. In the absence of any express pleading and of sufficient material to support the claim, the Court cannot disagree with the High Court’s view that the inquiry was not vitiated by a breach of natural-justice rules. The President of India was not obligated, before issuing an order dismissing the appellant, to hear the witnesses’ evidence; he could form his conclusion on the basis of the evidence already recorded by the Enquiry Commissioner. Article 311 of the Constitution provides that a public servant may show cause against a proposed action, yet the authority to pass an order adverse to a public servant is not conditioned on the holding of a viva-voce hearing, even if a fair and full inquiry has previously been conducted before the Enquiry Commissioner. In The High Commissioner for India and Another v I.M. Lal (1), dealing with section 240, clause 3, Lord Thankerton, addressing similar contentions, observed: “In the opinion of their Lordships, no action is proposed within the meaning of the sub-section until a definite conclusion has been come to on the charges and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on. Prior to that stage, the charges are unproved and the suggested punishments.”

The Court observed that when charges have not yet been proved, they remain merely hypothetical. It is only after a definite conclusion on those charges has been reached that the statute provides the civil servant with the opportunity described in sub-section (3). The judges added that they saw no difficulty in the statutory opportunity being afforded at more than one stage. They noted that if a civil servant had already undergone an inquiry under rule 55, it would not be reasonable to require a repetition of that stage when the inquiry had been duly carried out; however, this would not extinguish his statutory right, and he would still be entitled to make a representation against the punishment proposed as a result of the inquiry’s findings. This interpretation was affirmed by this Court in Khem Chand v. The Union of India and Others, where Chief Justice S. R. Das, at page 1099, observed that “of course if the government servant has been through the enquiry under r. 55, it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out.” By the Constitution, an opportunity to show cause against any proposed action against a public servant is guaranteed, and that opportunity must be a reasonable one. Whether the opportunity afforded in a particular case is reasonable depends on the circumstances of that case.

In the present matter, the enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Commissioner, who at the time held the high office of Chief Justice of the East Punjab High Court. The appellant himself examined eighty-two witnesses, produced a substantial body of documentary evidence, and submitted an argumentative defence that extended over three hundred and twenty-one printed pages. The Court held that the provision of an oral representation was not a necessary component of the opportunity to show cause contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. Consequently, the appellant’s claim that he had been deprived of constitutional protection because the President did not grant him an oral hearing could not be sustained. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs, and the order of dismissal was affirmed.