S. Kapur Singh vs Union of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 15 December, 1959

Coram: B.P. Sinha, J.C. Shah, K.C. Das Gupta, K. Subba Rao, P.B. Gajendragadkar

The Court recorded that Sardar Kapur Singh, who would be referred to as the appellant, had been admitted to the Indian Civil Service by the Secretary of State for India in Council after succeeding in a competitive examination held in Delhi in 1931. Following a period of training in the United Kingdom, the appellant returned to India in November 1933 and was appointed Assistant Commissioner at Ferozepore in the Punjab Province. He continued to serve in various posts within the province from 1933 until 1947. In July 1947, he was posted as Deputy Commissioner at Dharamsala and remained in that position until 11 February 1948, when he was transferred to Hoshiarpur. He continued as Deputy Commissioner at Hoshiarpur until a few days before 14 April 1949. On 13 April 1949, the appellant received an order from the Government of East Punjab that suspended him from service. On 5 May 1950, the appellant filed a representation before the President of India, objecting to the suspension imposed by the Government of East Punjab. In that representation, he requested that he be released from the control of the Punjab Government and, if any disciplinary action was to be taken, that it be conducted outside the province by officials appointed by the Government of India, in an atmosphere free from prejudice and hostility. The Government of East Punjab, on 18 May 1950, appointed Mr. Eric Weston, Chief Justice of the East Punjab High Court, as Enquiry Commissioner under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, to conduct an enquiry against the appellant on twelve specific charges. The appellant was served with notice of those charges. On 5 November 1950, following the suggestion of the Enquiry Commissioner, the Government of East Punjab withdrew charges numbered eleven and twelve and the Enquiry Commissioner proceeded to hold the enquiry on the remaining ten charges. Charges one, two, seven, eight, nine and ten concerned alleged misappropriation of various sums of money that had been received by or entrusted to the appellant, for which he allegedly failed to render account. The third charge related to the appellant’s alleged attempts to obtain a firearm belonging to an engineer, his unauthorized retention of that weapon, and his procurement of sanction from the Government of East Punjab for its purchase. The fourth charge alleged that the appellant, while acting as Deputy Commissioner, granted sanction under the Alienation of Land Act for the sale of a plot of land by an agriculturist to a non‑agriculturist, that he was himself a beneficiary of the transaction, and that he abused his authority to have the land transferred to his name without awaiting the required government sanction. The Court further noted that the Enquiry Commissioner heard the evidence on behalf of the State.

The fifth charge alleged that the appellant, while serving as Deputy Commissioner at Hoshiarpur, had caused a government contract for the supply of fire‑wood to be granted to Sardar Raghbir Singh without inviting any tenders or quotations, that the rates fixed for that contract were unreasonably high, and that the wood supplied was wet and of inferior quality, so that after drying it weighed only half of the quantity for which the State had paid, thereby causing a loss of Rs 30,000 to the State. The sixth charge alleged that the appellant had, by abusing the authority of his office, arranged for the purchase of a motor car in violation of the Government order dated 21 March 1949, that he had entered into a bogus transaction of sale of that car with M/s Massand Motors, and that he had decided an appeal concerning that car in which he was personally interested. Charges numbered one to four and seven to ten related to the official conduct of the appellant during his posting as Deputy Commissioner at Dharamsala, whereas charges five and six related to his period of posting as Deputy Commissioner at Hoshiarpur. The Enquiry Commissioner heard the evidence on behalf of the State at Dharamsala between 31 July and 21 August 1950. The enquiry proceedings were then resumed on 5 September at Simla and continued until 23 October, the date on which the State’s evidence was closed. On 27 October the appellant filed a list of defence witnesses. A detailed written statement was subsequently filed by the appellant and he gave evidence on oath between 28 November and 5 December 1950. The defence witnesses were examined between 5 December and 28 December 1950. At that stage the appellant did not seek to examine any further witnesses, and consequently his case was treated as closed on 28 December 1950. After that date, the appellant filed several applications and affidavits seeking certain directions from the Enquiry Commissioner and requesting information from the State. On 2 January 1951 the Enquiry Commissioner adjourned the proceedings for the winter vacation. The enquiry was resumed on 12 March 1951, and after recording the formal evidence of two witnesses, Sub‑Inspector S. Gurbachan Singh and Sub‑Inspector Ch. Mangal Singh, concerning statements made by certain defence witnesses during the investigation that were said to be materially different from those made before the Enquiry Commissioner, the enquiry was finally closed after hearing arguments. On 14 May 1951 the Enquiry Commissioner prepared his report. He held that the appellant had taken the amount referred to in charge No 1 from the Government on the basis of a claim of Raja Harmohinder Singh that was made at the appellant’s instance, that the appellant had also received the amount which was the subject matter of charge No 2, that the appellant admitted having received the amounts which were the subject matter of charges Nos 7, 9 and 10, and that the amount which was the subject‑matter of charge No 8 had been obtained by the appellant from the Government under a fraudulent claim sanctioned by the appellant with full knowledge of its true nature.

The Enquiry Commissioner concluded that the appellant had taken the sum of Rs 16,734‑11‑6 from the Government with full knowledge of its true character. Although the appellant claimed to have made certain payments to refugees, the Commissioner found that the appellant had failed to provide any account of how the received amount, or an amount approximating it, was disbursed. Consequently, the Commissioner held that the charge of misappropriation against the appellant was proved, even though the exact unaccounted amount could not be precisely determined. Regarding charges three and four, the Commissioner recorded no finding against the appellant. For charge six, the Commissioner entered an adverse finding insofar as it pertained to the appellant’s conduct in deciding an appeal in which he had a personal interest. Concerning charge five, the Commissioner observed that the appellant’s action of granting a contract to Sardar Raghbir Singh amounted to a dishonest preference. The Commissioner further stated that the appellant knowingly allowed the contractor to defraud the Government in the execution of the contract, resulting in considerable loss for which the appellant was held responsible.

This report was transmitted to the Government of East Punjab. On 11 February 1952, the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, furnished a copy of the report to the appellant and informed him that, after careful consideration of the report and especially of the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Commissioner on each charge, the President of India deemed the appellant “unsuitable to continue” in Government service. Accordingly, the President provisionally decided that the appellant should be dismissed from Government service. The Secretary further conveyed that, before the President took final action, the appellant would be given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed dismissal and that any representation made by the appellant would be considered by the President. The appellant was directed to submit his written representation within twenty‑one days of receiving the letter. On 7 May 1952, the appellant filed a detailed statement comprising 321 printed pages.

Subsequently, the President consulted the Union Public Service Commission and, by an order dated 27 July 1953, dismissed the appellant with immediate effect. The appellant challenged the President’s order by filing a petition in the East Punjab High Court seeking a writ under article 226 of the Constitution. The petition prayed for a writ quashing the enquiry proceedings and the Enquiry Commissioner’s report, as well as a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate order directing the Union of India to reinstate the appellant in the Indian Civil Service from the date of his suspension. By separate but concurring judgments, Chief Justice Bhandari and Justice Khosla of the East Punjab High Court dismissed the petition.

In response to the order dismissing the appellant, an appeal was lodged on the basis of a certificate of fitness issued by the High Court. Counsel for the appellant argued that the dismissal order should be set aside because the Enquiry Commissioner had acted without jurisdiction and had breached the principles of natural justice. The counsel presented several specific grounds. First, the enquiry could not be directed by the Punjab Government because the appellant was a member of the Indian Civil Service and not an employee of the Government of Punjab. Second, even if the Punjab Government could direct an enquiry, it could not be conducted under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850; instead, it should have been held pursuant to rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, and because the enquiry was not conducted under that rule, the resulting order lacked jurisdiction. Third, the enquiry conducted under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, was claimed to violate the equal‑protection clause of the Constitution and was therefore void. Fourth, the Enquiry Commissioner was said to have acted contrary to natural‑justice requirements by denying the appellant a sufficient opportunity to examine witnesses and to adduce documentary evidence in support of his case. The appellant also challenged the President’s dismissal order on the contention that the President had not directed a viva voce examination of the witnesses whose statements had been recorded by the Enquiry Commissioner, and had not offered the appellant a chance to make an oral submission concerning the evidence, especially his defence. Consequently, the appellant asserted that he had been deprived of a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action.

The appellant had been admitted to the civil service under a covenant with the Secretary of State for India, and the special method of his recruitment did not justify the conclusion that he was not employed by the Government of East Punjab at the relevant time. Sub‑section 2 of section 10 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that any person appointed by the Secretary of State to the Crown civil service in India who continued to serve on or after the appointed day under the Government of the Dominion of India, or any province or part thereof, was entitled to the same conditions of service with respect to remuneration, leave, pension, disciplinary matters and tenure of office. Similarly, sub‑section 2 of section 240 of the Government of India Act, as amended, states that a person appointed by the Secretary of State who remained in the establishment of the Dominion of India continued to hold his position under the appropriate governmental authority. These provisions therefore established that the appellant’s service was deemed to be under the Government of East Punjab for the purposes of the dismissal proceedings.

The Court observed that a civil servant was not subject to dismissal by any authority below the Governor General or Governor when the servant was engaged in the affairs of the Dominion or a Province. The Court then stated that, since India became a Republic, Article 310(1) of the Constitution provides that a member of a Union civil service or an all‑India service holds office at the pleasure of the President. The Court further observed that any person who holds a civil post under the Union is likewise appointed during the President’s pleasure. The Court explained that the power to dismiss a Union or all‑India civil servant cannot be equated with the statutory authority given to a State to order an enquiry into alleged misdemeanour. Section 2 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, provides that the Government may initiate a formal public inquiry. It may do so when it believes there are good grounds to examine an imputation of misbehaviour against a person whose appointment cannot be terminated without the Government’s sanction. The Court noted that section 23 of the same Act defines “Government” to mean the Central Government for persons employed by it and the State Government for persons employed by a State. The Court observed that at the time the enquiry was ordered, the appellant was employed by the Government of East Punjab, and that nothing in the Constitution removed the State’s power to direct an enquiry under section 2 of the Act.

The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, does not apply to enquiries against members of the Indian Civil Service. It held that the submission was without force because the Act was expressly enacted to regulate inquiries into the conduct of public servants who cannot be removed from their appointment without the Government’s sanction. The Court acknowledged that the appellant had entered service under a covenant with the Secretary of State for India in Council. However, the Court noted that since the commencement of the Constitution of India, the Secretary of State no longer possessed authority over the employment or dismissal of public servants serving in the Union civil service or the Indian Civil Service. Consequently, members of the Indian Civil Service who continue to serve in India hold office at the pleasure of the President and may be dismissed by the President. The Court explained that the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, is intended to regulate investigations into the behaviour of senior public servants whose appointment is not removable without the Government’s sanction. It further clarified that enquiries into the conduct of members of subordinate services, who are appointed and may be dismissed by authorities subordinate to the Government, fall outside the scope of the Act.

The Court observed that the members of the Indian Civil Service cannot be said to be employees of the President merely because they hold office during the President’s pleasure since the Constitution came into force. They continue to be regarded as employees of the Union or of the particular State in which they are appointed. Under the Constitution, the executive authority of the Union is vested in the President, and it is in the exercise of that executive authority that the President may lawfully terminate the appointment of a civil servant who belongs either to the Union civil service or to an all‑India service. Consequently, members of the Indian Civil Service are not exempt from dismissal without the Government’s sanction, and they are not placed outside the scope of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850.

Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules was then set out. The rule declares, “Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of a Service (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal court or by a Court Martial) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so direct, an oral inquiry shall be held. At that inquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person charged shall be entitled to cross‑examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may, for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. This rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. All or any of the provisions of the rule, may in exceptional cases, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, be waived, where there is a difficulty in observing exactly the requirements of the rule and those requirements can be waived without injustice to the person.”

The Court noted that the appellant relied on Rule 55 and contended that, according to that rule, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a member of the Indian Civil Service could be issued unless an inquiry was conducted in the manner prescribed by the rule. The Court observed, however, that the rule expressly states that the inquiry contemplated “without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850.” This phrase, the Court explained, means that a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank may not be effected without an inquiry either under the procedure laid down in the 1850 Act or under the procedure set out in Rule 55 itself. Consequently, the rule does not support the appellant’s proposition that, even if an inquiry is held under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, a separate inquiry expressly under Rule 55 must also be undertaken before any adverse order is passed. The Court further held that the appellant’s argument proceeded on an unwarranted assumption: the expression “without prejudice” in the rule was not intended to convey the meaning of “notwithstanding.”

The Court then referred to the observations made in S. A. Venkataraman v. Union of India and Another ([1954] S.C.R. 1150), wherein Justice Mukherjea, delivering the judgment, explained that Rule 55, which appears in the same chapter, prescribes the procedure to be followed before any order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank may be issued against a servant. He clarified that no such order shall be made unless the person concerned receives a written notice of the grounds for the proposed action and is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. An inquiry must be conducted concerning the servant’s conduct, and that inquiry may be carried out either in accordance with the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, or in a less formal and less public manner as provided for by the rule itself. The Court indicated that these pronouncements dispel any doubt as to the true meaning of the opening clause of the rule.

The Court then addressed the substantive question raised by the appellant: whether conducting an inquiry against a public servant under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, infringes the equal‑protection clause of the Constitution. The appellant contended that the Government possesses authority to direct an inquiry in either of two alternative modes, and that directing an inquiry under the 1850 Act, which contains more stringent provisions, while directing another similarly situated servant to an inquiry under Rule 55, violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court noted that Article 311(2) of the Constitution guarantees that a public servant charged with misconduct shall not be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank unless he is given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. The Court indicated that the content of this guarantee has been explained in jurisprudence.

The Court referred to the decision in Khem Chand v. Union of India and Others (1958) 1 S.C.R. 1080 at pages 1096‑97, where it observed that the phrase “reasonable opportunity” contained in the provision means that the servant must be given (a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which can be exercised only if he is told precisely what charges are brought against him and the facts on which those charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross‑examining the witnesses produced against him and by calling his own witnesses or examining himself in support of his defence; and (c) an opportunity to make a representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted, which he can do only after the inquiry is concluded, the competent authority has considered the gravity of the proven charges, tentatively decides which of the three punishments authorized by law should be imposed, and communicates that tentative decision to the servant. By the Constitution, public servants who are not members of the Indian Civil Service and who are charged with a misdemeanor are guaranteed a fair inquiry; this guarantee requires that the servant be afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself by showing that the evidence on which the charges rest is false or unreliable and by presenting his own evidence and witnesses, and also that he be given a chance to show cause against any punishment proposed. The Constitution, however, does not obligate that an inquiry be conducted under any particular statutory power or administrative rule. The guarantee that applies to members of the Indian Civil Service is slightly different. Article 314 provides that a public servant who was appointed by the Secretary of State to a civil service of the Crown in India continues, unless the Constitution expressly provides otherwise after it came into force, to serve under the Government of India or a State on the same conditions of service with respect to remuneration, leave, pension and disciplinary matters as he enjoyed immediately before the Constitution. Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which was in force before the Constitution, required that no order of dismissal or removal could be passed except following an inquiry, and by virtue of Article 314 the same disciplinary rights that existed before the Constitution are guaranteed to civil servants appointed by the Secretary of State. Consequently, a member of the Indian Civil Service, before any disciplinary action is taken against him, is entitled by the constitutional guarantees to an inquiry into his alleged misconduct, either under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act or under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules.

At the time the Constitution came into force, the guarantee of an enquiry could be carried out under either of two alternative powers, and the Court held that the use of either power was not, on its face, illegal. The Court then explained in detail the procedure that applied when an enquiry was conducted under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850. Under that Act the Enquiry Commissioner had to give the accused a copy of the charge sheet together with a list of the documents and the names of the witnesses that would be used to support the charge, and this had to be done at least three days before the enquiry began. Section eleven required the prosecutor to read out the articles of charge, after which the accused had to plead either guilty or not guilty to each charge. The plea had to be recorded, and if the accused either refused to plead or, without a reasonable excuse, failed to appear to answer the charge either himself or through counsel or an authorised agent, the law deemed that he admitted the truth of the articles of charge. Sections thirteen, fourteen, fifteen and sixteen laid down the precise order in which witnesses were to be examined. Section eighteen specified how the Commissioner should keep notes of oral evidence. Section nineteen gave the prosecutor a further opportunity, after the accused had completed his defence, to make a general oral reply on the whole case and to present evidence that contradicted any evidence offered in defence; however, the accused was not entitled to an adjournment of the proceedings even if the new evidence had not been listed in the material supplied to him earlier. Section twenty authorised the Enquiry Commissioner to amend the charge where necessary. The Court observed that this statutory procedure was markedly more detailed than the procedure laid down in rule fifty‑five of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Under rule fifty‑five, the grounds for any proposed action against a public servant had to be reduced to a definite charge and communicated to him together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge was based and any other circumstances that might be taken into account in passing a final order. The public servant was to be given reasonable time to submit a written statement of his defence and to indicate whether he wished to be heard in person. If he so desired, or if the authority directed, an oral enquiry had to be held. At such an oral enquiry the public servant was allowed to cross‑examine the prosecution witnesses, to give his own evidence in person and to examine his own witnesses. The Court noted that the detailed provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 were drafted in such a comprehensive manner because, at the time of its enactment, there was no codified law of evidence in force. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that, despite the greater detail in the Act, the substantive content of the procedure under the Act and the procedure required by rule fifty‑five were not materially different.

Rule 55 and the provisions of Act XXXVII of 1850 are, in substance, not materially different. Under either procedure the public servant who is the subject of an enquiry must receive notice of the charges against him, and he must be supplied with the material on which the charge is sought to be sustained. If the public servant wishes, he may request an oral hearing at which the prosecution witnesses and his own witnesses may be examined. The counsel for the appellant argued that the procedure established by the Act is more onerous for the public servant in two important respects. First, section 11 of Act XXXVII of 1850 provides that if the accused refuses or, without reasonable cause, neglects to appear to answer the charge, the accused shall be taken to admit the truth of the articles of charge; no comparable provision exists in Rule 55. Second, section 19 of the Act permits the prosecutor, even after the defence evidence is closed, to exhibit evidence that contradicts the defence evidence, and the Commissioner is not bound to adjourn the proceeding even though the new evidence was not listed in the material furnished to the accused; again, no such provision appears in Rule 55. The Court observed that although the procedure under Rule 55 may be somewhat more flexible, the provisions that the appellant relied upon as discriminatory are also implicit in Rule 55. If the public servant does not desire an oral enquiry, the authority is under no obligation to hold one. Likewise, the rule does not prevent the authority from presenting prosecutorial evidence after the defence case is closed when that evidence is intended to contradict the public servant’s evidence.

The principal constitutional guarantee afforded to a member of the Indian Civil Service is a reasonable opportunity to be heard in an enquiry conducted under either the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act or Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules. Discrimination does not arise merely because one of the two alternative sources of authority is invoked, unless it can be shown that the adopted procedure operated to the prejudice of the public servant. In the present case, the enquiry held against the appellant was not conducted in a manner different from the manner permissible under Rule 55. Consequently, on a plea of inequality before the law, the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Commissioner cannot be declared void merely because it was not conducted in the exact manner the appellant suggested. The Court therefore proceeded to consider the appellant’s contention that the Enquiry Commissioner conducted the enquiry in violation of the rules of natural justice.

His Lordship, after examining the material presented in support of the plea, concurred with the High Court’s assessment that the enquiry was not invalidated by any breach of the rules of natural justice. The Court noted that the President of India was under no obligation to hear live testimony from witnesses before issuing an order dismissing the appellant; the President could base his decision on the evidence that had already been recorded by the Enquiry Commissioner. Article 311 of the Constitution guarantees a public servant the right to show cause against any proposed action, yet the authority to pass an order adverse to a public servant is not contingent upon conducting a fresh viva‑voce inquiry, even when a prior fair and comprehensive enquiry before the Enquiry Commissioner has taken place. In the precedent The High Commissioner for India and Another v. I. M. Lal (75 L.A. 225), dealing with section 240, clause 3, Lord Thankerton addressed similar arguments and observed: “In the opinion of their Lordships, no action is proposed within the meaning of the sub‑section until a definite conclusion has been come to on the charges and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on. Prior to that stage, the charges are unproved and the suggested punishments are merely hypothetical. It is on that stage being reached that the statue gives the civil servant the opportunity for which sub‑section (3) makes provision. Their Lordships would only add that they see no difficulty in the statutory opportunity being reasonably afforded at more than one stage. If the civil servant had been through an inquiry under rule 55, it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out; but that would not exhaust his statutory right, and he would still be entitled to represent against the punishment proposed as the result of the findings of the inquiry.” This principle was later affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kemi Chand v. Union of India and Others ([1958] S.C.R. 1080), where Chief Justice S. R. Das, at page 1099, stated: “Of course if the government servant has been through the enquiry under r. 55, it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out.” The Court further explained that while the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to show cause, such an opportunity must be reasonable and its reasonableness is judged according to the facts of each case. In the present matter, the enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Commissioner, who was the Chief Justice of the East Punjab High Court. The appellant himself examined eighty‑two witnesses, produced an extensive collection of documentary material, and submitted a comprehensive defence spanning three hundred and twenty‑one printed pages, thereby demonstrating that a substantial and fair opportunity to be heard had already been afforded.

The Court examined whether the Constitution, in Article 311, obliges the President to provide an oral hearing as an essential part of the opportunity for a public servant to show cause. In its view, the Constitution does not require that a person be allowed to make an oral representation in order to satisfy the requirement of an opportunity to show cause. Consequently, the argument raised by the appellant – that he had been denied the protection of Article 311 because the President did not grant him an oral hearing – could not be sustained. The Court therefore concluded that the appellant’s claim of a constitutional violation was untenable. As a result of this conclusion, the Court held that the appeal failed. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. The final disposition was that the appeal was dismissed.